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Abstract
This thesis examines practices of dispute resolution and conceptions of justice 
internal to China, in order to understand the potential role of rights in the Chinese 
legal system. While rights assertion, defence and protection can only occur 
alongside dispute resolution practices already entrenched in China, they could 
also transform these Chinese practices, by encouraging a more tolerant attitude to 
public disagreement in dispute resolution.
A tradition of authoritarian supervision and control of officials is currently 
weakening the ability of Chinese courts to protect rights and to conduct 
principled argument about justice. Chinese culture has partly accommodated this 
supervisionist tradition by the practices of remonstration with government, and 
mediation of civil and other disputes. But these latter practices also support 
attitudes opposing injustice and unjustified rule. It is argued that rights-assertive 
and empathetic attitudes are consistent and fundamentally connected. It may be 
right not to insist on what is due to oneself, and to seek conciliation. Yet when 
rights are asserted, they must be taken seriously. To take them seriously, 
sustained public disagreement about law and justice must be allowed.
As Chinese people are now increasingly rights-assertive, courts more often 
oppose the supervisionist tradition, by engaging in controversial legal argument 
and occasionally by adjudicating on the basis of constitutional rights and 
principles. This could help to correct some of the injustices done to the large and 
growing Chinese underclass, especially as remonstration mechanisms are failing.
The Chinese example supports the conclusion that legal systems in 
transition are not best served by a ‘thin’ version of rule of law, but instead need a 
strong constitutional legal practice. This illustrates that law should not be defined 
by its claim to authority but by its function to serve justice.
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Chapter One Introduction: the weak Chinese legal system
Justice. This thesis offers a critical perspective on some prevalent attitudes 
toward legal development in contemporary China. Addressing Chinese 
academics and practitioners of law as well as jurists and sinologists, it is also a 
discussion of the status and nature of rights in a legal culture in transition.
We cannot truly understand the Chinese legal system unless we measure it 
by the most important aspiration of any legal system, justice, and try to 
understand the perspective of insiders to the system. This makes it important to 
identify some injustices that happen in China to date, and to understand people's 
reactions to these. We also need to respond to the fact that there is widespread 
disagreement about what justice requires, in China as well as outside China.1 
Over the past two decades, the idea of having legal rights protected by courts has 
been introduced into many ordinary Chinese people’s lives as a novel idea, while 
many traditional ideas and attitudes remain important. Present injustices - for 
instance, the deprivation of farmers and migrants to the cities and of urban 
residents in redeveloping areas, state torture, persecution because of political or 
religious beliefs -  as well as reactions to such injustices provide ample material 
for study.
So far as ordinary Chinese people are concerned, competing and sometimes 
conflicting conceptions of justice, law and good government translate into a mix 
of different and sometimes incoherent expectations from the administration of 
justice -  from government, including the police and procuracies and the courts,
1 Practices aimed at justice must take people’s different but reasonable expectations into account, 
for the simple reason that this is fair and therefore part of being just. One of the most famous 
recent accounts of fairness as an aspect of justice is Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge,
6
but also from the newly emerging professional class of lawyers. Conflicting 
attitudes are also evident from the rules intended to organise and give meaning to 
legal institutions. They are evident from what the law says, and from what legal 
professionals do. To give one example, Chinese law tells courts to judge 
independently on the one hand,2 but it stifles judicial independence in many 
ways, on the other; not just because of corruption or because the government 
does not dare to give independence to judges, but because of a deep conviction 
held and acted on by many, that control of judges and control over judicial 
decisions are necessary to ensure the right judicial decisions. Chinese law 
contains many legal rules and practices inspired by this conviction. The conflicts 
just mentioned are so entrenched that some of the institutions we have to study, 
many of their practices and rules, do not make coherent sense. The stronger the 
opposed convictions that support judicial supervision and judicial independence, 
the weaker the integrity of the Chinese legal system. A just and better legal 
system would have to show a greater measure of coherence.
There are now several relatively recent systematic accounts of 
contemporary Chinese law in Western languages, which describe legal 
institutions, providing information and comment on their functions. Among 
these, the earlier works take a functional approach very much oriented toward a 
Western, for instance, an American model of a legal system. They might criticise, 
for example, the lack of political power distributions characteristic of Western 
political orders without really arguing in depth why such distributions were 
required. A typical example for this is Lubman’s characterisation of Chinese
Massachusetts: 1971). For a discussion of semantic convention, see Stavropoulos, ‘Hart’s 
Semantics’, in Coleman, Jules (editor), Hart’s Postscript (Oxford: 2001).
2 See, for instance, Article 126 of the Constitution.
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legal practices as ‘law as administration':3 although he does not very explicitly 
argue for separation of powers in China,4 the implication of what he says is that 
judicial, legislative and administrative (executive) powers should be separated in 
a good political and legal order, which is why something is wrong, or at least odd, 
with ‘law as administration'.
Other, more recent accounts have reacted to such implicit assumptions by 
proposing that the ‘Ideal Western Legal Order’ (abbreviated ‘IWLO’), or that 
liberal democracy was not ‘necessarily’ the right model for China.5 This was an 
appropriate criticism. But then the next step in this argument should have been 
taken: we should have been told what was wrong with the ‘Ideal Western Legal 
Order’ model in China, and this account would have given some normative -  that 
is, action-directing -  guidance as to what model should replace it. Instead 
Western legal research on China went largely into retreat from evaluation. 
Cautions against the use of ‘IWLO’ were sometimes supported by references to a 
branch of legal philosophy, whose aim has been generally to minimise the 
evaluative components of their descriptions of legal concepts.6 From a positivist 
as well as from a relativist point of view, it seemed better not to address the 
simplistic question of whether a foreign legal system was good at delivering 
justice. ‘Rule of law’ could be dissociated from justice, and not to dissociate it 
made you look naive or unprofessional, because justice is such a notoriously 
controversial idea.7
3 A chapter heading in Bird in a Cage (Stanford: 1999).
4 Lubman also says that it would be wrong to speak of a Chinese legal ‘system’ as such.
5 Clarke, ‘When is a Riddle Just a Mistake’, in Hsu Stephen (editor) Understanding China’s 
Legal System. Essays in Honour ofJ.A. Cohen (New York: 2003).
6 Most notably, of the concept of a legal system itself. Raz, The Concept o f a Legal System - An 
Introduction to the Theory o f a Legal System (2nd edition, Oxford: 1980).
7 ‘PRC legal scholars often go beyond claiming that rule of law requires good laws to asserting 
that rule of law entails justice for all (...) Dong Yuyu, for instance, argues that ruling the country 
in accordance with law (yifa zhiguo) is not the same as rule of law (fazhi) (...) He believes that
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‘Although justice is a popular requirement for rule of law, there is little 
agreement over what justice is. Liberals, Socialists, Communitarians, 
Neoauthoritarians, Soft authoritarians. New Conservatives, Old 
Conservatives, Buddhists, Daoists, Neo-Confucians, and New Confucians 
all differ on what is considered just, and hence what rule of law requires. 
By incorporating particular conceptions of the economy, political order, 
or human rights into rule of law, thick conceptions decrease the 
likelihood that a consensus will emerge as to its meaning. Indeed, one of 
the reasons for limiting the concept of the rule of law to the requirements 
of a thin theory is to avoid getting mired in never-ending debates about 
the superiority of the various political theories all contending for the 
throne of justice.’8
This presupposes that some shared views or, to use the Rawlsian phrase referred 
to by Peerenboom, some ‘overlapping consensus’,9 are preconditions of shared 
practices, such as legal practices. It appears at best like a negligent 
misunderstanding, and at worst like a ‘liberal’ imposition to go beyond what 
could be expected to be agreed and suggest, for instance, that Chinese courts of 
law should be there to protect rights the way they do in our systems, by using 
independent judgement and the power to coerce. Rather it is assumed that we 
should mainly observe how practices are developing, and might at best attempt 
predictions.10
To some it seemed problematic even to discuss China’s legal institutions as 
such: as ‘legal institutions’, especially if one was not happy to use ‘thin’ legal
rule of law requires more - specifically, rule of law entails peace, order, freedom, and justice.’ 
This passage immediately precedes the passage quoted in the main text, in China's Long March 
Toward Rule o f Law (Cambridge: 2002), at p. 70. See also Peerenboom, ‘Let One Hundred 
Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China’, 2002 Michigan 
Journal o f International Law Vol. 23, 1, at p. 60.
8 Peerenboom, ibid. Further support for the relegation of justice to ‘thrones’ in airy theory seemed 
to come from the fact of increasingly hypocritical claims of allegiance to communism as a moral 
and political theory in China, as well as from the Marxist notion of ideology, with its connotation 
of ‘false consciousness’ created by the ruling social class.
9 Rawls, John, ‘The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus’, 1987 Oxford Journal for Legal Studies 1.
10 This is the approach apparently taken by Pitman B. Potter in his The Chinese Legal System: 
Globalisation and local legal culture (London, New York: 2001). See for instance at pp. 14 f.
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concepts, as Peerenboom does. To quote from Clarke's cautious discussion of the 
permissibility of using ‘IWLO’, as an example of the ‘at best’ version:
‘The first assumption is that China has legal institutions. In other words 
the IWLO [Ideal Western Legal Order] approach assumes that (...) China 
has a set of institutions that can meaningfully be grouped together under a 
single rubric (...) More specifically, the very act of naming institutions 
involves drawing conclusions about them before the investigation has 
even begun. If we call an institution a court, then we are claiming that this 
word conveys to the listener a more complete and accurate picture than 
some other word. We could equally well call the institution a “team’' or 
an “office” or a “bureau”; the decision not to use those words represents 
an implicit assertion about the nature of the institution in question. The 
problem is that this assertion precedes, rather than follows, an inquiry 
into the nature of the institution.'
(...) It is often said that Chinese judges lack judicial independence. 
The perception of this lack stems from an interpretation of the institution 
of Chinese courts and judges that sees them as embryonic courts and 
judges in ideal Western legal order.’11
From this perspective, it can also appear ‘ethnocentristic’ to characterise the 
Chinese Constitution -  or xianfa - as a document whose central principles must 
not be violated by any state institution.12 No argument appears to remain, then, to 
support the claim that judges must respect the Constitution, for instance by 
refusing to apply laws that violate it or by handling cases in which claims are 
based solely on rights guaranteed by the constitution.13 Controversial claims that 
the constitution should be accorded more respect in Chinese legal practice are
where he makes predictive statements about the effects of ‘globalized’ legal norms ‘borrowed 
from abroad’ on ‘local legal culture.’
11 Clarke, ‘When is a Riddle Just a Mistake’, in Hsu (editor) Understanding China’s Legal 
System. Essays in Honour o f J.A. Cohen (New York: 2003), pp. 8 f.
12 The characters for xianfa are . Recently, the Chinese constitution has been amended to 
enshrine respect and protection of human rights by the state as a principle, but this does not settle 
the dispute I am describing in the main text.
13 From this perspective, too, it must appear that description is a more challenging, more intricate, 
perhaps even more honourable task than ‘mere’ evaluation. This is apparently Clarke’s 
conclusion at the end of the essay I just quoted from.
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therefore - unhelpfully - reduced to a mere report that some people want this to 
happen, while others do not.14
Important and genuine as the concerns raised here are. we should be careful 
not to misunderstand what it means to be in substantive disagreement about 
concepts such as ‘court' and ‘Constitution’. It is therefore necessary to look more 
closely at Clarke’s argument about the use of ‘court’ and ‘legal system’ and 
‘Constitution’. To persuade us that particular risks of imposing our ideals attach 
to talking about Chinese ‘courts’, etc, Clarke also asks us to imagine that instead 
of thinking of shenpanyuan as ‘adjudication officers’ -  this is the standard 
translation for shenpanyuan -,15 we try out thinking of them as ‘baseball players’. 
He points out that if we did, we would note very different deficiencies in 
shenpanyuan, than we would when thinking of them as judges. Thinking of them 
as judges we will complain, for instance, about shenpanyuan’s lack of 
independence, but if we thought of them as baseball players we might be more 
concerned with their physical strength, their ability to play in a team and so on.
The thrust of Clarke’s argument here is relativist. He rightly observes that 
the ideas of judges, courts and constitution connote ideas about what such 
institutions should be like and what relationships should obtain among them, and 
he observes, too, that there is a particular history of the use of these concepts in 
our societies. The point of the example of different references for shenpanyuan is 
not about correctly translating this term; it is that by using the same concepts 
with reference to foreign institutions that have foreign names, in foreign cultures, 
we distort our understanding of what these institutions really are. Therefore, in
14 Clarke, ibid. p. 20.
15 The standard translation for ‘judge’ is faguan (ji'g '). A faguan is also a shenpanyuan,
as is a People’s Juror (A K ;P n^w ).
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Clarke’s view, it might be appropriately sensitive to cultural difference, say, to 
speak of Chinese fayuan16 as offices or bureaus of some sort, rather than as 
courts, because ‘court’ has so many culturally specific connotations.
But note an important difference in possible disagreements about the use of 
these words or concepts: if you complained about the average Chinese 
shenpanyuan's lack of baseball potential due to (say) his modest average height I 
would disagree with you, but I would probably not be induced to engage in any 
serious argument with you. I would consider you simply to have misunderstood 
‘shenpanyuan’. 17 By contrast, serious and significant argument about what 
shenpanyuan or judges should be like could not possibly be settled by pointing 
out linguistic or semantic mistakes or failures to observe linguistic conventions. 
The question what the purpose of courts and judges is in China, is not settled by 
the way we happen to use Chinese language. It would also be ridiculous to claim 
that judges were just, for instance, only because they were called Justices in some 
places.18 Almost anything beyond the reassuringly common understanding19 that 
we do not generally call judges ‘baseball players’, will have to be argued for, and 
may be essentially contested.20 Indeed, many of the aspects we now value about 
the institutions of courts and judges and constitutions in our countries have had 
to be fought about over centuries, before they could become realities (think of the
16
171 would be almost as little prepared to discuss with you, as 1 would to explain to you why 
judges were not fish. This is a straightforward linguistic or semantic problem, but not specifically 
a problem about translation from one language into another or of cross-cultural use of concepts. 
Dworkin has described this problem in his so-called semantic sting argument in Law’s Empire 
(Harvard: 1986).
18 Guest, ‘Why The Law Is Just’, (2000) Current Legal Problems 31-52.
19 Stavropoulos challenges the idea that there is anything about the meaning of concepts that 
could not be challenged in a substantive way, in Objectivity in Law (Oxford: 1998).
201 am here restating an argument set out by Gallie in ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, 86 
Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society 1955-56, 167, and used by Hart in The Concept o f Law 
(Oxford: 1961), Rawls in A Theory o f Justice (Harvard: 1971), and Dworkin in Law’s Empire
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abolition of in camera court procedures, for instance). But the radical changes 
these institutions underwent did not generally prompt us to invent new words for 
them, as we continued speaking of ‘courts’ and of ‘judges'.
So there is nothing that should embarrass us, as serious and conscientious 
observers, about calling Chinese fayuan ‘courts', speaking of the xianfa as ‘the 
Constitution', and so on. Using these words could not possibly release us from 
the obligation to spell out what such institutions should be like, or why they are 
not as good as they could be, in a particular context. Conversely, it is not 
necessary to regard preferences voiced within China for greater respect for the 
xianfa, or for the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter, 
‘ICCPR’) - another example used by Clarke - as though they were a matter of a 
kind of moral taste, like colour taste; or a matter of fashion or popular whim. Of 
course, ‘wanting’ constitutional principles to be respected and applied by courts 
is wanting something for a reason, and is open to discussion in a way tastes are 
not.
Once we allow ourselves to engage in an argument about what many 
people rightly value most about their legal institutions -  namely, their aspiration 
to deliver justice -  a discussion of such institutions as the Chinese constitution 
and courts can come alive. Many positions can indeed be taken in this argument; 
one important one among them is a legal positivist one.21 Among the many 
questions to be addressed are the questions how personal conviction about what 
justice requires should influence a judge’s decision, whether the law to be
(Harvard: 1986), to support their use of the ideas of concepts of which there can be a number of 
conceptions.
21 Compare Waldron’s ‘Normative (or Ethical) Positivism’ and Perry, Stephen, ‘Hart’s 
Methodological Positivism’ both in Coleman, Jules (editor), Hart’s Postscript (Oxford: 2001) at 
pp. 410 and 311 respectively.
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applied by judges should be determined by social sources, whether law has moral 
merit just by virtue of being law, being legally valid; and so on.22
Engaging in these arguments means doing more justice to many individuals 
caught up in China’s legal practices and institutions, most notably many of its 
government and party officials. Being a Chinese judge, or a Chinese police 
officer or procurator, or even a Chinese law teacher, it seems difficult to avoid 
some degree of implication in injustice, even with the best intentions. There are 
bad, and even grossly unjust, laws to uphold or apply or teach to students; there 
are lines of argument not to be crossed if one wants to keep one’s job. People 
directly challenged by a weak and erratic system, people who strive for its 
improvement and for the preservation of their personal integrity, who engage in 
often passionate discussion about how to improve, and devote their lives to this 
ambition, deserve respect. Little respect would be shown to them by relegating 
justice to an area of seemingly pointless disagreement with which foreign legal 
experts could have nothing to do.23
It is of course difficult to engage in this way; it is difficult even to begin 
describing what people’s attitudes to injustice and conceptions of justice are. Yet 
the point of description is not -  could not be - to provide an account reporting as 
many personal viewpoints as possible, or an account to which any significant 
number of people would assent, or which represented consented, shared views of 
any significant number of people. It has to be to indicate positions and concerns
22 These are all questions discussed in the context of legal positivism. See Dyzenhaus, ‘The 
Genealogy of Legal Positivism’, 24 (2004) Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies, 39, for an account 
that distinguishes and relates them to each other.
23 As Peerenboom does, apparently. ‘(...) In their reporting, Western journalists often impose 
their own values, and are quick to assume that actions not in accord with their values are 
tantamount of violations of international human rights law. Although violations of international 
human rights law and China’s own domestic laws are occurring with troubling frequency, 
international human rights law is much less definitive on many important issues than is generally
14
relevant to a discussion, in order to be able to engage in it. In this attempt, one 
may look at institutions and practices and theories, prepared not to find a 
coherent and impersonal conception of law, rule of law, or justice ‘behind them’, 
but rather expressions of differences and disagreement.
History. It is also necessary to be aware of China’s history of philosophical and 
jurisprudential, debate, which includes a debate of rights.24 Both China’s more 
ancient and its more recent history are full of highly controversial discussions 
about what matters most to justice and good government, and it appears that 
actual legal institutions in Chinese history, such as the practice of the yamen 
magistrate or the practice of the imperial compilers of case notes to the imperial 
codes, have been focal points of disagreement among Chinese people throughout 
their history. It is hardly possible in this context to identify any particular theory 
or school of thought as ‘the official one’. Precisely the fact that this is so 
frequently attempted with Confucianism in China may be due to the peculiar 
preoccupation of Western legal scholarship with identifying what is perceived to 
be authoritative theories. What matters more than authoritative endorsement, at 
least for the purposes of the present discussion, is what ideas and lines of 
argument in Chinese cultures have remained forceful and are still used to justify 
legal practices.25 Forceful new ideas and arguments, such as that of rights
assumed by non-lawyers.’ Peerenboom, Introduction to China’s Long March Toward the Rule o f 
Law and http://www.intemational.ucla.edu/asia/article.asp?.
24 To be important, rights do not need to have been recognised by any number of people or over 
any stretch of time. But for an account of the now over a century old history of human rights 
debate among Chinese intellectuals and academics, see Marina Svensson’s recent book Debating 
Human Rights in China: A Conceptual and Political History (Lanham and Oxford: 2002).
25 In a way also much oriented toward authoritative endorsement, a sort of official synthesis of 
Confucianism and Chinese Legalism is often supposed to have taken place. The rough date for 
this synthesis is the beginning of the second Han period, the first and second centuries. This 
period came after a brief period of explicit imperial endorsement of Legalism by Qin Shi Huang
15
protected by courts, have produced conflict but also the possibility of new debate 
about justice and law.
This thesis considers such contemporary debates, and there is one 
'traditional' idea which is particularly important to the argument advanced here. 
A central idea of Kongzi, Confucius,26 and one that has remained important in 
China, is that one must show regard for other people, especially by not insisting 
too much on what is due from them to oneself. One must be prepared to give way, 
and to settle matters amicably. As ‘what is due to oneself is perhaps one of the 
most general and pertinent ways of expressing claims based on justice,27 this is 
important to everything else that can be said about justice in Chinese societies. It 
does not at all mean that the idea of what was due to oneself and others did not 
play an important role. How could it possibly not be important? Indeed, many 
historiographs of ‘Confucianism’ have also emphasised the importance of giving 
each what is due to them according to their respective position towards oneself. 
Kongzi's moral philosophy can perhaps be used to support a general precept not 
to force moral demands upon one another, by using the -  justified, but coercive 
and hence potentially violent -  mechanisms provided by imperial (governmental) 
legal institutions.
A tension between the imperative requirement of doing justice and the 
more persuasive requirement of yielding is reflected, I think, in many
Di, the first emperor to unite China, and was characterised by explicit endorsement of 
Confucianism, but implicit acceptance of many Legalist thoughts.
26 Kong Qiu, or Kong Zi, Kong Fu Zi, or Confucius (551-479 B.C). After him, the two most 
important Confucian scholars of the era before the first emperor (221 BC..), were Meng Zi 
(Mencius, 371? - 289? B.C.) and Xun Kuang (or Xun Qing or Xun Zi, probably 298-238 BC).
21 Zheng (IE), ‘uprightness, correctness’, yi (X),  ‘justice, righteousness’, and gong (X ), 
‘publicness’ are components of modem words for ‘justice’. ‘The idea of yi is rather formal, but 
that of Jen [ren, (Z] (human-heartedness) is much more concrete. The formal essence of the 
duties of man in society is their “oughtness” because all the duties are what he ought to do. But 
the material essence of these duties is “loving others”, i.e., yen or human-heartedness.’ Fung Yu- 
lan, A Short History o f Chinese Philosophy, edited by Bodde (New York: 1948), p. 42.
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contemporary discussions about the Chinese legal system.28 The connection 
between understanding what is due to oneself, and understanding how one should 
act towards others, is also of central importance to rights theories, as is discussed 
in Chapter Three.
These thoughts also matter to the image of ideal government as a caring 
institution, as well as to the traditional idea of magistrate courts iyamen). In the 
Confucian tradition, imperial magistrates were characterised as the father and 
mother official, or as the official close to the people. At the same time, the image 
of good government officials was influenced by the precepts of the most 
important ‘Legalist’, Han Feizi.29 One of his central thoughts, which occupies 
much of the discussion of later chapters, was that people should be governed 
indirectly through control of the officials,30 and that control must also be 
exercised by means of certain rules which particularly specified punishment, and 
which applied to all, fa ,31
28 This tension just mentioned not only led to numerous rules in magistrate legal practice, 
designed to deter people from litigation. Some of these were specifically directed at lawyers 
helping ordinary people to prepare claims before the magistrate; they could be punished if these 
claims turned out to be wrong. Throughout Imperial times, lawyers ( ‘litigation masters’, 
‘litigation tricksters’) were subjected to a lot of official as well as popular contempt and hostility. 
Macauley’s Social Power and Legal Culture. Litigation Masters in Late Imperial China 
(Stanford: 1992) gives a very detailed account.
29 Fajia or the ‘Law School’ or ‘School of Method’. Its most important representative was Han 
Fei (Han Fei Zi). who lived until 233 BC, and who was a disciple of Xun Zi.
30Ming zhu zhi ling bu zhi min ( ^ i j o $ ^ ? p K : ) .  Tan Shigui ( i¥ tttf t)  discusses this in Tan 
Shigui, Sifa Jubai fangzhi /im (*?])£/& H f c ), On the prevention of corruption in the 
administration o f justice (Beijing: 2003) at p. 4. Bodde and Morris discuss xingming ( M&) ,  
which they explain as the idea of [a correspondence between] performance and title -  and the 
consequent requirement for punishment when accomplishment falls short of (assigned, claimed) 
work. Bodde and Morris, Law in Imperial China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1967) p. 20.
31 Against the background of natural law and positivistic theories of law in Western cultures, one 
has often attempted to see Confucianism as presenting a rule of ‘rites’, or of mores, li, and to see 
Legalism as presenting an idea of rule by law, fa. Many moved from this insight to the claim that 
the Confucian idea of li was opposed to the idea of rights. See for instance Ames, ‘Rites as Rights: 
The Confucian Alternative’, in Rouner (editor), Human Rights and the World's Religions, ed. 
(Notre Dame: 1988), 199. But see also the more cautious account of li in Hall and Ames, ‘A 
Pragmatist Understanding of Confucian Democracy’, in Bell and Hahm Chaibong, Confucianism 
for the Modem World (Cambridge: 2003). I think this kind of juxtaposition is confusing, 
especially so far as it focuses on a supposedly fixed metaethical status of law and of rites or 
conventional morality, according to authorship (authority): to understand fa  as laws made by
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Western scholars researching Chinese law of the (late) imperial period in 
the 1960s therefore saw it primarily as criminal law,32 and this perhaps helped to 
explain why there was no perceived need for judicial independence in imperial 
China. The belief that Chinese imperial magistrate courts were centrally 
institutions for criminal punishment dominated the major account of Imperial 
Chinese law produced at that time.33 The state appeared reluctant to meddle in 
‘civil disputes', or where it did, it appeared that such ‘civil’ disputes tended to be 
converted into criminal matters by the substance as well as the procedures of 
imperial law. Many institutions within ‘society’ as juxtaposed with imperial 
government, such as clans and guilds, took care of resolving disputes in ways 
generally characterised as arbitration or mediation.34 It seemed very important 
that such organisations did not have the authority of imperial government, and 
consequently, what they did was sometimes also characterised as ‘informal’ law 
or as ‘social’ as opposed to ‘legal’ institutions.
More recent research has shown that imperial courts, despite the general 
emphasis on setdement, were involved to a much higher degree than previously
rulers appears simplistic, as appears the understanding that li as norms inherent to morality are 
somehow created by, or exist in virtue of, social, general acceptance. Kongzi’s idea of right 
conduct was also, for instance, expressed by being able to draw a parallel from oneself to others. 
Indeed the very objection of legalists against followers of Kongzi, that rule by li came down to 
rule by men, could be read as a restatement of the objection against understanding both fa  and li 
in a simplistic way, which I just mentioned.
32 It should be noted that many Chinese legal scholars concur in this view, for which there are of 
course many good reasons. To give an example of the pervasiveness of this perception, the 
constitutional legal scholar Cai Dingjian spoke of China’s having passed through a ‘criminal law 
stage’ of legal history, and its now entering a ‘constitutionalist stage’, in a speech entitled 
‘Constitutionalism in China’s Modern History, and China’s Constitutionalist Future (Zhongguo 
jindai de xianzheng he dangqian de xianzheng zhi lu, ^  on
30 July 2004; pertly reprinted in Li Yaqiong ‘China stands before a constitutionalist era
(Zhongguo zhanzai xianzheng jieduan menkou, ^  P  )’, Southern Metropo­
litan ( ), available at http://www.nanfangdailycom.cn/southnews/jwxy/2004
07310131.asp
33 This idea dominates Bodde’s and Morris’s account in Law in Imperial China (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: 1967), for instance.
34 For instance by Sybille van der Sprenkel in Legal Institutions in Manchu China: a Sociological 
Analysis (London: 1967).
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thought in the handling of ‘civil’ cases -  disputes among citizens themselves.35 
The largely customary rules governing land transactions, for instance (a highly 
important area of dispute given the importance of agriculture) had evolved under 
the influence of the imperial codes and the directives by imperial government. 
But the rules in the codes largely stated punishments for certain kinds of 
behaviour. Imperial government may not have been concerned with telling 
people, or perhaps even felt unable to tell people, what they owed each other, by 
means of the provisions of the imperial legal codes. But even so, of course, 
people can still have been owed certain things or forms of conduct, or might owe 
to others. The idea of yielding could not obliterate the idea of a certain conduct 
being due.36
Even if imperial government showed explicit concern mainly with 
stipulating punishments in the imperial codes, punishment and persuasion to 
yield must be seen as connected, as two ways of taking indirect influence to get a 
person to do what he ought to do. These ways of influencing another are 
particularly important against a background assumption that conduct owed by a 
person as a matter of (moral) duty ought to come from their free decision -  that it 
matters whether respect or caring, for instance, are practiced with real 
commitment, or genuineness, that could not be replaced by mere unwilling
35 Compare Philip Huang, Code, Custom, and Legal Practice in China: The Qing and the 
Republic Compared (Stanford: 2001), and Randle Edwards, ‘The Role of Case Precedent in the 
Qing Judicial Process As Reflected in Appelate Hearings’, in Understanding China’s Legal 
Svstem. Essays in Honour o f Jerome Cohen (New York: 2003), 180.
3 Perhaps one should also mention the importance of ‘not over-doing’, in this context. According 
to Fung (Feng) Yu-lan dao ( it) , the way, is based on a fundamental opposition of being and not 
being, and ‘among the laws that govern the change of things, the most fundamental one is that 
“when a thing reaches its extreme, it reverts from it.” Ibid. p. 97. This idea that “reversing is the 
movement of the dao” also explains the idea of wuwei (Jcf j ),  ‘non-activity’ or ‘not over-doing’. 
This may have an impact on the way in which social conflicts are treated by central government, 
as well as by the parties to disputes: as already expressed by the idea of xisong (H i£ ) and xi shi 
ning ren (.E ^ t' A), ‘letting matters rest and set people at peace’, there is a point in shifting the 
focus away from the seemingly main issue of a conflict. See also Chapter Four.
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obedience to commands.37 The fact that punishment and persuasion seem related 
as different ways of taking an influence on another’s mind should not prompt one 
too readily to assume that there was no tension between a ‘Legalist’ emphasis on 
punishment and ‘Confucian’ emphasis on persuasion and education. It is even 
more difficult to accept that the disagreements resulting from this tension could 
have been settled sometime in the first century.
The importance of imperial legal tradition for contemporary practice is 
now more emphasised by contemporary Chinese scholars. As communism loses 
its influence on Chinese society including academia, scholars will now make 
direct references to legal tradition, and explicitly advocate making use of
TOtraditional practices. An example particularly in point for this thesis is the way 
in which judges are subjected to control and supervision in order to prevent what 
is generally referred to as corruption. For instance, traditional techniques of 
grading, rewarding, disciplining and punishing play a central role in a recent 
work on the prevention of judicial corruption.40 Other academics write about
37 Fung (Feng) Yu-lan characterises the term which above I mentioned as one of those 
translatable as ‘justice’, namely yi ( SL),  as ‘social rightness’, and says it connotes that the right 
thing is done with a motivation or purpose to do the right thing. It is sometimes translated as 
‘righteousness’. Feng Yu-lan, ed. by Derk Bodde, A Short History o f Chinese Philosophy (New 
York: 1948), at p. 42: ‘. Righteousness (yi) means the “oughtness” of a situation. It is a 
categorical imperative. Everyone in society has certain things which he ought to do. If, however, 
he does them because of other non-moral considerations, then even though he does what he ought 
to do, his action is no longer a righteous one. To use a word often disparaged by Confucius and 
later Confucians, he is then acting for “profit”. Yi (righteousness) [JJC] and li (profit) [flj] are in 
Confucianism diametrically opposed terms...’ A common combination is yiwu, S L $ r , which 
translates as ‘duty’; further combinations of yiwu with other words bring out both aspects of yi as 
what ought to be done, and what is done freely because it ought to be done: e.g. ‘compulsory 
education’ and ‘volunteer service’.
38 Bodde and Morris note that by the time of the Tang Dynasty, the breach between Confucianism 
and Legalism had been ‘effectively closed.’ Ibid. p. 20.
39 A new ‘traditionalism’ could be said to have developed since the mid-eighties. See the account 
given by Xue Yong (i?'/S) in ‘How much does the ‘Traditionalist Party” really understand of 
tradition? ( “Chuantongpai” dui chuantong liaojie duoshao?, ?)’, in
Southern Metropolitan ( ^ ^ j  #P rt] ) of 6 May 2004, available at http://www.nanfangdaily. 
com.cn/southnews/spqy/200405060108.asp.
40 Tan Shigui (W tttU), On the prevention o f corruption in the administration o f justice (Sifa 
fubaifangzhi lun, (Beijing: 2003).
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Confucian ideas of management and supervision, seeking to connect their 
account to far more recent theories of governance and government.41 There are 
also new proposals to develop a system for the official compilation of selected 
court decisions, made under supervision and to be corrected by superior courts 
where necessary, which seem to borrow features from China’s imperial 
tradition.42 After a long time of being too dangerous to be discussed, Chinese 
legal tradition is coming alive again to be discussed critically in relation to 
politics, law and economics, rather than cautiously narrated and reported on as 
part of China’s ‘feudalist’ past.
This is of course not to say that Chinese communism or that related 
officially propagated ideas (socialism, Marxism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng 
Xiaoping Theory, Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents, and so on)43 were no longer 
important. All officials, at least, must still state their allegiance to it, and some 
ideas of communism such as for instance state control over land as crucial to 
subsistence, play a very important role in current legal practice. Another 
important remaining element is Mao Zedong’s distinction between contradictions 
among the people, which can be resolved by peaceful means and must be
41 For instance, Sun Juyou, (# 1 £ ^ 0 , The Confucian School’s Philosophy o f Management (Rujia 
guanli zhexue xinlun i£) (Jinan: 2003).
42 Du Yulu and Yang Yemao (ttl& M , ‘Thoughts on the establishment of a system of
precedent with guidance function in China (dui jianli woguo panli zhidao zhidu zhi sikao, £t
, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php7idsl09
555.
43 For a good introduction to Mao Zedong connecting his thought to his life see Jonathan 
Spence’s Mao Zedong (London: 2001) and for a classic discussion see Schram, Stuart R., The 
Thought o f Mao Tse-Tung. Cambridge: 1989). A good, brief account of Deng’s reform and 
central ideas is given in Goldman, Merle and Fairbank, John King, China. A New History 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1999) at pp. 406 ff. See also Stefan Landsberger’s introduction, 
‘Deng Xiaoping Theory’, at http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/dxpt.html. with further references. 
Extensive online archives for both figures are available at the website http://www. 
websitesaboutchina.com/main/poli/politics_l_l.htm. The Three Represents (see also Chapter 
Nine) were first launched in a speech by Jiang Zemin in February 2000. An account of this can be 
found at http://www. websitesaboutchina.com/main/poli/politics_l_l.htm. and Landsberger 
provides an account of the theory in his ‘Jiang Zemin Theory (“Three Represents”)’, at 
http://www.iisg.nl/~landsberger/jzmt.html.
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resolved by distinguishing between right and wrong, and contradictions between 
the people and its enemies, in which right and wrong are inappropriate categories, 
and which must be resolved with force.44 This distinction matters particularly to 
mediation and to criminal law practice, and is accordingly addressed in my 
discussion of both. Both the increasingly untenable ‘communist’ claim that the 
state will administer resources according to an interpretation of the ideal of 
equality, and the Maoist idea of enemies to good society, now form part of 
Chinese legal culture. Just as the idea of and the many institutions for state 
control and supervision and punishment of officials they, too, weaken the ability 
of Chinese courts to protect Chinese citizens’ rights.45
Methods and Sources. The argument in this thesis combines an abstract 
discussion of rights and justice with an interpretive discussion of some areas of 
Chinese law. The sources used for the -  necessarily selective - account of 
current legal practice in China include textbooks, monographs, and contributions 
to periodicals. The most important source of information on cases proved to be 
newspaper reports, because some of the daily and weekly Chinese newspapers
44 To quote: ‘The contradictions between ourselves and the enemy are antagonistic contradictions. 
Within the ranks of the people, the contradictions among the working people are nonantagonistic, 
while those between the exploited and the exploiting classes have a nonantagonistic aspect in 
addition to an antagonistic aspect (...) Since they are different in nature, the contradictions 
between ourselves and the enemy and the contradictions among the people must be resolved by 
different methods. To put it briefly, the former are a matter of drawing a clear distinction between 
ourselves and the enemy, and the latter a matter of drawing a clear distinction between right and 
wrong.’ Mao Zedong, 1957, ‘On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People’, 
(translation) in Selden, Mark, The People’s Republic o f China: A Documentary History o f 
Revolutionary Change, New York Monthly Review Press, 1979, pp. 324 ff.
45 Compare Lubman’s assessment in ‘The Study Of Chinese Law In The United States: 
Reflections On The Past And Concerns About The Future’, 2 (2003) Washington University 
Global Law Review 1, at p. 18: ‘It is necessary to explore contemporary legal culture very closely, 
even while relating it to Chinese tradition, because China is currently in the midst of an 
extraordinary institutional and social flux (...) Contemporary scholars -  and China, indeed -  must 
relate the Chinese cultural legacy to different contemporary values. The attempt is necessary even 
though both interpretation of the past and understanding of the present are contested, both in 
Chinese and in foreign legal scholarship.’
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provide the most detailed and open reports available at all, especially on 
politically sensitive cases (such as the ones used in Chapters Five to Seven) A 
disadvantage of using case reports from the public media is that one has to rely 
on their accuracy and credibility. This problem could be reduced by using a 
number of different sources where possible, giving preference to reports that 
appeared in mainland Chinese media as well as media outside China, and 
choosing cases that appeared common or typical of certain problems. Of course 
extensive use has also been made of legislation at national and local levels. 
Where appropriate, references to international treaties and obligations according 
to international law are provided, although the present study does not primarily 
discusses the extent of such obligations, but rather examines the question how 
legal rights protection can become entrenched in China, from an internal 
perspective.
The selection that has been made of case material and exemplary topics has 
been greatly influenced by conversations with Chinese legal academics and 
professionals, visits to legal institutions, and classes and public lectures attended 
mainly in Beijing in 2003. Especially given the present incoherence of Chinese 
law, individual cases can serve better to explain the difficulties resulting from 
such incoherence, than the mere recitation or summarisation of legislation, or 
description of institutional arrangements. Moreover looking closely at individual 
cases allows one to get as close as possible to the perspective of people ‘inside’ 
the system, an approach important to this thesis especially when it discusses 
problems of rights assertion and the status of disagreement in dispute resolution.
The approach chosen here is interpretive, in the sense that an interpretation 
of some moral principles important to law and rights, such as the principle of
23
universalisability. informs an interpretation of current practices in China, such as 
mediation, remonstration, rights discourse and rights protection. This approach 
emphasises that understanding the requirements of law is connected (though of 
course not as a matter of actual deliberation in every instance of interpreting law) 
to an interpretation of abstract moral principles. It relies mostly on what is called 
analytical political philosophy. In the present cross-cultural context, it 
emphasises that there are great uncertainty and disagreement about the most 
fundamental principles of law not only in the Chinese society in its current stage 
of reform and renewal, but also in seemingly more staid and conservative 
Western societies.
Outline and main argument. This introduction is followed by nine chapters. In 
the following two chapters, various Chinese attitudes to injustice are discussed 
and related to theories of rights and rights assertion. The central argument in this 
discussion is that a proper understanding of rights allows, rather than disables, 
one to see value in consensus and persuasion to do the right thing.
Chinese mediation as discussed in chapter four is a normative practice but 
cannot be understood as a legal rights protection mechanism. Chinese judges and 
other officials may sometimes use mediation in a manipulative and unfair way. 
But mediation can be a way of resolving disputes, which particularly takes the 
relationships between involved parties appropriately into account, and allows for 
adapting to the changing attitudes of parties to a dispute in the process of its 
resolution. This can be valuable, also in a judge.
Chapter five turns to a particular area of fundamental rights, to discuss in a 
case study if and how the rights of migrant workers are protected in Chinese law,
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in the context of legislation, of mechanisms for appeals to governmental 
authorities, and of adjudication. This discussion draws attention to many Chinese 
people’s transition from the countryside into China’s expanding urban areas, and 
allows us to address the rights of a particularly large group of disadvantaged 
people in Chinese society. It is argued that because the egalitarian aims originally 
attributed to China’s legal and political system are increasingly neglected, 
Chinese citizens’ rights to free movement, to physical integrity, and to equality 
before the law are now in greater need of protection. This also requires a 
discussion of what a right to equality means in contemporary Chinese law. 
Improving legislation would be one way to effect better protection, but in this as 
well as in other areas, Chinese legislation is hampered by the absence of an 
effective distribution of legislative power. The system is best characterised by the 
idea of an extension or delegation of the power to rule -  to issue orders, laws and 
regulations -  from the top to the bottom. This results in great inconsistency and 
incoherence of the rules produced by various state authorities, especially those at 
the bottom end of the hierarchy. As it is ‘extended’, the power to rule is also 
thinned out, contributing to the present weakness of the Chinese legal system.
In the context of administration, the most important institution channelling 
citizens’ reactions to injustice is remonstration with government, through 
complaints and letters (xinfang, shangfang)46 This unique institution reflects 
some Chinese attitudes to injustice47 but is not, according to the argument in 
Chapter Six, an adequate institution for the protection of legal rights. The drama 
of its recent failures should not prevent us from acknowledging its potential
46 ft i j j ,
47 Which I try to identify in Chapter Two.
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advantages, for instance, its flexibility and its assumption of a person-to-person 
relationship between government and citizens.
Chapters Seven and Eight are devoted to an analysis of courts' handling of 
cases with civil rights elements, and a further chapter addresses the changing role 
of lawyers as they are gradually meeting the challenge of protecting fundamental 
rights. This requires a discussion, among other things, of the changing status of 
the Chinese constitution and its rights guarantees, and some developments in 
criminal defence. It is argued that a non-positivistic understanding of 
constitutional rights could remove some perceived doctrinal obstacles to 
effective rights protection by Chinese courts. But as indicated above, the more 
important obstacles to such protection are conflicting ideas about how to run 
courts. Chinese courts are not merely Western style courts doing badly. There are 
vibrant ongoing debates about how to run courts and how to train, appoint, and 
supervise judges: these debates are necessarily also debates about what the point 
of adjudication is. Some of the proposals and current practices and doctrines 
threaten the sound development of independent, impartial and rights-oriented 
adjudication.
Some contemporary Chinese attitudes to justice indicate expectations from 
the most recently introduced legal institutions, which cannot be fulfilled.48 But 
this alone does not warrant the conclusion that the Chinese, somehow burdened 
with a tradition little engaging in rights talk, did not want, need, or understand 
rights, or that the idea of rights had no moral force in China. Instead, this thesis 
argues that Chinese approaches to conflict provide one with interesting and 
important answers to the question what it means to have rights, to be rights-
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assertive, especially towards government, and to protect rights through the use of 
state coercion.
48 Palmer, Michael, ‘“So, good people too may litigate?” Individual justice, legal change and the 
family in contemporary China’, inaugural lecture at SOAS, 12 June 2002.
27
Chapter Two Responses to wrongs and injustice in China
Deciding what should be done. This chapter discusses aspects of a ‘Chinese' 
conception of justice with a particular reference to conceptions of rights. The 
underlying assumption in doing so is that the concept of justice is important in 
any culture but that there are different conceptions of justice.1 Even when one 
agrees that something has been unjust, one may still have different reactions or 
attitudes to injustice.2 Culturally characteristic responses to wrongs and injustice3 
point to specific conceptions of justice, but also to disagreement about justice 
within one culture. For instance, in contemporary China, some traditional 
attitudes appear to be in conflict with a commitment to rights protection.
Having a right generally means having meaningful options. Some have 
tried to capture this fact by the idea of a right to do wrong.4 Logically at least, 
one can distinguish between what one has a right to do and what it would be right 
for one to do,5 or what one should do. Having a right also implies a certain
1 This distinction goes back to Gallie, W. B., ‘Essentially Contested Concepts’, 86 Proceedings o f 
the Aristotelian Society 1955-56, 167. Hart drew ‘in effect’ the same distinction in The Concept 
o f Law ( Is* edition. Oxford: 1961) at p. 155/159: see his Postscript to the 2nd edition (1994) at p. 
246, and Rawls followed him in A Theory o f Justice (Harvard: 1971) at p. 5, and so did Dworkin 
in Law’s Empire (Harvard: 1986) in his discussion in Chapter 2.
2 In at least one point such attitudes have to be the same to be correct: anyone must reject 
injustice. Judith Jarvis Thomson maintains that in a moral context there are no good or bad 
‘attitudes’, only correct or incorrect ones. This is a useful idea, since it reminds us that 
recognising there are different conceptions of justice does not release us from the obligation to 
find out which is the right one. Thomson, ‘Reasons for Acting, Wanting, Admiring, Believing’, 
public lecture, 26 and 27 May 2004, at UCL, London.
‘Wrong’ is more easily associated with the conduct of ‘private’ individuals than ‘injustice’. But 
this thesis suggests in this chapter and the following that justice can be a personal virtue, and 
criticises the over-emphasis on public aspects or conceptions of justice, and therefore I use 
‘wrongs’ and ‘injustice’ with little distinction.
4 See Waldron, Jeremy, ‘The Right to do Wrong’, chapter 3 in Waldron, Liberal Rights. Collected 
papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge: 1993). ‘The cutting edge of a rights-claim is the claim that it 
entails about the wrongness of interfering with the action that the right-bearer has chosen. So 
what is defended or contested when a general right is in dispute is the claim that choice within a 
certain range is not to be interfered with. This claim in turn is usually defended on the basis of the 
importance of the choices in the range in question for the lives of the individuals who are making 
them.’
5 Dworkin uses this distinction, for instance, in Taking Rights Seriously at p. 188.
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degree of independence from what other people want: no one can make me agree 
to abandon my right, if I do not want to. This independence connects rights to 
duties.6 and the idea of legal rights and duties enforceable in courts distinguishes 
asserting legal rights from making legal petitions.7
The distinction between what one has a right to do and what one should do 
is important also for understanding court judgements. A court decision 
confirming that a person has a particular legal right can be described as a 
judgement about what should be done. But to say that judges decide whether a 
claimant’s claims were justified is more accurate in what could be called a rights- 
centred system of adjudication. The judge’s decision confirms, as a matter of 
right, the rights someone is asserting. The judge does not make a comprehensive 
judgement about whether someone took the right decision in asserting that right 
in this way, or at least that judgement is not part of his judicial decision. To give 
an example, it is usually not up to the judge to decide if the greedy rich 
moneylender should assert his claims toward the poor old widow. There are 
some cases in which it turns out that the moneylender’s assertion is some kind of 
‘abuse of right’ and that, therefore, he does not have the legal right in question at 
all. But there are many more cases in which he does have it; even if he should, all 
things considered, refrain from making claims based on it.8 This does not mean 
that the judge has to reproach himself for what has been someone else’s decision, 
or that he cannot make his judgement in the conviction it is the right judgement
6 Below I argue against the idea that rights only ‘exist’ if there are corresponding obligations,
though.
7
It is important to an argument which is part of this thesis, that however well-functioning 
mechanisms for revision and ‘self-correction in government authorities might be, they will only 
be addressing the question of what should, all things considered, be done. They could not, 
therefore, by themselves be regarded as appropriate mechanisms for the protection of legal rights.
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for him to make. What is important is that there is the possibility of discrepancy 
between the two kinds of judgement -  about what one has a right to do, and what 
one should do as long as we do not have a general duty to be rights-assertive. 
And would it not seem very difficult to say that we should always claim what 
was due to us?
In the following, it is argued that certain Chinese legal practices focus on 
the question what should be done, rather than the question what rights one has. 
Concentrating on what should be done generates a strong pressure to reach public 
consensus about this question, whereas concentrating on rights leaves more room 
for public disagreement. This requires a further discussion of the possible impact 
of attitudes prevalent in China on rights protection, especially against the 
background of growing public dissent and unrest in China at the present time.9 
The third chapter turns back to the question of rights-assertiveness.
Demanding justice and protecting rights. Where the distinction between the 
questions what rights one has and what one should do is not specially 
emphasised, controversy and discussion are likely to be concerned immediately 
with what should be done. An example for this is the practice of seeking revision 
of governmental decisions by writing letters or lodging informal complaints in 
person, so prevalent in China. It is characteristic of a culture of remonstration 
and petitioning, to which rights protection has been introduced as a new 
mechanism.10 Reflecting this culture, but also a certain change in focus toward
8 ‘Making’ or ‘asserting’ claims is more concrete that ‘asserting a right’ but sometimes these 
expressions can be used interchangeably.
9 On this, see Murray Scot Tanner, ‘China Rethinks Unrest’, 27 (2004) The Washington 
Quarterly 137.
10 Another instance of an imperfect conjunction of administrative review and court review is the 
fact that China’s Administrative Reconsideration Law does not provide mechanisms for the
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rights, the Chinese Constitution guarantees in its Article 41 a broadly worded 
‘right to complain’ to every citizen:
‘Citizens of the People's Republic of China have the right to criticise and 
make suggestions regarding any state organ or functionary. Citizens have 
the right to make to relevant state organs complaints or charges against, 
or exposures of; any state organ or functionary for violation of the law or 
dereliction of duty, but fabrication or distortion of facts for purposes of 
libel or false incrimination is prohibited.
The state organ concerned must deal with complaints, charges or 
exposures made by citizens in a responsible manner after ascertaining the 
facts. No one may suppress such complaints, charges and exposures or 
retaliate against the citizens making them.
Citizens who have suffered losses as a result of infringement of their civic 
rights by any state organ or functionary have the right to compensation in 
accordance with the law.’11
China has institutions - called offices for letters and visits to complain12 -  
corresponding to this ‘right’, which have a very important function in Chinese 
legal practice. The right to complain is broad in its reference to ‘relevant’ 
authorities, but narrow in not pointing to any possibility to make complaints 
forceful by putting the power of legal courts behind them. In practice, what 
citizens demand and occasionally get through this mechanism can go beyond 
what rights protection in court would give them: for instance, as is explained 
below, a public recognition on the part of a government authority of having been 
in the wrong, or a personal apology. The letters and complaints practice also 
gives people an opportunity to seek the most powerful authority in place to lodge
enforcement of reconsideration decisions in a way similar to the enforcement of court decisions 
made in the course of administrative litigation (court review of administrative decisions). In 
chapter 6, I discuss the implications of Article 32: ‘The respondent [to the administrative 
reconsideration application] shall comply with the administrative reconsideration decision. If the 
respondent does not comply with it or delays compliance without adequate reason, then the 
administrative reconsideration authority or its superior administrative authority shall order the 
respondent to comply, setting a time limit for compliance.’
11 I am using the translation available at Beijing University’s Chinalawinfo webpage (falti 
xinxiwang). See http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=46441.
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complaints; to do so informally and to restore, perhaps, a degree of trust between 
citizens and government by allowing for direct communication between them. 
The picture of the ‘father and mother official’ as a description of imperial 
magistrates13 comes to mind here. The institution of making informal complaints, 
and of picking - as is apparently done to considerable degree in practice -  the 
actually most potent authority at which to direct one’s complaint, seems 
particularly useful in a context where power centres can shift and vary, and 
where personal influence, e.g. as a consequence of party membership or rank, 
also tends to fluctuate. The institution of complaints to government also institutes 
a kind of supervision over officials, by allowing ‘meddling’, to a certain degree, 
of officials with other officials’ work, even outside relationships of 
administrative subordination.14
Article 41 also allows us so see important similarities between the letters 
and complaints mechanism and adjudication over rights in court. Weight is 
placed, implicitly, on the importance of being persuasive and in other words to 
provide reasoned argument -  for of course a complainant will only be successful 
if he is believed to have a proper cause, and if the person addressed is in a 
position to persuade or order the official or authority originally producing a 
grievance, to revise their decision or to make amends. There is also an implicit 
recognition of the importance of the public realm, for instance in the phrase 
‘exposure’.
12 iiitfiM . Here is also a national Letters and Complaints Bureau, or Bureau for petitions.
13 Fumuguan ( ^ ^ l a ) .
14 The idea of supervising (governing) officials in order indirectly to govern the people comes to 
mind again. Tan Shigui discusses the idea of ‘enlightened government by controlling the 
officials, not the people’ (ming zhu zhi ling bu zhi min K:), as formulated by Han
Feizi, in traditional China. Tan Shigui ( )  On the prevention o f corruption in the 
administration of justice (Sifa fubai fangzhi lun, (Beijing: 2003), p. 4. While
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Yet courts and offices to receive petitions make different uses of the public 
realm. For a complaint, it may be better to be indirect and informal, and to keep 
problems unpublicised. At the same time the complaint mechanism can utilise 
publicness in a special way: it can utilise the publicisation of a grievance, by a 
‘naming and shaming’ technique.15 One could try to see Article 41 as envisaging 
a gradated response. At the lowest stage, there is a non-public letter to an 
authority. At this stage non-publicisation of a dispute can help to prevent it from 
escalating. It can help to encourage citizens to overcome their fear of 
governmental authorities or some of their members just because there is a 
mechanism of direct communication: this can be an advantage in cases where 
people fear government or certain government officials. By instituting varying 
degrees of (non-) publicity for the resolution of an issue, on the other hand, one 
accentuates the effects of publicity when it is used to a high degree. At the 
highest stage, there is the now so frequent ‘collective complaint’ made by a few, 
a few dozen or hundred people in front of the building of some state authority to 
express challenge, outrage or, as the case may be, despair. Recent occurrences of 
public protests show that there is a point when the letters and complaints 
mechanism collapses, in cases of great public discontent, in which public dissent 
becomes strong and obvious.
Apologies, confessions, and disagreement. One day in October 2003 a small 
crowd had gathered around some demonstrators in front of a Beijing hotel. The
they are not governed, it seems that the people are also not protected, as a consequence of this 
technique: government is, as it were, entirely a matter between officials.
15 Apparently, central government in some cases encourages citizens to make complaints against 
local officials, to counter local corruption.
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demonstrators - all, they said, belonging to the same family - displayed a scroll 
reading
‘Only One Hundred Thousand Yuan in Compensation for a Life.' 16
They said that they were demonstrating because a young man belonging to their 
family, an employee with the hotel, had been killed in an accident which, they 
said, was a hotel driver’s fault; but then the hotel had intimidated its other 
employees into not giving witness statements,17 and the police had refused 
further to investigate the matter. The hotel had given the family the stated sum of 
money in an ‘agreement’ drawn up about the circumstances of the death.
‘So, do you want more money?’
‘We don’t want more money! We want an investigation! We want to 
know what happened!’
‘Why don’t you sue? The hotel? Or the police?’
‘You don’t understand. The police won’t do anything. We are here to 
make them do something. We are not afraid. What we really want is an 
apology.'™
Compensation is often demanded to ‘make up’ for a wrong without being the 
primary object of a (legal) dispute. Traditional practices in China reflect this. For 
instance, van der Sprenkel reports that in village mediation in Imperial and 
Republican China, it was typically expected that the party ‘awarded’ a claim for
16 Yi tiao shengming zhi chang shi wan yuan 7U ). This is the scroll as I 
remember it and I may be wrong about the figure. The average income in Beijing is considered to 
range around ten thousand Yuan per annum.
17 A frequent problem because there is no legal obligation even in criminal matters to provide 
witness statements.
18 The term gongdao ( ^ if i)  used here most frequently translates into ‘justice’, ‘reason’. But the 
special expression yao yi ge gongdao (1?— should be translated as ‘wanting an apology,’ 
cm - more literally, wanting a public acknowledgement of what is (would have been) morally 
required. Dao combines with another character to mean ‘to apologise’ in dao qian (iKIft).
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compensation would not actually demand this money on pain of appearing 
undignified, and that the defeated party would (instead) arrange a banquet at his 
own cost.19 ‘Only one hundred thousand Yuan’ does not indicate that this sum is 
not enough; it does not either, apparently, just say that money cannot compensate 
for a life. Perhaps it says that paying compensation has not been the right kind of 
response to what happened. Or it reflects the traditional belief that the right 
compensation for a life is a life.20
Note that the alleged facts of the case described above point to a criminal 
case -  a case, perhaps, of negligent killing and of perverting the course of justice. 
Yet what the relatives of the deceased person have got is monetary compensation, 
and what they ask for -  ‘really’ -  is not punishment but an apology, gongdao -  a 
public recognition of having been wronged by an injustice, and something that 
cannot easily be measured. It is not quite clear whom they want to apologise, but 
it is clear that they consider their deceased relative’s employer to bear some 
responsibility, and are at the same time angry because the police have failed to 
investigate.
This seems to be a fairly common case -  sufficiently common to allow the 
question: what i f  a legal culture is based on an assumption that an apology is a 
centrally important reaction to a wrong done to someone else? Compensation
19 She paraphrases a Chinese author writing in 1945 to describe the typical development of an 
arbitration process carried out by village leaders in a place in Shandong. ‘First, he says, the 
invited or self-appointed village-leaders enquire into the background of the dispute and establish 
what is really at issue. Then they propose a solution based on past experience of such quarrels. 
Next comes the task of getting the parties to agree to a compromise, discovering how much each 
will concede and where the agreement can be struck. Then follows a party or a feast to mark the 
conclusion of the conflict, the expenses being borne by one party, if he admits to having alone 
been at fault, or shared, if both admit some responsibility. Thus the settlement is reached and 
publicised. Except among the poorest people, it would be undignified of the wronged party to 
accept compensation; his victory lies in the general opinion that he has the right on his side. In 
theory the feast is given to repay the mediators, but in fact it is an admission of defeat and an 
apology.’ Van der Sprenkel, Sybille, Legal Institutions in Manchu China. A Sociological Analysis 
(London: 1967), p. 101.
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may be understood to have a more symbolical meaning. It may also have a 
conciliatory, as well as a punitive function, in a way relating punishment and 
conciliation to the handling of individual guilt. From the perspective of Western 
criminal law practice, there are some apparent contradictions in the way we deal 
with the notion that comes central in our practice of criminal punishment. As a 
psychological notion, guilt is conventionally sometimes likened to an illness, an 
encumbrance of autonomy, something psychotherapy helps us to get rid of. But 
as a normative notion, guilt guides the judgement, for instance, of a criminal and 
of how he should be dealt with; to many of the practitioners of criminal law, guilt 
presupposes what has been termed the ‘unencumbered’ (autonomous) self. 
Psychologists may be aware of the fact that coping with guilt liberates, that 
victim and perpetrator may suffer from different sorts of guilt and that it is good 
if they can in some way be reconciled. But ‘public justice’ takes no notice of this 
‘merely’ psychological problem. Justice as understood by many legal 
practitioners does not involve conciliation and liberation from guilt. What was 
characterised tentatively as a ‘Chinese’ practice of compensation and apologies 
as responses to injustice may teach us that justice in some cases requires 
conciliation, and even requires liberation from the feeling of guilt arising from 
having done injustice.
There is more evidence to show how entrenched a part of legal practice the 
giving and receiving of apologies is in China. The Chinese Principles o f Civil 
Law list among the ‘remedies’ which a court can order a defendant (typically in 
civil litigation) to provide, a ‘formal apology’, and a ‘formal apology’ is also 
mentioned as part of the legally required compensation for certain kinds of
20 Sha ren chang ming (^r A ( # ^ ) .
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damages -  to one's personality or right to reputation - done by state organs, 
according to the State Compensation Law.21 The seeking of justice in the form of 
an apology, especially from state officials who have wronged one, is viewed very 
critically by some legal professionals and intellectuals in China, even when they 
applaud the fact that people are becoming generally more litigious toward 
government. A commentator on the development of administrative adjudication 
over the last two decades states critically that
‘The persistence of the phenomenon of “not litigating against officials” is 
in essence due to a [persisting] problem with the right to complain and 
litigate.22 The right to complain and litigate is conferred onto the people 
by the law as a right to be exercised legally and autonomously. In 
administrative litigation, the concrete administrative act complained 
against will be subjected to a review of its legality. Therefore, legality is 
the only measure by which it will be decided if the citizen wins the case. 
[However] in its development until today, people going to court in 
administrative litigation will change the goal of litigation from “winning 
the lawsuit” into “restoring public justice [by obtaining a public 
recognition of what is just; an apology]”.’23
21 In Chinese, the expression few this is pei li dao qian The li here is the li frequently
translated as ‘rites’ or ‘morals’ or ‘etiquette, good behaviour’. For the State Compensation Law, 
see its Article 30, which requires the formal apology in cases of damaging someone’s name or 
someone’s good reputation (minguquan, rongyuquan, ). I understand that the
right to reputation is supposed to vest in people with a public office, etc. See also Article 134 
Principles o f Civil Law which lists a formal apology generally as a remedy. See also Article 30 of 
the Supreme People’s Court’s 2000 judicial interpretation ‘On problems of compensation in cases 
of administrative and civil litigation’, judicial interpretation no. 2000/27 (zuigao renmin fayuan 
guanvu minshi xingzheng susong zhong sifa peichang ruogan wenti de jieshi, fashi (2000) 2 hao,
m$ ) \ K;& ( 2 0 0 0 / 2 7  ,
available at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=31348. It 
reiterates the relevant passage of Article 30 of the State Compensation Law. For an example see 
the case of unlawful detention of Huang Jingjia decided by the Supreme People’s Court in 2000, 
where the defendant, a State Procuracy at city level, is ordered to pay damages, and restore the 
applicant’s good name and formally to apologise to him. See the report ‘The case of criminal 
procedure court compensation for Huang Jingjia (Huang Jingjia guojia xingshi peichang an, H  
available on the Chinalawnet webpage at http://law.chinalawinfo.com/ 
newlaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=cas&Gid=33554843.
22 Suquan wenti (VftXN@). In several combinations su is used to refer to complaints brought 
against a variety of administrative and other authorities, and therefore not limited to litigation in 
court.
23 Fan Fu [a pen name] ( f l ^ ) ,  ‘Looking back at 20 years of administrative litigation: the attitude 
of “even in cases of humiliation or death one must not litigate against officials” is becoming a 
thing of the past (Wo guo xingzheng shenpan 20 nian huigu: “qusi bu gao guan!” cheng wang 
shi, S i S H t 20 1=rll’” $V&M- )’ available at http://news.xinhuanet.
com/legal/2004-02/23/content_1327635.htm. The expression used here is taohui gongdao (1^0  
^ i i ) .  See above on gongdao, pei li dao qian. «
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As long as one concedes the process of adjudication in courts at all to be 
connected to the ideal of justice, it is of course not odd to seek justice there. But 
apologies at the order of a court do seem odd even if -  or when - this is what ‘the 
restoration of justice’ requires. Most importantly, there is a problem with 
freedom of mind. While a court may order for public apologies, it seems that no 
court can order for an apology to be sincere, because it cannot order anyone to 
think a certain way or, indeed, to lie.24
A court-ordered apology can only make sense if the court’s judgement has 
a certain persuasive quality: if it seeks to produce sincere acceptance by all 
parties, while at the same time also being a public attribution (or negation) of 
responsibility or liability. This practice presupposes deference towards the court, 
as well as an ideal consensus over the result at the end of the adjudication 
process.25 Even ordering the ‘losing’ party to make a formal apology whatever 
their secret misgivings be, may be a form of such public recognition or 
recognition by the court through the defendant; though as just noted, in such a 
case it will come at the price of risking hypocrisy. (It is difficult to imagine an 
intentionally hypocritical system.)
A public admission of wrongdoing -  however small-scale the ‘public’ 
forum for this may be - must have been very important in a context where
24If, say, German legislators decided to incorporate such a ‘remedy’ in the German Civil Code, it 
would probably take little time for the German Constitutional Court to be required to strike such 
legislation down, as violating the principles of human dignity and freedom of expression. Many 
areas of Chinese law, such as its foundations of civil law and general administrative law, have 
some resemblance to German law, for historical reasons.
25 Compare with the claims to Gegendarstellung (to have an opportunity to present one’s own, 
contrary view) and Berichtigungsanspruch (claim to the correction of a misrepresentation of facts) 
available according to German civil law in cases of infringement of one’s personality right. This 
is even though German law is widely considered to provide high standards of the protection of 
personality rights and of personal honour in the Western legal world (and conversely to restrict
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tradition did not provide courts as institutionally separate from ‘administration’, 
or the rest of government, to pronounce on wrongdoing. But even where such 
courts exist, one may reasonably feel that nothing could replace an own 
admission of wrongdoing on the part of the wrongdoer: this, we may at least 
infer, is what motivated Chinese legislators to make apologies legally available 
remedies at the order of a court, besides more tangible remedies such as 
monetary compensation. In the introduction I suggested that some Chinese 
conceptions of justice were more ‘intimate’ than the one supporting most of our 
legal institutions. This is what I meant: there is a person-to-person view of 
governmental injustice in China, making apologies particularly attractive, 
significant, and therefore important.26
The importance of apologies, and the practices centred in apologies, further 
confirm the importance of the public realm in Chinese society. Indeed the very 
word gongdao contains the character for ‘public’. It may be appropriate to say 
that the public realm is used for confirming and enforcing standards of conduct 
applying in more private realms of life as well as in public ones, rather than for 
creating standards of conduct of its own: wrongdoing requires an apology by the 
wrongdoer as a matter of justice or fairness -  as we require this in private, e.g. 
family, relationships quite uncontroversially. The possibility of sincere and 
sustained disagreement over what constitutes wrongdoing is rather neglected by 
such a practice, while the fact that there are wrong acts, which are wrong whether 
or not we recognise it, is emphatically affirmed.
the right to free speech rather much. Compare Prinz, Peters, Medienrecht: die zivilrechtlichen 
Ansspruche (Muenchen: 1999).
26 In Zhang Yimou’s much noted 1992 Film The Story o f Qiu Ju, the peasant woman Qiu Ju 
keeps saying, ‘I only want an apology!’ Here the expression used is wo zhi yao yi ge shuofa ($t 
It connotes ‘explanation.’
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The role of confessions in Chinese criminal law practice can give further 
insights into what is valuable about apologies, and how, on the other hand, 
demanding apologies and confessions can work to the exclusion of important 
rights protections. As a public recognition of having been at fault, apologies in 
the contexts we looked at above are similar to confessions, which have always 
played a very important role in Chinese criminal justice and continue doing so to 
date.27 The right to silence, and the presumption of innocence are not protected in 
the Chinese criminal process.28 According to Article 93 of the criminal procedure 
law, the suspect has the obligation ‘to answer questions truthfully’, and only the 
right ‘to refuse to answer such questions as have no connection with the case 
[then investigated].’ Tragically, this leads to the widespread use of torture. Song 
Yinghui writes in 2003:
‘The second factor [hampering the regularity of the criminal investigation 
process] is that the suspect’s statement is turned into almost the sole aim 
of the criminal investigation process. In order to obtain a confession even 
inappropriate [not legally available] measures may be taken, and at times 
this results in grievous violations of the suspect’s right to bodily integrity. 
In our law enforcement and judicial practice the reliance on confessions 
is very strong, almost to the point where “when one has not obtained a 
confession, this cannot be counted as having solved the case [po'an\ ”y29
27 For the legal tradition and the situation under imperial law see Rickett, William, ‘Voluntary 
Surrender and Confessions in Chinese Law: the problem of Continuity’, (1971) 30 Journal of 
Asian Studies 797.
28 For classic discussions of this problem in post-1949 China see Cohen, Jerome Alan, The 
Criminal Process in The People's Republic Of China 1949-1963. An Introduction (Harvard: 
1968), especially pp. 30 ff, and Gelatt, Timothy A., ‘The People’s Republic of China and The 
Presumption of Innocence’, 73 (1982) Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 259. See also 
Chapters Seven and Nine of this dissertation.
29 Song Yinghui Introduction to the Elements o f Criminal Procedure (Xingshi Susong
Yuanli Daodu, .Beijing: 2003), a t p. 329. Article 46 of the Criminal
Procedure Law says that no conviction must be made solely on the basis of the defendant’s 
statement (confession), but this provision, which aims to reduce the use of torture to elicit 
confessions, is of little significance in criminal practice, besides obviously not preventing the 
investigators from extorting a ‘confession’ first and supplying some further evidence afterwards.
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For decades, the saying ‘who makes a clean breast (of his crime) will be treated 
leniently; who obstinately refuses to confess, will be treated harshly’ was 
displayed on the walls of most Chinese police stations, that is, where suspects 
would be interrogated. Despite increasingly strong criticism, the attitude it 
expresses is still the norm with police officers,30 and appears to be maintained by 
many members of the ordinary public, too. The traditional emphasis on 
confessions on the one hand, and progressive views requiring rights protection of 
criminal suspects and defendants on the other, are a good example for how the 
conflicts of attitude mentioned above translate into real conflicts in institutions 
and among people.31
Public suicide and public protest. Above it was suggested that complaint, 
exposure, remonstration and apology did not make sense in the absence of an 
assumption that the other will be honest, and will listen. Unlike determining 
someone’s rights, working out what should be done requires an assumption of an 
ultimately common effort, different from that of courts adjudicating rights; yet it 
would be particularly blind to deny that remonstration, mediation and similar 
ways of handling conflicts can provide the framework for dissensus and protest 
against wrongs and injustice.
30 Shi Fei ( f f  ll), ‘Welcoming the demise of the principle ‘who confesses will be treated leniently, 
who obstinately refuses to confess, will be treated harshly (Huansong “tanbai congkuan, kangju 
congyan ” tuiwei, fAf§)A/IE’’ifI/(A)\ available at
http://www.ah.xinhuanet.com/xinwen/2003-12/09/content_1313545.htm, also emphasises the 
connection between this principle and torture in police detention, and the fact that this attitude is 
still prevalent.
31 Chen Ruihua writes as follows. ‘In the opinion of the author, the problem of criminal
procedure in the final analysis is one that goes to the nature of the judicial system, especially the 
relationships between the Public Security Organs, the prosecution organs and the People's Court.’ 
‘Major Issues Concerning the Reform of Criminal Judicature in China’ (2000?) translated by 
Yang Yushen and revised by David Kelly, available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_ 
wzdetails.asp?id=1720. (No date of publication is explicitly stated.)
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A particularly dramatic form of demonstration against injustice, which 
helps to understand differences in attitude even better, is self-mutilation or 
suicide in public. As a form of accusing and passing judgement on others it has 
always been important in Chinese tradition, and has been employed to great 
effect in Chinese society in the recent past.32 The degree of publicity with which 
this is done varies. Sometimes, suicides and self-mutilations appear as the 
morally acceptable alternative to revolt; sometimes these two responses to 
injustice combine. In recent months and years, for instance, suicides and suicide 
attempts at Tiananmen (the Gate of Heavenly Peace), have occurred rather 
frequently. One writer, resident in Beijing, claims that there were over ten ‘self- 
immolation incidents’ in 2003 on Tiananmen Square alone.33 In November 2003 
people who had created disturbances in Tiananmen Square, the centre of Beijing 
were tried and this was reported in the official Xinhua News agency news:
‘Today two criminals who created disturbances in Tiananmen Square 
were convicted in first instance. (...) The unemployed Ye Guoqiang from 
the Xuanwu district of Beijing had already received administrative 
punishments and criminal punishments in previous cases. Between May 
and September of this year Ye Guoqiang successively went to the Beijing 
City Government, to the Gate of Heavenly Peace and other places on ten 
occasions, either for silent sit-ins, or for demonstrations, and several 
attempts on the part of the relevant authorities to criticise and educate him 
had no effect. To create a disturbance he jumped off the Western comer 
of Jinshui Bridge into Jinshui River at the Gate of Heavenly Peace. This 
caused a large crowd to gather and look on, which led to a great
32 The suicide rate in China is apparently 2.3 times the world average, according to a report by 
The Central News Agency, ‘China suicide rate is 2.3 times the global average’, posted on 18 
November 2003 at http://www.asianresearch.org/Articles/1697.html. Of course, suicide can have 
many different motivations. For instance, the 2003 campaigns against corruption in government 
led to a large number of suicides. See Watts, Jonathan in The Guardian, 30 January 2004, 
‘Corruption Crackdown led to hundreds of Communist Party suicides’ (in the first half of 2003), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.Uk/china/story/0,7369,1135066,OO.html.
33 He Qinglian, ‘Where is the Boom of the Chinese Real Estate Industry Coming from?’, 8 May 
2004 in Epoch Times, five-part Article posted at http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-5- 
9/21289.html. According to another report, there were three such reports by mid-October. See the 
Agence France-Presse Article, ‘Two More Suicide Attempts on Beijing’s Tiananmen Square’ at 
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/3-10-22/11560.html.
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disruption of [public] order in the said area. Ye Guoqiang was 
apprehended on the spot by public security authorities.34
Only foreign media reports on the same incidents made clear that Ye’s grievance 
related to an unlawful eviction and/or demolition of his home at the instigation of 
property developers, who had bought land use rights for the plot in question from 
the city of Beijing. When we view it as the target of such actions -  as 
perpetrator we must conclude that the Chinese state has conflicting interests in 
publicising the administrative and punitive measures against 'creating public 
disturbance’ of this sort, and keeping the disturbances and their causes 
unpublicised. This is only one of the conflicts mentioned in the previous chapter. 
It easily translates into conflicts of attitude -  desiring control, but also the 
protection of citizens -  so characteristic of Chinese officials to date, and it 
contributes to the weakening of the legal system.
Many similar ‘disturbances’ occur in less central, but still public places in 
China. While Chinese society has always made use of the institution of taking 
matters into a more or less public arena, of a technique of ‘shaming’, the present 
conditions of technically easily available public media in increasingly large parts 
of the country36 make these techniques far more threatening to government than
34 Li Yongjing and Li Huiwen ), Two criminal creating disturbances at 
Tian’anmen convicted’ (Tiananmen zhizao shiduan liang an fan bei pan xing,
Xinhuawang, 28 November 2003)’, Xinhuawang, 28 November 2003, at 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-l l/28/content_1203464.htm.
35 Compare the Agence France-Presse Article on the same case, ibid.: ‘Xinhua News, and China 
Legal Daily did not mention that Ye Guoqiang’s senile father had also been arrested for 
protesting, nor did they mention the relationship between Ye Guoqiang and several other Beijing 
protestors (...) They didn’t interview the defendants’ lawyers or family members either.’ For a 
systematic account of the connection between demolition and protest see also Human Rights 
Watch in China’s March 2004 report ‘Demolished: Forced Evictions and the Tenants' Rights 
Movement in China’, available at http://hrw.org/reports/2004/china0304/. It includes the case of 
Zhu Zhengliang from Anhui, who set fire to himself in front of the portrait of Mao Zedong on 
Tiananmen Square, on 15 September 2003, also as a protest against eviction and demolition.
36 As I state in more detail in chapter nine, there are of course efforts to control the media.
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they used to be. Changes in factual conditions of public life, especially the 
growth of public media, have turned mechanisms and techniques of complaint, 
remonstration and exposure that used to work well into explosive weapons.37
The ‘right to criticise’ and complain under Article 41 of the Chinese 
Constitution has perhaps been more significant in providing forms for the 
expression of discontent, for some time, than the right to free speech (Article 39) 
and other civil liberties, which have not been receiving adequate protection.38 
But there are now great efforts at suppression and concealment of public dissent, 
as it appears to be growing out of control, and the right to make complaints, 
especially if ‘complaint’ takes the form of demonstrations or of self-mutilation or 
attempts at suicide, is being restricted.39 This is not least because the number of 
incidents is increasing. A recent sinologist study based largely on Chinese police 
statistics, and corroborated in part by other data, concludes that ‘mass incidents’ 
are now occurring in tens of thousands of instances per year, and that there has 
been a ‘clear trend’ toward larger demonstrations, sometimes combined with 
public suicides or suicide threats, and some demonstrations involving ‘hundreds, 
thousands, or even tens of thousands of protestors,’ in the past few years.40 Even 
though public suicide and ‘mass petitioning’ follow certain distinctive patterns, 
such as the gathering round certain official buildings, the repeated use of certain
37 While aware of Habermas’s writing on the significance of publicity to modem and what he 
terms post-modem society (Habermas, Strukturwandel der Oeffentlichkeit, Frankfurt: 1990) I am 
sceptical of his understanding of ‘intersubjective’ truth generated, so to speak, in public 
discourse.
38 As the existence of letters and complaints offices in most government authorities indicates.
39 Compare, for instance, a recently introduced police regulation in Xi’an, which provides for 
fines for threatening or attempting suicide in public places. Xinhuawang, ‘Xi’an; to climb up a 
high rise building and ‘kill oneself will no longer work (Xi’an: palou “zisha" xing bu tong le, 
‘0 $ :  )’, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-04/27/content_144 
2111.htm.
40 Tanner, Murray Scot, ‘China Rethinks Unrest’, 27 (2004) The Washington Quarterly 137 at p. 
141. In many instances protest is directed against eviction and land deprivation, but of course
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forms of expression,41 the ritualised methods of suicide (such as jumping from 
high-rise buildings in public places, self-immolation, and blowing oneself up in 
front of official buildings), and so on, they are of course not effective procedures 
for obtaining protection from injustice or. indeed, redress for rights violation. 
They are far removed from the suggestion of making a common effort to resolve 
a conflict, which appeared to be one of the potential merits of remonstration and 
mediation mentioned at the beginning of this discussion; they appear to be less 
about ‘what should be done’ than pure accusations. Sometimes, as in the case of 
people opposing forceful eviction, they are expressions of uncompromising 
resistance. Developed out of the practice of ‘petitioning’, they are also less an 
expression of diversity of views than an expression of the failure of the legal 
system, and indeed, often the ‘petitioning’ addresses the courts themselves.42 
This brings us to the topic of the next section:
Attitudes to moral and legal rights in China. The phrase ‘attitudes to rights in 
China’ makes deliberate use of an ambivalence: what is meant here is both 
‘attitudes to rights in China’ and ‘attitudes to rights in China\ These two senses 
are closely related. It is important to capture both in a discussion, for otherwise, 
discussion will be limited to a mere description of attitudes of people in China. 
There is ample evidence that the idea of legal rights protection has been catching
there are many other causes, too, and individual reports often mention that the causes bringing 
‘mass protesters’ together are diverse.
41 One of these appears to be the use of the character yuan! (§l!) -  ‘wrong!’ or ‘injustice!’ in red
on white (shirts or scrolls).
42 A discussion of the phenomenon of petitioning courts or petitioning for courts to act a certain 
way, addressing also individual and more orderly petitioning, can be found in Qiu Feng’s 
‘Breaking out of the vicious circle of litigation complaints (^ t t i  10 July 2004
in Southern Metropolitan ( ^ J ^ f ), available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/south 
news/spqy/200407100216. See also the case of Ma Jiyun which is discussed in Chapter Five.
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on in China, and people are increasingly prepared to use rights as sharp weapons 
in legal conflicts, and to go to court. This, and the great problems with effective 
rights protection in court, is the topic of much of the discussion in the following 
chapters. Yet given the prevalence, at the same time, of more traditional forms of 
conflict resolution and seeking justice, it is sometimes claimed that rights in 
China do not or cannot have the same meaning as in Western countries and legal 
institutions. The discussion in the following mostly addresses the level of 
abstraction at which concerns about conflicts or inconsistencies between Chinese 
attitudes to injustice and rights discourse (rights protection) should be discussed.
An extreme position appears to derive conclusions about the nature of 
rights in contemporary China from the supposed fact that there was no concept of 
rights in Chinese culture up to some rather recent point in Chinese history. In a 
rather early exposition of his approach, Peerenboom claims that rights ‘with 
Chinese characteristics’ are in some way determined by a protracted absence of 
‘rights’ in Chinese language.43 He quotes Macintyre on the conspicuous absence 
of such concepts in many languages and cultures.
“‘There is no expression in any ancient or medieval language correctly 
translated by our expression ‘a right’, until near the close of the middle 
ages: the concept lacks any means of expression in Hebrew, Greek, Latin 
or Arabic, classical or medieval, before 1400, let alone in Old English, or 
in Japanese even as late as the mid-nineteenth century.’”44
43 Again, it is actually quite difficult to maintain this. The word now used for ‘rights’ certainly 
can be traced back to the writings of Xunzi, though used there with a negative connotation, and 
generally translated as ‘power, profit’. See Angle, Angle, Stephen, Human Rights in Chinese 
Thought: A Cross Cultural Inquiry (Cambridge: 2002), and also my Chapter Three.
44 Peerenboom, ‘What’s Wrong with Chinese Rights: Toward a Theory of Rights with Chinese 
Characteristics’, in Alston, Philip, Human Rights Law (Aldershot: 1996), 293, p. 301, note 37. 
The -  famous - quotation is from Macintyre, Alaisdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory 
(Notre Dame: 1981), p. 67.
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He considers rights ‘with Chinese characteristics’ to be understood (and used) as 
only ‘instrumental’ in contemporary China. But it is difficult to understand why 
anyone could think that one could deduce the existence, or actuality, or practical 
importance of rights from the fact that there happened to be a word to express the 
idea of rights in some languages.45 The existence of such words in many 
languages is as little evidence for that, as is the non-existence for the contrary: a 
lot more argument would be needed to explain why linguistic practices of this 
kind were significant to what was right for participants of the practice, and no 
such argument is provided. Conversely, even if a culture or language does have 
the term, this does not settle that something of importance is denoted by it. Even 
if our observation of public discourse and contemporary legal practice leave us 
with a sense that many Chinese people ignore legal rights, this does not by itself 
mean that rights -  legal rights - are not important to Chinese people today.46
In the absence of any mechanisms or institutions that could serve the 
protection of legal rights, and in the absence, too, of any beliefs on the part of 
anyone in a particular society, that such rights are important, there might not be 
much point in discussing if rights ‘existed’ in such a community, although there 
can be reasonable disagreement about this question. But if there are institutions 
potentially capable of protecting legal rights, texts guaranteeing the protection of 
rights, and most importantly, people caring about them, disagreement will
45 In Natural Rights Theories: Their Origin and Development (Cambridge: 1979), Richard Tuck 
gives an account of early rights theories. His discussion brings out how controversial the 
understanding of rights was from the moment it began to be proposed as central to a political and 
legal theory (according to him, in the 16th century).
46 A similar objection has to be made to Lubmans comment that ‘[t]he concepts of rights held by 
litigants, whether peasant household or urban entrepreneurs, may be less rigid than those of 
Western counterparts....Even notions of rights that seem diluted by comparison to Western ideal 
types could, however, still be useful -  and perceived by claimants as being useful -  in bringing 
about results considered to be just or fair in a Chinese context.’ Lubman, Bird in a Cage 
(Stanford: 1999),. p. 303. It is difficult to understand why it is ‘useful’ if results are ‘considered’
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concentrate not on the ‘existence’ of rights, but on how important they are, and 
on the requirements for their protection. This kind of disagreement connects to 
wider discussions about the nature and status of legal rights and moral rights. 
China is now in the second kind of situation, as the following chapters show.
There is an obvious way in which the question how significant rights are in 
practice depends on the availability of effective legal remedies. This, and its 
emphasis on legal rights protecting a freedom  to make use of legal remedies as 
one wishes, must be why so many are attracted to Hart’s conceptual argument 
about the tautological nature of ‘moral right’ ,47 The purpose of a moral right, 
which he identifies as providing merely a reason for creating a legal right, 
renders a moral right (including the basic and abstract ‘moral’ right which he has 
identified) weak or ‘empty’.48 Ultimately, according to this account, rights must 
be legal rights, and these are characterised by the availability of enforceable legal 
remedies protecting rights. The advantage of such an understanding in the
to be just, or fair, ‘in a Chinese context’, as long as it is not clear if they are just in this context. 
Useful to whom?
47 Hart. Herbert L.A., ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, chapter three in Waldron, Jeremy (ed.), 
Theories o f Rights (Oxford: 1984), 79. (first published in The Philosophical Review vol. LXIV 
no. 2 (April 1955), pp. 175-91). ‘The statement that the fact that a moral right exists is a reason 
why there ought to be a legal right, would when spelt out, amount to the statement that the reason 
why there ought to be a certain legal right is that there ought to be a legal right.' Note that the 
statement that a moral right is ‘a reason’ for there to be ‘a certain legal right’ is considerably 
weaker than that it is ‘the reason’ why there should be a legal right.
48 Because of his description of rights as ‘existing’ only when there is an obligation on the part of 
someone else, Hart finds himself in some difficulty to decide if one has a (legal) ‘right’ to do 
what oneself is obligated to do. He characterises such a right as a ‘unilateral’ right, following 
Bentham, but calls this use of ‘right’ ‘odd’. See Hart, ‘Legal Rights’, in Essays on Bentham, 
Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford: 1982), 162. Yet it is not difficult to talk 
about rights to do or not do something, even when one has an obligation to do that thing. Note the 
use of ‘absolute’ rights and ‘relative’ obligations in Continental civil law: I may have an absolute 
right to transfer ownership in my book to B, even when I have a relative obligation to A to 
transfer ownership to A.
If moral as well as legal obligations have a bearing on what one should do, legally and 
morally, then one sees how Hart’s use of ‘unilateral right’ would have to be inflationary, to cover 
all those cases in which what one had a right to do was in some way wider (offered more options) 
than what one should do. If only legal obligation counts, on the other hand, then according 
priority to legal obligation over legal rights appears arbitrary and sometimes inaccurate. Both 
must come from some social source, e.g. legislative enactment, on this account (see just above on 
property right and contractual obligation).
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present ‘Chinese’ context is the helpful stress it puts on the availability of 
coercion; on the sense that justice must be done and that rights must be protected. 
It seems nevertheless mistaken in its narrow construction of the contexts in 
which force may be used to protect rights (it appears that only state force may be 
used, and only to protect legal rights that have been ‘created’), as well as in its 
exclusion of forms of conduct that respect rights without being accompanied by a 
supposedly authoritative threat of coercion.
All which one can do, sometimes, is to provide some kind of amends after 
the violation of a legal right has occurred; and the best one can do, sometimes, is 
to provide coercive protection against imminent rights violation. The legal 
mechanisms set up to protect legal rights reflect this. But it would be wrong to 
claim that therefore rights should be treated as nothing but entitlements to certain 
legal remedies, and hence ‘legal’ in ‘nature’. The proposition that ‘justice must 
be done’ cannot by itself be a reason for denying that there are moral rights.49 
Respect for rights could rest on non-coercive measures or conduct, even though 
justice must be done; we would not, could not, conclude from the breakdown of a 
particular political system protecting against rights violations that the rights 
concerned had somehow disappeared. Coercion cannot be used, except by a great 
stretch of the meaning of the word ‘protect’, to protect the right not to be tortured
49 See how Hart’s interpretation of legal and moral rights, and his insistence on an effective 
disjunction between the two kinds of right, applies in real cases. He rejects the use of legal 
‘rights’ f a - ‘a class of helots whom free citizens were allowed to treat as they wished...[in regard 
of] those acts which they were not forbidden by law to do.’ In such a case one might most 
naturally feel drawn to emphasising the helots’ moral rights. But even if Hart would allow that 
they had moral rights, if asked, he certainly rejects considering these as impacting the helots’ 
legal status. So far as the law is concerned, the helots have only ‘naked’ rights to which no legal 
obligation whatever is related. ‘Naked’ rights, according to Hart, are ‘nonentities’. If Hart 
allowed moral rights to play a role in this context, and allowed a fuller impact of ‘moral’ on legal 
rights, he could accept the idea of ‘naked’ rights as well. Naked rights would be rights 
unsupported by specific legal obligation.
when torture has already occurred, for instance. Here one cannot coerce into 
respect for legal rights, but only into making certain amends for violating them.50 
To come back to another example considered in the context of Chinese legal 
practice, we can make sense of the idea that someone has a right to an apology; 
at the same time, it is difficult to think of an apology as something anyone could 
have a legal right to. There is a point, in other words, to the idea of moral rights, 
which cannot be captured by the justification of legal coercion to enforce rights. 
Legal rights are one form of rights, specific to law as a peculiar social 
institution.51
This is an important point to make for the situation in China, just because 
the protection of legal rights is comparatively weak there. From the interpretive 
and moral perspective proposed here, the availability of legal remedies does not 
determine what legal rights Chinese people have. The question what legal rights 
there are is connected to the moral justification of rights, as well as to those 
rights guarantees available in international treaties such as the -  not yet ratified - 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the text of the 
constitution; though of course such guarantees require interpretation in the 
context of the legal system as a whole.52 It is wrong to say that ‘people’s legal 
rights are their moral rights’, and there has to be some other, more compelling, 
relationship between legal and moral rights than mere justification for ‘why there 
should be a legal right.’ If the relationship between legal and moral rights is not
50 It constitutes no argument against this, to point out that fear of legal punishment in accordance 
with a coercive legal rule will on the whole deter people from torturing, because ‘on the whole’ 
and ‘will’ signal merely predictive, non-normative statements. A similar point is made by Hart 
himself in his distinction between being obliged and being obligated. Although he makes this 
point, it is Hart’s recognition-based understanding of ‘legal rule’ that appears to give force to his 
basing the existence of rights on coercive legal rules.
51 Or: a legal right is ‘legal’ by being connected to the practice of a certain social institution.
52 This is important to the argument in Chapter Five, which also comments on Article 12 of the 
ICCPR, and to Chapter Seven, which discusses the status of constitutional rights.
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weak in the way suggested by Hart, we are thrown back on the question what 
moral and legal rights we have after all, and need to consider a new approach for 
understanding the particular edge of the idea of moral rights.531 sketch below 
what this means for China.
Above the distinction between what one should do and what one had a 
right to do was introduced, as a distinction important to changing Chinese 
attitudes.54 Note that if moral rights only have the shadow-like justificatory force 
proposed by Hart, then what I should do is indifferent to what moral rights I 
have, unless the moral right in question has already led to the creation of a legal 
right. It is still possible to make a linguistic distinction, but the distinction has no 
action-guiding, practical or ‘normative’ significance. Oddly, too, I do not seem to 
have an obligation to respect others’ merely moral rights not complemented in 
this way - except perhaps for an obligation to bring a complementing legal right 
into being, if I can. Of course, this does not mean that according to Hart, I have 
no moral obligation to respect other people, or that there are not certain things I 
must not under any circumstances do to them, whatever the law says! Indeed, 
one could argue in defence of Hart, to say that someone has no moral right to do 
something is only a particularly emphatic way of saying that they ought not to do 
it. It may be because of the indifference of the ultimate moral question what one 
should do, to what moral rights people have, which a positivistic understanding 
of legal and moral rights suggests, that many people are struck with a seeming 
indifference of ‘indigenous’ Chinese political and moral discourse to the idea of
53 Simmonds uses this question to characterise the ‘interest’ theory of rights as opposed to the 
‘will’ theory. Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (2nd edition, London: 2002), at pp. 304 
ff.
54 An interesting discussion of the change of attitude required, itself also reflecting an important 
attitude, can be found in Wang Xiyong (3:M f§), ‘Why not choose court to protect one’s rights?
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rights. But there is still room for further efforts to capture the point of moral 
rights in a more satisfactory way:
One way is to argue that to say someone has no right to do something is not 
just emphatically saying that they ought not to do it.55 Waldron claims that there 
are several distinct moral rights protecting a range o f options of conduct, all of 
which options one may choose in a specific situation, in the sense that 
interference, or at least coercive interference, with them would not be justified.56 
Necessarily, he says, this protects in some cases against interference with doing 
what is wrong.
‘The cutting edge of a rights-claim is the claim that it entails about the 
wrongness of interfering with the action that the right-bearer has chosen. 
So what is defended or contested when a general right is in dispute is the 
claim that choice within a certain range is not to be interfered with. This 
claim in turn is usually defended on the basis of the importance of the 
choices in the range in question for the lives of the individuals who are 
making them.’57
He forcefully points out why it is right that one should respect a right to do 
wrong. But he is not very clear about the way the right to do wrong is limited.
(Weiquan weihe bu xuan fayuan?, K?)’, in Nanfang Ribao ($3 f j  H ) of 20
July 2004, available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/spqy/200407200003.asp.
55 In 'Ought, Must and the aims of morality’, a lecture given at Oxford on 28 October 2002, 
Bernard Williams identifies proper moral uses of must as uses at the end of moral deliberation 
and differentiates these from the use of ‘ought’ which can apply, for instance, to conflicting 
moral obligations. Used in the negative this distinction applies too. In the main text I argue that 
certain apparently true propositions about things one should not do (because others had rights that 
one not do them) can be rejected at a later stage of deliberation. To such ‘prima facie rights’, then 
only the expression ‘ought not’ should be applied.
561 might also call it an ‘area’ conception but the use of this metaphor is limited. It might confuse 
especially in regard to the right to do wrong, which Waldron defends. If one has a right to choose 
among right and wrong actions, ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ or some ‘wrong choices’ must belong to one 
area. See also the exchange between Waldron and Pildes in ‘Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social 
Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitutionalism’, (1998) Oxford Journal o f Legal Studies 
725) and two contributions to the 2000 issue of the same Journal, pp. 302 and 309 ff. (‘Pildes on 
Dworkin’s Theory of Rights’ and ‘Dworkin’s Two Conceptions of Rights’).
57 Waldron, Jeremy, ‘’The Right to do Wrong’, chapter 3 in Waldron, Liberal Rights. Collected 
papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge: 1993), 80-81.
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For Waldron, the limits of what wrong things one has a right to do, appear to be 
set by an historical kind of consensus.58
‘...Over the centuries, a certain liberal consensus has evolved: 
individuals' political activities, their intimate relations with others, their 
public expressions of opinions, their choice of associates, their 
participation in self-governing groups and organizations, particularly 
political organizations and labor unions, their choice of an occupation -  
all these have been regarded as particularly important in people’s 
definitions of themselves.'59
But paradoxically, if proceeding from an abstract ‘right to do wrong’ we sought 
to establish limits of such a right using ‘shared’ ‘traditional’ liberties as Waldron 
suggests we do, no such limits would appear to exist, where no shared traditions 
of liberal rights could be identified. There would, indeed, appear to be a ‘right’ to 
do anything wrong; or we would be reduced to the mere unhelpful formula that 
‘we have a moral right to do wrong, up to a point.’ In a place where we could not 
confidently point to a popular tradition of defending and protecting rights, this 
would be a problem. We can only avoid the conclusion that what it would be 
wrong to do and what we have no right to do appear the same,60 if we are able to
58 Dworkin, in his earlier ‘What Rights Do We Have?’, in Taking Rights Seriously (London: 
1977), 268, also discusses the related projects of preserving a right to do wrong, and determining 
what distinct liberties we have. Dworkin reminds us of Berlin’s famous argument few an 
(according to my terminology) abstract understanding of liberty, but argues that in order to 
maintain this abstract view of political liberty, one would have to ‘water down’ the idea of a 
right, to the point where the right to liberty would be ‘something hardly worth having at all. 
Preceding Waldron, Dworkin argues that the political ideal of equality requires an identification 
of specific liberties against a general background right to equal respect and concern. These 
distinct liberties according to Waldron’s terminology are ‘specific’ liberties, but ‘general’ in 
designating, each of them, distinct ‘ranges of options’.
Finnis believes that there are ‘fixed points’ which could be identified as ‘absolute rights’, not 
culture bound, and mentions among these ‘most obviously, the right not to have one’s life taken 
directly as a means to any further end; but also the right not to be positively lied to in any 
situation (e.g. teaching, preaching, research publication, news broadcasting) in which factual 
communication (as distinct from fiction, jest, or poetry) is reasonably expected; and the related 
right not to be condemned on knowingly false charges, ...[and] the right to be taken into 
respectful consideration in any assessment of what the common good requires.’ Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: 1980), 219 f. Characteristically, Finnis’s is an enumeration of 
things that others should not or should do to oneself, rather than of what one has a right to do.
59 Waldron, ibid. 81.
60 And this was the project we embarked on after the discussion of Hart’s account just above.
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point out what we have a right to do, whether or not it is wrong for us to do it. 
Unless we work out a plausible account of this, the liberal attraction of having 
rights is considerably reduced; and this can only be worked out by making full 
use of background justifications for having rights at all. A mere appeal to 
tradition will not do. Waldron should be read as proposing a structure for rights - 
centred argument: it begins with pointing to a certain range of options, and 
continues with explaining the importance of its inviolability and inalienability.
This might prompt us to return to Hart’s abstract, but also useful -  and of 
course not new - suggestion that moral rights make only sense with the proviso 
that they are limited by the rights of others - another way of expressing their 
abstract justification by equality and freedom. Hart, of course, presents it as an 
hypothetical account.61 This kind of limitation (which we could call Kantian) 
does not allow us to define any distinct ranges or areas of choice one has in a 
given situation; but at least it states that there are certain limits and gives us an 
idea of how to determine them. However widely rights may be interpreted, in 
order for there to be a right at all, that right must be limited by others’ rights. The 
freedom to murder, for instance, is not -  as we might put it - normatively 
valuable ‘freedom’. These considerations, Hart’s Kantian one and Waldron’s and 
Dworkin’s one, are not entirely irreconcilable. They both assert that there is only 
so far individual people can be persuaded to do the right thing, because they are 
free. Coercing people is prima facie wrong. These propositions are also 
reconcilable with the principles of the Chinese practices considered above, since 
the importance of doing right, of persuading, of avoiding coercion if possible do 
not contradict any of them. Therefore on a ‘strong’ interpretation of moral
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rights, one that does not view them as mere shadows of legal rights, it is easy to 
make this connection, whereas the positivistic understanding considered earlier 
on suggested that legal rights had no interpretive connection with common and 
characteristic responses to wrongs and injustice in China. Chinese responses to 
injustice are compatible with -  they are not inconsistent with - ‘rights talk’. 
Rights as responses to wrongs and injustice - rights against injustice - most 
importantly impose a structure on answering the question what should be done in 
cases of dispute, whereby the wishes and views of individuals are respected in a 
particular way. This gives the voice of the rights-bearer a special significance; it 
cannot, of course, transform wrong views into right views, but it protects people 
to make decisions for themselves within certain limits, and to resist the violation 
of their rights.
61 For reasons evident from the previous discussion. He says that if there are any moral rights at 
all, then this must be their structure or nature.
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Chapter Three Rights-assertion, dispute resolution and justice
Rights and liberal values. The previous chapter argued that there was no 
inconsistency between a number of responses to injustice described as common 
in China to date, and asserting legal and moral rights against injustice. Chapter 
Two also threw doubt on the usefulness of claims to an alleged ‘liberal’ 
consensus settling what rights people have. It is possible to employ the idea of 
rights, including moral rights, in a variety of social relationships and structures, 
and while it is important to identify particular ‘areas’ of life in which people have 
rights, we also need to provide some argument for why this is important in a 
particular society or culture.1 Of course, such argument must try to be persuasive, 
so it aims at consensus or unanimity. Some think that if only rights could be 
introduced without the added weight of ‘foreign’ beliefs in liberal values, they 
would be more welcome in China. Around the time at which some of the cases to 
be addressed in my further account of Chinese legal practices happened, Ames 
and Hall suggest that
‘Contemporary China remains, even under “communism”, a ritually 
constituted society, without even a rhetorical appeal to the belief in 
objective principles often associated with liberal reflections upon the 
issue of human rights. The very idea of some regimen of human rights 
possessed prior to their being granted by the particular society to which 
one belongs, has never been an assumption of Chinese rulers or peoples. 
But, as we shall see, this does not mean that the Chinese are left without 
any guarantees of social or political rights. The real irony of the liberal 
approach to human rights is that even if it were wholly defensible, the
1 Human rights treaties, which place states under obligation to protect rights under the rules and 
principles of international law, are good starting points for an argument about the implications of 
this obligation. I give an outline for such an argument regarding the right to move freely in 
Chapter Five. There, I address Article 12 of the ICCPR and say that China has to honour its 
obligation under this convention, but also argue that there is an independent reason for protecting 
the right to move freely, as interpretation of China’s own constitution shows.
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exclusive rhetoric of its presentation precludes Chinese investment in its 
ideas and implications.’"
This is a stunning assertion: do the authors happen to know that no one in China 
has ever even assumed that rights might be anything but ‘granted’ rights? Of 
course they do not; hence the confusing reference to aggregate ‘peoples’ and 
‘rulers’.3 The discussion in later chapters throws doubt on such assertions about 
Chinese beliefs, by providing evidence of Chinese people thinking and talking 
about and defending rights without, necessarily, abandoning certain beliefs or 
values they hold as part of their own culture.4 For the more abstract discussion in 
this chapter it must be noted, recalling what has been said in the previous 
chapter, that it is not at all evident that the ideas that people are free, and that 
they are equals, are alien to specific Chinese beliefs and attitudes about what is 
just. The importance accorded to being persuasive in remonstration and 
mediation, for instance, suggests that freedom of mind is valued. This value 
accorded to freedom of mind is therefore as much a condition of being 
persuasive, as it is a fact about the participants in any particular discourse.5 Even 
a practice of deference toward another person, to give another example, while it 
suggests some measure of inequality, does not entail morally significant
2 Hall, David, and Ames, Roger, ‘A Pragmatist Understanding of Confucian Democracy’, in Bell, 
Daniel, and Hahm Chaibong, Confucianism for the Modem World (Cambridge: 2003), 124, at p. 
152 f.
3 It appears most plausible that it is Ames and Hall themselves who make ‘assumptions’, or claim 
that certain institutions and types of conduct in China can be best explained as requiring certain 
assumptions and not allowing others, on the part of those (Chinese) upholding these institutions. 
But this claim has considerably less force than the claim that the people in question do not, in 
fact, ‘assume’ the truth of liberal principles.
4 To quote Chad Hansen, ‘The Asian Values Debate and the Moral Synthesis Goals of 
Comparative Philosophy’, online at http://www.hku.hk/philodep/ch/aparights.html: ‘To isolate 
“Confucianism” as the community and draw them out of the context of their fellow language 
users is a transparent attempt to evade internally warranted criticism. Needless to say, this is an 
obvious objection, since the people being jailed in China are Chinese citizens, bom, raised and 
educated in China, not Western Rawls scholars. Clearly Chinese norms of practical reason always 
have and still do contain powerful grounds for rejecting Confucian authoritarianism.’
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inequality, or a morally significant lack of freedom, for it is possible to be 
deferent of one’s own accord, and for good reasons. Just as not insisting on what 
is due to oneself presupposes, rather than undermines, the idea of something 
being due to oneself, so, too, the idea of having rights is reconcilable with a 
certain variety of (culturally specific) schemes as to what rights one has,6 and 
with a variety of methods of dispute resolution. To elaborate on this idea is the 
aim of the present chapter, which goes beyond showing that there is no 
inconsistency, and tries to argue that some Chinese ideas and attitudes can help 
us better to understand what having rights means, by requiring us to connect this 
idea to controversies about moral values in Western philosophy. So this chapter 
is the constructive complement to the previous chapter. It argues that rights 
discourse gives adjudication a structure that specially accommodates public 
dissensus, and therefore protects the free and equal status of people in dispute. 
Like any normative practice, including apologies and conciliation, remonstration 
and mediation, rights discourse is also premised on there being right answers and 
meeting the demands of justice as well as possible, and the implications of this, 
too, are drawn out here.
Doing justice to the victim of injustice requires, surely, taking the victim’s 
own wishes and judgement into account to some degree. At the same time,
5 This is a little similar to Habermas’s ‘Kantian’ ‘counterfactual’ assumption. Habermas, 
Fakiizitaet und Geltung (Frankfurt a.M.: 1992).
6 See, again, Dworkin’s, ‘What Rights Do We Have?’, in Taking Rights Seriously (London: 1977). 
If contemporary human rights treaties attempt an enumeration of central rights that anyone has, 
we should, I suggest, see such enumerations as practical postulates for the people on earth here 
and now, rather than troubling ourselves with the question if people in ancient China or Egypt 
‘had the same human rights as we have.’ The irritation with which we respond to efforts to relate 
the application of human rights guarantees to our own factual situation is perhaps a residue of the 
dogmas of empiricism, compelling us to distinguish between what is true as a matter of 
contingent empirical fact and what is conceptually true. Quine, ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’, 
(1950) in From a Logical Point o f View (1964). A conception of truth opposing this rigid 
distinction might accept, for instance, that if human life’s physical conditions were entirely 
different from what they are, our moral values might be different.
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justice requires that like cases must be treated alike.7 The adjudication process 
leading up to court judgements about a person's rights capture, so to speak, a 
particular moment, at which rights have been asserted by bringing specific claims 
before the court, and therefore the question about what is just has become 
considerably sharpened, to the question of what follows from certain legal rights 
for these claims asserted, on a general assumption that the principle of treating 
like cases alike will hold. The assumption is that a right one has will be protected 
by the judges' independent and if necessary coercively enforceable judgement.8 
Sometimes, we perceive a mechanical uniformity of different cases and the way 
they are taken to and handled in court. For instance, in certain personal injury 
claims cases, it seems possible to -  or at least some people try to - put price tags 
on all kinds of rights violation, so far as monetary compensation is sought in 
court. On the other hand, sometimes people want solutions which cannot be 
easily provided by this court practice, and there is the phenomenon of mediation 
in all its varieties, conciliation and settlement out of court. It is by some regarded 
as an irritating and disturbing alternative. There appears to many to be a conflict
7 Treating like cases alike is a controversial requirement of justice. See for instance Wiggins’s 
discussion of claims of need in Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: 1987), pp. 51 ff., regarding the 
requirement as unclear. Raz’s discussion of equality characterises it as scarcely related to a 
morally significant notion of justice, in chapter nine of The Authority o f Law (Oxford: 1979) -  as 
a mere requirement that rules and/ex' principles be applied. Some use the expression 
‘contextualised justice’, reminding us of the well-known cautions against relying on precedent in 
Imperial Chinese law.
Note also the difference between criminal law and tort law in this context, tracking the 
dividing line between supposed private and public realms, or types of dispute, in our legal system. 
I resume discussion of this problem in my discussion of criminal law in chapter 7.
8 By contrast petitions a - complaints made toward a government authority come early to present 
this sharpened question about what legal rights require. In terms of technical administrative law, 
the authority appealed to will often have (administrative) discretion to choose among a number of 
lawful options. On the other hand in the most extreme form of remonstration, public suicide, it 
seems too late for the rights of the suicide protester to be practically significant.
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between adjudication and what is termed ‘alternative’ forms of dispute 
resolution.9
Not seeking the resolution of disputes in courts of law adjudicating over 
rights might obstruct not only the justice of treating like cases alike - how can it 
be just that, say, one tortfeasor may ‘get away with’ a mere apology, when 
another has to pay damages? It might also hinder the development of law as a 
growing body of rules and principles; rules and principles which are sometimes 
replaced by new ones. What if, Luban asks rhetorically, Brown v Board o f 
Education had settled out of court? Then, it is suggested, no publicly knowable, 
publicly announced standard to the effect that segregation denied people’s equal 
status would have resulted from the resolution of this dispute.10 A similar point 
could be made about many other ‘new’ rules and principles crystallised from the 
adjudicative process, both (though to varying extents) in civil and common law 
jurisdictions.
But then, so what? It is surely very difficult to think of a reason why the 
parties to the dispute in Brown could have been forbidden to settle their dispute 
by an agreement reached out of court and without a court decision, even though
9 Bernard Williams defines as the aim of relativism to explain away a conflict, and says that so 
far as it is possible to ‘find in the two [conflicting] statements a form that makes them 
straightforwardly compatible’ the problem then faced by the ‘relational’ relativist is to explain 
why it looked as if there had been a conflict. Precisely in those cases where a logical relation 
dispelling the appearance of conflict can be established, the second task is very difficult. 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (London: 1985), p. 156. Having argued that the 
idea of having rights is not inconsistent with any of the practices described above, this second 
difficulty is my difficulty now. My strategy is to point out that there is conflict not at the abstract 
level of the question whether one has rights, but at the more concrete level of what rights one has 
and how rights are protected.
10 Luban, David, ‘Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm’, (1995) 83 Georgetown Law 
Journal 2619. It is important to take in the significance of the expression ‘out of court’, as this 
suggests the presence -  the general availability - of courts, whereas in China, courts are not yet 
real courts, in some places. (If public standards, rules and principles of justice are upheld by 
public courts, the question prompted by this finding goes, what of places where there simply are 
no such institutions, and consequently no such standards can be set up?)
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we may feel very happy, now, that they did not, and had the matter out in court.11 
Or was there, after all, some kind of civic duty to come forth and fight in court 
for equality, against racial segregation? I think that there is no general intuitive 
response to this question. We can see value in rights assertion as well as in more 
conciliatory forms of dispute resolution. Still some writers, perhaps most notably 
Fiss,12 invoking Western moral philosophy, have argued that there is a general 
need for ‘public’ adjudication serving as well as elaborating public (universal) 
values, as an intrinsically superior way of resolving disputes.
The discussion here addresses these controversies by a discussion of an 
aspect important to different forms of dispute resolution -  varying degrees and 
uses of publicness -  and a discussion of the principle of universalisability. Some 
contemporary philosophers in the so-called ‘analytic’ tradition have connected 
universalisability to the liberal values of equality and impartiality, as they have 
also connected publicness to truth. A critical interpretation of the Kantian 
universalisability urges the conclusion that due to the centrality of this test, 
publicness as a form of dispute resolution has only indirect value. Publicness is 
not by itself an indispensable property of just dispute resolution outcomes: it has 
value as a justice-enhancing form (‘form’ as opposed to substance) of dispute 
resolution, but it has no intrinsic justifying value. This can help us to qualify the 
characterisation of rights as ‘impersonal’, understand what is morally good in the 
so-called ‘alternative’ forms of dispute resolution, and provide the elements of an 
account of justice in private and public settings. It can also help to get a better
11 And I think we can imagine the case to have settled on just terms.
12 Fiss, Owen, ‘Against Settlement’ (1984), chapter nine in Freeman, Michael (ed.), Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (New York: 1995). Luban’s critique, which I discuss below, goes further than 
Fiss, insofar as it argues for public adjudication at a more abstract, or conceptual level, than Fiss 
does.
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insight into Chinese responses to injustice and forms of dispute resolution, and 
provide a link to an important thought in Confucian philosophy.
Universalisability. Universalisability is related to the principles of treating like 
cases alike and others as equals, which have just been mentioned. The Kantian 
principle of universalisability, as a test for whether one’s actions are morally 
right or permissible, has been expressed most famously as the requirement that 
one should act so as to make the maxim of one’s willing compatible with a 
general -  or universal -  law, mirrors principles formulated by many others, 
which use what Bernard Williams has characterised as a ‘role reversal test’.13 
The vocabulary Kant employs already moves us close to the domain of law, as 
does his use of ‘the moral law’, of course. For Kant, law or objective ‘right’ 
(Recht) only governs our external actions, and has the added formal property of 
publicness; but there are strong connections between law and what he calls the 
moral law (Sittengesetz, das moralische Gesetz).
David Wiggins has addressed a seemingly puzzling consequence of the 
universalisability requirement. He considers whether this requirement means that 
as a matter of morality, one may have to assert a particular kind of claim against 
one’s inclination or against a moral urge to be generous and forgiving -  on pain, 
as it were, of counteracting a public morality based on rights assertion.14
‘It appears that when universalized in Kant’s fashion, the maxim ‘To 
release my debtor from his debt, as an act of mere generosity’ must stand 
convicted of what Kant calls a ‘contradiction in conception’. (Anyone 
who knows what debt is must know that, if everyone acted on the maxim 
‘to release a debtor as an act of generosity’, then most of the expectations 
presupposed to lending and borrowing would lapse, and then the practices
13 Williams, Bernard, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (London: 1985), p. 82 ff.
14 In Wiggins’ example the right (claim) is waived.
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presupposed to the intention to release one’s debtor from his debt as an 
act of simple generosity would lapse too.) Nobody is normally required to 
release his debtor, but it is strange to be required not to.
Where the contradiction in conception test seems problematic, we can 
still subject intentions and their maxims to the test of consistency of 
willing. But...[i]f rational agency presupposes that nothing empirical 
should fix the character of what is done, and if this means that what is 
done must flow from the agent’s giving himself as a law (his pre- 
empirical selfs giving himself as a law) what empirically 
uncontaminated reason proposes, then Kant needs to be able to confirm 
the Kantian purity of the rationality of the agent’s will to ensure (say) that 
he is helped when he needs help...Is there any account that can do this 
without importing the metaphysical ideas occasionally drawn upon by 
Kant that commit one to a quite distinct conception of ethics (...)?’15
Wiggins argues that ‘post-Kantian universalizers’ mischaracterised, or 
misunderstood, the nature of the Kantian self when applying this 
universalisability test.16 They mistakenly interpret it as an empirically real self 
exercising, as it were, self-interested judgement, without yet also exercising 
moral judgement. This self has of course actual desires and drives and intentions 
and so on; it purports to be an T  in the real world, not an agent of rationality 
according to Kant’s conception of people -  all people - as belonging to both an 
empirical and a noumenal world. The post-Kantians mistakenly believe that we 
can use what people - conceived of in this ‘empirically contaminated’ way - 
would decide for themselves, as ‘input’ for the universalisation process. The 
outcome of such a thought experiment, according to these post-Kantians, must be 
correct moral judgement, made in the particular form of a somewhat law-like 
maxim. There is of course notorious disagreement over whether we can usefully 
abstract from certain given circumstances we are actually in, or stipulate 
ignorance of them, to improve conditions for making a universalising judgement
15 Wiggins, Needs, Values, Truth (Oxford: 1987), p. 69.
16 This is an approximate way of putting it, as Wiggins is critical of the idea of personal identity.
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on this kind of account; but the post-Kantians make no effort - do not care to 
make any effort - to uphold Kant’s metaphysical premises.17
Wiggins is right in his criticism of many ‘post-Kantian universalisers’. For 
as frequently pointed out, despite our desire to identify some general criterion for 
moral goodness or rightness applying to whatever we do, there is no way we can 
work out a helpful process of making choices that would be ‘best’ for us, without 
already demanding that we make those choices as moral choices. But then, why 
universalise at all? Wiggins proposes that there is another and better way of 
universalising in the sense of ‘doing the best for all taken together,’ rather than 
indexing the moral judgment to be made to who oneself is in the first place.18 For 
the post-Kantian universalisers (except Wiggins), this will require them to stop 
‘trying to determine a recognizably moral content for morality by seeing it as the 
instrument for the harmonization of interests as pre-morally conceived.’ 19 
‘Doing the best for all taken together’ according to Wiggins ‘does not define the
moral point of view, it presupposes it, and at best makes what it presupposes
20more explicit.’
17 Nagel uses a related sort of test, proposed by Scanlon, for explaining what is wrong here: 
(using Scanlon's test of reasonable rejection): ‘Because the situation involves a conflict of 
interests, any maxim on which a person proposes to act would, if universalized, conflict with 
what he would want for himself in at least one of the hypothetical positions he might occupy 
under it’ Nagel, Thomas, Equality and Partiality (Oxford: 1992) at pp. 42 f. See also Scanlon, 
Thomas, What We Owe To Each Other (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1998). Nagel quotes 
Scanlon’s earlier essay ‘Contractualism and Utilitarianism’ in Sen, Amartya, and Williams, 
Bernard, Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge: 1982).
18 Wiggins does not use the idea of identity in this context.
19 Ibid. p. 75. In a similar vein (whatever their differences may be further into the argument) 
Williams explains, critically, that Rawls compared to Kant assumes a ‘less radical’ ignorance. 
‘The point is that a self-interested choice in ignorance of one’s identity is supposed to model in 
important respects non-self-interested or moral choice under ordinary conditions of knowledge 
(...) [But I]f self-interested rational choice is what is at issue it is hard to see how the question of 
probabilities [of ending up one way or the other in real society] can altogether be avoided, or 
how, if the probability of ending up as a slave were small enough, it would not be rational for the 
parties to choose a system involving slavery if it conveyed large enough other benefits.’ 
Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy (London: 1985), pp. 78-9
20 Ibid. p. 78. On this account, of two ‘suspicions’ Nagel phrases ibid at p. 43, only the first is an 
actually troubling one: ‘[T]he sort of question that I have said must be answered in applying the 
categorical imperative is itself so close to a moral question about the right way to deal with
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With what appears to be a similar purpose, Williams reminds us that 
‘sympathetic identification with others' as one of the elements that gives force to 
utilitarianism/ cannot be understood as a procedure that guarantees correct 
moral judgement:
‘[T]he insightful understanding of others’ feelings possessed by the 
sympathetic person is possessed in much the same form by the sadistic or 
cruel person (...) [M]oral thinking demands no sense of ‘know’ except 
knowledge, and it is a truth, if not a conceptual one, that any knowledge it 
can use may be turned against it.’22
This observation helps to understand in what way empathy is important, and how 
it connects to the universalisability test. Contrary to Rawls and other post- 
Kantian ‘constructivists’, universalisation understood properly does not describe 
a procedure, required by the criterion of universalisability, the outcome of which 
is moral judgement. According to Wiggins, one is instead required to consider 
another’s viewpoint, in a process which one can usefully call ‘universalisation’, 
in the following way, and which also invokes the value of publicness.
‘He [the universaliser] can consult the moral ideas that he has already and 
that others have, holding tentatively fast to his own but also holding these 
ideas open to subversion by anything that might affect them when he 
contemplates other positions, especially positions that are strange to him, 
and the moral outlooks of those who occupy these other positions. He 
endorses a judgment as correct only if, even when in the ways described 
he imagines himself occupying different standpoints and is properly 
influenced by that, he still endorses the judgment as correct. And if any 
two universalisers endorse different judgments then they have to hunt 
down the source of the discrepancy.’ (p. 81) ... Universalizers of the new 
sort do not make moral judgements out of desires, or out of the rational 
will (whether autonomous or heteronomous). Having the candidate 
judgments already, what they do is subject them to a publicness or 
objectivity test by which we should regulate any would-be objective
conflicting interests that it invites the suspicion that the whole procedure is empty: that the 
categorical imperative cannot be the basis of morality because to derive results from it one must 
rely on the very moral judgements one is trying to derive.’
21 Besides the idea of role-reversal discussed above.
22 Williams, ibid. (note 13) at p. 91.
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judgment about anything at all, e.g. an object of perception. “It seems to 
me thus and so. I think it is thus and so. But not everyone agrees: and 
how would it strike me if I looked at the scene from over there, or from 
underneath?’ (p. 81) ... What these precepts point to as the aspiration of 
moral discourse is nothing less than the objectivity and publicness that 
are proprietary to truth... ’"3
If universalisation led to a moral judgement as an outcome from a procedure 
processing some non-moral input (information, non-moral judgements, desires, 
interests), one could point at the procedure of universalisation and say, ‘it has to 
be right, because it has been produced in this way.’ Then, indeed, what is 
morally right could map a kind of crudely understood moral ‘legislation’24 aimed, 
exclusively, at distributing rights. And rights might then indeed appear to 
correspond to ‘interests pre-morally conceived’. The moralising effect of the 
universalisation technique would be to make such interests compatible, by seeing 
how much of an individual’s interests remained as worthy of protection, after 
undergoing the universalisation procedure, which ascertained that one 
individual’s interests did not detract from or impinge on another individual’s 
interests. On the basis of an understanding of rights as worked out in the previous 
chapter, this cannot be correct.
However we understand the role of role-reversal in moral argument, it 
cannot lead to a complete denial of the freedom of the other person to decide for
23 Ibid. p. 84. Compare this to Guest’s account of direct equality: ‘If we want to persist with 
equality as a moral ideal, it means that we should not say that a state of affairs is morally unequal 
and therefore wrong because it consists of unequal outcomes. Rather, we should understand 
equality as a relationship between ourselves and others. If we have genuinely been treated as an 
equal then we cannot have a grievance about justice. Directing our understanding this way shows 
that an appeal to equality is displayed in the common sort of complaint that goes ‘I’m a person, 
too’, or ‘Try to see it from my point of view’, or ‘Be fair to me.’ Here, treating a person as an 
equal means ‘acting with the awareness that another is, in the important aspects, equal to 
yourselfY Stephen Guest, ‘Why The Law Is Just’, (2000) Current Legal Problems 31. Guest 
apparently agrees that moral equality requires something different from what can be expressed in 
a logical universalising formula and this too appears to come out in Wiggins’s critique and re­
interpretation of universalisation. But there are differences, too. Guest obviously is aiming at a
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themselves what their interests are. People have moral obligations but they are 
not interchangeable moral agents just acting out moral obligations and rights. 
Only in a (Kantian?) world in which anything that is wrong is also an 
infringement of freedom and in which freedom threatens to verge on the freedom 
only to do the right thing,25 might this appear to be no problem; but then in a 
Kantian scheme, the moral law would only be required because humans are not 
purely rational, and legal rights would have to be understood as flowing from the 
principle of objective right, which only governs what Kant calls ‘external’ 
actions in the empirical world, and therefore not the freedom to think, judge, 
differently and wrongly.26 We are not acting on ‘interests’ conceived without the 
important moral ingredient of freedom to choose for ourselves. But neither would 
it be correct to say that the concept of a right is analytically exhausted by the idea 
of an option to release another from a duty, at one’s own discretion.27 It has been 
pointed out how this empty and formalistic approach fails to explain the
judgement about equality, and about justice. Wiggins is suggesting a test or ‘consciousness 
requirement’ for moral judgement generally.
24 The word ‘legislation’ is used by Kant in one of his formulations of the categorical imperative.
25 Isaiah Berlin’s charge against Kant, in ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in Four Essays on Liberty 
(Oxford: 1969).
There is little reason to think that Kant would have agreed with there being a moral right to do 
wrong. Consider his stance on ‘a supposed right to lie for benevolent reasons’ (which is that there 
is no such right). But note that while Kant explicitly condemns lying under any circumstances, he 
might have difficulties with negligently wrong statements, and it seems impossible to understand 
him as saying that people must not say wrong things at all, even when they are making an honest 
mistake! One should point out at this stage that being wrong in argument and doing wrong are 
different things, but error, it appears, may affect both. - Consider, too, Kant’s definition of Recht 
(objective right) as the whole of the conditions under which the voluntary actions of any one 
person can be harmonized in reality with the voluntary actions of every other person, according to 
a universal law of freedom. Here, voluntary action or choice (Willkuer) is the action or choice of 
real human beings, which may, of course, be wrong. Seen from that perspective, and considering 
that Kant also asserts that right {Recht) ‘comes from’ justice, there seems to be an argument for 
people having a range of (in Dworkin’s and Waldron’s sense) morally meaningful options 
protected by Recht, and rights, on Kantian terms. Kant, Metaphysics o f Morals, translation here 
used available at /ztfp://www,41iterature .net/Immanuel_Kant/Science_of_Right/2.html.
26 Kant says in his Metaphysics o f Morals (1785), in the chapter ‘Doctrine of Right’: ‘Now, 
everything that is wrong is a hindrance of freedom, according to universal laws; and compulsion 
or constraint of any kind is a hindrance or resistance made to freedom. Consequently, if a certain 
exercise of freedom is itself a hindrance of the freedom that is according to universal laws, it is 
wrong; and the compulsion of constraint which is opposed to it is right.’
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inalienability of certain rights, or the distinction between rights alienation and 
rights waiver.28 We are of course aware, too, that real freedom to think and judge 
for oneself also requires the freedom to make public use of one’s reason -  that it 
requires a right to free speech.29 In this context, some important freedoms such as 
the freedom of speech may usefully be related to general human ‘interests’.
To choose a rights-centred mode of moral discussion cannot mean that the 
business of determining morally right actions becomes suddenly limited to 
sorting out what rights each person has and what obligations on the part of others 
follow from, or correspond to, such rights. This would imply an odd, overly 
mechanical conception of rights. There is an added, empathetic, other-conscious 
aspect to them. The discussion above has had the goal of bringing out that this
TOaspect can be understood in terms of the universalisability test. There is no
general obligation to exercise one’s rights in a particular assertive way, or to
assert or enforce claims toward others just because one is morally permitted to
assert or morally capable of asserting them. This is as pointless as it would be to
11
characterise a person as just, for instance, just because he had a certain right. 
Asserting one’s rights in court (or any other forum) is not generally more 
reasonable or more rational, or otherwise superior compared to not asserting
27 This is generally thought to be the gist of the ‘will’ theory of rights.
28 Compare Simmonds, Nigel, Central Issues in Jurisprudence (2nd edition, Cambridge: 2002) at 
pp. 310 ff..
A distinction between public and private use of reason was used by Kant in ‘What is 
Enlightenment?’ (Koenigsberg, 1784). In a private relationship as with one’s employer, there 
may be restrictions on what one may say, but not in public. But while the public use of reason 
should be free, there is no right to disobey a command based on ‘public’ law, according to Kant 
(see just below).
30 To revert to the example, there may be no duty not to enforce a claim, but even so it may be 
right to do so, and doing so may be a particularly good realisation of moral freedom.
31 Williams draws our attention to Aristotle’s claim that a person who was just ‘stood between’ a 
person who suffered injustice, and a person who inflicted injustice. On the face of it, this rightly 
strikes us as odd. Williams says that the central case of acting justly is making a just distribution. 
Bernard Williams, ‘Justice as a Virtue’, in Rorty, Amelie (editor), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics 
(Berkeley: 1980), 189, at p. 191. My argument here concentrates more on reactions to injustice
one’s rights in court. But neither can we say on the basis of the above that it 
might not be better to litigate in certain cases, or that one might not have a duty 
to do so, arising not from the fact of having a right, but from some other 
circumstance.32 This confirms that a moral judgement of what rights one has 
cannot be conclusive of what one should do.
Even though rights are a matter of justice and though justice ‘must be 
done,’ it would be as wrong as it would be impossible to compel people to stand 
up to those who infringed their rights in those situations when it matters, as in 
Brown v Board o f Education. With Waldron, we should appreciate the difference 
between alienating rights and waiving rights, and understand that what a rights- 
centred conception of justice requires is merely that certain rights must not be 
alienated, even though they may be waived on occasion.33 This matters to how 
we should assess the situation in China, where the disposition of people to assert 
their legal rights is growing, but slowly. However enthusiastically we may 
endorse the protection of rights or of certain particularly important rights, we 
depend to some extent on such factual dispositions for a confident assertion that 
the protection of rights in a particular place or society is required. Many mixed 
motivations can deter people from taking the rights they have to court: fear, for 
instance, or the desire to restore a relationship to genuine reconciliation and 
peace. Of course, we are allowed to persuade people of the importance of certain 
rights.
than on ways of being just. Such reactions can be right or wrong, even when a just distribution of 
rights has been put in place.
32 Consider in this context the status of rights against the state and in particular, perhaps the right 
to freedom of mind; a freedom which Kant characterises as also a duty. From his perspective 
(that is, rejecting that there is a meaningful ‘right to do wrong’) it seems that rights (just) are 
coercively protected rights against being wronged by others, but even on this account it seems 
there could be no obligation to insist on their coercive enforcement to prevent a wrong or provide 
a remedy when having been wronged.
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A cautious and critical understanding of the requirement of 
universalisability, one that does not seek to understand it as a kind of procedure 
for harmonising interests but as an injunction to consider the other person, 
including their moral views, has a further advantage of importance to the present 
study. It allows one to connect to important Confucian ideas, notably that of 
‘alterity’ or ‘reciprocity’ or ‘altruism’34 or, indeed, ‘the Golden Rule’, shu.35 
Both shu and zhong36 are aspects of ren, human-heartedness, according to 
Confucian teaching.
‘Zigong asked: “Is there a single word such that one could practice it 
through all one’s life?” The master said: “Reciprocity perhaps? What you
*>7
do not want done to yourself, do not do to others.’”
These ideas allow us to re-examine the claim that Chinese culture, in particular 
Confucianism, does not allow for a sound rights-oriented legal practice, and the
33 Waldron, Jeremy, ‘Inalienable Rights’, in (1999) Boston Review, April/May issue, available at 
http://www.bostonreview.net/BR24.2/waldron.html.
34 The translation used by Feng Yu-lan. Angle in his discussion of Liu Shipei’s account of shu in 
the early 20th century chooses the translation ‘using-oneself-as-a-measure’, obviously referring to 
the also widely known saying, shu, tui ji yi j i  ren ye (#B, A& ), ‘to be able from one’s 
own self to draw a parallel for the treatment of others; that is shu.’ This is a quotation from the 
(Neo-) Confucian Zhu Xi. (A H , 1130-1200). Angle, ibid. p. 169. Wiggins uses the expression 
‘alterity’.
35 One could also relate shu (j?B) and ren ({—) to equality in Guest’s sense, referred to above. To 
understand what equality requires, one must seek to empathise with the other person, however 
different that person be from oneself. This means that to view oneself in a certain social role does 
not detract from the ability to see oneself as essentially like the other, or as essentially equal. 
Similarity is not enough for equality but neither does inequality follow from difference. This is 
because equality is a substantive, not just a formal idea. To say, for instance, in a contemporary 
context, that people have equal human rights is to say more than just to say that all people have 
human rights, according to such a substantive view.
36 Feng Yu-lan characterises this as ‘the practice of conscientiousness towards others.’ It is often 
translated as ‘loyalty’.
37 Analects, XV.24. Ji suo bu yu, wu shi yu ren . Wiggins also mentions
shu in this context, and uses the translation ‘alterity’ for shu. Translations consulted are available 
at http://www.wsu.edu:8080/%20~dee/CHPHIL/ANALECTS.HTM. and Dawson, Raymond, 
Confucius. The Analects (Oxford, New York: 1993). Few the original text and an explanation, see 
for instance the edition in the Chinese Sages Series (A  Cai Xiqin, Lai Bo and
Xia Yuhe ( H # lt j ,  translators and annotators), Confucius. The Analects (Huayu
Jiaoxue Press (f£i« Beijing: 1994).p. 251 f. This latter text translates ‘forbearance’,
probably partly because of the modem usage of the character shu.
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claim that law in Chinese culture is frequently viewed as something intrinsically 
bad.38 Consider, again, the arguments of Ames and Hall.
‘[I]n China, there is less of a tendency to stress the legal enforcement of 
rights. In fact, reliance upon the application of law, far from being a 
means of realizing human dignity, has been perceived as fundamentally 
dehumanizing since it leads to the impoverishment of mutual 
accommodation and compromises the particular responsibilities of the 
community to define what would be appropriate conduct.’39
They could in this passage be alluding to another one of Confucius’s 
observations in the Analects, which has often been quoted to explain that in 
Chinese culture law was generally thought of as something bad.
‘Lead the people with governmental measures and regulate them by law 
and punishment, and they will avoid wrongdoing but will have no sense 
of honour and shame. Lead them with virtue and regulate them by the 
rules of propriety, and they will have a sense of shame and, moreover, set 
themselves right.’ 40
The first thing that should strike us about Ames’s and Hall’s remark, is that 
unlike law, rights, including legal rights, are not simply ‘applied’ but require to 
be asserted before they can be defended and protected. The authors’ swift 
transition from ‘rights’ to ‘law’ is therefore inappropriate. Secondly, as just 
discussed, the possibility that rights assertion under certain circumstances may be 
disruptive and wrong is not conclusive of the question if legal rights are 
generally worth having. It is precisely the idea of rights-centred law as a moral
38 Morris’s and Bodde’s Law in Imperial China has contributed to spreading this view.
39 Hall, David, and Ames, Roger, ‘A Pragmatist Understanding of Confucian Democracy’, in 
Bell, Daniel, and Hahm Chaibong, Confucianism for the Modem World (Cambridge: 2003), 124, 
152 f.
40 Confucius, Analects, H.3. (Zi Yue: dao zhi yi zheng, qi zhi yi xing, min mian er wu chi; dao zhi 
yi de, qi zhi yi li, you chi er ge. f  0 :
M$&). It is important to notice that the expression here translated as ‘law and punishment’ is 
represented by the single character xing (ffj) whose central meaning is legal punishment (as in 
xingfa, penal or criminal law). See the translation (used here) by Liu, Shu-Hsien, in
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practice, not an application of imposed rules, that can have a humanising effect 
on the practice of law.
It has of course been variously argued, and in much greater depth than
41attempted here, that Confucian values are reconcilable with human rights. In a 
similar vein, Angle has argued that there is ample opportunity for communication 
between members of different cultures with concepts of rights that are at a 
certain conceptual distance, but not, apparently, therefore unable to communicate 
with each other about rights.42 In order to make Confucian values work for an 
actual rights-oriented legal practice in China (and elsewhere) it is also important 
to see how it may influence, guide and justify such a practice. The reflections 
above suggest that Confucian values can urge us to give exact and sensitive 
consideration to the problem of rights assertion and require us, as suggested in 
my introduction, not to insist inappropriately on what is due to us. They also urge 
us, perhaps especially in view of the word for ‘rights’ in Chinese, not to equate 
the idea of profit or ‘interest’ with the idea of rights, even though these ideas are 
related.43
It is particularly important in a Chinese context to distinguish between 
rights and interests, because of the connotations the word for ‘right’ (as in 
‘subjective right’) in its standard translation has in Chinese. It is useful to remind
Understanding Confucian Philosophy (Westport: 1998), at p. 20, and Cai, Lai and Xia, ibid. pp. 
12 f..
41 See for an influential argument of this kind, Du Gangjian, Song Gang, ‘Relating Human Rights 
to Chinese Culture: The Four Paths of the Confucian Analects and the Four Principles of a New 
Theory of Benevolence’, in Davis, Michael C. (editor), Human Rights and Chinese Values 
(Oxford, New York: 1995).
42 Angle, ibid. His explicit conclusion (at pp. 250) is a little difficult to understand because he 
chooses to refer to the Chinese community, and more specifically to its government as the 
relevant (why?) participants of a cross-cultural dialogue on rights which he proposes. He says 
that ‘the only way a community can unilaterally declare its values and practices immune to the 
scrutiny of others is through “parochialism,” which also cuts off that community from making 
legitimate demands on others.’ p. 250.
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ourselves of the relationship between the notion of yi, justice or a sense of justice, 
and the notion of //, profit, which according to Feng Yu-lan’s classic exposition 
of Chinese philosophy expresses an opposition.44 The word for ‘right’ in Chinese 
is quanli and contains the character //, profit. The word for ‘interest’ is liyi and 
the standard translation for ‘rights and interests’ is quanyi45 Here, rather than at 
the level of an abstract discussion of whether the concept of rights is at all 
intelligible to Chinese or to traditional Chinese (as to that, see my discussion 
above), is where the connection between language and thought should be 
considered. Yet this use of language could not by itself demonstrate that Chinese 
people did not or could not understand the ‘concept o f  rights or, even more 
facetiously, demonstrate that rights were not good for them. Angle’s fascinating 
account of the history of translations of texts on international law, and the way 
‘rights’ came to be translated in the nineteenth century by using the character for 
‘power’, quart and then routinely combining it with the character for ‘profit’, li, 
emphasises that these terms became charged with ‘normative’ and ‘positive’ 
(attractive, good) meaning, quite distinct from an early pejorative use of quan-li, 
for instance by Xunzi (3rd century B.C.).46 Particularly interestingly, he argues
43 The distinction does not hinge on the use of words. It is of course possible to use ‘interest’ not 
in the sense of ‘interest, pre-morally conceived.’
44 ‘With regard to the virtues of the individual, Confucius emphasized human-heartedness and 
righteousness, especially the former. Righteousness (yi) means the “oughtness “ of a situation. It 
is a categorical imperative. Everyone in society has certain things which he ought to do. If, 
however, he does them because of other non-moral considerations, then even though he does 
what he ought to do, his action is no longer a righteous one. To use a word often disparaged by 
Confucius and later Confucianists, he is then acting for “profit”. Yi (righteousness) and li (profit) 
are in Confucianism diametrically opposed terms...’ Fung (Feng) Yu-lan, ed. by Derk Bodde, A 
Short History o f Chinese Philosophy (New York: 1948), p. 42. Quan means ‘power’, ‘might’. I 
think that partly due to Confucian tradition, the idea of rights could be unfavourably associated 
with seeking profit, ‘standing on one’s rights’ in an immoral manner.
45 Cp. Du and Song ibid. at p. 46.
46 Of quan ($0 : ‘A Chinese reader of the General Laws [a translation of Henry Wheaton’s 
Elements of International Law undertaken by an American missionary in the 1860ies, and 
published in 1864 as General Laws of the Myriad Nations, Wanguo Gongfa (T T S l^S )] would 
immediately understand that there was something special about “quan”. The quan of a state or
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that by using quanli as opposed to words used in Confucian and other traditional 
writings, which already referred to reason or right, as an abstract principle,47 the 
special point was made that this was something new and therefore worth 
studying. Chinese language is quite capable of providing an adequate word for 
rights, but that, of course, does not free us from the task of making an argument 
for rights protection in China.
While this account of universalisability and its connection with rights 
assertion puts a stop, as it were, on an understanding of rights that will lead to the 
conclusion that rights are too cold and cruel, too rule-like and insensitive to 
individuals, to be attractive or even acceptable in Chinese culture, this account 
may have the worrying consequence of making rights assertion, defence and 
protection appear a very complicated matter. If I have a right, then surely you 
cannot complain if I assert it towards you and ask you to respect it, without 
complicated considerations about personal relationships coming into the problem. 
The following discussion considers this objection by discussing the supposed 
‘public’ and impersonal qualities of rights, and the moral significance of the 
public realm 48
individual are not simply the powers it happens to have: the text makes clear that quan is a 
normative notion, dependent on reason, justice, and agreements.’
Of quanli ): ‘In the General Laws, the term “quanli” undergoes two kinds of
transformations. First, it is regularly used in approximately its traditional sense, but with a 
positive connotation instead of its older negative connotation (...) [Second], “quanli” is 
occasionally used a direct translation for “rights”.’ Angle, Human Rights and Chinese Thought 
(Cambridge: 2002) at p. 108 and 109 respectively. His further account traces the history of the 
use of quanli e.g. in Japan and then back in China.
47 Dao, daoli (ill, M.M). I comment on li ( 3 )  in Chapter Four. Liu Shu-Hsien in Understanding 
Confucian Philosophy (Westport: 1998) explains at length how li (reason) was given a particular 
status in the Afeo-Confucian tradition, which began only in the eleventh century A.D.
48 Note that there are several words in Chinese which are commonly translated into ‘justice’. 
Besides the already mentioned gongdao (^ if i)  there are zhengyi (lEJ^C) and gongzheng ( ^  iE). 
They have one character, pronounced zheng (IE) -  upright, just - , in common. The first character
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‘Public' rights and the moral significance o f the public realm. Many accounts of 
justice, not least A Theory o f Justice by Rawls, concentrate on justice as a 
property of social institutions, and relate their account to a public dimension, as 
Rawls does by speaking of a ‘public conception of justice.’49 The protection of 
legal rights, in particular, appears to depend to a degree on there being public 
requirements of protection. Perhaps the so-called public/private divide has 
appeared particularly important to philosophers of law who want to strengthen 
the notion of liberal rights and who insist (as Dworkin does most notably in 
contemporary jurisprudence) on the possibility of objectivity in legal judgment.
The attraction of rights in this context could lie precisely in their 
impersonality. Waldron has suggested that legal rights assume importance when 
‘attachment’ ceases. This, he argues, is what allows us to be ‘proud and 
independent individuals.’ Law and legal rights are characterised as ‘impersonal’, 
‘public’, ‘public and hence (...) visible and reliable’, and as ‘formal’.50 On the 
other, the ‘feeling’ side of his dichotomy appear words such as ‘natural’, 
‘personal’, ‘intimate’, and time-words suggesting that when dealing with 
affection, one is dealing with empirical, natural phenomena which ‘are initiated’ 
or ‘cease’; which obtain only as a matter of ‘is’ but not of ‘ought’.
‘Having something to fall back on if an attachment fails may be a 
condition of being able to identify intensely with one’s attachments, 
rather than something which derogates from that intensity.’ 51
in gongzheng (2ME) means ‘public’. The character gong (4*) has a connotation of fairness or 
openness also in other combinations (words).
4 Rawls, A Theory o f Justice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1971), e.g. at p. 4. ‘Now let us say that 
a society is well-ordered when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members but 
when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of justice.’ At p. 10 Rawls discusses 
the way this might conflict with an Aristotelian conception of justice whereby justice can be a 
property, or virtue, of persons. Hart in The Concept o f Law also designates justice as the one 
moral virtue attaching exclusively to social institutions.
50 Ibid. p. 378.
51 Waldron, Liberal Rights. Collected papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge: 1991), at p. 391.
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i s  it to be supposed that the intimate and affective relations that 
characterize various forms of community will never come apart, that 
affections will never change, and that people will never feel the urge to 
exit from some relationships and initiate others?’52
Yet ‘affection’ has a normative dimension of its own. It appears that Waldron 
fails to consider, at least in these passages, how far it is possible to dissociate the 
psychological-empirical aspect of a relationship between people from what they 
owe to each other morally or legally. Not only marriages, to use Waldron’s most 
striking example, seem to have their basis in respect - but divorces as well. At 
least it is difficult to understand how what we owe each other, in marriage as 
well as in (or after) separation and divorce, should be determined without some 
empathy blurring the idea of an impersonal other.53
Perhaps, though, the role of judges deciding about rights could be used to 
justify the characterisation of legal rights as ‘impersonal’. Practical disputes 
about legal rights typically involve the judgement of third persons who are not 
the parties involved. These external parties do not necessarily feel the emotions 
of the divorcing couple, say, or the loneliness of another’s ageing parent. This, it 
might appear, is actually what enables them to be good judges. But however 
great their emotional or social distance from the parties,54 third persons can enter 
(and sometimes cannot help entering) into the conflicting parties’ feelings by
52 Ibid. p. 374. The expression ‘feel the urge’ really suggests that such urges can be resisted, and I 
do not think Waldron was not aware of this when writing; but he does not make more of it.
53 As to this expression, what, anyway, is supposed to remain of the image of the other when one 
takes an ‘impersonal’ viewpoint? It is not clear how ‘natural’ mutual concern and respect could 
be replaced by formal claims based on ‘formal’ or ‘impersonal’ law. And how can ‘concern and 
respect’ at all be understood morally, if they were defeated whenever inclination, feeling, or 
affection cease to support them? -  Perhaps the idea of the impersonal is most persuasive in those 
cases where there is comparative ignorance of the other person, as in some commercial 
relationships.
54 Bearing in mind that the role of the judge , or other third person intervener, changed for 
instance in English legal history from a person well familiar with the parties to one who should 
have no connections with them, if possible. Menkel-Meadow, ‘Is the Adversary Model Really
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empathetic understanding. In their turn, people in disagreement and conflict can 
sometimes be persuaded by third persons to do right by each other; for instance, 
to provide adequate maintenance in the event of divorce. They might be helped 
along by such persons to understand what they ought to do vis-a-vis each other; 
they may themselves achieve an impartial -  though hardly an ‘impersonal’ -  
viewpoint: they are not barred, just by being emotionally involved, from making 
right judgements. Conversely the mere fact that one uses, or falls back on, the 
judgement of third persons to regulate the relationships between ourselves and 
others, is not an argument that judges need not or must not have affections; or not 
care for those whom they judge. Waldron’s account of liberal rights is an 
incomplete account of the moral relationships between persons. Characterising 
rights as themselves ‘public’ and explaining the private realm as empty of moral 
obligation mischaracterises what is valuable about public decision processes, and 
carries the implications of the distinction between public and private too far. 
Rights have public and private aspects. Even the decision how, or when, to 
exercise rights must be a private decision.
The same, then, must be said of justice: it also has public and private 
aspects; there are certain requirements for just conduct towards others, which 
cannot be settled by settling rights and obligations understood as proceduralised 
guarantees that remaining ‘within’ one’s rights one can do no wrong to another 
person.55 As scholars of Aristotle remind us, justice may be understood as a
Dead? Dilemmas of Ethics [and] Professional Responsibility as Legal Institutions and Roles 
Evolve’, Current Legal Problems lecture delivered on 13 May 2004 at UCL.
55 Nagel remarks that ‘one of the virtues of a system of exclusive rights is that it permits some of 
the relations between persons to be governed by pure procedural justice.’ Ibid. at p. 140. It is not 
quite clear to me how he distinguishes those relations from others. At any rate Nagel regards the 
design bringing about such a scheme as requiring that ‘the actual rights be designed so that their 
consequences will be morally acceptable.’ It does not follow from this that they cannot be more 
than morally acceptable; nor that morally desirable conduct could be enforced.
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personal virtue (as Aristotle does in the Nicomachean Ethics),56 and in this 
understanding the person who is just -  who knows how to be just -  also knows 
how to be a good friend. It is important to keep this in mind for an understanding 
of justice that includes rights as a central idea, but does not reject the idea of 
reconciliation.
It seems that the importance of court practice and the way it is connected 
with public life, and is itself a public practice, has led some writers to hold a very 
strong view of an intrinsic superiority of public adjudication over other forms of 
dispute resolution. Luban, for instance, has argued that adjudication is essentially 
an ‘elaboration of [certain] public values,’ an indispensable task, we are led to 
think, which must be (largely) performed by courts of law. In a particular strong 
and influential form,57 his view can be traced to a Kantian thesis, that publicness 
is in some necessary as well as formal way connected to the idea of just law or 
‘objective’ right (Recht). Consider a statement by Kant also cited by Luban (I 
choose a standard rather than his modified translation),58 in the second appendix 
to Kant’s essay on Perpetual Peace.
‘If, in considering public right as the jurists usually conceive of it, I 
abstract from all its material aspects (as determined by the various 
empirically given relationships of men within a state, or of states with one 
another), I am left with the formal attribute o f publicness. For every claim 
upon right potentially possesses this attribute, and without it, there can be 
no justice (which can only be conceived as publicly knowable) and 
therefore no right, since right can only come from justice (...) [W]e may 
specify the following proposition as the transcendental formula of public
56 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, fifth book. Also Wiggins, David, ‘A Neo-Aristotelian 
Approach to Justice: How Would It Go?, public lecture given at Cambridge on 11 July 2002. 
Wiggins’s ‘Neo-Aristotelian Reflections on Justice’ in 113 (2004) Mind A ll  are partly based on 
this lecture.
57 Luban also looks to Hegel, the Hebrew Bible, Fiss, Hannah Arendt, Dworkin, Finnis, the 
German criminal procedure, Kant, and some other authors and practices for support of his view 
about the importance of ‘the public realm’
58 In the immediate context of his argument about (against) ‘secrecy’ in settlements.
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right: ‘All actions affecting the rights of other human beings are wrong if 
their maxim is not compatible with their being made public.’59
Writers who see themselves in a Kantian tradition but reject Kant’s 
transcendental form of argument, turn to real public life, ‘really’ public 
adjudication in courts, etc., as opposed to compatibility with being made public.60 
But as an attribute of real-life empirical events ‘publicness’ can have, as we 
know, a multitude of functions, without having the important normative 
connotation Kant meant by ‘compatibility with being made public.’ Attributing a 
particular moral significance or status to publicness just by itself presents us with 
a danger quite similar to the danger already addressed by Williams in regard to 
empathy: there is of course no guarantee of rightness coming from the public 
form of a judgement made or a decision or action taken. Just as the cruel person 
can use empathy, so can the tyrant use law. Exaggerated expectations from 
publicness in this respect seem often linked with a notion of authority, as in 
‘authority of the law’, or ‘authority of the state’. Indeed, Kant when addressing 
the consequences of his ‘compatibility with being made public’ criterion for the 
concept of objective right, saw himself forced to say that no person had a right to 
resist against a tyrant ruler as long as he ruled through public ‘Right’.61 In
59 ‘Alle, auf das Recht anderer Menschen bezogene Handlungen, deren Maxime sich nicht mit 
dem Prinzip der Publizitaet vertraegt, sind unrecht.’ By contrast Luban translates ‘incompatible 
with publicness,’ ibid at p. 2648. Quoted from Reiss, Kant. Political Writings (2nd edition, 
Cambridge: 1991), p. 136 and p. 125. In the Metaphysics o f Morals he says at paragraph 43: 
‘Public right is the sum total of those laws which require to be made universally public in order to 
produce a state of right.’
Very prominent among these is Habermas, to whom Luban also refers at p. 2658.
61 So contrary to my translation above it appears that Recht, despite being dependent on a formal 
moral criterion, is not always ‘just law’, but can also comprise the unjust laws of a tyrant. ‘The 
rights of the people have been violated, and there can be no doubt that the tyrant would not be 
receiving unjust treatment if he were dethroned. Nevertheless, it is in the highest degree wrong if 
the subjects pursue their rights in this way (...) According to this principle [of publicness] the 
people [oppressed by a tyrant] asks itself whether it dares to make public the maxim of its 
intention to rebel on certain occasions. It is easily seen that if one were to make it a condition of 
founding a political constitution that force might in certain eventualities be used against the head 
of state, the people would have to claim rightful authority over its ruler. But if this were so, the
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contrast to this I would suggest that under an extreme tyranny the fact that 
institutions of the tyrannical state, including courts, are ‘public’ institutions, does 
not help to justify them, or to deny citizens the moral right to resist. Interestingly, 
this attitude could be supported by reference to certain ideas in Confucianism, 
expounded, among others, by Du and Song (above). “ Endorsing such a right 
against the standards and boundaries set by publicly announced laws requires us 
not unthinkingly to attach value to the supposed formal attribute of publicness as 
an attribute of law. It helps to demystify law by making use of an idea of justice 
giving a right to break law, in certain cases.
We must conclude from this that publicness as a form of dispute resolution 
can only have indirect value. Perhaps ‘compatibility with being made public’ can 
be understood as an attitude to be taken by the person who has made judgements 
already, and tests these judgements against the standard of compatibility with 
being made public, in a way quite similar to ‘universalisability’. Certainly, one of 
the values of having public adjudication consists in having an opportunity to treat 
like cases alike; another consists in having a forum for robust public argument 
and disagreement. Treating like cases alike also means protecting legitimate 
expectations, giving fair warning to people as to how the law might treat them. 
This is a practical argument about the moral equality of citizens. (It is one which, 
as was pointed out earlier on, is distrusted by Chinese practices.) In this 
interpretation, publicness has only instrumental value, just as the publicness of
ruler would not be the head of state; or if both parties were given authority as a prior condition of 
establishing the state, the existence of the state itself, which it was the people’s intention to 
establish, would become impossible. The injustice of rebellion is thus apparent form the fact that 
if the maxim upon which it would act were publicly acknowledged, it would defeat its own 
purpose.’ Ibid. at p. 126/7.
‘The path of justice discussed in the Analects introduced the classical notion of resistance. In 
the Analects, ‘justice’ (yi) is not less important than ‘benevolence’ (ren). Both justice and 
benevolence have higher authority than the written law.’ Ibid at p. 45. Many writers in the
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remonstration or demonstration: it is not the fact that someone chooses a public 
forum to protest that makes his case, but the substantive grievances or arguments 
he takes into that public forum.
Moreover treating like cases alike can be understood as a requirement 
flowing from the principle of moral equality. So, too, can the ‘universalisability’ 
requirement discussed above, or the Confucian principle of shu, reciprocity. 
Connecting my interpretation of the value of publicness to the previous 
discussion of universalisability 1 suggest, therefore, that publicness is not ensured 
by, and that justice is not simply - not always - achieved by, looking up publicly 
available precedent cases enabling one to treat ‘like cases alike’.63 What is most 
important to the universalisability test as interpreted above, is not to make a 
process of dispute resolution known to the public, or referring to publicly or 
generally known standards. Rather, publicness warrants the conditions in which 
one can attain the perspective of the other person. As sociologists have many 
times pointed out to us, this can be much helped by the presence of a third person, 
of interested and active spectators, mediators, or judges. A study of various 
dispute resolution techniques therefore also teaches us important lessons about 
different ways to use publicness: publicness begins, one could say, with the 
presence of a third uninvolved person.64 In such a ‘public’ sphere rights may but 
need not always be asserted.
A related and just as important instrumental value attaching to the 
institution of public rights protection is its liberating effect on public discussion.
American liberal tradition, notably including Thoreau, Rawls, and Dworkin, have argued for a 
right to resistance -  a right, indeed, under certain circumstances to break the law.
63 To discern the rule or principle contained in precedent cases is an instantiation of rule- 
following not easily explained, as Wittgenstein reminds us. Guest, ‘Why The Law Is Just’.
64 There is a Chinese saying, ‘two people make for a private, three people make for a public 
setting’ {Hang ren wei si, san ren wei gong, —AA^A, H A A  A).
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As is argued in the following, it is important to be able to voice disagreement, 
also about the most consequential moral and legal questions in a society, and the 
institution of public rights protection in conjunction with certain substantive legal 
rights make these processes possible in liberal and democratic societies. In this 
sense, publicness has value not so much as an attribute of law as it has value as 
an attribute of a certain, important form of disagreement (about what is right).
The thesis that emerges from this is that the very interpretation of 
universalisability and equality which gives edge to the idea of rights is also an 
interpretation that allows us to see value in consensus and persuasion to do the 
right thing. It stresses the importance of rights’ origin in a moral perspective (one 
may forgive one’s debtor, out of mere benevolence), and the right, therefore, to 
break the law that gives and constrains legal rights, in extreme cases. Translated 
into the logic of rights this means that conciliation should be valued and sought, 
and that it may be right, for this purpose, not to insist on what is due to oneself. 
But it may not be; rights assertion is situation-bound. Translated into traditional 
Confucian terms it confirms the insight that ‘a noble person will achieve 
conciliation based on principle but not blind union. A small person will blindly 
seek to unite, but cannot achieve principled conciliation.’65
65 Junzi he er bu tong, xiao ren tong er bu he (H ~f ). Confucius,
Analects XIII.23. Cai, Lai and Xia’s edition (above note 37), at p. 207. Dawson, ibid. (note 37) at 
p. 52, translates for ‘unite’ ‘making one’s views coincide with those of others’ and juxtaposes this 
with ‘behaving in a conciliatory manner.’
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Chapter Four Chinese mediation practice
Mediation and judgement. Chinese mediation or tiaojie,1 this chapter argues, is 
firmly premised on the participants’ making judgements about right and wrong. 
The moral status of influence exercised persuasively or coercively in Chinese 
mediation depends partly on the rightness of the judgements on which it is based. 
It also depends on the availability of other dispute resolution procedures as 
alternatives to mediation. Overall it is suggested here that the function of 
mediation changes with the introduction and evolution of rights-centred court 
practice in China.
Chinese mediation combines persuasion and education with what could 
usefully be called a principle of indirection, or depending on the case, redirection 
on the part of the mediator, and aims at public recognition of the mediated 
solution by all involved parties. Often the success of mediation depends on the 
ability of the mediator to win personal deference from the parties to a dispute and 
this in turn often relies on the mediator’s potentially coercive power. Viewed 
together, these features make Chinese mediation quite distinct from adjudication 
about legal rights; yet it does allow for disputes to be resolved justly. But this is 
an abstract account, and we must allow it to be challenged by the reality of actual 
mediation processes, a few examples of which are considered in this chapter.
1 Similar to Michael Palmer in ‘The Revival of Mediation in the People’s Republic of China: (1) 
Extra-Judicial Mediation’, in Butler, W.E. (ed.), Yearbook on Socialist Legal Systems (New 
York: 1987), and to Donald Clarke in ‘Dispute Resolution in China’, (1991) Journal o f Chinese 
Law [succeeded by Columbia Journal o f Asian Law], vol. 5, no. 2 245,1 think we must be careful 
to remind ourselves that mediation in the Chinese context is quite different from mediation in 
Western societies. This is not to say that arguments used in debates about the latter could not be 
used for discussing the former.
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‘What is called mediation is when, as a conflict between two parties 
arises, a third party takes it on itself to handle it and in accordance with 
certain prescribed rules, uses the techniques of persuasion, education, and 
reformation3 to carry out resolution and restore harmony, thereby 
effecting that the parties to the dispute reach “deep insight and great 
understanding;”4 that they “understand and accommodate each other”,5 
and negotiate a resolution of the conflict, to “let the matter rest so that 
people be set at peace”6 and that they get along amicably, for the aims of 
social stability and harmony.’7
Mediation, in institutionalised form, has been a traditional response to disputes in 
China for many thousands of years.8 It was also used in communist China and is 
still widely practised to date. Mediation is used as a technique by courts in the 
course of certain types of procedure, especially civil litigation. The Code of Civil 
Procedure provides in its article 86 that ‘where a civil case which it has accepted 
can be mediated, the people's court shall resolve it through mediation on the basis 
of the litigants' voluntary participation, by ascertaining the facts and by 
distinguishing right from wrong.’ The content of the agreement reached through 
mediation ‘shall not contravene the law.’9 Judicial mediation can also be used for 
‘minor’ criminal cases, notably such cases as can be privately prosecuted.10 In
2 The Chinese term tiaojie (ffiffl) can also be translated as ‘conciliation’ (see Palmer, ibid .p. 
219). Note that in the late eighties the term tiaohe , ‘mediation’, was officially brandished 
as standing for an illegitimate kind of mediation, seeking compromise at all costs and neglecting 
the rights and wrongs of a case. Palmer, ibid. The term hejie (fQflj?) is now generally used for 
settlement that does not result from proceduralised mediation.
3 Ganhua (Jj&ffc), literally, reforming or transforming emotions. The translation offered in The 
Concise English-Chinese Chinese-English Dictionary (Oxford/Beijing: 1986), at: p. 141 is ‘[to] 
reform a misguided person through persuasion.’
4 Shen ming da yi ($£*$ Al!C)-I put this and following set four-character expressions in citation 
marks to indicate the feel they have of being quotations, in Chinese.
5 Huliang hurang ( S l ^ S i h ) .
6 Xi shi ning ren A ) .
7 Li Chunlin (^ # $ £ ) ,  Handbook on People’s mediation (Renmin tiaojie shouce,
M, Beijing: 1989), at p. 3 on the question ‘What is the basic meaning of mediation?’
8 Cohen, Jerome Alan, ‘Chinese Mediation on the Eve of Modernization’, (1966) 54 California 
Law Review 1201.
9 Article 88 of the Civil Procedure Law (Minshi susongfa, The Supreme People’s
Court’s new rules, discussed below, say that the mandatory rules of the law must not be 
contravened.
10 Compare Article 13 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(amended 1996), also Article 127 (listing offences for which the institution of criminal
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divorce cases, the court must attempt mediation before a divorce can be 
granted.11 Further rules on judicial mediation are discussed below.
Mediation is also institutionalised extra-judicially, mainly in the form of 
‘People’s Mediation’.12 People's Mediation is dealt with by People’s Mediation 
Committees, which are regulated by the Regulations fo r the Organisation o f 
People's Mediation Committees. Other institutions also provide mediation 
services;13 one particularly important one is mediation carried out by the labour 
tribunals dealing with most labour related ‘arbitrations’ in big cities. The Chinese 
constitution provides that the People’s Mediation Committees are ‘working 
committees under organisations for grass-root autonomy, such as residents’ 
committees and villagers’ committees, whose task it is to mediate civil 
disputes.’14 They are supposed to be guided or ‘directed’ by the courts.15 They 
are supposed to be freely elected.16 In recent years, the urban shequ, residential 
community, has also provided People’s Mediation services. The composition of
proceedings can be made dependent on private action being taken, such as defamation or bigamy. 
For a detailed account of the introduction of extrajudicial pre-trial mediation in criminal matters, 
particularly relating to the experiences of one district court, see Mao Guofang ‘On
introducing [extrajudicial] pre-trial mediation in criminal matters that can be privately prosecuted 
(xingshizisu anjian shezhi qianzhi tiaojie chengxu de gouxiang,
ff'-tfifatMy, 2 September 2002, posted at http://www.shezfy.com/Discuss/detail.asp?id=134. See 
also Yang Rongxin ffr), ‘Widening the scope of mediation, determining the legal effects of 
mediation settlements (Tuokuan renmin tiaojie fanwei queding tiaojie xieyi xiaoli,
foiXffltf))', 30 September 2002 at http://www.rmfyb.com/public/detail.php?
id=42292.
11 Compare Article 35 of the Marriage Law (Hunyin fa, as revised in 2001). The new
draft Supreme People’s Court Regulations on judicial mediation contains further rules on divorce 
cases, requiring the parties to provide written reasons for not appearing for a mediation session 
(Article 21).
Renmin tiaojie (A !$$?). Palmer observes that ‘although the term renmin tiaojie is primarily 
used to refer to extrajudicial mediation, some legal theorists also employ it to characterize both 
judicial and extrajudicial domestic mediation,’ with further references, ibid. p. 220 note 5.
13 See Gerke’s detailed account in Die Schlichtung im chinesischen Recht (Mediation in Chinese 
Law, Hamburg: 1992), at pp. 40 ff.
14 Article 111 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
15 Cp. Article 22 (2) of the Organic Law of the People's Courts of the People's Republic of China.
16 But such elections are often flawed, implying no real choice. The developments in Chinese 
village election have generated a literature by itself, in recent years. See for instance, the 
contribution by Horsley, Jamie P., ‘A Legal Perspective on the Development of Electoral
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mediation committees is changing as efforts are being made to improve the 
standards of training and education of mediators, and to ‘professionalise’ their 
work, and as it is perceived that the changes in Chinese society -  economic 
instabilities and an apparent increase in crime, to mention a few - present new 
challenges. There are no rules preventing people familiar with the disputing 
parties from being mediators; on the contrary, local people knowing as much as 
possible about their community are clearly preferred.17
Besides People’s Mediation, there are further institutions also carrying out
18extra-judicial mediation, for instance, the ‘judicial assistants’ working in local 
government. Lawyers, too, can be mediators,19 and governmental departments
are responsible for mediation in specific administrative disputes. There is also-
20so-called ‘mediation among the people’, that is, mediation that occurs without 
any participation by government officials.21 In the following, I first concentrate 
on People’s Mediation’, before making some remarks on mediation by courts.
The requirements o f law, feeling and reason in extrajudicial mediation. The 
interpretation of the universalisability test in the previous chapter allowed us to 
add new substance to the idea of equality in law. Treating like cases alike is 
important, but the process of identifying significant similarities and determining 
‘like’ legal consequences is, as we know, very difficult, and merely looking at
Democracy in China: The Case of Village Elections,’ in Understanding China's Legal System 
(New York: 2003).
17 Familiarity with the parties used to be seen as desirable in many types of court in earlier 
Western legal history. Menkel-Meadow, ‘Is the Adversary Model Really Dead? Dilemmas of 
Ethics [and] Professional Responsibility as Legal Institutions and Roles Evolve’, Current Legal 
Problems lecture delivered on 13 May 2004 at UCL (forthcoming in Current Legal Problems).
18 Sifa zhuli yuan( W] m ).
19 Cp. Article 2 of the Lawyers’ Law of the People’s Republic of China and Gerke, ibid. pp. 45 ff.
20 Minjian tiaojie (K l'sJi^ lf).
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the text of rules, or of precedent cases, is never enough. Morally and legally 
relevant equality comprises but is not exhausted by the principle of treating like 
cases alike, although clearly this principle must generally not be counteracted in 
law. An important exception is when a court finds that previous court decisions 
have applied the law in a grossly unjust way. Legal rights, when discussed in 
dispute resolution processes, have the effect of drawing special attention to the 
positions of ‘the other’ impersonated by the parties to a dispute (as is strikingly 
the case in criminal litigation, regarding the defendant’s rights).
Mediation, as becomes clearer in the following, is well suited to taking 
disputants’ entire circumstances, including their character, emotions, 
relationships, changing wishes, and rightful claims, into account, thus including 
some features which adjudication cannot -  and ought not to -  consider. This can 
be a particularly good way of treating people as equals -  of, indeed, doing justice 
to people -, although it makes it more difficult to follow the more specific 
(equality-dependent) legal principle of treating ‘like cases alike’, for the obvious 
reason that the more aspects of a case one allows to be relevant to how it should 
be handled, the fewer cases one will find that are significantly like each other. 
The institution of legal rights disciplines and concentrates reasoning at an early 
stage of the dispute resolution (adjudication) process, on what has been claimed 
‘by right’. A substantive, non-formal understanding of equality may appreciate 
mediation and adjudication as different ways of serving the ideal of equality. On 
an understanding of following legal rules which refutes the simplistic assumption 
that this could be done by ticking off, as it were, criteria of application in any one
21 For instance in Li Chunlin, Handbook on People’s mediation (Renmin tiaojie shouce, A K ijf 
Beijing: 1989), at p. 7.
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case, to see if the rule did apply, 22 we may not even be able entirely to 
distinguish legal rule-following from principled appreciation of a party’s entire 
circumstances in the process of mediation.
The Regulations for the Organisation o f Mediation Committees most 
importantly require that mediation should be carried out on the basis of the facts 
(shishi and of an analysis of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ (shifei in  cases
which the law does not provide clear rules for,’ the Statutes require that they be 
handled ‘on the basis of the public morality of the society.’ These, it has been 
persuasively argued, include ‘the content of the feelings and reasoning] on 
which mediation practice is based.’ In an influential article,24 two Chinese 
authors have tried to distinguish between different ‘styles’ of mediation 
according to the degree to which law and legal rights play a role in the mediation 
process. The character for qing ( tft) , which was translated as ‘feeling’,25 actually 
has a wide meaning. In certain combinations it translates as ‘situation’ or 
‘circumstances’.26 If, in the present context, qing refers to both the ‘feeling’ and
22 For a critique of this approach see Dworkin, ‘The Model of Rules I’ and ‘IT, chapters 3 and 4 
in his Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard: 1977).
23 Article 8. Shifei (/!£#) has a wide meaning; it is generally correctly translated into ‘right and 
wrong’ but also means mere affirmation and negation. Consider also the expression ‘seeking 
truth from facts’ (shishi qiu shi, ), a phrase coined by Deng Xiaoping, and quite 
commonly cited by mediators describing their work method.
24 Liu Guang’an Li Cunpeng ‘People’s Mediation and Rights Protection
{Minjian tiaojie yu quanli baohu, K l0J ’, in Xia Yong (M U, editor), Toward
an Age of Rights: A Perspective o f the Civil Rights Development in China (Zou xiang quanli de 
shidai: Zhongguo gongmin quanli fazhan yanjiu, fE fa tXfll ^  H ‘Jx.MiJffi,
expanded edition, Beijing: 1995), 285. Lubman, for instance, briefly discusses this essay in his 
‘Dispute Resolution in China after Deng Xiaoping: “Mao and Mediation” Revisited’, 11 
Columbia Journal o f Asian Law 1997, 229 at p. 281.
25 Note that Lubman translates qing (tft) in this text (see above) as ‘emotions’. I think this has a 
too passive and perhaps even irrational connotation.
26 For instance, in the words ‘situation’ (qingkuang, f##£) and ‘national condition’ (guoqing, 
S t# ) . In a later paragraph of this essay, the authors mention ‘face’ [here: mian ® ] besides 
‘feelings’, and this emphasises interpersonal relations and the feelings that govern these. For an 
analysis of ‘face’ see van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China. A Sociological 
Analysis (London: 1962), p. 99 (also discussing differences between the expressions lion (Hi) 
and mian (ffi)).
the ‘circumstance’ senses of the word, and given the juxtaposition with falii 
(law), ‘mediation in accordance with qing,' is mediation in accordance with a 
reality of feelings and circumstances in a dispute, not all of which might be
27relevant to its legal assessment. As short translations, evoking the work of 
Llewellyn,28 we could use ‘situation sense’, or simply ‘feeling’. U  ( 3 )  is 
normally translated as ‘reason’ or ‘principle’.29 So ‘mediation in accordance with 
qing, li' (tft3 )  is mediation speaking to reason and feelings, addressing all the 
relevant circumstances of a dispute in order to resolve it.30 Mediation in 
accordance with law, then, must be a process of mediation using a different 
technique, or taking different aspects into account from those which matter in 
mediation in accordance with feeling and reason.
The application of the concepts of feeling, reason, and law to categorise 
mediation goes back to the often used conceptual triad of qing, li, and fa  in 
Chinese. It is quite common to use the expression 'heqing, heli, hefa’ , being ‘in 
accordance with reason, feeling, and law’ in praise of a person’s, especially an 
official’s, conduct or decision. In a certain sense, the originality of Li’s and Liu’s 
approach consisted in breaking up this expression and discussing the possible 
compliance of mediation with one requirement but not the other(s). Another 
important aspect of the use of these three requirements is that it echoes, without
27 By contrast to this use of qing tit, whenever in the case reports used by the authors references 
are made to ‘establishing the facts’ or ‘establishing the historic reality’ in a legal context, 
different expressions such as xianshi and shiji P/F (‘reality’) are used.
28 Whose work, in turn, has been brought back to the fore of jurisprudence by William Twining. 
Compare Michael Freeman’s account of legal realism and of Llewellyn’s idea of ‘situation sense’ 
in Freeman, Michael, Introduction to Jurisprudence (7th edition, London: 2001) at pp. 802 ff, 
especially p. 808.
29 Compare with this translation: ‘Reason, principle; the fitness of things. Right, as an abstract 
principle.’ Mathews’ Chinese-English Dictionary, revised American edition (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: 1943), main entry for character no. 3864.
30 A standard modem, albeit somewhat dated, dictionary translates the set expression qingli tS S  
as ‘reason, the whole aspect of a case.’ Mathews' Chinese-English Dictionary, revised American
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explicitly mentioning, the more traditional Confucian duality of li ( t l  ), 
‘propriety’, and fa  ('/£), ‘law’. It is important to make quite clear that the 
Confucian li (tL) has linguistically nothing in common with the li (SI) generally 
translated as ‘reason’; nothing, that is, but its identical pronunciation in Mandarin 
Chinese. But still, considering the analysis of the Confucian li (^l) as ‘having 
emotional content’ offered by Bodde and Morris,31 we must conclude that it has a 
resemblance with qing (tit), feeling, and perhaps also with li (SI), ‘reason’ or 
‘right as an abstract principle.’ It is worth noticing even at this stage, that the 
praise of being ‘in accordance with feeling, reason, and law’ is sometimes also 
bestowed on legal decisions in contemporary China. As for the Confucian li and 
its juxtaposition with fa, law, these terms have resurfaced in jurisprudential 
debate around the idea of the rule of law. Rule of law was meant to be the form 
of governance of the new age, of modernity, and was thus considered to be 
opposed to rule by ‘rites’, as the Confucian li may be most generally translated. 
Rule by law has also frequently been juxtaposed with ‘rule by virtue’ or 
‘morality’ and ‘rule by men’. Yet in the reality of legal life, both elements appear 
to remain.32
edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1943), entry for character no. 1170. I think this translation 
would be too narrow in the present context.
31 Bodde, Derk and Morris, Clarence, Law in Imperial China (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1967): 
‘The li (...) constitute both the concrete institutions and the accepted modes of behaviour in a 
civilised state’ (ibid. p. 19). The authors consider that the li were in a sense an ‘upper class 
monopoly’, because so complex, they were underpinned by broad moral principles, representing 
‘what men in general instinctively feel to be right.’ ‘Li give poetry and beauty to life and have 
emotional content’ (ibid. p. 20).
32 Liu Yan, in ‘Rule of Law in China: An Ever-Changing View’, a paper presented at the 
conference Political Practice in Modem China in Churchill College, Cambridge, 26-27 June 
2002, identifies several stages of juxtaposition in recent Chinese history -  ‘rule of law vs rule of 
man’; ‘rule of law vs. rule by law’; ‘rule of virtue vs. rule of law’ -, drawing attention to the 
reference to rule of virtue (dezhi, W-'ia) made by Jiang Zemin in 2001.
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Extrajudicial mediation achieving justice. Of the cases of mediation ‘in 
accordance with feeling and reason,' one discussed by Li and Liu involves a 
married couple living in the countryside. Initially, their relations were good, but 
as the wife bore her husband no child over several years, he started quarrelling 
with her, and declaring he wanted a divorce.
‘When the chairman of the mediation committee of the village heard 
about this, he spoke to Mr Ah as follows. “When you come home from 
work in the fields you are all dirty, but there are clean clothes waiting for 
you, everything is clean and tidy and supper is waiting for you, is this not 
all due to the hard work of your wife? She is so good to you, how then 
can you want to divorce from her?” After this persuasive speech, Mr Ah 
and his wife restored their good relations. They adopted and reared a 
child, and their household was a harmonious one.’33
This story makes its point by not reporting the actual qing li, or the details of the 
mediation process: it is what can be called indirection or redirection, and consists 
in shifting the focus away from the conflict.34 Li and Liu comment:
‘In the above two examples the mediation workers did not consider the 
loss or gain of rights brought about by the conflict itself; they did not 
actually get down to the facts and [on that basis] reason with the two 
parties of the conflict. Nor did they consider whether their mediation 
should be carried out in accordance with law, or with which law. Rather 
they moved away from the conflict itself and talked about... conjugal love 
to the parties, thereby getting the parties no longer to calculate their 
mutual losses or gains of rights, and getting them spontaneously to 
resolve the conflict and renew harmony, of their own accord.’35
It is suggested here that one party’s ‘gain’ of ‘rights’ would mean another party’s 
loss, although we might point out that no loss or gain could possibly be involved
33 Ibid. at p. 295. The report is originally taken from the journal (1989) People’s Mediation (A 
K iH # ) no. 5, 55.
34 The term ‘to redirect’ is used by Lon Fuller in his ‘Mediation -  its Forms and Functions’, 
(1971) 44 Southern California Law Review 305. ‘[T]he central quality of mediation, namely, its 
capacity to reorient the parties toward each other, not by imposing rules on them, but by helping 
them to achieve a new and shared perception of their relationship, a perception that will redirect 
their attitudes and dispositions toward one another.’ Ibid. at p. 325.
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when someone’s right was protected against another party who was in the wrong. 
Li’s and Liu’s focus is on the experience of the disputants as their dispute 
develops.36 Sustained public disagreement about the legal result of a case may be 
seen as the most striking feature of adjudication over legal rights, and this may 
be why the authors are so ready to assert that adjudication involved the loss and 
gain of rights.
In cases in which accordance with law is positively asserted as part of the 
mediation process, it appears that the mediators will act almost as one would 
expect judges to act: they establish the facts and suggest a solution as one would 
expect a court decision to be. But the mediator-judge in such a case will still 
make a judgement about what should be done, rather than about what people’s 
rights are. Consider the case of the Gong and Liu families living in a village in 
Shunyi county (in Greater Beijing).
‘They lived one in the front and one in the back courtyard. By the eastern 
wall of the [homes of ] the two families ran a footpath from south to 
north. In the spring of 1990, Mr Gong blocked up the northern door of his 
own home and cut two poplar trees by the [eastern] wall. He made a new 
door going out from the eastern wall, onto the footpath [now] shared with 
the Liu family. Mr Liu opposed this vehemently. He demanded damages 
from Mr Gong for the two poplar trees. But Mr Gong not only did not pay 
any attention Mr Liu’s objections. He also climbed onto the roof of the 
northern room of the Liu family and there demolished over three hundred 
tiles and stripped off a roof ridge three metres long. Thereafter he dug a 
fifty centimetres deep ditch in front of the Lius’ door.
When the village mediation committee received news of this conflict 
they first sought to prevent the situation from escalating any further. 
Secondly, they investigated and established the facts. According to land 
registration archives, this footpath had been the Lius’ footpath of old, and 
the poplar trees by the wall, too, had been planted by the Liu family.
The mediation committee carried out legal education on Mr Gong on 
the basis of the residential boundaries established in this way, with regard 
to the conflict about the trees, the running water, and the footpath. In
35 Ibid. at p. 295.
36 By comparison, Vilhelm Aubert, in his ‘Competition and dissensus: two types of conflict and 
of conflict resolution’ (1963), in Freeman, Michael (editor) Alternative Dispute Resolution (New 
York: 1995), 151, is very cautious in his references to gain and loss.
92
doing so they respected the historic reality as well as the principles for 
carrying out mediation, as they are laid down in the policies and laws of 
the present. They brought Mr Gong to recognise his mistake. Then they 
made suggestions for the handling [of the conflict]. They suggested 
firstly, that Mr Gong undertake to repair the damaged roof of the Lius, 
and pay damages for the trees, and secondly they suggested that he level 
out the ditch dug in front of the Lius’ door, and resume the use of his 
original door. Mr Liu accepted this mediation [result] and Mr Gong also 
complied with it.’37
Clearly, the mediation process here has a de-escalating function as the mediators 
‘sought to prevent the situation from escalating any further.’ This preventive 
function of mediation work is often acknowledged and emphasised by officials, 
in as impressive ways as possible. There is also what one might call an 
‘enforcement function’ or ‘enforcement replacement’ function. The mediators 
‘brought Mr Gong to recognise his mistake.’ Persuasion, on this analysis, appears 
to replace coercive enforcement measures. We must appreciate the fact that the 
mediator, in this and so many other cases, is a person of power and influence, 
and that the reason why his ‘suggestion’ is respected may be the fact that 
sanction, if indirect ones, are expected in the case of ‘disobedience’. It is 
therefore impossible to decide, on the basis of an account like the one above, if 
any pressure that may have been brought to bear on Mr Gong was justified. The 
process could be described as fluid; but this does not detract from the 
understanding that mediators should make right judgements, and be persuasive. 
High expectations must be held of the process’s individual participants and their 
ability to behave appropriately towards each other.
The 1989 Regulations fo r  the Organisation o f Mediation Committees 
provide for the initiation of mediation proceedings either by an application made
37 Ibid. p. 297-8. The authors note that they have taken this case from ‘mediation [case] material 
of Shunyi county.’
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by a party, or upon the initiative of the mediation committee itself. In the latter 
case, it is assumed that the parties would have agreed to this initiative, and that 
they want mediation to go ahead. Article 6 (3) requires that the parties’ right to 
sue be respected and that the parties must not be prevented from filing a case 
with the court on the grounds that they have not attempted mediation, or that the 
mediation has not been successful. There are no rules directly providing for the 
situation that a party does not consent to carrying out mediation,39 and most 
mediation reports do not address the issue by whom mediation is initiated at all.
Whether a claim to authority to intervene is valid, is all the more important 
because of the degree of interference that mediation represents. Not only does the 
mediator in people’s mediation have the task of monitoring the mediation result 
for its lawfulness (Article 6). The local government agency is also called on to 
‘support the mediation agreement reached under supervision of the People’s 
Mediation Committee, if it is in accordance with the laws and regulations and 
policies. If the agreement contravenes them, it shall correct it.’40 Similarly, 
Article 6 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Rules on Handling People's 
Mediation Agreements provides that the court may in certain circumstances annul 
or alter the mediation agreement.41 There is no hint that the parties to the 
mediation agreement could refuse to accept the ‘corrected’ agreement but it is
38 Regulations, Article 7 clause 1. Gerke translates ‘application of the parties’ (der Parteien), but 
the Chinese does not specify plural or singular.
39 Gerke remarks that ‘it is an interesting question how often parties are talked into assenting to a 
mediation procedure by the people’s mediation committee. No information could be obtained on 
this head during the interviews conducted by the author.’ Ibid. at p. 223.
40 Regulations, Article 10.
41 See just below on these Rules and Chapter Seven on the status of rules issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court.
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stated that the court must not annul an agreement when the party entitled to ask 
for an alteration has asked for the latter.42
The regulations set out that mediation shall be carried out in accordance 
with the laws, regulations, rules and policies43 and where none of these are 
pertinent, on the basis of ‘public morality’. It also prohibits seeking illicit 
personal gain, pressurising, attacking or retaliating blows, humiliating or 
punishing the parties, betraying their confidences, or accepting invitations to 
meals or presents.44
Importantly, there is an explicit requirement that mediators judge right and 
wrong. The only justification for influencing the parties can be that it is right so 
to get them to chose the right ‘settlement’ solution; mediation must be open, 
then, to leave the parties themselves to find out what the right solution is because 
that may be crucial. It also crucial that both parties acknowledge this to be the 
right solution, because that is what justice -  yi, the personal ‘sense of justice’ - 
requires: it is only achieved, when one is acting rightly on the right motives.
Given the attention paid to questions of right and wrong in both 
adjudication and mediation the main differences between mediation and rights- 
centred adjudication, lie in their different approaches to agreement and 
disagreement, and in apparently different assessments of the moral status of 
persuasive influence exercised on another.45 It may not be plausible to assert that
42 Supreme People’s Court’s 2002 Rules on problems of handling People’s Mediation settlement 
in civil litigation, judicial interpretation (2002) no. 29 (zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu shenli 
sheiji renmin tiaojie xieyi de minshi anjian de ruogan guiding, fashi (2002) 29 hao, Hit?
'(£M (2002) 29 There is a strong 
indication, therefore, that interference on the part of a governmental agency would contravene the 
principles of mediation so much that it could not be lawful.
^  falii (fkW), fagui ('/££!), guizhang (M $ ), zhengce (M.W).
44 Articles 6(1) and 12 of the Regulations.
45 Another case discussed in Li and Liu’s Article (see above) is that of a woman persuaded to 
withdraw the application for a divorce, in circumstances that look very much as though it would 
have been better for her to insist on divorce, because of a real risk of continued physical abuse.
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genuine reconciliation could occur unless both parties gained an understanding of 
the right and wrong of their and the other party’s conduct, when examples of 
actual mediation prove to have worked rather by diverting attention from this 
particular question. But diverting immediate attention from a wrong done, a right 
violated, a claim that could be made, does not necessarily amount to denying the 
wrong, the right, or the claim. Understanding and insight, on the other hand, are 
not always promoted by facing the other person with a statement setting out right 
and wrong. Indirection, not stating one’s own view may be the best technique to 
achieve understanding.46
This can be discussed using an example of mediation case narrated in the 
September 2003 issue of People's Mediation, a magazine that contains reports on 
mediation work and academic activities around mediation, interviews with 
successful People’s Mediators, etc., with an evident purpose of showing the 
advantages of successful mediation, and giving guidance to mediators.47 This 
case in Yulin village in Chongqing involves a father-in-law, old Mr Wu, and 
daughter-in-law, Liu Xiu, who live in a disharmonious relationship. Their son 
and husband Wu Jun is generally caught up unhappily in the middle. One day 
Liu Xiu uses verbally abuses her somewhat deaf father-in-law for complaining 
that she has not cooked the food soft enough for him to eat. Unexpectedly he 
hears what she says and a minor fight erupts which leaves both parties suffering 
light injuries and requiring medical treatment for more than 30 Yuan in each 
case. They are both certain of being in the right and require to be compensated 
for the medical bill. An experienced mediator respectfully described as ‘old Su’
46 This line of argument could be supported by pointing out that sometimes when rights/claims 
are asserted in court, or redress or retribution sought for a wrong, the claims superficially at issue 
are not at the bottom of a real dispute.
47 Liu and Li have also used this journal; see case above.
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and ‘village cadre Su\ nicknamed ‘Porridge Su' for his predilection for a local 
dish, and addressed as ‘leader Su’, is called in to mediate (tiaojie). The two 
disputing parties, the unhappy and silent Wu Jun, and diverse relatives and other 
spectators are assembled in a manner, the report says (uncritically), ‘really 
reminding one of the old wartime tribunals.’48
Su spends two hours reading out the entire text of the Law fo r  the 
protection o f the rights o f the elderly and of the Law for the protection o f the 
rights o f women to everybody.49 He then asks the parties to ‘discuss’, which 
prompts Liu Xiu to exclaim,
“‘Leader Su, what is there to discuss? Why can’t you just judge who is 
wrong and who is right50 - and then of course there is also my medical 
bill to be taken care of.” She shot a glance at the old man.
“Porridge” Su thought to himself, if I criticise Liu Xiu she’s sure to 
abuse me with her sharp tongue, but if I say the old man is in the wrong I 
will be hated by him.
He goes on to point out the difficulties faced by both of the parties, the old age of 
old Wu and the difficult position of Liu Xiu in a family which is not her original 
(maiden) one, but he is again interrupted, now by old Mr. Wu.
“‘Look, Leader Su, I only want you to tell us two things; one is, who was 
right and who was wrong. The other, you should decide51 she’s got to pay 
my medical bill.” Su said “But both parties have a medical bill of thirty 
something yuan; fortunately, that’s not all that much. Of course these 
bills must be paid by the party who is in the wrong. But as to who is in
48 See Leng’s account of dispute resolution in that time, Leng, S. C., ‘Pre-1949 Development of 
the Communist Chinese System of Justice’, pp. 1-26 in his Justice in Communist China: A 
Survey of the Judicial System o f the Chinese People’s Republic (Dobbs Ferry: 1967).
49 Quite characteristically, it is obvious from the report that family members of both Liu Xiu and 
her husband are assembled; the publicness of this setting is important to the resolution of the 
conflict.
50 She uses the expression pingpan ( i¥ ^ J )  which I translate as ‘judge’. The most general 
translation of pan is ‘to judge’, ping is ‘to assess’, ‘to criticise’ (W). Adjudication is shenpan 
($ ^J), ‘hearing’ or ‘trying’ and ‘judging.’
51 He uses the word duan ($r), which more concretely means ‘to break’ or ‘to cut’; the idea is that 
of discriminating right from wrong, or allotting burdens. Panduan (^ij^fr) also means ‘to judge’.
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the wrong, well, 1 think that both parties should make use of the weapons 
of criticism and self-criticism. I do not at all mean to say that old Wu is in 
the wrong. Nor do I mean to say that Liu Xiu is in the wrong; in my view, 
the fault is with Wu Jun.” Wu Jun and everybody present started. A 
member of Liu Xiu’s maiden family gave a covert laugh. Su went on: 
“Aren’t I right? Just look what you’ve done, Wu Jun. Your father is so 
good and so old; his teeth are loose, why didn’t you explain to your wife 
she had to use more firewood when cooking. If you had done the cooking 
yourself, all this wouldn’t have happened. And it’s you who [best] 
understands your old father’s situation, isn’t it? What’s more Liu Xiu is 
your wife; and such a good-hearted and honest wife. After this long 
marriage you understand her disposition; how is it that you cannot make 
your own father understand your own wife? If for instance she likes 
speaking out a bit sharply, you ought to explain to your father that this is 
just going with the times, being modem (...)” “But surely this hasn’t been 
entirely my fault?” Wu Jun asked, confused. “Just think a little,” old 
“Porridge” Su said softly.’
Su then draws up a simple mediation agreement, the details of which are not 
given but may be inferred. He reminds the parties that New Year will be 
celebrated the next day, and that this conflict is after all ‘an internal’ one. Of 
course, he says, if they cannot make up their minds just yet, he will come back 
the next day to continue (mediating); but, again, the next day is New Year...
‘Finally, Wu Jun spoke. “I agree with leader Su’s suggestion, and I’ll sign 
it,” he said. With Wu Jun having taken the initiative, old Wu and Liu Xiu 
followed suit and signed the agreement.. .Old “Porridge” Su had again 
been successful.’52
On the surface, it would be easy to characterise this mediation process as one 
ending in a plainly wrong settlement, in which the eagerness to pacify the 
conflicting parties had overridden concern for truth and rightness, and perhaps 
this might lead one further to take this as an example of cultural difference or of
52 Pang Ran (J)6#0 [member of] the [Communist] Party’s Committee of Chongqing Jiangjin 
City, Dushi Town , ‘’’Porridge” Su judges who is in the wrong’
(“Su Xini” duan li, 8frJ!)\ (2003) People’s Mediation (Renmin Tiaojie, A K ;^ ^ ) ,
September issue, p. 21. Note that the expression duan li , ‘judging who is wrong’ or ‘judging 
right from wrong’ uses the character li (31, reason, right as an abstract principle).
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a conception of what was right that was ‘relative’ to culture. But one does not 
have to look far beneath the surface to see how this process makes sense, also to 
us. Its point here is for Su not to judge about the parties’ rights and wrongs, and 
his tongue-in-cheek ‘judgement’ that the dispute is Wu Jun’s fault is shown to be 
just this, tongue-in-cheek, by the report emphasising that Su does not really want 
to express a judgement at all. His refusal to judge could be called indirection; his 
‘judgement’ directing attention to Wu Jun could be called redirection; for by 
doing so, he reminds the parties of the person on whom their affections 
concentrate, who will suffer if they continue in conflict and who, without being 
(clearly) at fault is the much likelier real object or cause of the dispute, than the 
medical bills to be paid. The judgement, ultimately, about who was right or 
wrong, and how much, must be made by the parties themselves, for their dispute 
to be truly resolved, and imposing such judgements might only make things 
worse. The fact that the details of the settlement are not given (it is only said 
there were four points) further illustrates this. The question who is to pay the 
bills, of course, has little real meaning in this dispute occurring in the same 
household of clearly limited means. The real challenge seems to be to get the 
parties to be just -  or to ‘do justice’ - towards each other, in this case, and the 
solution proposed by the mediator is an attempt at approximating or promoting 
this goal. Reverting to the observation that justice pertained exclusively to social 
institutions, the conclusion seems inevitable that this could not mean that justice 
was exclusively the business of courts of law.
Wrong mediation. Commentators on Chinese mediation are often keen to 
emphasise that mediation can go wrong, and ‘wrongness’ in such cases is
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generally shown to consist in both an unfair judgement of the situation made by 
the mediator, and undue coercive pressure exercised to make a weak and 
disadvantaged party ‘agree’ to the suggested settlement. Often, the mediator 
denies the wrongful conduct of one of the parties. Li and Liu, in their influential 
essay categorising mediation, characterise a fifth group of cases,53 which they 
simply call ‘other cases’, as cases in which the mediators have ‘neither relied on 
law, nor on feelings, reason, or custom.’ Some of the mediators in these cases, 
they consider, have been merely
‘indifferent, and not wanting to offend any of the parties. Some were in 
fear of power and just accommodated the bullying party. In some cases 
the mediator only thought of ‘letting the matter rest so that people be set 
at peace,’ but did not consider whether the mediation method was in 
accordance with feeling, reason, or law.’54
Consider the following case, in which the Lu family’s daughter has had a pre­
marital sexual relationship with the neighbouring Yu family’s son Yu Xiaosan. 
Yu Xiaosan has no intention of marrying this daughter, and the Lu family is 
outraged. One day
‘They all grabbed shovels and hooks and went to see Yu Xiaosan to settle 
the bill with him. They made a stack of firewood in front of his door, and 
shouted that they wanted Yu Xiaosan to come out, otherwise they would 
light the fire and bum his home down. The mediation committee 
chairman, Qi, on hearing about this hastened to the spot to talk to them. 
He first addressed old Mr Lu and said, “come, sir, cool down. It’s my job 
to beat and punish people.”
Then Qi negotiates first with the Lus and then with the Yus, and gets old Mr Yu
to slap his son in the face in public, and Yu Xiaosan to apologise to the Lus.
53 That is, mediation in accordance with law, mediation in accordance with feeling and reason, 
mediation in accordance with the law as well as feeling and reason, and mediation in accordance 
with custom.
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‘Yu Xiaoson knocked his head against the floor several times towards 
the Lus and cried, “I am indeed wretched, and the old men of the Lu 
family shall deal with me!” Qi said to the Lus, “I suppose that settles the 
matter; he has been beaten, he has knelt down. Killing him would go too 
far." But the Lus thought the situation had not yet been set right. Then the 
older Yu approached Lu offering him some money. He said, “Most 
generous elder brother, these 200 yuan we give to your daughter to mend 
her health!”55 So by beating up [Yu Xiaosan], getting him to kneel down 
and offering money in compensation Chairman Qi eventually brought the 
Lu family to calm down. Later, Chairman Qi said, “people want face as 
trees want bark. As you ‘gave him face’ in front of all the people, how 
could he still be angry!’” 56
Li and Liu consider that the mediator in this case has only looked towards 
calming down the conflict but not considered ‘what the legal assessment of this 
case would be’ or (!) how to approach the issue in terms of feelings and 
reason.’57 This kind of mediation, they consider, ‘does not even get to addressing 
the problems of protecting people’s legal rights and interests in accordance with 
feelings, reason, and law.’58
So bad, bullying mediation demeans mediation, and offends law, feeling 
and reason. Conversely, the requirements of ‘basing on law’ and ‘basing on 
feeling and reason’ are thought to be standards of excellence (requirements) that 
can be combined. 59 The regulations for People’s mediation as recently 
interpreted by the Supreme People’s Court in its 2002 rules on handling
54 Ibid. p. 303.
55 Bubu shenzi, mend her body: this suggests that the (for all that is told, consensual)
sexual intercourse she had while unmarried is seen as somehow having damaged her body, an 
indication of the value attributed to women’s virginity, as putting Yu Xiaosan firmly ‘in the 
wrong.’
56 Ibid. P. 304. The authors give as reference for this case item 13 of the National People’s 
Mediation Work Congress’s [compilation of] work experience material.
57 They do not explicitly address the question of customary law. The implication is that it would 
at any rate be wrong according to law, feeling and reason, to respect any customary norm 
allowing for the punishment of the young man in such cases, and that this ‘wrongness’ would 
override any custom.
58 Ibid. P. 304.
59 As Li and Liu’s use of the category ‘mediation in accordance with law, feeling and reason’ 
already indicates.
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mediation agreements in civil litigation stipulate that mediated settlements must 
respect the mandatory (but not the dispositive) rules of the law:60 beyond this, 
there is no and should be no requirement that mediation must somehow track or 
mirror the pattern of rights and duties distributed by law, when the parties choose 
to negotiate their conflict without reference to these rights and duties. ‘Mediation 
in accordance with’ or ‘relying on the law’ indicates the desire to demonstrate 
the goodness of mediation by linking it to the general development towards fazhi, 
rule of law or by law, which of course has been part of the political agenda in 
China for more than twenty years. But it may misleadingly suggest that 
mediation could perform the function of protecting legal rights, in a less 
confrontational and cost-effective way than court adjudication.
The authors find justifications for the peculiarities of Chinese mediation 
practices in its social structure. Despite having described legal assessments as 
used in mediation, they allow some doubts whether (legal) rights really are an 
appropriate moral standard forjudging human relationships; implicit in this is the 
concession that mediation does not aim at the protection of legal rights.
‘The characteristic weighting of feeling and reason above law, in 
particular, is due to the fact that the lower strata of Chinese society, 
especially its rural society, to this day remain a close-knit society. People 
live together in one location or in one work unit for a long time, and they 
form all sorts of ties amongst each other. So they don’t want to apply the 
law strictly in ordinary conflicts about rights,61 in order not to harm/strain 
these kinds of relationship. This gets to a point where they are even 
prepared to waive some rights in order to save some feelings [feeling and
60 In Article five, subsection four. The Court’s rules go far in further ‘restricting’ the range of 
settlements to be recognised by the courts; excluding settlements that are ‘clearly unfair’, and 
settlements that harm the public interest or a third person’s interests.
61 The expression used here is ‘wei yiban de quanli jiufen yange yifa chuli
M )\  Compare to my earlier comment on Ames and Hall’s easy transition from ‘rights’ 
to ‘application of the law’, which misses the point of rights assertion.
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reason, qingli], in order to improve the relationships in/with their [social] 
environment.’62
Mediation and adjudication; intrajudicial mediation. In the absence of a working 
institution for the protection of legal rights like a Western court, it is impossible 
to pin down any reason why coercive, but non-violent pressure exercised to make 
a person do what they should do is wrong. 1 think it simply is not; it is indeed 
unimaginable that a community should not at some stage resort to coercion in 
order, at least, to protect itself. Usually there is also a practice of punishment 
which usually includes violence; but this is an area not to be considered in the 
present context of mediation (except where, as in the example above, ‘mediation’ 
goes wrong.) It is of course also in the absence of state courts that the mediation 
processes appear (natural and) justified, so far as they respect the moral 
requirements pertaining to mediation.63
But especially in the Chinese countryside, mediation is also an accepted 
part of dispute resolution by judges in state courts, and is far more widespread 
than in any Western court practice. 64 The use of mediation in court has been 
actively promoted by a variety of measures taken by state authorities. For 
instance, a 2003 Supreme People’s Court legal interpretation imposes a duty on
62 Ibid. P. 305. The authors also draw attention to the Chinese tradition of imperial government 
which discouraged litigation (wusong, and encouraged settling thiem amicably (xisong, ,H> 
i£). They consider that this tradition still pervades official attitudes towards conflicts in China.
63 This is reminiscent of Fuller’s general claim that different processes have ‘different moralities’, 
as expressed in his two essays on mediation and adjudication/arbitration respectively. But it is not 
clear from the above that that something that might be right in mediation might be wrong 
according to ‘the morality o f  adjudication. Fuller, Lon L., ‘The Forms and Limits of 
Adjudication’ (1978), chapter one in Freeman, Michael (ed.), Alternative Dispute Resolution 
(New York: 1995), and ‘Mediation -  its Forms and Functions’, (1971) 44 Southern California 
Law Review 305.
64 Gerke, ibid. p. 38. In 1956 intra-judicial mediation was first officially endorsed by what came 
to be called the ‘twelve-character-directive’ and this endorsement was confirmed in 1964 by the 
‘sixteen character directive’. After the Great Cultural Revolution, mediation within courts 
became a very important part of the legal reform movement initiated in the late 70s by Deng 
Xiaoping under the slogan of developing ‘socialist legality’ and ‘legality with Chinese
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judges to attempt mediation in most civil litigation cases using a new simplified 
procedure.65 At the same time, there is a discussion, within China, about whether 
the widespread application of mediation by courts is in line with the general 
development toward the rule of law.66 This discussion tunes in with wider claims 
that in order to achieve rule of law, the administration of justice (as we may 
appropriately call it here) must be concentrated on the courts. As extreme 
instances, the phenomenon of villagers taking ‘justice’ in their own hands occurs, 
and we find references to ‘moral courts’ or ‘courts on the kang' (the traditional 
heated brick platform used as bed and sitting place in northern peasant houses), 
etc. Thus, a recent newspaper report tells us about a group of villagers outraged 
at the fact that a couple who murdered their own possibly mentally disturbed son 
in ‘punishment’ for his misdemeanors, including attempting to rape his own 
mother and generally molesting the villagers, were arrested. The villagers were 
outraged at the disrespect shown for the principle that ‘great causes of justice 
obliterate family relationships’ -  the idea that to uphold justice, when a relative 
commits a serious crime he should be punished by his relatives despite (or 
because of, one might as well say) the family relationship.67
characteristics.’ As part of the reformation of the Code of Civil procedure the principle of 
zhuozhong tiaojie/tiaojie wei zJhu has been taken out of the new 1991 code.
65 See Article 14 of the 2003 Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation no. 15 ‘SPC judicial 
interpretation [providing] rules for the application of the simplified civil procedure rules (Zuigao 
fayuan guanyu shiyong jianyi chengxu shenli minshi anjian de ruogan guiding, A K '/ i
T ig  om (2003)15 m
66 Peerenboom’s China’s Long March Toward Rule o f Law, in contrast for instance with 
Lubman’s earlier synoptic account of Chinese law, deals with mediation only in passim. But see 
his concise discussion at pp. 162 ff. He concludes that the strength of mediation would not mean 
court adjudication was not required. This conclusion may well be supported. But how valuable, 
with reference to China, is the argument that courts are needed because ‘without the credible 
threat of suing in court, the parties would have less reason to reach agreement through litigation?’ 
See Peerenboom, p. 162. Such credible threat cannot be said to have existed in rural China at 
least over recent decades, and still Chinese mediation could work, in some instances, to effect just 
dispute resolution. -  Peerenboom’s criticism, too, that Chinese mediation was frequently 
coercive, seems superficial, for reasons given in the main text.
67 Chen Jun ($£¥), ‘The law does not recognise the principle of punishing one’s relatives to 
uphold justice (Falii bu ren “da yi mie qin”’, 12 May 2004, available at
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There are two main areas of concern: one is whether mandatory or quasi­
mandatory ‘imposed’ mediation is acceptable; the other, whether judges can 
successfully perform the roles of both mediator and judge.68 1 consider the 
second question to be the more central one. Parties in imposed mediation may 
still agree not to, or unilaterally refuse to, settle. But a judge who works toward 
getting the parties to consent to a settlement, performs a role potentially very 
different from a judge working to protect the parties’ legal rights. The mediating 
judge may, for instance, strive for familiarity and confidence in a way the 
adjudicating judge will not. But while the fact that the mediator may turn himself 
into a judge in adversary proceedings may evidently threaten the success of 
mediation, it is difficult to see why the judge should not be allowed to attempt 
mediation by making suggestions, for instance, for a settlement. Of course, 
judges in some Western systems are also enjoined to suggest settlements to 
parties in civil litigation (‘at all stages of the procedure’) though they may not 
always be eager to do so.69 There is no deep, necessary contradiction between the 
role of a judge and a mediator, but problems may arise in practice in various 
forms. One is that judges may abuse their supposed duty to mediate by refusing 
to adjudicate, because the former is easier for them. Another is with judges using 
information they have obtained confidentially in a previous mediation attempt.
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-05/12/content_1465070.htm. The son was suffering from a 
head tumour. This Article also comments that such cases have been frequent in recent years.
68 For a relatively early discussion of this topic Shi Fengyi, ‘Tantan Renmin Tiaojie de jige renshi 
wenti' [trans. ‘Talks on the Understanding Problems of People’s Mediation’], Faxue Yanjiu 1988 
no. 4, 75; Ji Weidong , ‘Fazhi yu tiaojie de beilun ’ [trans. The
Conflict [rather contradiction] between Legal System and Mediation’], Faxue Yanjiu
1989 no.5, 21; Zhu Changli (A  H A ), ‘Study on problems with undue intervention in mediation 
(Guanyu renmin tiaojie ganyu wenti de yanjiu, , originally
translated as ‘Some Problems of Mediation by Common People in China’), (1999) Faxue Yanjiu 
(?£ W f f t )  no. 5, 79.
69 Compare, for instance, section 278 of the German Civil Procedure Law.
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Both these questions are indirectly addressed by the Supreme People’s 
Court's new draft rules on intrajudicial mediation, which have been posted on the 
internet to invite discussion and comments. For instance, the rules specify that 
the initiation of mediation must be based on consent or on a law prescribing 
mandatory mediation, and details groups of cases in which mediation should be 
carried out, but also of cases where mediation is prohibited. This latter group 
includes cases ‘concerning the public interest’ (Articles 3, 4). In the context of 
court appeals, mediation is to happen only if the parties so wish (Article 14). 
Regarding the specific work methods of the judge as mediator, it is prescribed 
that mediation is normally not public, and that judges may ‘carry out mediation 
work on’ the parties separately, but only if they do not object (Article 10). In 
contrast to People’s Mediation settlements, intrajudicially mediated settlements 
have the status of a judgement acquiring legal effect like judgements, and can be 
coercively enforced according to Article 35. They can also be challenged but 
only in the retrial (zaishen) procedure before the court, on account of not being 
valid.70
As early as 1994, an article under the title ‘pre-litigation mediation -  much 
trouble, little benefit’71 complained about the practice of courts trying to mediate 
cases before even properly accepting them for litigation, saying mediation of
70 I comment on this type of procedure below. ‘Supreme People’s Court’s rules on relevant 
problems regarding judicial mediation work (Draft inviting comments) (Zuigao renmin fayuan 
guanyu renmin tioajie gongzuo ruogan wenti de guiding (zhengqiu yijian gao), :§ri5Af^v4 K A
(fiE4cl?;JSLII ))’, 10 February 2004, avaliable at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-02/10/content_1306657_l.htm.
71 Zhu Xiaozhen and Fang Longhua, ‘“Pre-litigation mediation:” much trouble, little benefit -  on 
reasonings by the Mufan City Intermediate Court (Suqian tiaojie ” bi duo li shao -  yu Mufanjiang 
shi zhongji fayuan s h a n g q u e (1994) 
Faxue no. 4, 20.
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this sort was against the principle of the rule of law, or rule ‘by’ law (fazhi 
7p) “ and represented illegitimate ‘rule by men’ (renzhi A v n ) .
‘As a conflict can [sometimes] not be avoided or have irreversible effects 
and causes of existence, and because moreover, any conflict in reality 
always contains an inherent danger to the actually existing legal system, 
the state and its authorities/organs (such as judicial authorities) must 
resolve conflicts through the real law and procedures in order to eliminate 
entirely any behaviour contravening the law. Litigation is one form of 
conflict resolution and stands for an historical progress, for mankind 
parting with uncivilised ‘self-help’. And moreover because it is a 
phenomenon of rationalisation, it represents the most standardised and, in 
terms of enforcement, most effective technique...’73
The authors suggest that a modem legal system cannot tolerate the resolution of 
conflicts by any other method than adjudication. Only adjudication seems 
capable of resolving conflicts fully ‘rationally’.74 A more recent comment on the 
situation of rural courts captures the important point, that reconciliation is of 
particular importance in the countryside where communities are relatively close- 
knit. It reminds us, appropriately I think, that support for rights protection does
72 The expression fazhi admits of both translations.
73 Zhu Xiaozhen, Fang Longhua, ibid. p. 22.
74 A more differentiated analysis is offered in a more recent contribution to the discussion based 
on an account of two ‘dodgy’ or ‘vague legal products’, namely, two instances of judicial 
mediation at a local court, by Yang Liu. His criticism of the second instance of mediation, in 
which a case of blackmail in the context of a sexual relationship is ‘based on non-legal facts’(p. 
484) is bizarre. He may be referring to the fact that the court does not ascertain whether a rape 
alleged to have occurred did occur, or that the ascertainment of facts did not occur in the process 
of evidence gathering, but then it is in order in civil litigation not to prove facts which neither of 
the parties dispute. - In the case discussed the plaintiff had a sexual relationship with the 
defendant’s wife and when discovered gave money to settle the dispute (!), but he is continuously 
harassed and threatened by the aggrieved husband. The ‘settlement’ stipulates that the plaintiff 
pay another sum of ‘compensation’ to the defendant (not the wife!), but that the defendant must 
immediately stop his threats and blackmailing attempts. This is indeed an instance of mediation 
gone wrong, but just as in the above instance, this is because there is strong suspicion of criminal 
behaviour, and because, simply, the mediating judge makes wrong judgements. Yang Liu ($5#P), 
‘Dodgy legal products: an examination of two cases of local court mediations (Mohu de falti 
chanpin: dui liang qi jiceng fayuan tiaojie anjian de kaocha,
) in Jiang Shigong editor), Mediation, Legality and Modernity:
Mediation in China (tiaojie,fazhi yu xiandaixing: zhongguo tiaojie zhidu yanjiu,
* S lB jU M K ffift) (Beijing: 2001), 484 esp. pp. 492 ff.
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not preclude reconciliation, just as justice is not in necessary -  is not always in 
conflict with friendship or with social peace.
‘The judge when hearing a case cannot simply ‘decide and be done with 
it;' he cannot not consider the further results [of his judgement]. No, he 
must, taking the peculiarities of rural societal relationships and the 
peculiarities of the way peasants think into account, adjudicate cases 
guided by the idea of ‘valuing social peace’, give weight to mediation and 
make mediation the primary technique of resolving civil litigation 
disputes. He must not exacerbate the conflict or leave a conflict in 
existence; [instead] he must resolve the conflict in the courtroom (...) [He 
should] from the perspective of the law as well as of feeling and reason 
seek to persuade and educate the parties and patiently carry out mediation 
work, so as to make them value social peace, forgive and understand each 
other, and restore good relations.’75
If courts or individual judges seem sometimes particularly bad at mediation, or 
are heavily criticised for performing the task of mediation, this may at least 
sometimes be to do with the fact that they do not take the rights and the position 
of parties seriously enough; that they do not offer the parties a forum for real 
disagreement and discussion, but rather present themselves as intimidating and 
‘silencing’ and end up making wrong judgements. It is difficult to resist the 
suggestion that this is because court mediation has not offered a proper forum for 
exchanging arguments and ascertaining the facts. Mediation accommodates 
disagreement between the parties in a special way, and so does rights protection 
in court. On this analysis, only courts strong in their ability to protect rights can 
also be strong in providing just and hence desirable mediation.
Turning to situations where the original conflict to be resolved is one 
between citizens and state, as the next chapter does, also means turning from the 
domestic and/or rural setting of cases discussed until now, to a more urban
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setting. Unsurprisingly, one of the weakest groups in urban society are China’s 
internal, urban migrant workers from the countryside.
75 Guo Wei Rural local courts should emphasise mediation more’ (nongcun jiceng fayuan
gengjia yao zhong tiaojie ), 30 April 2004, available at http://
www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=l 13763.
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Chapter Five Rights and Principles of Legislation in China
The case o f Wang Xingmao. 1 Wang Xingmao and his 16-year-old son Wang 
Chaozheng had been working in a coal mine near Lianyuan, a city in Hunan 
province, for three months, but because Wang Chaozheng had fallen ill, they 
were on their way home on 22 April 2002. Before they could board their train at 
the railway station of Lianyuan, they were arrested by the local police and put 
into the Lianyuan ‘station for internment and deportation,’ situated at a few 
kilometres’ distance from Lianyuan City, on the grounds that they were not able 
to show sufficient documentation of their identity, and of being allowed to be in 
Lianyuan. The following morning, the father was told that ‘in accordance with a 
regulation of the internment station,’ unless Wang Xingmao paid 1200 Yuan 
Renminbi to the internment and deportation station, his son would continue to be 
locked up there. Wang Xingmao himself was released so that he could go and get 
the money. He hastened home and tried his best, borrowing from family and 
friends, but he could not find so much money in such short time. After three days, 
in despair, he tried to kill himself by drinking a bottle of pesticides. He was taken 
to hospital and as a consequence of this, the local government made a phone call 
to the Lianyuan Internment and deportation station, telling them they had better 
release Wang Chaozheng. But this did not happen and a year later, the 
whereabouts of Wang Xingmao after his being taken to hospital were not known. 
When a month later, relatives of the still interned Wang Chaozheng had collected 
1000 Yuan Renminbi, and were able to buy him out with this sum, they told him
1 This story is told by Cao Yongwen in the Hong Kong based weekly magazine ‘An
investigation into the true story of trading people at Hunan Lianyuan’s internment station (Hunan 
Lianyuan shourongzhan “mairen mairen” zhenxiang diaocha, “^ A ^ A ” M
summer 2003, available at http://www.phoenixtv.com.cn/home/phoenixweekly/116/48 
page.html. See also below note 2.
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that his father had disappeared. It is reported that Chaozheng ‘left [home] in 
search for his father,’ and of him, too, there was no trace a year later.
Wang Xingmao and his son had become the victims of a systematic 
collaboration between the local police station and the local internment and 
deportation station which allegedly had thousands of victims.2 The aim of this 
collaboration was to extort as much money as possible from migrant workers, 
whose arrest was ‘justified’ because they had insufficient papers on them. An 
‘agreement’ between the internment station and the local police stipulated that the 
police would get a provision of 50 Yuan for every person they brought to the 
internment station, and there was a ‘tariff system, according to an ‘internal 
regulation’3 of the station, whereby the sum to be paid by the detainee or his 
friends or relatives was determined according to their place of residence, and to 
the grounds on which they were kept interned -  as vagrants, drug addicts, 
prostitutes or prostitutes’ clients, etc.4 The whistle-blower reported that these 
‘grounds’ were faked in the majority (95%) of cases. In his words, the people 
interned were simply peasants, or rural residents, and workers. The conclusion is 
tempting that they were interned because they were defenceless peasants and
2 In a previous interview the official, Guo Xianli, claimed among other things, that between 1996 
and November 2002 more than ten thousand peasants (members of the rural population) had been 
held hostage in this way and that over 3.2 million Yuan RMB in cash had been extorted. It is not 
clear to what area he was referring to, but from the context it is likely he referred just to Lianyuan. 
See Chen Feng ‘A former internment secretary lifts the dark curtain to make revelations 
about internment: over a million Yuan extorted in 6 years’ (Qian shourongzhan shuji pilu 
shouronog heimu: liu nian sougua shang bai wan yuan,,
SfJ-hH ), in the newspaper Southern Metropolitan ( ) ,  19 June 2003, at 
http://news.xinhuanet. com/legal/2003-06/19/content_945548.htm.
3 Guiding (M/£).
4 To quote from the newspaper article reporting the content of the regulation’, there was a 
division into A, B and C types of grounds of internment, and within these types, the ‘fees’ raised 
differed according to how long the detainee was detained, and whether he was coming from inside 
or outside the province (town). So, for instance, a person detained ‘for’ taking or selling drugs, 
detained for over ten days and from outside the province would be charged 1400 Yuan whereas a 
person detained ‘for’ general vagrancy and begging detained for less than ten days and from the 
same province would be charged 600 Yuan. The exorbitant fee-taking is (was) partly due to the 
fact that the stations were under-funded, and that they needed to employ more staff than they were 
allotted (bianzhi, Hi rjilj) by the Civil Affairs Bureau in charge.
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workers. The unhappy inmates of stations like these5 were not just systematically 
‘sold’ to their relatives and friends; they were not only subjected to grossly 
unreasonable ‘fees’ in the detention stations. In some places, they were also 
forced to do heavy and sometimes dangerous work on special sites, such as 
building sites, of which there used to be some in many larger cities.6
In May 2003, three legal scholars in Beijing petitioned to the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress to declare the main legal basis for 
the internment and deportation system, the Directives for internment and
*7
deportation o f urban vagrants and beggars promulgated in 1982 by the State 
Council, unconstitutional. In June 2003, a case of murder of an interned inmate, 
under the eyes and indeed with participation of some of the official employees of 
such a station in Guangdong, was tried, and raised a lot of media attention and 
public concern. In the wake of this trial, some further cases which had happened 
between 2000 and 2001, and had gone to court, were also reported in the media -  
Wang Xingmao’s case being one of them.8 The protest, in public media, internet
5 Exceptions did exist. See Shi Yin (ffitfc), ‘ Tianjin: an internment station “returned to its origins 
[its original purpose]” (Tianjin: bei "huanyuan” de shourong zhan, JkW-: |f£ “ W.”
$&y, Southern Weekend (t^T/j JS] A ), 26 June 2003, available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/ 
zm/20030626/cs/zt/200306260708.asp, on a ‘model’ station in Tianjin run by an official 
committed to providing inmates with proper food, education programmes, etc.
6 For information on forced labour in the Lianyuan internment station, see Chen Xuan (l&lSf), 
‘Shanghai: an end to the tasks of ‘no. 936’? (Shanghai: 936 renwu de zongjie?,Ai'M: 936
?, Southern Weekend ($3 }j HU A  ), 26 June 2003, at http://cul.sina.com.cn/s/2003-06- 
27/37117.html.
7 Chengshi liulang qitao renyuan shourong qiansong banfa ( ^  A  
published by the State Council on 12 May 1982.
For instance, a report on a youth interned in Beijing in 2001, who was declared to have been 
released after an internment of several days’ duration, but never returned home and is lost, in 
Xinhuawang (author not named), ‘a youth interned for the second time in Beijing Luoyang not 
heard about for two years after his release, Yi shao man zai Beijing Luoyang bei liangdu shourong 
chuzhan Hang nian xialuo bu ming, i t ^ l b f r o m
Wuhan Morning Post, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-07/09/content_987615.htm; a 
Xinhuawang report on 25 migrant workers burned to death in a transport van because the van’s 
construction had been altered so as to make it difficult to open the back door, in Lin Jie 
Vn), ’In the case of 25 internees burnt to death in a car the court hearing has been adjourned 
indefinitely (25 ming bei shourong renyuan shaosi chezhong anjian tingshen bei wuxianqi tuichi, 
25 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-
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chatrooms, etc., against such practices were then overtaken by the abolition of the 
Directives which are the background, if not a justification, for practices such as 
the one described above.9 In June 2003 the State Council announced that as of 1 
August 2003, the old Directives would be replaced by the new Directives for Aid 
fo r  Urban Vagrants and Beggars.10 Article eleven of the new Directives reads 
like an enumeration of past malpractices:
‘The employees of the Aid Station must of their own accord respect the 
laws, regulations, policies and relevant statutes of the state. They are not 
allowed to impose detention or any measure amounting to detention on 
the recipients of aid. Verbal abuse, physical punishment, and mistreatment 
of the aid recipients are not allowed; it is not allowed to instigate verbal 
abuse, physical punishment or mistreatment. It is not allowed to practice 
deception, exploitation or embezzlement on the aid recipients. It is not 
allowed to confiscate articles of daily necessity from the aid recipients; it 
is not allowed to confiscate their passes/documents or to confiscate 
material [prepared] for the purposes of [administrative] reconsideration 
[applications] or accusation. It is not allowed to employ aid recipients as 
supervisors [of other inmates of the stations]. It is not allowed to make aid 
recipients perform labour for private purposes. It is not allowed to molest 
women.’
China had had its first highy publicised instance of abolition of a law on the 
grounds, simply, that it was bad law. It had infringed constitutional rights, and 
provided an institutional framework in which further rights violations could occur 
-  although, unsurprisingly, no government official ever stated these reasons. The 
following discussion of the legislative context of Wang Xingmao’s case is meant 
to provide a background understanding of situations in which citizens may find
08/27/content_ 1047117.htm; also a report on the internment of an eighty year old in Shenzhen 
who had forgotten his papers when going out for a walk, which I discuss in detail in the sixth 
chapter.
91 discuss the case of Sun Zhigang in the context of criminal procedure below.
10 Chengshi shenghuo wuzhao de liulang qitao renyuan jiuzhu banfa
). See also the Civil Affairs’ Bureau’s Specific guidelines for applying the 
Directives for Aid to the urban homeless published on 21 July 2004 (Chengshi shenghuo wuzhao 
de liulang qitao renyuan jiuzhu guanli banfa shishi xize, MM A S  A ^ f^ '^ Y [ l^ iTt‘ A  MI&&Ji§;
mfh'&gnmm).
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themselves forced to challenge official measures taken against them. Most 
importantly, this involves identifying the way in which Chinese legislation fails 
to give real meaning to the principle of equality before the law.
The right to move freely and the Internment and Deportation Directives. If, at the 
time when their detention was made, Wang Xingmao and his son had been able 
to protest against the legality of these measures, they might have said something 
like the following.
‘There are laws which restrict the right to personal freedom and bodily 
integrity of Chinese citizens, (as there are in practically any country). But these 
laws must themselves be constitutional. The Directives for Internment and 
Deportation o f Urban Vagrants and Beggars are not, because Article 37 of the 
Constitution says that only the police may detain me. You may call this measure 
‘internment’ but of course it amounts to detention.11 Moreover a court or people’s 
procurator should approve of this measure. Also, it should be a ‘law’, not a mere 
administrative regulation, which restricted my right to personal freedom. Not to 
mention the fact that it is against human dignity to lock people up for days and 
weeks, just because they are not carrying a certain document with them. Even if 
you set aside all these arguments against the Directives, still, the application of 
the Directives must respect my rights and the principles laid down in the 
constitution. The laws can’t possibly have been made for authorities, like you, to 
use them arbitrarily, or for you to exploit your power for financial gain. Therefore, 
even if you are claiming that the arrest and detention are based on the Directives, 
on a regulation called the ‘three no’s rule’, or on any other official norm or
11 The respective Chinese expressions are shourong and daibu (i£M). The full expression
for ‘internment and deportation’ or ‘internment and relocation’ is shourong qiansong
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document, they are still illegal.’ This would have amounted to a request to 
examine the legality, in particular the constitutionality both of the specific 
administrative decisions and measures taken against Wang and his son, and of the 
laws and administrative regulations on which these decisions and measures relied 
or were purported to rely. In China, there is no court procedure for the second 
kind of examination. From a practising lawyer’s point of view, therefore, there 
may seem to be little need even to embark on the second kind of examination. 
But the examination itself can of course still be made, and as is argued in the 
following, must be made, to make sense of Chinese law.
The 1982 Directives on the Internment and Deportation o f Urban Vagrants 
and Beggars issued by the State Council (the executive branch of government) 
only required that beggars from rural families, ‘rogue’ urban residents, tramps or 
beggars, and other people who lived in the streets and had no livelihood be 
interned and deported from the cities. For this purpose, extra ‘stations’ (or 
‘centres’) were erected in the bigger cities (Article four). The governments of the 
deported people’s home areas were responsible for re-allocating the deported, 
according to Article nine. It is only a further, apparently unpublicised View on the 
Reform o f Internment and Deportation Work, also issued by the State Council, 
that requires these measures to be carried out on anyone who does not have the 
so-called ‘three permits’ or ‘three documents’: identity card, temporary residence 
permit and work permit.12 People coming under this rule were called the ‘three
12 Zhang Wen (M3t)  refers to this 1991 ‘[State Council] View on the reform of internment and 
Deportation Work (Guanyu shourong qiansong gongzuo gaige wenti de yijian,
)’ in ‘Why can we only ‘reside temporarily’ in our own country?’ (Wei 
shenme zai ziji de zuguo women zhi neng zhanzhu?, Southern
Window (^] RUf), 19 November 2001, reprinted in Wang Zhenmin (£E$1K), Case Reader in 
Constitutional law (4 1 f f l XM Tsinghua University, Beijing: 2002) p. 115.
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1 3no’ people. There was, in every major city, a maze of further regulations 
regarding all three requirements.
Whether seen in conjunction with such rules or not the unconstitutionality 
of the now abolished Directives for internment and deportation was obvious. 
They violated the right to personal freedom. Article 37 of the Chinese 
Constitution states that
‘The freedom of the person of citizens of the People’s Republic of China 
is inviolable. No citizen may be arrested except with the approval or by 
decision of a People’s Procuratorate or by decision of a People’s Court, 
and arrests must be made by a public security organ.
Unlawful detention or deprivation or restriction of citizens’ freedom of the 
person by other means is prohibited, and unlawful search of the person of 
citizens is prohibited.’14
In violation of this rule it was not the police, working under the Ministry of 
Public Security, but instead authorities under the Ministry of Civil Affairs, which 
were in charge of the internment and deportation stations, and decided about 
internment and deportation. Also, the Directives could not count as a ‘law’ in 
China, but according to the 2000 Legislation Law (Article nine in conjunction 
with article Eight) and the Law on Administrative Punishment (Article nine), only
13 San wu renyuan ELfcX'A.  Further legislation dealing with the ‘three no’ includes the Ministry 
of Public Security’s 1995 Directives regarding application for temporary residence permits and 
or for Beijing City alone, the Beijing administrative regulations on the administration o f migrant 
workers of 1995. These stipulate that work permits, which are required, are not issued unless one 
has either got a household registration for the area for which one has got a work permit or a 
temporary residence permit for that area. - The requirement to have an identity card is now mainly 
stipulated by the ID card law, according to which persons under sixteen ‘may’ also apply for an 
ID card, see Li Yu ( ^(ift), Zhai Huimin ( I lS l iO , ‘Protecting citizens’ legal rights and interests; 
benefiting citizens’ activities in society -  a reading of the Residents’ Identity Card Law 
(Baozhang gongmin hefa quanyi bianli gongmin shehui huodong,
Legal Daily ( vif&J EUR) of 29 June 2003, at http://www. 
legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2003-06/29/content_35161 .htm.
14 The Chinese constitution also states, in its preamble, that the exploitation of man by man has 
been abolished.
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a ‘law’- falii15 - can restrict the right to personal freedom. These two laws have 
to some extent affirmed the logic of the ‘parliamentary prerogative of restricting 
rights in China,’16 which is based on the understanding that a ‘law’ is an abstract 
and general legal rule made by a legislature representing the will of the people. 
According to the 2000 Chinese legislation law only the National People’s 
Congress and its Standing Committee produce ‘laws’, falii. What the State 
Council makes are but ‘administrative regulations’. So the Directives were 
gravely flawed in a formal way, without even considering the question if their 
restriction of personal freedom (Article 37 of the Constitution) required some 
further substantive justification.17
The history of the internment and deportation system, and of the abolition 
of the old Directives, throws light on a wider issue. The current Chinese system 
of legislation does not entrust one body or a clearly defined number of bodies to 
make general laws; but without generality of laws, it is difficult to adhere to the 
most basic requirement that citizens of one legal system be affected, as well as
|  O
protected, by the law as equals, and to protect their nghts. Wang Xingmao was 
not only wrongfully interned because he did not belong to any of the categories of 
people who could be lawfully detained. He was also told by the Lianyuan
15 Falii (&#).
16 Because in theory the People’s Congresses represent the will of the people. According to article 
five of the 2000 Legislation Law (yL'iifi,), 'laws shall embody the will o f the people, enhance 
socialist democracy and guarantee that the people participate in legislative activities through 
various channels’ (my emphasis).
17 And on that head, too, the internment and deportation rules failed. Punishment and imminent 
grave danger to public safety might have been cited as justifications but were not cited and would 
not in fact have justified internment and deportation. By the Ministry of Public Security’s 2 June 
1995 Directives on applications for temporary residence permits specific 
punishments were already envisaged for offending against the requirement for a temporary 
residence permit. - No grave danger to public security could have been inferred from the mere 
presence of homeless people in big cities.
8 The 2000 Legislation Law just mentioned ‘privileges’ national level legislation in some ways. 
It therefore reads a bit like an attempt to push the system of People’s Congresses in the direction 
of a parliamentary system.
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internment station that ‘there was a regulation’ effectively setting out tariffs for 
different kinds of detainees. This ‘internal regulation’19 stipulated exorbitant 
‘fees’. Of course, such an ‘internal regulation’ could serve no justificatory 
function at all.20 But it is not easy to pin down the exact, technical reason why 
they should not count as part of Chinese law. The legal system relies on the co­
existence of a multitude of ‘legislators’ ruling over different areas of 
administration in an almost absolutist way, while on the other hand there is some 
fiction of unity and coherence. This by itself poses a threat to effective rights 
protection for Chinese citizens. Even if judicial review of all the current norms 
were allowed (it is not), it would be technically highly difficult to put into 
practice, because law should conform not only to the constitution but also to all 
other higher-ranking law. A truly vast amount of review would be necessary.
The organ for nationwide legislation and the supreme legislative organ is 
the National People’s Congress (hereafter NPC). It makes, alters and amends the 
constitution as well as ordinary laws.21 The NPC has a Standing Committee, 
which can also make laws, but only such that are not deemed ‘fundamental’ 
laws.22 Also the Standing Committee can only legislate outside the NPC plenary 
sessions, which last for only three weeks a year. Outside the sessions, the 
Standing Committee is moreover authorised to alter and amend ‘fundamental’ 
laws. Although they have (had) such great an impact on some fundamental rights 
of Chinese citizens, neither the rules for household registration nor the ones for
19 The expression used is ‘zhanshang guiding (££ JiM /E )’-
20 Justification or exculpation in a criminal law context might be a more complex matter.
21 There are some procedural difference between the passing/altering ordinary laws and those of 
constitutional rank, in that a two thirds majority is necessary to change the constitution. Given the 
fact that opposition to proposed legislation is still very timid in the NPC, this latter requirement is 
of little practical importance. Alterations and amendments of the constitution are frequent. There 
are moreover laws of constitutional significance, such as the 2000 Legislation Law.
22 Examples are the criminal and criminal procedure, civil and civil procedure, administration and 
administrative procedure laws.
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internment and deportation are (were) laws passed by the National People’s 
Congress.23 This is symptomatic of the existence of various further mechanisms 
for the production of ‘legislation’ in a wider sense. Besides the ‘laws’ in a 
narrower sense (falii),24 there is a large number of regulations and so-called 
‘rules’, as well as statutes, etc. (xingzheng fagui, difangxing fagui, zizhi tiaoli and
25danxing tiaoli), passed by a number of different authorities. Importantly, 
legislation is not restricted to the People’s Congresses at their various levels, but 
occurs at largely through the activity of administrative authorities. There are the
' J f i‘governments’ at the various administrative levels, as well as departments at 
these levels, which are directly responsible to the national ministries. The 2000 
Legislation Law attempted to define various authorities’ ‘limits of power’ to 
‘legislate’, according to some of its chapter headings, but the success of this 
attempt was limited. For instance, according to the Legislation Law the State 
Council has the power to make ‘administrative regulations’, firstly ‘in matters for 
which the implementation of laws requires this,’ and secondly in matters ‘within 
the administrative functions and powers of the State Council as provided for in 
Article 89 of the Constitution.’ Article 89 of the Constitution, however, merely 
states that the State Council may ‘make administrative regulations’ in its 
subsection one, without stating any limits of this power. On the basis of just these 
provisions, then, it appears that the State Council can make regulations -
23 For an interesting chart for legislative activities previous to enactment of the legislation law, see 
Chen Sixi (B£#t1I) and Tong Weidong in Ying
Songnian ) and Yuan Shuhong Toward Government under the Rule o f Law
(Zouxiang fazhi zkengfu, Beijing: 2001).
24 Falii (&#).
25 In Chinese, xingzheng fagui ( '/£)$), difangxing fagui zizhi tiaoli ( §
$!)> danxing tiaoli ( ^ f l ^ 'J ) *  and guizhang See Appendix‘Chart on Legislation’, p.
271.
26 Starting with the State Council (central government, the cabinet) and its Legal Affairs Bureau 
(Fazhiban, vAffeU Ab) at the top, and continuing down to the governments of larger cities.
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‘legislate’ -  in any matter it pleases?1 Article 56 in conjunction with article nine 
of the Legislation Law provides that for matters to be regulated by laws (falii), the 
State Council may be empowered by the NPC or its Standing Committee to make 
administrative regulations, which are later to be replaced by laws. ‘Matters to be 
regulated by laws,’ however, are not definitely enumerated in the Legislation 
Law, because the enumeration provided in article eight includes in its subsection 
ten ‘other matters which must be regulated by laws made by the NPC or its 
Standing Committee (my emphasis).’ Neither from the end of the administrative 
regulation, nor from the end of NPC legislation, is there a clear account of what 
should be legislated on by which authority. There is consequently no meaningful 
‘distribution’ of legislative power among these two institutions.28 There is only an 
attempt to establish a hierarchy among norms already produced by either body, 
according to which NPC laws are above administrative regulations (Article 78 
Legislation Law). Incoherence and inconsistency between laws and State Council 
regulations are thereby not forestalled but instead envisaged and effectively 
invited.29
27 Xu Anbiao, an official working in the Law Work Committee of the NPC, describes a dogmatic 
dispute between a ‘doctrine of [legislation according to] tasks’ and a ‘doctrine of [legislation 
according to] legal basis’. Xu Anbiao (#$:$*)> ‘Legislative powers according to the Legislation 
Law', Legal Daily (/£r£ij 0  j$I) of 4 June 2000, available at http://www.jc.gov.cn/personal/ysxs/ 
fnsxl/ fnsx979.htm. He claims the Legislation Law, then new, has clearly defined legislative 
powers and hence settled the dispute.
8 With the important exception of article nine of the Legislation Law, which states a number of 
areas to be regulated only by ‘laws’. See above on article nine and the Directives for internment 
and deportation.
29 It appears that the best the NPC could do to define limits on the part of the State Council to 
‘legislate’ and to prevent conflict, would be to authorise it to legislate provisionally in as many 
defined areas as possible, in accordance with article seven of the Legislation Law.
Moreover, although there is a hierarchy of legislation, this hierarchy is not theoretically quite 
clear, and in practice often neglected, so that many local norms contravene norms supposed to be 
higher up in the hierarchy.29 For example, article 86 of the Legislation Law is intended to deal 
with conflict between rules (guizhang) made by national level ministries and rules made by local 
(provincial level) governments. It is up to the State Council to decide which of them should be 
applied. This means that these regulations are theoretically at the same level, and only in cases of 
practical conflict one will be chosen over the other. - A 1986 Judicial Interpretation was in 
content very similar to the relevant provisions of the 2000 Legislation Law.
120
Outside the system under the Legislation Law, there is an apparently 
uninterrupted continuity between ‘laws’ ‘regulations’ and ‘rules’ according to the 
2000 Legislation Law, and lower-order norms, ‘notifications’, ‘provisions’, 
‘commands’, ‘letters’, ‘views’ etc., issued by lower level administrative 
authorities. A generic term for such documents is ‘red-headed documents,’ in a
-in
literal translation. The existence of such lower ranking norms or documents is 
acknowledged, for instance, by article seven of the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law, which addresses the -  very limited - extent to which such 
norms can be subjected to an examination of their legality (see also Chapter 
Seven).
There are some efforts at ensuring conformity of legislation with higher 
ranking law, when such legislation is first made and published. For instance, the
Legislation Law provides for derogation (from the level of provincial
•2 1
administrative regulations downwards) of lower ranking law, and provides in 
Articles 85 ff. that in cases of inconsistency the higher administrative or 
legislative organ can alter (!) or annul legislation made by a lower ranking 
authority, and that the corresponding level People’s Congress can alter or annul 
legislation of the People’s government (article 88). Attempts have also been 
made to proceduralise the supervision this hierarchy makes possible, through the 
so-called bei ’an -  filing -  procedure,32 to discover any contravention of law, or
30 Hongtou wenjian
31 E.g. article 64.
32 Bei’an {&%).  Thereby, anything that is a mere regulation (produced by a local people’s 
congress) or rule (produced by a national ministry or by a local government) needs to be 
submitted to the respective higher ranking authority, within thirty days after (!) promulgation, 
‘for the record’, according to article 89 of the Legislation Law, and to The Statutes on filing rules 
and regulations (Fagui guizhang bei’an tiaoli, no. 337 (2001), effective as 
of 1 January 2002, promulgated on 14 September 2001 by the State Council. To give an example, 
rules produced by a ministry need to be submitted to the State Council. The increased activity in 
revising legislation is also due to the obligation to bring about legislative transparency according 
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade following China’s accession to the WTO in
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inconsistencies33 among the norms. A similar system has been introduced in 
accordance with article 63 of the Legislation Law for local People's Congresses’ 
‘regulations’ created at the level of comparatively larger cities. The examination 
and approval mechanism such as the bei'an mechanism is useful within certain 
limits.34 But crucially, the courts have been left out of the task of review, as is 
explained in greater detail in Chapter Seven.
The bei'an principle allowing for annulment or alteration of norms by 
higher-ranking authorities can only be meaningful if just like in other contexts of 
government, it is understood that a higher ranking authority has full power over 
the actions of its lower ranking authorities, and that it can assume its functions 
and competences at its own discretion. But of course, a lower ranking authority, 
represented by a lower official (a human being), will sometimes act without the 
knowledge of and instructions by a higher ranking official (another human being). 
Unlike a legislator in a federal system, the Chinese state official is not protected 
against some kinds of central-level interference but required, instead, to excel in 
an impossible exercise of perfect mind-reading of his higher ranking officials. 
Unlike a Western judge, who is required to make ideally independent and 
informed judgements displaying all the virtues of judicial justice, fairness and 
integrity, he is, it seems, merely required to be deferent to higher authorities. He 
has the power to make rules by extension of central power, not by virtue of a 
distribution of legislative power.
December 2001 (Chapter X of GATT 1994 and Protocol on The Accession of The People’s 
Republic Of China [to the WTO], 10 November 2001, available at http://docsonline.wto. 
org/DDFDocuments/t/WT/L/432.doc, especially part C).
33 The expression used is ‘lack of identity’, that is, bu yizhi (T*—i£).
34 It is not difficult to imagine what problems may arise with these approval and filing systems. 
One is that the examination of the consistency of one regulation with thousands of others will be 
an arduous task.
122
The vertical extension of the power to make laws over several tiers of state 
administration can be explained, to a degree, by the related ideas of unlimited 
responsibility and comprehensive control. There is also no really ‘level’ 
relationship between the People's Congresses and the corresponding People’s 
Governments. Theoretically the People’s Congresses are superior as they produce, 
elect or appoint People’s governments, for instance. Although perhaps it should, 
this does not result in an effective review by the Peoples’ Congresses over any 
other authority, beyond incidental intervention, and it allows for no review at all 
by the NPC over the rules made by local governments.2,5 There is no distribution 
of legislative power in the sense that the powers to legislate of one authority 
clearly delineated the powers to legislate of another. Only one exception, 
characteristically recent, to the principle of diffuse extension exists in the form of 
Article 9 of the Legislation Law.36
It is important to see how the substantive inequality effected by the 
subjection of some groups of people to unjustified hardship and the absence of 
clearly distributed legislative power can combine. ‘Legislative’ power is extended 
down to the very lowest ranks of government, and as this power is extended it is 
also thinned out. The point of this structure cannot be to provide laws so much as 
to organise rule of officials over people, an important element of such rule being 
the supervision of officials themselves, according to hierarchy. The attitude it 
encourages is that of ‘I am the law’ - an attitude which of course defeats real
35 There is no presumption of a command or other hierarchical structure across ‘levels’ between, 
for instance, the central (National) People’s Congress and provincial governments as is evidenced 
for instance by the fact that according to article 90 of the Legislation Law, the Standing 
Committee of the National People’s Congress has been entrusted with reviewing administrative, 
local, autonomous and separate regulations (made by lower ranking People’s Congresses) but not 
with reviewing local ‘rules’ made by lower ranking People’s Governments.
36 Compare also article nine of the Administrative Punishment Law (xingzheng chufa fa, 'fTffft&t 
?£), promulgated on 17 March 1996 by the NPC (1996, no. 613).
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‘law’.37 But this attitude seems justified, to a degree, by wider ideas about good 
government in China. The absence of real ‘distribution’ of legislative power to 
local legislatures, discussed above, reveals to some extent an attitude of distrust 
toward officials, translating into a perceived need for their education and 
supervision, whose limits are dictated only by practical exigencies. Another 
assumption that appears to dominate political argument in China is that central 
power can extend but not pervade society, and that means not only that the 
exercise but also that the justification of the exercise of central state power is 
limited by ‘natural’ circumstances. Otherwise, it seems, there would have to be 
more serious efforts at giving effect to central, national laws.
Tentatively, the idea that officials, while being educated and supervised on 
the one hand, must also be given ‘rope’ and power to exercise by themselves, 
might be traced back to the Chinese idea characterised as ‘not overdoing’, which 
in the principles of indirection and redirection is also present in Chinese 
mediation.38 In the present context, this idea can be used to justify local power to 
make and apply rules, to make and enforce commands tailored to the special 
requirements of a particular place. This is also the background for legislation on 
the rights of internal migrants to stay in the cities, which is the topic of the next 
section.
The right to move freely, the right to personal freedom, and the household 
registration system. The internment and deportation rules have now been 
abolished to a large extent. But these legislative changes have affected only a part 
of those laws, rules and regulations that turn people from the Chinese countryside
37 We can intelligibly speak of ‘law’ and ‘real law’ to express requirements not met by mere 
‘law’.
38 One possible translation of wuwei
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into second-class citizens. As it were in the background of the case of Wang 
Xingmao and his son, there is the right to move freely and freely to choose their 
residence in their own country. There is no express mention of the right to move 
freely40 in the Chinese constitution in force today. There was such mention in the 
earlier 1954 Chinese constitution, until the 1972 constitution, in which the right 
was dropped out, although it is unclear if this could ‘heal’ unconstitutionality of 
earlier legislation.41
In the present Chinese constitution, the right to move freely in one’s own 
country is implied in the wider right of personal liberty.42 There are two main 
reasons for this. One reason for adopting a wide interpretation of Article 37 of the 
Chinese constitution is that only if the right to move freely is seen as part of the 
right to personal freedom, can justice be done to Article 12 of the 1966 
International Covenant on Citizens’ and Political Rights (hereafter ICCPR).43 The
39 In Chinese, the idea of a ‘dual system’ contained in such expressions as eryuan hukou guanli 
tizhi, cheng xiang eryuan tizhi in (—j t f 3 P  H j lWPI)  is frequently used. For
an argument against this perception, reinforced by the legal system, for instance Xu Shengru (W
‘The “three rural problems” to be included in important [political] agenda, 
?yA1lElci^.|§’), in 21s' Century Economic Herald (21 ) of 13 October 2003, at
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20031013/jd/200310130754.asp.
In some provinces, there is still a basic distinction between ‘rural’ and ‘nonrural’ household 
registrations in place, whereas others, such as Fujian, Guangdong, and Hunan, have abolished this 
basic distinction. See Xinhuawang, ‘The Household registration reforms: marked successes of the 
reforms in recent years ), at http://www.
chinapop. gov .c n/rkkx/ztbd/t20040326_10545. htm.
40 In Chinese, qianxiquan
41The most important piece of legislation restricting the right to move freely was passed on 9 
January 1958 by the NPC. (Hukou dengji tiaoli f 3 ). See Xinhuawang, ‘The first
constitution regulated [contained] the “right to move freely” -  calls in the media to restore it’, 
(Shoubu xianfa ceng guiding “qianxi ziyou -  meiti kanwen huyu huifu, h S
Pf VkM),  8 April 2004 , available at http://taiwan.qianlong.com/ 23/2002-4- 
8/45 @ 191772.htm. Consider that in China, the same body that makes simple laws, also makes 
changes to the text of the constitution.
42 Or renshenquan (A ll  jX).
43 China has only signed (in 1998) but not yet ratified the ICCPR, which is not regarded as a self­
executing international norm in China; but it can be argued that China is under obligation to effect 
ratification within reasonable time, and that it has an indirect obligation, as a matter of 
international law, to respect Article 12 of the ICCPR.
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‘direct applicability’ of the ICCPR in court is disputed in China,44 but what it 
demands of its member states is of course not that they cite it in their court 
decisions, but that they respect it.45 The second and more substantive reason why 
a wide interpretation should be given to this article is that there is only a 
difference in degree between being detained or interned, and being prevented 
from going where one wants to go. The fact that household registration was, in 
the case of Chinese peasants (migrant workers), ‘enforced’ by internment and 
deportation, and that the legal grounds for internment and deportation and the 
household registration system have come under attack within little time from 
each other, serves to illustrate this connection.46
One thing that restricts one in one’s exercise of the right to move freely is 
private property in land. Just because one is not allowed to walk on someone 
else’s private lawn does not mean that his right to move freely within his own 
country is infringed or violated; free movement is not every freedom to move 
anywhere, just as in the case of the obstacle someone meets who wishes to board 
a train, but has no ticket for it.47 On the other hand it is part of the logic of the 
right to move freely as we protect it, that public spaces such as streets and squares
44 The question whether the ICCPR may be cited by Chinese courts is relevant, for instance, 
because direct application of Article 12 would make it easier to refer to UN Human Rights 
Commission interpretations of Article 12 for guidance.
45 See Qin Qianhong (HIbiJ^E), ‘On the implementation of the two International Human Rights 
Conventions and on the transformation of the Chinese Constitution (Lun liangge guoji renquan 
gongyue de shishi he zhongguo xianfa bianqian, )’, 
http://www.law-lib.com.cn/lw/lw_view.asp7nos: 1724. He considers that courts do have the option 
of citing international human rights obligations according to the two conventions but makes 
suggestions for limiting this power to higher-ranking courts. See also on incorporating an explicit 
right to move freely back into the Constitution, Wu Xue’an (H^!$c), ‘To carry out reform of the 
household registration system thoroughly (Jiang huji gaige jinxing daodi,
16 June 2003, at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2003-06/16/content_33126.htm.
46 Several large cities made move to abolish the temporary residence permit requirement. See, for 
an example, Tian Yu (fflM), Xinhuawang, ‘Beijing will abolish the temporary residence permit 
[requirement within the next half year (Beiing jiang quxiao jingwai renyuan zhanzhuzheng, JtM
21 September 2003, at http:/211.100.18.62/fzdt/xwnr.asp?id=10391.
47 For an opposed standpoints on this particular example, see Cohen, G. A., ‘Freedom and 
Money’, paper for UCL Colloquium, 11 January 1999.
126
are equally accessible to all citizens. By contrast in Chinese cities, there is only 
state ownership in land, while there is collective ownership of farmland in the 
countryside. The state retains ultimate control over land even where rights of use 
are distributed. Distinctions between publicly accessible space and privately 
occupied space arise from official approval, habit and circumstances,48 or in the 
case of recently constructed buildings they arise from the fact that ‘rights of use’ 
in land, limited to a maximum 70-year term, have been sold.49 This regime 
reinforces the principle of territorial local rule by government or its officials.50
The current household registration system is based primarily on the so- 
called Statutes on Household Registration passed by the Standing Committee of 
the then NPC in 1958.51 Most importantly, these stipulate that anyone living in 
the People’s Republic of China must be registered as belonging to a certain 
household or work unit, with universities, factories, etc. also counting as 
households (Article 2). Anyone moving out of their household registration area 
must apply for a ‘migration certificate’, and people wanting to move from the 
countryside to a city must submit evidence of having been employed or accepted 
at a university in the city, or of their move having been approved by the 
household registration office of the place they are moving to (Article 10). 
Residence of over three nights in a city outside one’s registration area requires a 
report to the household registration authority - normally the police station -  of a 
registered person or unit one is staying with, for a ‘registration of temporary
48 There may be but is not always a tenancy agreement.
49 The state retains control or instance because the right to use in land including the property in a 
newly erected building falls back to the state after expiry of the lease.
50 Two other areas of social concern at present, the requisitioning of rural land and the demolition 
of urban houses involve large-scale relocation. In these contexts, too, poor ordinary people are 
treated as though they had no right to be in any particular place: a reflection, again, of the 
confusion in land law at present.
51 As mentioned above the ‘statutes’ were made by the Standing Committee of the NPC; as such, 
they would today be called ‘law’.
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residence’ (Article 15), and after residence of over three months in a registration 
area not one’s own one must apply for an extension, or go through the migration 
procedures. If neither can be obtained, the ‘migrant’ must return to his 
registration area, according to Article 16. This provision is the most important 
one in the context of the right to move freely, because its restriction of this right 
is so explicit.
The historical background for the household registration system was the 
shortage economy under Chinese socialism.52 People were not free agents in an 
economy supposedly based on market principles (‘the invisible hand’); instead, 
they were part of the big central plan for production and distribution. From the 
1950s and into the 1990s, China was still practising rationing and planned 
economy on certain goods. The ordinary food coupons one got, for instance, were 
restricted to one’s household registration area.53 One could not, generally, buy 
such essential goods with money. As soon as the rationing and price controls 
were dropped, the situation started to change. According to a Ministry of Public 
Security statistic published in 2003, there were then 130 million ‘migrant’ people 
in China -  this is about a tenth of the population, and of these, (only!) over 50 
million have got a ‘temporary residence’ permit.54 As an instrument to control 
and restrict migration, the household registration and temporary residence permit 
scheme appeared to have failed.55
52 For an historical overview see Wu Xue’an (H ^:£c), ‘To carry out reform of the household 
registration system thoroughly (Jiang huji gaige jinxing daodi, S'J/K)’, 16 June
2003, at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2003-06/16/content_33126.htm.
53 For special purposes -  such as approved travel - one could get nationwide’ coupons, though.
54 Xinhua News, 25 July 2003, ‘China is undergoing a new round of reforms of the household 
registration system (Zhongguo zheng tuixing xin yi lun gaige, ^  ’ 
at http://news.cyol.com/gb/news/2003-07/25/content_703810.htm.
55 An increasing number of city governments (or public security bureaus) are coming to this 
conclusion too.
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But household registration is the precondition of a number of state benefits 
and public services and as such it still works, confirming and aggravating 
inequalities in wealth among people ‘from’ different regions.56 Therefore, a 
person migrating to another place, such as a city, nowadays faces two kinds of 
problem. One is illegality, so far as the registration requirement is concerned, 
because there are so many restrictions on registering at one’s actual place of 
abode. Another is losing out on the various rights and interests attaching to his 
household registration. With the disappearance of very large scale distribution of 
basic goods, the household registration system has become the one legal 
requirement that hinders people from moving to where they want, within their 
own country.57 Individual cities, such as Beijing, have created further regulations 
to control migration into them, in a manner again posing the problems of
co
‘legislation’ already expounded above. In the early nineties, there also arose a 
practice of selling and buying household registrations in some places, or - again - 
of raising exorbitant ‘fees’ for migrants.59 In the later nineties, the ministry of 
security and provincial governments stopped these practices, because it was
56 To date, it is one’s household registration that determines where (and due to the poverty of 
some regions, effectively whether) one is entitled to medical care, where one’s child is entitled to 
kindergarten and schooling, where one can get social security, and where one can be assisted in 
finding a workplace. See generally Wu Xue’an (supra note 50).
57 At the same time, life in the cities became more attractive, so cities started “fencing in” their 
wealth .The title of a 2001 article in Legal Daily is ‘Walking out of the town walls -  a serialised 
report on the reform of the household registration system’, by Sun Chunying (# # 5 5 ) ,  Zouchu
“weicheng” -  huji zhidu gaige xilie baodao “ HIM” (third
part), 21 September 2001, at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/200109/19/content 
_24489.htm (see below).
58 For example, the Beijing City government’s 13 June 1995 Regulation on the Handling o f the 
household registration o f migrant workers coming to Beijing (Beijing shi waidi laijing renyuan 
huji guanli guiding, SM aE ) in its article 6 stipulates that the
issuing of residence cards must be restricted by the district and county governments of Beijing, 
which must each set an adequate ratio of outside people to ‘local’ people not to be surpassed. The 
residence permit is to be refused, for instance, to women of child bearing age who have no 
certificate stating their marriage and child-bearing status (hunyu zhuangkuang,
59 See the article by Xu Haitao (iT#l$f), ‘Shijiazhuang entirely removes the [bamboo] fences 
(Shijiazhuang quanmian chechu huji fangli )’, 13 August 2001, 
available at http://www.unn.com.en/GB/channell9/49/l 17/200108/13/92230.html.
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realised that the rural workforce was actually needed. All this testifies to a 
sustained effort to continue and extend control, as well as to a conviction on the 
part of (a significant number of) government officials that control of migration 
into cities is necessary. There are reforms, especially toward facilitating the 
registration in areas where rural workforces are actually needed, but there is as 
yet no clear sign that the system itself will be scrapped nationwide.60 Better ways 
are being sought for selecting those whose migration into cities is desirable from 
the point of view of (certain) officials -  while government will remain in control, 
both of people and of goods distributed, and seek to improve distribution criteria. 
(At the same time, the new phenomenon of labour shortage in cities shows how 
much these cities depend on cheap migrant workers with little protection.)
A registration requirement as such does not seriously affect one’s freedom 
to move, but the household registration system is not a mere registration but a 
‘control’ system, with control extending both to migration and to the distribution 
of goods such as social services. The Chinese constitution, so far as it proclaims 
citizens’ rights -  any citizens’ rights -, affords protection against this system in its 
article 37 but only slowly, as poor peasants or rural residents stream into the by 
comparison increasingly richer cities, are they beginning to assert the rights they 
have.
60 In 1998 the State Council is reported to have circulated, with an ‘approving notice’, the 
Ministry of Public Security’s (internal) Views on the handling o f problems relating to the 
household registration (guanyu hukou wenti de yijian, P  NMWSSJAL) to administrative
authorities. Their basic goal was to set up standards to facilitate the transfer of household 
registration. Another set of such Views circulated in May 2001 is reported to have contained an 
admonition to get rid of quotas for ‘immigration’ to small towns and cities and discriminatory 
treatment in these places, according to a report by Zhao Huiying (M H H  ) in the China 
Macroeconomic News Net ( 41 M N ) at http://www.macrochina.com.cn/zhzt/
000093/005/20010823017321. shtml.
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Supervision and control: the right to equality and the rural and urban classes in 
China. Laws such as the one on household registration have furthered the 
creation of two different classes of Chinese citizens. The basic distinction is 
between peasants and the city population. When members of the poor rural 
population come to the cities, they become part of an urban underclass excluded 
or partly excluded from many essential social services (education, social security, 
etc.) and also, for instance, excluded from the right to vote for householders’ or 
village committees (local self-government agencies) in the places where they 
actually live.61
At the national level, the law providing a registration requirement is of 
course a general law. In that sense, it satisfies the requirement that everyone must 
be treated equally. The mere fact, too, that there are differences in wealth levels is 
hard to criticise as unjust, if for no other reason, then because ‘welfare’ and 
‘wealth’ may make unpersuasive metrics for significant social equality.62
But this does not mean that the guarantee to equality before the law (Article 
33 of the Constitution) could have no significance at all for the ‘class’ divide 
between urban and rural (migrant) Chinese citizens. For a more specific standard 
for assessing whether the right to equality has been infringed by a particular 
instance of differential treatment, we may assume that when a social service is in 
principle available to certain people, the right to equality before the law must at 
least mean that there must not be long term discrimination among applicants all 
fulfilling the proper preconditions of the social service in question.63 It means at
61 Ma Fuyun ( S / f e S ), ‘The definition of the status of resident entitled to vote against the 
background of the household registration reform’ (Huji zhidu gaige beijing xia de xuanmin zige 
jieding, unpublished draft).
62 For the position I am adopting here see Dworkin, ‘What Is Equality?’ Parts I-IV, especially 
Parts I and II, reprinted in Sovereign Virtue (Harvard: 2001).
63 In the short run ‘discriminatory’ treatment may sometimes be inevitable.
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least that, for instance, of two Chinese children who are of the same age and live 
in the same neighbourhood, one should not be given far more school education, 
from public means, than the other; one should not be denied access to publicly 
financed education, indirectly at the benefit of the other. It may be that the right 
to equality before the law is not exhausted by this claim.64 Equality before the 
law, on such an interpretation, is not just a right to be treated ‘according to the 
rules,’ or ‘to be treated the same in the same case,’ it is also a right to have as 
little differentiation as possible, because it rules out insignificant differences as 
basis of differential legislation. If this is true, then certain aspects of ‘household 
registration rights and interests’ infringe the right to equality before the law, and 
are unconstitutional for this additional reason.65
The right freely to move in one’s country reflects the intuition just 
mentioned: an important reason why people should have the right to move freely 
within their own country, is that otherwise, inequality between the people of 
different regions is likely to be confirmed and aggravated more and more.66 This 
understanding emphasises the close connection between liberty rights and the 
right to equality. At the same time, the connection confirms that further principles 
of equality are important preconditions of a proper protection of liberty rights. 
Importantly for China, among these are certain principles of redistribution
64 Whether or not it is exhausted, it is at any rate difficult to imagine how to rule this one modest 
claim out, except if the idea of equality were completely emptied of its moral sense, and 
understood as mere generality or universality of application (of a different substantive principle). 
For a more formal idea of equality in a legal context, though, see Raz, Joseph, ‘Equality’, Chapter 
9 of The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: 1986).
65 One might ask, why favour a ‘Ningxia’ registered child living in Beijing, along with a Beijing 
child with a Beijing household registration, and neglect the child registered and living in Ningxia? 
The answer must be that the ready availability of resources that could be used in equal amounts 
few the children living in Beijing, is significant for distributional justice, but also that a duty to 
redistribute extends to providing for the child in Ningxia.
66 It is not true, to answer a possible objection, that current migration control in large cities serves 
the purpose of restricting the influx of migrants to an actually needed or tolerable number: in 
2004, shortages of labour in the big cities arose.
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through taxation, for instance (‘justice of taxation’), or of equality in the use of 
public resources. In societies adhering to the principle of a separation of 
legislative, adjudicative and executive powers, it has become difficult to describe 
the distribution of resources and the distribution of (political) power as directly 
related. But in a simpler set-up, such as the one described for contemporary 
China, the way power is distributed can also define the way resources are 
distributed. The system described here depends, as already mentioned, to a 
certain degree on a fiction of incorporation or unity of lower and higher tiers of 
government. It is also one of ideally comprehensive control or ‘management’ 
(guanli)61 and at the same time, helplessly as it were, tolerating wide areas of 
non-control. There is no effective mechanism in place -  there is not even a 
perception of the requirement for a mechanism, it seems - to take such territorial 
control away from the city governments.68 The absence of certain legally 
entrenched principles of equality is not accidental. One should recall that the 
party state’s control over resources was initially founded in an egalitarian concern, 
and actually helped to reduce inequalities. In this context, the co-existence of the 
state ownership regime with the household registration system, but also with the 
set-up of the legislative process serve to explain each other. All these systems 
reflect the same (paternalistic) attitude of administering for the good of the people 
administered. A (governmental) department of whatever sort will regard it as its 
natural privilege to make rules and regulations for those ‘below’ it.
67 Guanli ( ^ S ) .
68 We have had an opportunity to note, above, not only that the Beijing city government was 
entrusted with the task of determining quotas for immigration (temporary residence) each year, 
but also that the Beijing Public Security Bureau felt entitled to announce the abolition of the 
temporary residence permit ‘for its own territory’, even though this appears to contradict national 
legislation on the matter.
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The idea of guanli has tradition in China, as has that of supervision.69 In a 
recent publication on New theory o f the Confucian philosophy of guanli, the 
Chinese scholar Sun Juyou explains the connection between basic Confucian 
ideas and the idea of regulation, management and control in the following way.
‘The problem at the heart of the discussions among Confucian 
philosophers can be analysed into two aspects: one is, how to improve 
one’s self (xiu shen),10 and one is, how to secure peace among people (an 
ren).1] These two problems are really both the problem of how to manage 
mankind and one’s self (guanli renlei zishen).12
While guanli has a special Chinese tradition, note that this is also the term used to 
translate the English term ‘management’. It could almost appear as though some 
Chinese scholars had all the more happily addressed ‘management’ theories from 
the West because of this dual ‘rootedness’ of the term, and the fact that there are 
so many Western management theories around now means that guanli is all the
n'l
more widespread in recent legal, economic, and political publications in China.
Today, the practices of supervision and control appear to have got the better 
of the original political aim of such control in the People’s Republic. This aim
69 Many relationships, such as between the People’s Congresses and the judiciary and 
administration, as well as the relationship between ‘the people’ and government, have been 
characterised as relationships of supervision (jiandu, U£.HF). There is an element of ‘watching’ at 
the same indicating a certain distance between or separateness of the person watched and the 
watcher. By contrast, guanli indicates less separateness and a more immediate ‘channeling’ (W) 
and ‘setting right’ ( 3 )  of activities as they happen.
70 Xiushen (H ^ ) .  A modem dictionary translates with greater flourish, ,to cultivate one’s moral 
character.’ See entry at p. 2158 in The Contemporary Chinese Dictionary (Foreign Language 
Teaching and Research Press, Beijing: 2002).
71 A. The Contemporary Chinese Dictionary (Foreign Language Teaching and Research Press, 
Beijing: 2002) translates as ,to bring peace to the people’. In the above text there is a 
juxtaposition but also connection between If and A, ‘self and [other, all] ‘people’.
72 Sun Juyou (#IH A ), New Theory o f the Confucian Philosophy of Management (Rujia guanli 
zhexue xinlun, (Jinan: 2003) at p. 4.
73 To give just one example for this, the book Crisis Management (weiji guanli j t l f f l l fS )  also 
relates ‘management’ to Confucian tradition, quoting as follows from the Book o f Great Learning 
A ^ .  ‘To “be in peace without forgetting crisis, to rule without forgetting unruliness/chaos, to 
live without forgetting death” is the most important experience to be drawn from the history of 
“ruling the country and pacifying the states”.’ Xue Lan, Zhang Qiang and Zhong Kaibin
3M, f+JFM), Crisis Management (weiji guanli, j&ffllflS, Beijing: 2003), at p. 8.
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was to distribute resources evenly (justly, equally), but today political 
‘management and control’ practices, as we have seen in the context of the 
household registration system, work for a confirmation of social inequality rather 
than against it. As an alternative, as it were, to justitiable rights to equality, there 
is the old ideal of equality achieved through socialism as a pre-stage of 
communism. But the ultimate socialist state to be achieved has been removed 
ever further away from people’s life horizons over the recent years, as in official 
parlance China has regressed into a future of ‘a long term primary stage of 
socialism.’74 While the idea of equality is of course important to communism, it 
appears therefore that in recent years, the ‘communist’ agenda has assumed 
something of the insincerity of a ‘civil religion’.
Just as the mechanisms of the protection of equal rights and the right to 
equality are alternatives to benevolent dictatorship for the centralised and 
egalitarian distribution of goods, so legal procedures are alternatives to 
procedures of supervision, discipline and control, as used in contemporary 
Chinese state and party administration. Communist party discipline and state 
control continue important as a means of implementing benevolent (egalitarian) 
policies whose aims, if made justitiable as equal rights and rights to equality, 
might present a great challenge to government and the party.
Upholding abstract principles. The preceding discussion of two related areas of 
Chinese law has provided examples of, on the whole, bad legislation, whose 
badness increases the more local and detailed it becomes. The characterisation of
74 According to the preamble of the Chinese Constitution as amended in 1999. Note the highly 
interesting comparisons drawn by some between ‘limited responsibility company’ and ‘limited 
responsibility government. For example, in Wang Zhenmin (iEM K), Casebook on Constitutional 
Law (Zhongguo xianfa anli jiaocheng, 'I3 , Tsinghua University Law School,
Beijing (unpublished), August 2002) p. 14.
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laws such as the internment and deportation and the household registration rules 
relied, in the first place, on certain civil rights standards, in particular the standard 
of the right to personal freedom as guaranteed by the Chinese Constitution. Then, 
as we turned to specific practices this legislation has given rise to, official 
corruption at a very large scale came into focus -  from profiteering on the part of 
officials, over exploitation of power, to ‘downright’ criminal conduct. This 
second kind of defect could be described as an abuse of the existing laws and 
regulations, whereas the first kind of defect could be described as insufficiency of 
the legislation itself. But the constitutional rights angle from which my discussion 
started, and the peculiarity of Chinese legal and administrative practice as a maze 
of more and more local and specific ‘norms’, demonstrate the superficiality of 
such a distinction. There is no significant difference between ‘legislation’ and 
abusive official practices ‘based on’ such legislation in China; there is neither a 
clear way of distinguishing the ‘legislation itself’ from the abuses, nor is there a 
way of completely separating the standards by which both should be judged. In 
Chinese law, it is first and foremost the Chinese Constitution, which demands 
that all state conduct conform to constitutional principles. It is the constitution, 
especially constitutional rights that allows to distinguish real law from ‘law’ that 
must not be applied, because it violates constitutional rights and because it 
violates justice. We must conclude that the worse a legislative framework, the 
more ‘real’ law is represented by (consists of) constitutional, that is, certain 
selected moral principles alone. But how to protect such principles in practice? 
The following chapters address various difficulties posed by this task, by 
considering the ways in which ordinary citizens can challenge unlawful state 
actions.
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Chapter Six Appeals to state authorities
The problem with self-control. There is a general problem with powerful 
institutions controlling themselves, or to be precise, with having some of its 
members supervise what the others do. This is particularly true of the police, for 
as perhaps the most prominent and immediately powerful administrative 
authority in civil society, the police are also called upon to protect people’s 
rights.1 It is as reasonable as it is paradoxical, then, to think of appealing to the 
police when, for instance, one has been arbitrarily arrested by it.2 When such an 
appeal fails, and also in cases where such an appeal would not be warranted by 
the gravity and urgency of the situation,3 the reaction to wrongful administrative 
acts will have to be some kind of review of the legality of the act in question, be 
it an act of legislation or an administrative measure or decision specifically 
targeting oneself. From the perspective of the individual concerned, relief of some 
sort can only be provided if the revision process is in some way addressed to him; 
at least, say, by informing him of the outcome of the review procedure.
1 As Article 2, paragraph 1, of the Chinese Police Law (WM'ii,) states.
2 A journalist named Ye Zhiqiu reports his own internment experience in Southern Weekend, 
without naming the place and time where the internment happened. He describes going for a walk 
in the streets in the small hours one day, without taking his temporary residence card with him. 
He is arrested; his ID card and work permit are not considered sufficient since they show him not 
to be a ‘local’ person, and he is ordered to board a van already packed with other victims, and 
driven to an internment station. ‘We were all escorted into the tiny 10 square metres large room. 
A few people tried to ring 110 from their mobile phones and to report to the police, but the answer 
they got was only: ‘That’s the business of the branch police office [paichusuo]. We’re not 
concerned with [guan] this.” I really don’t know whether they didn’t intend to be concerned, 
didn’t dare to be concerned, or just could no longer be bothered with these kinds of appeals.’ In 
the morning, everyone was taken back to their neighbourhood, but only after a fee of ten Yuan per 
person had been collected from them. Ye Zhiqiu ‘My own experience of internment
(Wo de yi ci shourong jingli, Southern Weekend, 19 June 2003, available at
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20030619/wh/bxjs/200306191190.asp.
3 There is theoretically also the option of obtaining an interim court injunction against a detention 
measure; in the context of internment and deportation, I have no knowledge of any case in which 
such an injunction was applied for.
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All of the mechanisms for the review of wrongful administrative conduct 
currently in place in China may, occasionally, yield good results in the sense of 
reducing, reversing or forestalling bad practices. But the conclusion of the third 
chapter was that special importance attaches to rights assertion, and that rights 
must not be confused with ‘interests, pre-morally conceived.’ Using this as a 
starting point, it is argued here that none of the available forms of administrative 
review in China can replace rights protection by courts. Indeed some of them 
appear to hinder rather than promote the building up of an effective judicial 
review mechanism, for instance by usurping judicial functions.
Correction by internal decision. When a concrete administrative act has been 
made, the acting authority can become active again of its own accord, to correct a 
mistaken or wrongful decision. The administrative authority can also be 
‘supervised internally’, by way of commands from a higher level instance of the 
same branch of administration.4 Textbooks on the administrative reconsideration 
procedure mention as options available to the administration to correct its own 
mistakes the ‘revocation’5 of an ‘concrete’ administrative act, and the ‘declaring 
invalid’ (invalidation) of such acts.6 This denotes administrative decisions or 
other measures or actions taken by public authorities, directly addressing and 
affecting an individual Chinese citizen or number of citizens. By contrast
4 Subordinate level officials will often seek instructions from ‘above’.
5 Chexiao Difficult translation -  in some context, ‘annulment’ seems correct.
6 In the context of the more modem administrative reconsideration procedure. But in principle, 
these are also the options available to authorities acting unprompted. Using a comparison with 
German administrative law, one might consider that either an administrative act has been illegal; 
in that event, the act generally ought to be considered null and void from the beginning. Or it has 
not been illegal but should merely be revoked with effect from the time of revocation. A related 
question would be if citizens had reason to place trust in the legal effect of legal administrative 
acts, trust which might deserve protection. See Luo Haocai general editor), Theory of
Administrative Law (Xingzhengfaxue, Beijing: 2001) at p. 272, on kinds of decisions
about administrative reconsideration.
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according to a Supreme People’s Court judicial interpretation of the relevant 
Articles of the Administrative Litigation Law, ‘abstract’ administrative acts are 
‘all documents of a normative character which are issued/publicised addressing 
an indefinite number of persons and which can be applied in multiple instances.’7 
So we have already encountered such ‘abstract administrative acts’ in the form of 
administrative legislation, in Chapter Five. Abstract administrative acts cannot be 
challenged in court. However, the need to take affected people’s wishes or their 
own perception of their own interests, into account when deciding on ‘correcting’ 
administrative decisions by itself illustrates the important fact that an 
administrative act creates a relationship between the administration and a citizen. 
An administrative mistake affecting citizens is not like an error to be corrected 
for the sake of correction, without consideration of the person(s) affected. Within 
the relationship created between a citizen and a state authority or official, an 
apology or some form of recognition of the mistake may become an important 
issue, as some of the examples given in the following show.
It will be remembered that in the case of the Directives for Internment and 
Deportation the State Council, which had created the Directives, replaced them 
by a more enlightened new regulation called Directives to Aid the Homeless. This 
was an act of self-correction. According to Article 89, subsections 13 and 14 of 
the Constitution, the State Council is entitled to alter or annul ‘inappropriate 
commands/orders, directives and rules 8 made by national ministries and
7 See Article 3 of the Supreme People’s Court’s Judicial Interpretation no. 8 (2000), (Zuigao 
renminfayuan guanyu zhixing xingzheng susongfa ruogan wenti de jieshi,
). The problem with abstract definitions such as ‘allowing for 
multiple application’ or ‘being addressed to more than one person’, moreover, is that these can be 
deliberately used in order further to reduce the application of administrative reconsideration and 
litigation.
8 Guizhang ( MM) -
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commissions’ 9 and ‘inappropriate decisions 10 and orders 11 made by local 
governments' -  decisions, that is, made by lower ranking authorities within an 
internal hierarchy. A further procedural basis for these kinds of review activity is 
the ‘bei'an’ procedure, which has already been discussed in the previous chapter. 
In practice, it appears that applications for administrative reconsideration, 
applications for the review of administrative rules, and exercise of the review 
right according to the bei'an procedure can be combined, according to the
provisions of the Legislation Law on filing regulations and rules, and the 2001
12State Council’s own Regulations on the Filing o f Regulations and Rules.
This example shows how in contrast to courts, the State Council can in 
some cases make decisions affecting the ‘legal’ basis of administrative decisions, 
rather than only such concrete decisions themselves. As the scope of its review is 
relatively wide, an application to the State Council or its Legal Affairs Bureau13 
may be more effective even than litigation in court; and the same applies to 
administrative reconsideration by local governments’ Legal Affairs Bureaus, 
where the legality of lower order ‘administrative legislation’ can be reviewed.14 
Members of the State Council’s Legal Affairs Office perceive themselves to be 
practically performing the functions of a court. Conversely, this weakens the role
9 Some institutions at national ‘ministry’ level are called ‘commissions’, for historical reasons.
10 Jueding
11 Mingling ('nfr4’)-
12 See the State Council’s Statutes on Filing Regulations and Rules (Fagui guizhang bei’an tiaoli,
effective as of 1 January 2002.
13 Fazhiban OLM th  ). For administrative reconsideration or in the course of a ‘letters and 
complaints’ procedure. On both, see below.
14 For example, consider the above-mentioned announcement of new rules of the Beijing City 
Public Security Bureau regarding the requirement of temporary residence permits. Functionally, 
these would be equivalent to Administrative Rules produced by ministries at the central (national) 
level.
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of the ‘real’ courts in charge of administrative litigation. For governments at 
provincial level, similar bodies exist, with regard to revising lower level norms.15
So recent legislation has in various places recognised the possibility that 
citizens may make suggestions toward government, be it the State Council or one 
of its lower branches, regarding the change or annulment of administrative 
decisions of any kind. Note that the abovementioned State Council’s own Statutes 
on Filing Regulations and Rules, effective as of 1 January 2002, allow 
organisations in society as well as individual citizens to ‘suggest’ the review of a 
norm to the State Council, according to its Article 9. A further such new 
mechanism will be considered in the context of the question of constitutional 
review in Chapter Eight. As for the State Council’s new Statutes, nothing but the 
mere right to make ‘suggestions’ is conceded by the new regulation.16 These 
suggestions, as has been pointed out before, seek assent from government seen as 
one whole of hierarchically interconnected institutions.17 They make it difficult 
to claim anything uncompromisingly as of right.
15 A report on the review activities of the Legislative Affairs Office of the [government of] Henan 
Province in 2003, says that during the past half year’s review of documents submitted in the 
course of the bei’an procedure, it was discovered that 19 percent of these were ‘illegal or 
inappropriate’ Weifa huo budang (i^'/isJc'T'^l). The author comments, ‘documents bearing the 
red stamp should represent respect for the law and incarnate the authority of the state. But with 
some people, it is alright to alter the codes according to their own fancy, and to ‘compose and 
circulate’ as they please. It is really impossible to imagine how these kinds of documents ever 
came into existence, how they came to be printed and published, and it is also impossible to 
imagine what kind of results they may have, if used for guiding the work of lower/relevant 
authorities [zhineng bumen].’ He Shang , a pen name), ‘Why do the “problematic
documents” make up 19 percent? (“Wenti wenjian’’ weihe zhan le 19 % .“MIS X T
19%’) Southern Weekend (M X  MX) ,  7 July 2003.
16 Wang Zhenmin points out that some of the newer mechanisms for making suggestions are due 
to undertakings in the context of China’s entry into the World Trade Organisation (hereafter 
WTO). Wang Zhenmin (BElSl^). Casebook on Constitutional Law, Tsinghua University Law 
School (Zhongguo xianfa anli jiaocheng, Qinghua Daxue faxueyuan, Beijing 2002 nian 8 yue, ^
X X ,  2002 X  8 M, unpublished, Beijing: August 2002). p. 
29. See below note 63 on the WTO entry requirements.
17 The citizen may also try to file an application with the local government or even the State 
Council. A lower authority may ask for Directives (qingshi, ilf tk ) by the State Council 
concerning the legality of a particular regulation, especially in the context of an administrative 
reconsideration procedure.
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External administrative supervision. It follows the logic of ‘ruling the officials 
not the people’ that the Chinese legal system envisages a form of external 
supervision by an authority ‘outside’ as well as in some ways above its state 
authorities. Indeed, it has its own Ministry of Supervision to perform this task.18 
Governmental ‘supervision’ of this external kind is exercised in nearly all state 
authorities, which have their own supervision departments. In his textbook on 
administrative law19 Luo Haocai says that the entity exercising ‘administrative 
supervision’ can be part of the legislature, the administration’s supervisory 
branch, or the judicial organs - which comprehend the courts and procuracy.20 
State decisions are treated as potential failures of duty, rather than as potential 
rights violations or infringements.
The Ministry of Supervision was established in 1987 on the basis of the 
Administrative Supervision Law, to quote its own self-introduction, ‘to guarantee 
the implementation of government decrees, maintain administrative discipline, 
facilitate the building up of an honest and clean government, improve public 
administration and raise administrative efficiency and enhance law awareness of 
public servants in performing public duties...on behalf of the State Council.’21 A 
similar institution had existed already from 1949 to 1959. Afterwards, the 
function of ‘administrative supervision’ was for some time performed by a
18 The Ministry of Supervision is called Jianchabu in Chinese. It shares one character with the 
word for ‘supervision’ used in the previous chapter discussing the difference between managing 
and regulating, and supervising.
19 Luo Haocai, ibid. p. 19 f.
20 It can also be what is termed the ‘subject of administration’ -  the acting administrative 
authority. In this context the author distinguishes between Xingzheng zhuti ) and
xingzheng xiangduifang, , that is, the addressee of an administrative decision or
measure.
21 Introduction to the Ministry o f Supervision o f the People’s Republic o f China/'f1 15 
H&firpPlHj A  (Zhonghua renmin gongheguo jianchabu jianru, bilingual, received in March 2003).
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Communist Party committee. In 1987 the new Ministry was created. The 
disciplinary committee of the Communist Party at central and local levels, and 
the new Ministry and the bureaus and other offices under it, were from the outset 
closely connected; in fact, it appears that the majority of important members of 
the Supervisory Ministry and the bureaus under it are now also members of the 
Committees. The main difference is that the Party Committee will become active 
only toward party members, and the administrative authority in question only 
toward civil servants; but if a person is both, then both the committee and the
77administrative authority can become active. The points of contact between the 
administrative supervision ministry and bureaus and the Communist Party are 
particularly numerous, not only in terms of personal identity of their staff. A 
glance at a current edition of the Administrative Supervision Law and 
Complementary Provisions shows that of the 27 ‘complementary provisions’ it 
contains, seven were published jointly by the State Council and the Communist 
Party Central Committee, and two more were published jointly by the Ministry of 
Supervision and the (central) Communist Party Disciplinary Commission.23
The reach of the administrative supervision apparatus extends to the 
ministries at central level (directly under the State Council) and to all local 
governments and their members, and also to villagers’ and residents’ committees 
(Articles 15 and 16 Administrative Supervision Law). The methods and powers of
22 If the conduct of the official and party member in question has been sufficiently serious to 
constitute a crime, especially in the context of corruption, then what will usually happen is that 
the Party committee deals with him first (often by expelling him from the party), and then ‘hands 
him over’ to the state’s crime or ( ‘Law enforcement’) authorities (in the case of suspicions against 
public officials, usually the People’s Procuracies). For a typical example see Shen Jixuan
), ‘Former Vice Governor of Anhui Privince Wang Huaizhong deprived of party membership, 
handed over to the law enforcement authorities (Anhui sheng yuanfushengzhang Wang Huaizhong 
bei kaichu dangji, yisong sifa jiguan, ,
report of 29 September 2003 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-09/29/content_1106674. 
htm.
23 Xingzheng jianchafa jiqi peitao guiding Beijing: 
2002).
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the Ministry of Supervision and the bureaus under it are in the main inquisitorial, 
disciplinary and punitive; they go up to the power to deprive someone of his 
office, and confiscate property (Article 27). It can also make ‘recommendations’ 
to other administrative authorities for how to handle certain problems, and as a 
ministry, it can moreover make its own administrative regulations. To give an 
example of the methods of the Ministry of Supervision, Article 22 of the 
Administrative Supervision Law says that the supervisory authority may
‘(...) order someone suspected of offending against administrative 
disciplinary rules to supply an explanation and clarification of the matter 
under investigation at a prescribed place and a prescribed time.’24
The Ministry and the authorities under it may make ‘recommendations’, or make 
‘supervisory recommendations or decisions’. 25 Again, despite some of the 
slogans employed in its self-introduction, the purpose of administrative 
supervision, is not mainly the protection of the rights of citizens. If in the course 
of administrative supervision, a remedy is afforded, this is as it were only by 
accident. The only reference of the Administrative Supervision Law to citizens’ 
interests is in Article 47.
24 Significantly, it then continues, ‘...but not under any circumstances may it impose detention or 
a measure amounting to detention on that person.’Article 22 echoes, I think, a method of 
‘supervision’ used by the Disciplinary Committees of the Communist Party towards members to 
be ‘disciplined.’It requires persons to appear ‘at a certain designated place and time, to answer 
questions’ but it is in effect sometimes a detention measure. It is called by an almost identical 
expression, and abbreviated shuanggui ( XX M ) -  the ‘two prescribed’ -  , and also consists in a 
prescription of a place (1) and time (2) at which a ‘suspect’ has to appear; sometimes to be locked 
up, for instance in a hotel room, and thus made to confess to misbehaviour or wrongdoing. 
Compare for an example taking place in Xiangfan in Hubei province, Huang Guangming (Wf~ 
HjJ), ‘Xiangfan Officialdom -  a thunderstorm of anticorruption measures in Xiangfan, Hubei 
Province: over 70 officials collectively suspected of crimes (Xiangfan guanchang -  hubei sheng 
xiangfan fanfu fengbao: 70yu ming guanyuan jiti she’an, l l l t 'g ’fjg — 70
£ £ 1 ^ ,  Southern Weekend, 30 October 2003, at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/ 
zm/20031030/xw/tb/200310300957.asp. The currently popular so-called ‘legal system literature’ 
also contains in colour and detail very useful accounts, for instance in the popular novel by Lu 
Tianming The Provincial Party Secretary (Shengwei shuji, Beijing: 2002).
25 See Articles 29 and 30.
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‘Article 47. Where there is infringement upon and damage to the 
legitimate interests of citizens, legal persons, or other organizations as a 
result of the supervisory organ or personnel illegally exercising their 
powers, compensations shall be made in accordance with law.’
But the law does not even contain any requirement to the effect that citizens 
affected by misconduct should be notified of the outcome of the supervision 
procedure, so that they may decide for themselves whether to pursue 
responsibility of the administrative authority. Nor is there any provision for the 
procedural involvement of affected citizens in the course of supervision 
according to the Supervision Law, allowing the citizen to make his case.26 How 
likely is it, really, that the administration will take it upon itself to discover what 
losses have occurred to individual citizens as a consequence of 
maladministration, and to ensure that such losses are compensated?
The fact that the Ministry of Supervision and the supervisory apparatus 
under it do exist and possess considerable power, is nevertheless important for 
the purpose of this study. It reflects a high degree of preoccupation with 
administrative correctness for its own sake,27 unrelated to the purpose of rights 
protection. In this ‘unrelatedness’, as well as in illustrating the importance of the 
Communist Party in supervising state officials the procedure of administrative 
supervision offers an important insight into Chinese administration.
Another peculiarity closely related to the idea of supervision and of 
‘correcting’ mistakes, is the predominance of ideas of punishment and discipline 
in the handling of administrative matters. It seems difficult to find a document of 
an administrative-regulatory nature in China, which does not threaten
26 Ordinary people with little education may be unlikely to turn to an authority under the Ministry 
of Supervision for help, among other things, because they simply do not know that these 
authorities exist.
27 An expression often used is jiuzheng cuowu ‘rectifying mistakes’.
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‘disciplining measures’ or ‘severe punishment' for some form of official 
misconduct or other, in one of its clauses.28 The effect of all this threatened 
‘severe’ disciplining and punishing is stifling. At the same time, these clauses 
sometimes read as though they substituted, or represented an alternative, to 
provisions for legal remedies, or even where such remedies are mentioned, as 
though they still somehow served to justify the entire piece of legislation, by 
exhibiting a high degree of general distrust: ‘we empower officials to impose 
restrictions and make demands on you, maybe in ways that contravene higher 
law...but we will punish our own officials if they abuse the powers we give them, 
or counteract our commands!’ Disciplinary clauses of this kind show concern 
with ensuring that things are done in a correct way, as well as confidence that 
mistakes can be righted by punishment, but while supervising itself in this way, 
the administrative apparatus appears, indeed, almost entirely concerned with 
itself. Perhaps this is particularly striking now that the Communist party state has 
all but abandoned the attempt to exercise ‘totalitarian’ control over but also 
provide total security to ordinary citizens (see Chapter Five). The current 
situation is perhaps more reminiscent of the principle mentioned in Chapter Two, 
that ‘the wise ruler controls the officials’ but leaves the people to themselves. 
Only in the present context it has lost its potentially benign meaning of tolerance 
and non-interference,29 under in many ways radically changed conditions of life
28 This threat sometimes complements the threat to ordinary citizens of being subjected to ‘severe 
punishment’, too, if they offend against the commands. This is the subject matter of the 
Administrative punishments law.
29 It is perhaps all the more interesting that modem Constitutionalism is by some interpreted as 
related to the ‘old’ idea of tolerance, kuanshu or shu (see discussion of shu in Chapter Three). 
This is done, for instance, by Cheng Jie in Cheng Jie ( f i  in), ‘Three philosophical sources of 
constitutionalism (Uxian zhuyi de san zhong sixiang yuanliu, at http:
//www.gongfa.com/chengjielixianzhuyisanchaoliu.htm. See also Chapter Ten.
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for ordinary people, and when a troublingly large number of officials refuses to 
conform to the image of the caring ‘father and mother official*.30
Shangfang: Informal ways o f achieving the reversal o f decisions. Partly due to 
the absence, for a long time, of a standardised procedure for stating claims 
towards public authorities, people affected by a wrongful measure often address 
themselves to various authorities -  the (local) People's Congress, the (local) 
government or governmental department, the authority just superior to the one 
that decided on the measure - seeking some sort of intervention. This way of 
seeking redress, already mentioned in Chapter Two, is still popular. ‘To receive 
supervision from the masses’ or ‘from society* is a term frequently used in China. 
Article three of the Constitution, for instance, mentions that the National People’s 
Congress receives supervision from the people, while also supervising the 
administrative, the judiciary, and the procuracy. This structure is reproduced at 
the more local levels of government. Thus the responsibility of the highest state 
organ towards the people is emphasised. But in this context, the idea of 
‘supervision* allows for many kinds of different interpretation. As Luo Haocai 
writes,
‘Citizens, legal persons or other organisations, representing a social force, 
can also exercise supervision over the administrative organ, by criticising 
or making suggestions, or by exposing its illegal conduct or reacting to 
[such conduct]. This does not necessarily set a specific procedure in 
motion; nor does it necessarily produce a particular legal result; it 
[therefore] does not count as legal [administrative] supervision, but is only 
a kind of supervision by society.’31
30 Not to claim that officials were any better in imperial times, of course.
31 Luo Haocai, ibid.{note 6) at p. 19.
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Historically speaking, the idea of ‘supervision by society' may have preceded that 
of rights protection by courts. 3“ ‘Society* is most importantly allowed to 
‘supervise' through a petitioning mechanism. Governmental departments usually 
have an ‘office for answering letters and receiving visitors', which I suggest 
calling letters and complaints offices.33 These institutions can be said to have 
been created in accordance with Article 41 of the Chinese Constitution, which 
has already been cited.
In practice, it is not always possible to distinguish clearly between 
‘administrative reconsideration* and more informal ways of complaining.34 
Letters and complaints offices exist as part of all kinds of public authorities, 
including People's Congresses and, indeed, courts of law. The People's 
Congresses are particularly popular authorities for citizens to turn to: they are 
responsible, in principle, for the appointment to all major government posts, and 
they are also responsible, in principle, for budgetary matters, and according to the 
Constitution, they are themselves exercising a supervising function.
There is no doubt that the letters and complaints procedure can be 
successful.35 But as a petitioning mechanism, the use of the institution of the 
complaints office or bureau is not without its own dangers. It is not surprising
The Administrative Litigation Law was only enacted in 1989.
"  The Chinese expression for this is Shouxin jiefang bangongshi i/j'/ } £ '# ) ,  or for short.
xinfangban ({,) i/j '/>).
,4 To illustrate the flexible uses this procedure can be put to, but also to the varied success of the 
project of ‘governing the officials’, in a public lecture at Tsinghua University on the rural tax 
burden as an example to illustrate the relationship between the centre and the periphery on 26 
September 2003 by Lii Xiaobo ( m he drew attention to the fact that letters and complaints
were sometimes invited by the central government as a means of putting pressure on local 
governments, which did not carry out central laws.
15 In an interview by Bi-weekly Conversations (4- f] with the Head of the - generally
low-profile - National Bureau for Letters and Complaints, Zhou Zhanshun (/nJfeHil), he asserted 
that the complaints ‘were resonable’ and required to be (and ‘with the help of officials in the 
Communist Party,’could be) resolved, in 80 percent of all cases. ‘National Minister for Letters 
and Complaints: 80% of complaints visits reasonable (Guojia xinfangju juzhang: 80% shangfang 
you daoli, '■ 80% Ji|^W iM S )’, available at http://www7.chinesenewsnet.com/
MainNews/SinoNews /Mainland/xhw_2003_l l_20_00_25_52_838.html.
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that public authorities find the letters and complaints offices a sometimes 
troublesome institution. The state has reacted to this by imposing restrictions. At 
national level, there are firstly the State Council Statutes on Receiving Letters and 
Visitors. whose Article 22 mentions a technique for dealing with troublesome 
complainants, which we are already familiar with: namely, ‘letters and 
complaints internment’.36
i f  the complainant does not respect the rules set out in Articles 11 and 14 
the letters and complaints authority may carry out criticism and education; 
if criticism and education have no effect, then the authority may request 
the local police to take the complainant away from the letters and 
complaints office and. in accordance with national regulations, to carry 
out internment and deportation, or to notify the complainant’s area of 
residence [sic], his work unit or his family to come and take him home.’
At lower levels of administrative legislation, there are further regulations 
detailing the situations in which complainants can be interned and deported.38 
For instance, Heilongjiang Province Guidelines for Carrying out Internment and 
Deportation on Complainants lists in its Article 7 among ‘candidates' for 
internment and deportation ‘those who after exhausting the methods of obtaining 
legal redress continue to make unreasonable claims and, while light criticism has 
no effect, continue to quarrel and are not prepared to stop [the dispute].’ So. even 
after the abolition of the Directives on Internment and Deportation o f Vagrants
36 Xinfang shourong (fn i/j ^  ?r )■ The statutes are displayed on the wall of reception offices of 
some People’s Courts, in the entrance areas of the courts, for instance.
37 See State Council’s 1995 Statutes on Letters and Complaints (Guowuyuan xinfang tiaoli, l l l#  
% i \ k ). edict no. 185 (1995). See also Wang Changfeng ’The resolution of
contradictions [conflicts, in sociey] rests on building up a healthy legal system (Jiejue maodun 
zaiyu jianquan fazhi, )’, in Legal Services News of 22
August 2003, at p. 4.
38 For example, the rules made in 1988 by the Chinese Ministry of Health. Compare Jin Weifeng, 
( ,  editor), China ’s system o f coercive administrative measures (Zhongguo xingzheng 
qiangzhifalii zhidu, 4 1 K f t ® r l i ' J WMf§., Beijing: 2002), at p. p. 203.
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and Beggars, other, no more justified.34 legislation on internment and deportation 
continues in force. Another form of internment or detention still in force is the 
‘internment for education system' -  a system also applied, for instance, to 
prostitutes, according to different legislation.40
In October 2002. Ma Jiyun, a 61 year-old citizen of Heilongjiang province 
who had just obtained a second instance (final) court judgement of the Jianshan 
District Court of Shuangyashang City, applied for an order for the enforcement of 
the court's decision that an invalidity certificate must be issued. The judgement 
said that it was wrong of the local labour and social insurance bureaus not to 
issue her disabled son Wang Guishan with an invalidity certificate, after Wang 
Guishan had been severely injured by work colleagues in a brawl. Ma left the 
Jianshan District Court Building in the company of her friend and legal 
representative Sheng Qifang. Sheng Qifang had previously represented Ma Jiyun 
in a legal case about the bodily injury inflicted on her son (before another District 
Court of Shuangyashan). A few minutes away from the court, Ma Jiyun was 
arrested by officers of another, namely the Baoshan District Court of 
Shuangyashan City, and put into ‘internment for education' for 75 days.41 She 
came out of this internment partially paralysed in consequence of a stroke, 
requiring to be supported by a family member.42 There was a reasoned written 
statement detailing the grounds of the internment measure initiated by the
The considerations regarding the Constitution and Legislation Law set out in Chapter Five
apply here. too.
411 The Chinese term for this is shourong jiaoyu ).
41 A series of Articles in Legal Services News ) of 22 August 2003 by Sheng
Xueyou and Wang Changfeng C T ldA ) reports on this case.
42 There is a later, further report of this case in Southern Weekend. Sheng Xueyou ‘Two
citizens cast doubt on “letters and complaints internment” (Liangge gongmin zhiyi “xinfang 
shourong", ”)’ Southern Weekend of 9 October 2003, at http://www.
nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20031009/xw/fz/200310090795.asp. This Article shows a picture of Ma 
Jiyun, supporting herself on a stick.
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Baoshan District Court of Shuangyashan City, which relied chiefly on the 
statement that Ma had tried at various times to speak to judges, and had in 
particular tried to obstruct the car of the President of the Supreme People's Court 
Xiao Yang for this purpose, when Xiao Yang was visiting the Heilongjiang High 
Court.4'
in  the matter of the bodily injury inflicted on her son Wang Guishan. Ma 
Jiyun had for a period of eight years been making complaints visits with 
authorities at exceedingly high levels...44 but the reasons stated in her 
applications for judicial supervision45 and his complaints letters could not 
be established, as had been ascertained by courts at four different 
levels...for several years Ma Jiyun incessantly made trips to Beijing and 
to the provincial capital to make complaints, and this conduct must be 
classified as making complaints without reasons. Several times of 
persuading and educating her had no effect; she persisted in querulant 
complaints visits, and in the end even made a plan of going to Beijing to 
make complaints visits during the time of [a plenary session of] the 
‘Sixteenth* [National Congress of the Communist Party of China].46
The Baoshan District Court's suggestion to impose ‘internment for education’ of 
three months’ duration was passed on to the Intermediate Court of Shuangyashan 
City (the court one level higher up), then to the Letters and Complaints Office of 
Shuangyashan City, and to the mayor of Shuangyashan City Zhang Wenxue, all 
of which signalled their approval of the measure. It was then carried out by the 
Shuangyashan police. According to the report Ma Jiyun had just been doing 
nothing more offensive than apply for a court order to enforce a legally effective 
court judgement, as her friend pointed out. Sheng Qifang also emphasised that 
there was no evidence for the alleged incident with Xiao Yang’s car; and as for 
the idea of going to Beijing during the Sixteenth Plenary Session, he pointed out
43 See Article by Sheng Xueyou in Legal Services News of 22 August
2003 at p.l. The author quotes a friend of Ma’s pointing out that these allegations were not 
supported by any evidence.
44 The Chinese expression for this is yueji shangfang (M tSJlifr).
45 The expression used is shensu ( ^  ilr). I discuss this procedure in chapter 7.
*  Ibid. p. 1.
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that the Baoshan District Court was merely alleging an intention on the part of 
Ma Jiyun.
Whether or not detaining Ma Jiyun as an ‘educational' measure in 
accordance with ‘administrative punishment detention' (according to Article 
eight subsection six of the Administrative Punishment Law) might have been 
possible, it was ‘letters and complaints' detention, not educational detention that 
was imposed here.47 Nor is there any reference to administrative punishment to 
be found in the Heilongjiang Guidelines fo r  Carrying out Internment and 
Deportation on Complainants, nor is it clear what (other) law Ma could originally 
have offended against48
Ma Jiyun and Sheng Qifang lost their confidence both in the power or 
willingness of the courts to protect their legal rights, and in the letters and 
complaints procedure. They filed two ‘suggestions’ with the Heilongjiang 
People's Congress’ Standing Committee and with the Heilongjiang government, 
to the effect that the above quoted Guidelines should be abolished as 
unconstitutional, because they contravene Article 37 of the Constitution and 
infringe Chinese citizens’ ‘right to sue. 49 The suggestion letter to the 
Heilongjiang government, which dates of 18 August 2003 was reprinted in the
47 The deciding authority for administrative punishment would have been a city government, for 
instance, and the authority carrying out this measure the police, see Article 16. Moreover Article 
three of the Administrative Punishment Law says that administrative punishments are invalid 
without legal basis or without following legal proceedings.
4K One might construe a legal obligation of heeding ‘persuasive’ and educational adhortations by 
letters and complaints offices from the fact that letters and complaints offices should try to 
persuade and educate unreasonable complainants. But again we encounter the limits of the idea of 
legal obligation. There can be no obligation to be persuaded or to be convinced of anything. In an 
interview by Hou Xiao with Fang Jiamin in Legal Services News of 22
August 2003 at page 13 he says that complainants have ‘a [legal] duty’ to comply with the 
procedure of letters and complaints visits, and not to persist in making too high or unreasonable 
claims.’
49 Suquan (iff See for the text of the petition, Suggestion letter petitioning for the abolition 
of Heilongjiang Province’s letters and complaints internment and deportation regulation (Qingqiu 
feizhi Heilongjiang sheng xinfang shourong qiansong gongzuo fagui jianyishu, in $  lk M j£ iX
)’, reprinted in Legal Services News ) of 22
August 2003 at p. 4. Not information is available on the outcome of this petition.
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newspaper reporting on the story, alleges some further details. Its last sentence 
also conveys a message of urgency, anger, and uncompromising request.
‘On 31 July 1991, a mine accident happened on the fourth platform of 
Shuangyashan Coal mine.50 The relevant authority issued a concluding 
report of a natural disaster. Sheng Qifang. Ma Jiyun and others reported 
on this falsification and suppression of facts and were in the end 
successful, for the mentioned accident was classified as an accident [to 
which attached] grave responsibility and the people responsible for it were 
convicted according to criminal law. But Sheng Qifang was put into 
‘interment for education' for 68 da^s as a consequence and had to wear 48 
pound heavy fetters round his feet. 1
[Also,] Ma Jiyun's son52 Wang Guishan was intentionally attacked 
with a knife by his fellow workers and room-mates, and heavily injured 
and left disabled. The Jianshan District Court of Shuangyashan has issued 
a judgement regarding the rejection of Wang Guishan’s application for a 
certificate of having suffered a work injury by the Shuangyashan Labour 
and Social Security Bureaus, deciding the rejection was illegal and 
ordering the defendants to make another specific administrative act. After 
the judgement took legal effect, it was in accordance with procedural law 
for Ma Jiyun to apply for a court order to enforce it. When Ma Jiyun went 
to the Jianshan District Court on 24 October 2002 to ask for an 
enforcement order regarding this judgement against the Labour and Social 
Security Bureau, the Baoshan District Court, which was handling another 
litigation of Ma Jiyun’s, imposed ‘educational internment’ on her. After 
75 days, because she had become [partly] paralysed,53 Ma Jiyun was 
‘released prematurely’.54 In accordance with law, the guidelines ought to 
be abolished immediately. This should not be put off any further.'55
The ‘letters and complaints' practice also brings out some special problems with 
informal complaint procedures. There may indeed be querulant complainants, 
their requests may be unreasonable, and they may hamper the work of public 
authorities, but it is difficult to deal with such problems. The very informality of 
the procedure for letters and complaints visits, the very comprehensiveness of the
50 The precise location of the accident is given as Shuangyashan kuangwuju si fangtai
WMhi i ) .
51 Jiaoliao (MW.)-
52 Changzi (t^T 1).
53 The Nanfang Zhoumo Article (note 39) details that according to the medical record she 
suffered from an obstruction of cerebral blood vessels, which combined with prolonged wrong 
treatment brought on a partial paralysis (a stroke).
54 an expression also used in the context of prison sentences. Ibid.,p. 4.
55 Urgency is conveyed here by using the four-character phrase ke bu rong huan (M'ftW-M).
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rights of complainants and of the obligations of ‘receiving' state authorities.56 and 
the lack of a forensic mechanism for sorting out factual and legal questions 
arising from the complaints made, creates in-built difficulties. State authorities 
are burdened with an ill-defined, almost unlimited ‘responsibility' - in this case 
not for allocating citizens but for dealing with dissatisfied citizens. In response, 
they grasp a very comprehensive kind of power over these citizens’ persons, and 
resort to abusing this power. Notably, Ma Jiyun and Sheng Qifang only attacked 
the constitutionality of the provincial Guidelines but not of the national level 
State Council Letters and Complaints Visits Statutes.51 Ma Jiyun’s case gives one 
an inkling of how many unconstitutional mechanisms for limiting the personal 
freedom of citizens there still are at state authorities' disposal. Various recent 
examples of shangfang activities are less complex (the way they are reported) but 
more alarming. As already mentioned, there is an increasing number of suicidal 
remonstration activities as well as activities euphemistically called ‘collective 
remonstration' -  meaning demonstrations.58 These occurrences are also reported
56 In the introduction to the above mentioned interview with Fang Jiamin. the respective rights 
and obligations are listed.
The later Article in Nanfang Zhoumo (note 39) on the same case reports on the journalist’s 
phone call made on 23 September 2003 to the ‘letters and complaints' office of the provincial 
government, where he is told to contact the provincial government ‘legal affairs' office, where he 
is told that the letter he is asking about has not yet been received by this office. The legal affairs 
office employee volunteers the information that ‘it would be very difficult to abolish the 
Heilongjiang province guidelines, while the State Council level statutes on complainants’ 
internment are still in force.’ Ibid .http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20031009/xw/fz/20031 
0090795.asp.
58 See for instance Zhou Yesheng, ‘On appropriately handling “collective complaints visits" 
(Tuoshan chuli “jitifang" de celue, sS:H§)’ at Zhengyiwang, 26 March 2003,
at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id= 109099. A report in Secret China C # '!1 S fR ii)  
says that Beijing government issued a ‘regulation’ in March 2003 prohibiting the complainants to 
use scrolls and to shout slogans, in order to avoid ‘disturbance of peace and stability.’ ‘Beijing 
issues edict to prohibit masses come to Beijing from shouting slogans and carrying scrolls when 
reporting grievances (Beijing banling: jinzhi fujing minzhong shenyuan shi han kouhao, la hengfu,
fe fit1!1!  , 3 April 2004,, at http://www.secretchina.
com/news/Articles/ 4/4/3/62766.html.
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and commented on publicly. 50 Coercive measures are taken against 
demonstrators: they may be charged with the crime of causing public 
disturbances, or with breaking local regulations, for instance.60
Dissatisfied citizens do not only ‘pay visits' to complain; they also write 
letters.61 Other reports have appeared on mass petitions submitted to governments 
or People's Congresses. In such cases, the focus of citizens sometimes changes 
from a particular complaint of maladministration to a request for the resignation 
of officials, according to some reports.62 Indeed, in 2004 the Communist Party of 
Sichuan Province was reported to have issued a regulation on the obligation to 
‘take the blame and resign,' a step which caused a flurry of discussions, not least 
over the voluntariness of such ‘resignations.’63 Even in extreme situations there
59 For a discussion of a case occurring at Tiananmen in September 2003. see Li Hongjun
%). 'Background of the self-immolation of a complainant (Shangfangzhe zimie de beihou, h i// 
# 'f l  ) \  9 October 2003 at http://www;nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20031009/xw/zy/200
310090797.asp.
60 See already in Chapter Two. On 21 October 2003 Xinhuawang reproduced an Article of the 
Morning Post reporting the arrest of seven Shanghai citizens come to the capital.
'Shanghai has detained seven criminal suspects for entering Beijing and causing public 
disturbance under the name of complaint visits (Shanghai xingshi juliu qi ming shexian yi jin jing 
shangfang wei ming juzhong zishizhe, k#J Jft Iff 7 Y i I'X  hiH  %  'h f t ) 21
October 2003. available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-10/21/content_1133521.htm. 
See also on a blockade of Beijing’s fourth ring road and consequent arrests on suspicion of 
disturbing the public order, ‘Instigating the masses to block the Fourth Ring Road -  two 
defendants accused in Beijing (Shandong qunzhong fengdu sihuanlu -  beijing liang ming 
beigaoren bei tiqi gongsu, a)J Iff /X ftifi l,Ll -H- h  n A. $ hi i/i)", 15 May 2004
at Xinhuawang. http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-05/14/content_1469086.htm.
hl See a report on petitioners being locked up so as to prevent them from demonstrating, and of 
citizens being put in shuanggui detention for organising petitions. Yu Meisun ( ),
‘Tangshan Police investigates all the peasants who signed the “Ten Thousand People’s 
Memorandum” - every person has put themselves in danger (Tangshan jingfang zhuicha "wan 
ren zhe" qianming nongmin, ren ren ziwei, Ah ill ^  /jifi f t  \ J] KV f J ^  hi K  A. A. /&)’, 14 
April 2004 at http://www.secretchina.eom/news/Articles/4/4/14/63394.html.
62 See, for instance, the Secret China report ‘Xinhuawang and Renminwang unite
-  an attack spearheaded against Jiang Zemin (Qingqing: Xinhuawang renminwang lianshou, 
maotou zhixiang Jiang Zemin, jhBff: 0 f ^  M A K; M 21 April 2004, at
http://www.secretchina.eom/news/Articles/4/4/21/63810.html.
63 See Qin Chuan, “Take Blame and Resign” More Popular’, China Daily 8 March 2004, at 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-03/08/content_312764.htm., Lian Yue ( ihhr ), 
“Taking the blame and resigning” is of course not voluntary /e  flM W )’, in
Southern Weekend (^h h f/» l^ )o f 6 May 2004, Zheng Zhi l£), ‘Let us clearly explain 
“Taking the blame and resigning” article by article ),18 May 2004,
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2004-05/18/content_1475132.htm
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is a perceived value in people's acting from their true insight into having done
wrong.
Administrative reconsideration. Whether one must or should exercise a right, is 
also a question of right and wrong; but once one has engaged in rights-centred 
discourse, this decision can only be taken by the person the exercise of whose 
rights is at issue. How well administrative litigation serves the purpose of 
individual rights protection, is very largely a matter of the specific procedures 
available.
The administrative reconsideration procedure is one clearly designed for 
‘indpendenf review of administrative decisions, although the review process 
remains within the administration itself. It gives citizens a right to challenge a 
specific measure taken against them, and to receive an answer to their 
challenge.64 It also gives the administration a chance to review its own decision; 
and it gives the complainant a chance to get a new decision relatively easily, 
without going through a complicated court procedure. The standard of scrutiny 
used in administrative reconsideration extends beyond looking at whether an 
administrative act was legal; it also considers whether it has been ‘reasonable’, in 
terms, say, of administrative goals.65 As already mentioned, administrative
Mln that sense, administrative reconsideration and litigation (See Chapter Seven) are the 
procedures with the best potential to fulfill China’s obligations after its accession to the WTO. 
Article X of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereafter GATT) demands that 
Members should ‘maintain or institute judicial, arbitral or administrative tribunals or procedures 
for the purpose, inter alia, of the prompt review and correction of administrative action relating to 
customs matters.’ These procedures therefore tend to be the ones on which Western observers 
concentrate their attention. On judicial review -  which administrative reconsideration can lead up 
to - see also part D of the Protocol on The Accession of The People’s Republic Of China [to the 
WTO], 10 November 2001, available at http://docsonline.wto.Org/DDFDocuments/tAVT/L/432. 
doc.
65 Hefaxing ( )  and helixing ( n 'S 't t  ). By contrast, in Chinese terms, administrative 
litigation allows review only as to ‘legality’ but not as to ‘reasonableness’ (appropriateness). 
Again, this is reminiscent of German law but the expression for the scope of scrutiny used there
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reconsideration can generally be requested only regarding ‘concrete’ 
administrative acts.*6
The requirements of ‘legality’ and ‘reasonableness’ should be considered 
carefully. Can something that is legal not be reasonable? For example. Article 54 
of the Chinese Administrative Litigation Law lists as possible grounds of the 
illegality of an administrative act that it is ultra vires, or has abused official 
power. Of course, power abuse is illegal as well as unreasonable: or at least if 
these requirements are not considered as disjunct but instead as connected, then 
there is room for legal interpretation to consider rights conformity, for instance, 
as a requirement of ‘reasonableness’. This is done in jurisdictions where a 
proportionality test is used to assess the impact of administrative decisions on 
constitutional rights, for instance. Rejecting such a connection, by contrast, 
means that the legality of a decision could be reviewed quite independently of its 
reasonableness, and can close the idea of legality off against substantive rights- 
related requirements.67
As mentioned before, the administration has three options for deciding a 
reconsideration application: to set a time limit for performance of the 
administration's obligation to act; to annul a specific administrative act, alter it or 
declare it invalid; and to reject the application for reconsideration. But these 
options only describe the forms which decisions in administrative reconsideration
for administrative as opposed to judicial review would be appropriateness’, in Chinese probably 
tuodangxing ( S  ) . -  The duality of hefa and heli here should also remind us of the 
discussion in Chapter Four.
66 The point of definition in this area of legal, political and moral concern has to be the appeal of 
its practical application and therefore a comparison may be useful: in German law, the distinction 
is used mainly because different tests are used for assessing the legality (including 
constitutionality) of specific and ‘abstract’ administrative acts -  administrative ordinances or 
regulations Compare e.g. Article 80 (1) of the German Basic Law.
67 This touches on the discussion about the nature of ‘judicial discretion’, and the question if there
can be ‘gaps’ in the law. (The view that there can be seems to be as popular in China, as 
elsewhere.)
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can take. The way these decisions are reached, and the substantive considerations 
going into them, are not further defined. It appears that mediation is used not 
infrequently. The 1999 Administrative Reconsideration Law contained a 
provision explicitly prohibiting the use of mediation, but in the current law, this 
prohibition has been dropped out.68 The use of mediation in administrative 
reconsideration procedure is problematic, given the power imbalance frequently 
characterising the relationship between citizens and the administration. However, 
an efficient administrative litigation procedure may be enough to level out the 
imbalance. In this context it is worth noting that Chinese scholars have recently 
put forth an argument for widening and acknowledging rather than rejecting 
mediation in administrative reconsideration and litigation procedure. 69 
Administrative reconsideration can include an application for damages according 
to the Administrative Compensation Law.10 In terms of their scope, decisions are 
like a court decision. The institution of administrative compensation can play an 
important role in empowering citizens to sue public authorities, because loss of 
money is a substantive threat, even against political power. It is not clear, 
however, how ready citizens are to claim compensation from government.71
hX See Wang Xixin ( 1.$}£?-). ‘Principles, Agreement and [political] governance -  a study of the 
possibility and appropriateness of use of ADR in the administrative process (Guize, heyi yu zhili 
-  xingzheng guoehengzhong shiyong ADR de kenengxing yu todangxing yanjiu, fcMWJ n l j in
i f ----- \ f ity H  fV111 Hj ADR fill “J ‘j )’ at http://www.chinalawedu.com/
news/2004_ 4/10/1455281654.htm The standard translation for zhili is ‘to rule’ or ‘administer a 
state’, but note it contains the li which can variously be translated as ‘reason’ or as ‘right, as an 
abstract principle.’ (See chapter 4.)
M Ibid.
70 Article 9. The claim for compensation can also be made outside a reconsideration procedure, or 
during administrative litigation. But note it may be difficult to get to the stage of administrative 
litigation, for instance if the administrative authority remains inactive until the time limit for filing 
a court case has elapsed (see below).
71 One report mentions only 35 handled cases of administrative compensation in [one of] 
Beijing’s two Intermediate courts, in a period of ten years -  not much in a city of now fourteen 
million. Guo Zhixia (fft^iBi), ‘Ten years after promulgation of the State Compensation Law, 35 
cases concluded in Beijing (Guojia peichangfa banbu shinian, Beijing shenjie 35 jian guojia 
peichang, 35 Xinhuawang, 11 May 2004, at
http://news.xinhuanet.eom/legal/2004-05/l l/content_1461641.htm
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If a citizen's appeal to the administrative body which made a decision, or its 
superior, for reconsideration does not result in relief or redress, then the fact that 
such an appeal is required before the citizen may sue the administration in 
court.72 may turn into a positive obstacle to rights protection. One of the 
remaining problems with the Administrative Reconsideration Law in China is that 
it imposes statutory time limits for opposing a reconsideration decision in the 
course of court litigation. To provide time limitations on challenges to 
administrative acts can be justified by public interest in the security of past 
decisions. But for time limitations to be justified, there has to be ‘fair warning’. 
An individual affected by an administrative decision or measure must be apprised 
of his procedural rights, including the right to apply for reconsideration and to 
sue. In China, the Administrative Litigation Law does not state a clear 
requirement that the citizen affected be advised about the statutory time limit. 
Surprisingly, there is a decision by the Supreme People’s Court, included in a 
collection of Exemplary decisions in administrative litigation, that if an 
application for administrative reconsideration is not answered at all, this must be 
regarded as an answer to the effect that the original administrative act is 
upheld.1*
On the other hand, the administrative review procedure allows for an 
extension of the scope of review of administrative decisions. It allows for review
72The expression for this requirement is qianzhi chengxu
73 As a consequence in this case, the applicant (plaintiff) had lost his right to litigate against the 
‘upheld’ administrative decision, due to time lapse.See ‘When an administrative reconsideration 
authority does not decide on a request within the time limit, it should be regarded as having 
upheld the original concrete administrative act’, (Fuyi jiguan yuqi dui fuyi shenqing buzuo caijue 
ying shiwei weichi yuan juti xingzheng xingwei,
Y > in Jiang Yong ( MM,  editor) Analysis o f Exemplary Decisions (Beijing:
2000) at p. 67.
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of ‘abstract* administrative acts to be subjected to review. Article seven of the 
Administrative Reconsideration Law states that
‘Article 7. When a citizen, a legal person or other organisation at the time 
of applying for administrative reconsideration of a specific act considers 
that a norm (guiding) of one of the kinds listed below, on which the 
administrative act relies, is illegal, he can also apply for an examination of 
said regulations with the administrative reconsideration authority.
(1) Norms of the ministries under the State Council;
(2) Norms made by local governments above prefecture (xian)74 level and 
their departments;
(3) County (xiang, zhen)75 level government norms.’
So within narrow limits, some ‘red-headed documents’ can now be subjected to 
administrative review as part of the administrative reconsideration procedure. 
This provision was only introduced in 1999 and welcomed by many scholars as a 
breakthrough. Insofar as only the review of documents with normative character 
by same level or higher level administrative authorities is concerned, the main 
change consists ‘merely’ in the fact that such review can occur at the initiative 
and request of an individual citizen, and that the administrative authority has an 
obligation to make a reasoned decision (Article 45 Administrative 
Reconsideration Law). If moreover the requirement for an ‘abstract 
administrative act review' can be brought up within a court procedure,76 the 
breakthrough is even much greater. Article 53 of the Administrative Litigation 
Law, however, could be read as taking the competence of actually examining the 
legality of ‘abstract’ administrative acts’ back out of the hands of courts again, by 
prescribing that when they come across a ‘norm’ (guiding) that is ‘not
74 Xian (Hr).
75 Xiang (^ ). Zhen (IK).
76 As argued by Wang Zhenmin ( i H K )  in an LL.M. class on Constitutional Law at Tsinghua 
University Law School on 9 October 2003.
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consistent’77 with other ‘administrative’ legislation, they have to submit this 
question to the State Council for decision.78 This issue is discussed in greater 
depth in Chapter Seven.
Beyond the provision in Article seven of the Administrative 
Reconsideration Law, the State Council (Legal Affairs Office) and the 
corresponding Legal Affairs Offices at provincial government level have even 
further-reaching rights of reviewing administrative legislation, according to 
Article 89, subsection 13 and 14 of the Chinese Constitution (for the State 
Council). These rights, however, are not reciprocated in any way by the power of 
the courts even just to submit questions about the legality of such higher-ranking 
administrative norms to the State Council. (An exception is the Supreme People’s 
Court’s right to submit such questions to the Standing Committee of the NPC, to 
be discussed below). By enhancing the power of administrative authorities while 
leaving the power of the courts limited, the courts are weakened, as in the case of 
Ma Jiyun above, who could not have challenged the legality -  constitutionality -  
of the Guidelines concerning complainants’ internment in court.
The review process generally envisaged, by contrast, leads from 
administrative reconsideration to review of an administrative decision in court, as 
the following example shows.79 One day in May 2000, eighty-year-old Mr Yuan 
from Shuichuan in Chongqing, who had been living with his children in
77 Here this translation is preferable over the more literal (or more common) translation of yizhi 
as ‘identical’.
78 Compare Article 89 (13) of the Constitution.
79 Xie Xiaoguo (i$t#EU), ‘An eighty-year-old interned in Shenzhen gets some words of apology 
after two years of troublesome litigation (Baxun laoren Shenzhen bei shourong, liangnian guansi 
feixin tao shuofa, £  H 'h v ti& v i)’, 21 Century Herald Tribune, 25 
June 2003, at http://news.21cn.com/guangdong/tq/2003-06-25/1088852.html. It is not an 
illustration of the ‘unimportance’ or infrequency of such cases, that even an extended search for 
court and/or administrative reconsideration cases in the context of internment and deportation led 
only to one court judgement reprinted in several anthologies (see below Chapter Seven), and a 
handful of cases reported in several newspapers (see Chapter Five).The probable reason for the 
scarcity of reports is that these cases are, or were, ‘too sensitive’.
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Shenzhen for over fourteen years, went for a stroll round the block. He had the 
bad luck of walking into the arms of officers of the Shenzhen police just on the 
look-out for ‘three no -  people', and since he was not carrying any documents 
with him, he was arrested, reportedly despite his protests that he was living with 
his children and had only forgotten his papers, and driven to the ‘Yinhu Shenzhen 
internment and deportation station'. There he spent a day and a night, before 
being taken further to the Shanwei Haifeng station. (It is not reported if any fee 
was collected from him on his leaving the first station.) This second station did 
not actually intern him, because after questioning him they thought it indeed 
likely that he had family in Shenzhen, and had somehow been mistakenly or 
unnecessarily80 arrested and interned. They found he was still carrying sixty Yuan 
with him and thought he might as well pay for his own train-fare back home, but 
they rented him a tricycle to take him to the railway station, and gave him a slip 
of paper saying where he was supposed to go. On arriving at the station, the old 
man in his confusion lost himself in the streets, but he was taken up by ‘a kind- 
hearted person’ who finally put him on the right train. In the meantime, Yuan 
Wen’s children had tried the police, hospitals and internment and deportation 
stations to find any trace of him, but in vain. At the first station, it was later 
discovered, the eighty-year-old Mr Yuan had ‘accidentally’ been registered as 
‘thirty years old’. ‘You don’t think we’d intern an eighty-year-old as a thirty- 
year-old?’, the staff at the Yinzhu Shenzhen station said to the daughter-in-law. 
They had better go to the Haifeng station, he said, and if the old man was not to 
be found there, well, then there was nothing else to do. At the Haifeng station, 
too, enquiries were made in vain. As a consequence, Mr Yuan’s ordeal continued
80 The legality of the internment measure was of course later disputed.
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for several more hours, and he was exposed to a considerable risk of getting lost 
altogether.
Mr Yuan's family were outraged. They reacted to what they felt to have 
been an injustice -  interning an eighty year old man who has merely forgotten his 
papers, apparently without listening to his statement of the facts, and making it 
impossible for his relatives to trace him.
‘...Yuan Wen and his children applied to various administrative 
departments, and eventually, with the intervention of the Shenzhen 
People's Congress and the Letters and Complaints Office of the Shenzhen 
government, they got some ‘words' [of apology or explanation] from the 
Civil Affairs Department of Shenzhen, the authority in charge of the 
internment and deportation stations.81
Mr Yuan's family’s application to the Bureau for Civil Affairs as the 
administrative authority just above the two internment and deportation stations 
here involved was an application for ‘administrative reconsideration’, but insofar 
as the family also addressed themselves to the local People’s Congress etc., they 
used informal channels to influence the decision. This appears to be by no means 
an untypical ‘modification’ of the administrative reconsideration procedure.
‘...Eventually, the administrative authority above the internment and 
deportation station came up with some ‘words'. On 18 July 2000, the 
answer given by the Shenzhen City Civil Affairs Bureau to the Office of 
the Shenzhen City People’s Congress [!] was: The City’s Internment and 
deportation station's internment and deportation of Yuan Wen was in 
accordance with the relevant legal provisions on internment and 
deportation; the way the station carried out internment and deportation on 
Yuan Wen had also followed the proper [relevant] order/path; currently, 
the relevant state regulations on internment and deportation had not made 
any restriction regarding the age of the targets/objects of internment and 
deportation and hence there was nothing wrong about internment and 
deportation of an eighty-year-old. When he entered the internment of
81 Ibid. (note 78). The expression I have translated as ‘getting some words’, gei le ge shuofa (ta 
T  i^ i&i£), was made famous by Zhang Yimou’s film The story o f Qiu Ju (Qiu Ju da guansi, 
JT'B’ wj). See also in Chapter 2.
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Yuan Wen in the computer register, the staff member of the station had 
difficulties to tell an ‘8’ from a ‘3’ because the police officer's form filled 
in by hand was written unclearly, and this was how Yuan Wen came to be 
wrongly registered as 30 instead of 80 years old. As a consequence, the 
family of Yuan Wen when searching for him had difficulties discovering 
his whereabouts, due to his age having been wrongly registered. This was 
brought about by a lapse of sense of duty on the part of the staff member 
of the station.
Eventually the Civil Affairs Bureau decided: the management82 of the 
station and the involved staff members should proffer comforting words83 
towards Yuan Wen, and express their regrets 4 towards his family. For 
losses arising to them from absence from work, food and traffic 
expenditure the station should made an appropriate ‘compensation’ 
payment, and the station’s work style should undergo a correction.’85
But then the family of Mr Yuan discovered that the Shenzhen internment and 
deportation station refused to pay any damages (and it appears they did not 
apologise, either). It is not clear who decided that no payment should be made 
and why; whether perhaps the Civil Affairs Bureau changed their mind or 
whether it could not exercise sufficient pressure on the station under its control. 
In a larger context, however, it should be observed that an obvious disadvantage 
of administrative review is that one’s case does not leave the realm of 
administration; there is a danger, therefore, that the procedure and outcome of 
reconsideration will be neither as impartial nor as efficient as a court procedure 
can be. Note in this context Article 32 of the Administrative Litigation Law.
‘Article 32. The respondent86 [to the administrative reconsideration 
application] shall 87 comply with the administrative reconsideration 
decision. If the respondent does not comply with it or delays compliance 
without adequate reason, then the administrative reconsideration
82 Lingdao ( ^ ^ ) .
83 Weiwen (St H ).
84 Qianyi (%kM) .
85 Ibid (note 78 ).
86 I.e. the administrative authority that originally became active, compare Article ten (3).
87 Yingdang
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authority 88 or its superior administrative authority shall order the 
respondent to comply, setting a time limit for compliance.'
There is no further provision for enforcement of administrative reconsideration 
decisions and not even an indication of the procedure by which citizens can 
demand an order to comply, or indicating the consequences of non-compliance 
for the administrative authority. But the administrative reconsideration procedure 
can be -  and in this case was - followed by a court procedure. I will turn again to 
Mr. Yuan as I go on to discuss rights protection through adjudication in China in 
the following chapter.
The fourth chapter, discussing mediation, explored the implications of the 
proposition that having rights was not conclusive of what one should do, and the 
fifth chapter discussed some indispensable requirements for legislation to respect 
legal rights. This chapter turned attention the other way from mediation, and 
illustrated how irreplaceable, as well as indispensable, rights protection is 
especially in situations of challenging a state authority. Neither petitions nor 
applications for administrative reconsideration can supply the full rights 
protection desirable, because the public authority in charge of handling petitions 
or reconsideration applications is too close, on the whole, to the authority whose 
decision may have infringed a citizen’s rights. Rights protection requires a certain 
procedure, but that does not mean that there are no rights where no such 
procedures are in place; rather, people’s rights are not protected in such cases.
88 See Articles twelve to fifteen on whom to apply to for administrative reconsideration. In some 
cases, the administrative reconsideration authority is the authority that orginally became active; in 
these cases, the authority to order compliance even more evidently has to be its superior.
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Chapter Seven Chinese court practice: a shift in perspective
To appeal to government or even a People's Congress is a common way of 
reacting to maladministration and injustice among Chinese citizens. To go to 
court is not yet, despite changes over the past years. Part of the reasons for this is 
that courts appear as dependent organs ‘under’ the government, rather than as 
independent institutions to check governmental power. But there are further 
reasons; one of them being, surely, that appeals in the form of ‘letters and 
complaints visits’ can be successful: not least because the authority appealed to 
may have real power or influence. The previous chapter essentially described a 
two-party relationship between individual citizen and state authorities at various 
levels and in different branches -  including the courts themselves, as in the case 
of Ma Jiyun, who sought to get help in the matter of her disabled son. Even where 
the intervention of a ‘third’ party such as a People’s Congress member is sought, 
there is an assumption that such intervention will take the form of an appeal to 
working relationships, or the form of a command based on political hierarchy: an 
assumption of unity between the state authorities involved. This chapter turns to 
litigation in court, as a procedure where the court is an impartial third institution, 
or should be.
The argument moves from an interpretive account of the purpose of 
criminal adjudication to discussion of how constitutional rights matter to 
litigation -  both administrative and civil1 - in China to date. This requires a 
position in the debate about the so-called ‘judicialisation of the Constitution’.
1 Or that is, civil as would-be administrative litigation, where the defendant is a state authority but 
is sued in a civil litigation procedure, to circumvent obstacles posed by the Administrative 
Litigation Law (see below).
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This discussion is about how far judges can take direct recourse to constitutional 
provisions, especially rights guarantees, in the process of deciding cases, and 
what they should do when faced with law they think unconstitutional. The 
vehemence with which this debate is being led at the moment is, it seems, an 
expression of how much it goes to the heart of traditional Chinese adjudication 
and mediation. Therefore the argument here has to connect to observations made 
previously: allowing discourse about fundamental rights requires a mode of 
discussion in which one’s most principled political, legal and moral convictions 
will have to be given sharp and unequivocal expression. In such adjudication 
processes, sustained dissensus about what should be done in any particular case 
can be expected at the end of a court procedure, which is of course expected to 
decide (‘settle’) the matter at hand. Certainly, constitutional rights cases are not 
generally settled by a sincere and genuine apology from one party to the other, or 
even by a mere show of unanimity or deference to the court’s view. Deference is 
shown only to the court’s decision. These features appear to make cases of 
fundamental rights adjudication differ a lot from what could be characterised as a 
more traditional mode of adjudication in China. A characterisation of rights- 
centred adjudication in this way owes a debt to Fuller’s famous characterisation 
of adjudication as most importantly a forum for the production of ‘proof and 
reasoned argument’ by both (all) parties, and also follows him in considering the 
authority of, or claim to authority by, the judge, regarded by some as the most 
important characteristic of the adjudication process in a ‘legal system’, as 
secondary. But this alone does not support the assertion that different processes 
of dispute resolution have ‘different moralities’, as Fuller famously claimed.
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Sun Zhi gang's case, and a change o f perspective in criminal adjudication. So let 
us first turn to the case that made the Internment and deportation measures dealt 
with in Chapters Five and Six famous, and led to their eventual demise. Sun 
Zhigang was a designer with a university degree who -  in a sequence of events 
by now already familiar -  was arrested one day in Guangzhou for not carrying all 
the documents required under the ‘three no’ rule with him -  he was not carrying 
his ‘temporary residence permit’ with him. Despite the fact that Sun’s employer 
reportedly provided ‘the relevant documents’ 2 within hours, Sun was kept 
interned for three days. On the third day of his detention, a number of people, 
including (some of) his room-mates and at least one official working at the 
hospital affiliated to the station, beat Sun Zhigang to death. They were 
subsequently arrested and charged. By the time it was tried in June 2003 in
■7
Guangzhou, the case had attracted enormous media attention. One of the twelve 
accused of the murder of Sun Zhigang, the official, was sentenced to death to be 
immediately executed.4
As we already know, an application for the abolition of the Directives for  
Internment and Deportation and subsequent events culminated in their abolition 
and replacement with a better piece of legislation. Thus the events triggered by 
the murder of Sun Zhigang had an impact far beyond the realm of criminal law, 
into the realm of administrative and constitutional law. This case was a case
2 China Daily Hong Kong Edition, ‘Tragedy spurs end to 21-year-old rule on vagrants’, 19 June 
2003, available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-06/20/content_239912.htm.
3 Some of the extent of the media reports may perhaps be attributed to the fact that just at that 
time, as a consequence of the SARS outbreak in Guangdong, Beijing and other parts of China, the 
media were experiencing a brief period of relative freedom, during which, for instance, ‘the right 
to be informed’ could be discussed. I discuss this sequence of events in passing in Chapter Nine.
4 By contrast, being sentenced to death with deferred execution (sihuan, M M ) regularly results in 
a commutation of the punishment to life imprisonment.
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about a crime, a case about constitutional rights, and a case about political reform.
Sun Zhigang's father was reported to have said:
‘My son has died an undignified death! An unjust death! A cruel death! 
But if my son’s death can speak to the better nature of those who enforce 
the law; if it can prevent that more ordinary citizens have to die this 
undignified death, then I can accept his death [as not in vain].'5
He did not, in this instance, demand to see the law that served as the basis for his 
son's arrest abolished, and merely appealed to the ‘good nature’ of ‘law 
enforcement officers.’ Reportedly, the family of the deceased initiated a litigation 
procedure against the internment and deportation station or its higher ranking 
authority, but it is also reported that a settlement was reached between the parties, 
who were unwilling further to propitiate the case, for instance by seeking 
‘constitutional’ review of the Directives fo r  Internment and Deportation at the
6 7initiative of a court, or even just to insist on a decision. But then, it is well 
known in Western countries, too, that it can be extremely difficult to find 
plaintiffs in civil rights cases, who are willing to see a court litigation through to a 
court decision. No one should be forced to do so; nor is it at all clear that they 
generally ought to ‘see it through,’ as typically many considerations will come 
into such a decision, and a settlement does not have to represent a bad
' ‘Reflections on the legal difficulties in adjudicating Sun Zhigang’s case in first instance -  in 
order to attack bad law [efa] we must uphold the Constitution [xianfa] (Fansi Sun Zhigang an yi 
shen falii kunjing , daji efa yao taichu xianfa, ix S  #  ^  ^  '/£ ^  fJ ftj ^  H
/£)’, China Economic Times (4 J 11 June 2003, available at http://www.sina.com.cn.
6 Consider the options available. Under Article 9 of the Statutes on Filing Regulations and Rules 
(bei’an, see Chapter Five) only the consistency with other administrative norms, all below State 
Council level, could have been challenged by a citizen by submission to the State Council, so 
challenges to ordinary NPC laws and the Constitution could not, prima facie, have been brought 
under this procedure. The same would apply according to Article 53 of the Administrative 
Litigation Law to the Supreme People’s Court’s right to submit questions of consistency between 
administrative norms below State Council level to the State Council. But the new procedure 
according to Article 90 of the Legislation Law (see below) would have allowed the Supreme 
People’s Court to submit the question to the NPC Standing Committee..
7 Wang Zhenmin’s ( i$ IK ;)  LL.M. class in Constitutional Law, Tsinghua Law School Beijing, 9 
October 2003.
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compromise. Nor, indeed, is it clear that many cases may not be settled under 
circumstances where a court decision would have been desirable, but power 
imbalance or similar circumstances ‘forced’ a party to agree to a settlement. Not 
all unlucky circumstances could possibly be obliterated by even the most 
enlightened practice of legal rights protection.
It is therefore not useful to dwell on the fact that in this instance, no court 
decision on the legality of Sun’s internment was reached. But one should not, 
either, be too easily persuaded that criminal procedure could be a procedure for
o
rights protection; it is that as little as the administrative ‘supervision’ procedures 
discussed above. A simplistic understanding of rights protection underlies claims 
that the imposition of punishment by the state is the result of a ‘balancing’ act 
between the rights of the victims of a crime and the rights of the criminal: this 
makes it appear that violation of one citizen’s rights requires violation of the 
rights of the wrong-doer.9 The violation of rights cannot possibly ever be required 
of the state, only reasonable measures for their protection from infringement, also 
by private citizens, and for providing redress. Whether the institution of criminal 
punishment is sufficient (or even at all suitable) to provide either is not a 
foregone conclusion but notoriously a matter of much debate. From a rights 
perspective, punishment requires justification as an invasion of rights; but there is 
another aspect to the justification of punishment which cannot be phrased in 
rights terms, and which appears to involve the justification of blame, or of 
measures expressing blame.
8 Despite the popularity of talking about ‘protecting the rights of victims’ through harsher laws 
against defendants (criminals).
9 Again, this could remind one of the expression ‘homicide is compensated by life’, sha ren chang 
ming (t& AI#^p ). This is how the assumption is sometimes put in the context of discussions about 
the death penalty, for instance, where of course the central right in question is the right to life 
(often both on the side of the victim and of the criminal).
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The punishment of the murderers of Sun Zhigang did nothing to protect his 
rights. Nor is it evident that the relatives of the victim had any right that his 
murderers be punished.10 It would have been different if there had been any court 
procedure examining the legality of his internment. Realistically, such a 
procedure would have had better chances of succeeding, if it had been able at 
least also to attack the constitutionality of the old Directives. 11 But these 
conditions did not in fact obtain. In some ways, the absence of the requirement of 
rights protection appears to simplify what justice requires: punishment can then 
be understood as being the main technique by which to achieve -  retributive - 
justice. Conversely as has been argued above, rights protection does not by itself
ijustify punishment, although once rights protection is accepted into a practice of 
criminal law it will shape and alter this practice. At the same time, as it addresses 
an individual wrongdoer rather than an institution, criminal punishment has a 
potential for affecting the mind of that person: which is something impossible, or 
at least less important, when a measure addresses an institution. The mind of the 
wrongdoing official abusing their power, or of course of any other criminal, 
comes into focus when he is punished.
10 Even procedures allowing the victims of crimes or persons related to them to ‘force’ the public 
prosecution of a crime, or allowing for a kind of ‘private’ prosecution, do not give a right to 
punishment of a criminal.
It is all the more interesting to note that the newspapers were quick to report that a number of 
officials involved in the case had been promptly ‘disciplined’ See Xiao Wenfeng ( N j t 1*#), ‘Trial 
opened in the case of inflicting bodily harm on Sun Zhigang resulting in his death; more than 
twenty responsible persons have received disciplinary measures (Sun Zhigang bei guyi shanghai 
zhisi an kaiting 20 yu zeren ren shou chufen, 20
f t ), Xinhuawang 5 June 2003, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/200306/05/content_904317 
.htm.
Wang Lei ( )  in his article ‘Examination of the constitutionality of internment and 
deportation (Shourong qiansong de xianfaxing shencha, ) 29 (2003)
Huadong Political and Legal Institute Journal at p. 97 elaborates on the
fact that the Directives for internment and deportation were abolished by a fairly hazardous 
procedure, rather than in the course of constitutional review.
21 understand rights protection in a narrow sense, as the reaction to a rights actually asserted, 
here.
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This allows one to see the administration of criminal justice as aiming at a 
public recognition of truth and guilt relating to the crime. It is also an important 
conclusion for understanding a relation between the ‘persuasive’ practice of 
mediation and the clearly coercive, or even cruel and violent, practice of criminal 
(corporeal) punishment untempered by a practice of rights protection. Both, of 
course, aim at determining what should be done, rather than at determining what 
rights one has. It is one of the great achievements of the imperial Chinese legal 
tradition that within this framework, humane considerations such as the 
criminal’s having a dependent parent, came into the magistrate’s decision to a 
great extent.
Tentatively, Sun Zhigang’s Case could be used to draw a further parallel: 
the attempt to re-direct attention or to concentrate attention on an individual 
culprit. This could supply a valid parallel with the ingenuous, clever-but-innocent 
technique adopted by the mediator ‘Porridge’ Su in the fourth chapter. But Su 
succeeds because in a sense he does draw attention to the very centre of the 
conflict: which is of course (or so we are meant to believe) the unhappy son and 
husband whom the disputing parties both, presumably, claim as object of their 
care and affection. By contrast merely punishing a few officials in the context of 
wrongful internment and deportation could not possibly have solved this issue of 
great legal, moral and social concern: it is a form of re-direction or direction of 
public attention, but a wrongheaded one. Sun Zhigang’s Case is an instance of 
requiring criminal punishment to perform more functions than it actually can 
serve; yet what makes it famous is that it is also among the first prominent cases 
which triggered a reaction beyond criminal punishment of Sun’s killers, and
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thereby testified to the ongoing transition towards rights centred thinking, which 
is gradually also influencing criminal legal practice itself.
In this area itself, there has most importantly been a change of attitude 
toward the extortion of confessions by torture. Torture continues to be a common 
phenomenon in Chinese police detention and interrogation, both prior to and after 
a formal arrest according to the Criminal Procedure Law.13 But attempts have 
been made recently to reduce its use, even though at the moment the extent and 
character of such attempts rather confirm the enormous extent to which torture is 
still being used. Traditionally judges were required effectively to endorse the use 
of torture by making convictions on the basis of coerced confessions. There was 
no real right to silence. For decades, the saying ‘who makes a clean breast [of his 
crime] will be treated leniently; who obstinately resists, will be treated harshly’ 
was displayed on the walls of most Chinese police stations, that is, where 
suspects would be interrogated.14 Many police officers think that cases cannot be 
‘solved’ (po'an) without using torture.15 According to Article 93 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law, the suspect still has the obligation ‘to answer questions
l3To quote Amnesty International: ‘Amnesty International continues to document cases where 
police have reportedly 'solved' criminal cases by extorting confessions through texture. The 
organization has documented torture perpetrated by law enforcement and judicial officials at all 
levels, ranging from security personnel sub-contracted by police, right through to judges; 
similarly, torture is known to have taken place in every form of detention facility in China, even 
in courtrooms.’ Amnesty International report, ‘Executed According to Law?’, March 2004, 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engasal70032004 (part 4 of the report).
14 Tanbai congkuan, kangju congyan (ifl.fi
15 Shi Fei, ‘Celebrating the demise of the principle “who makes a clean breast will be treated 
leniently, who obstinately resists will be treated harshly” (Huansong “tanbai congkuan, kangju 
congyan’’t u i w e i , & )A1&ifcfe}AJnL,,Mi±Ly, 9 December 2003, available at http: //www. 
ah.xinhuanet.com/xinwen/2003-12/09/content_1313545.htm also emphasises the connection 
between this principle and torture in police detention, and the fact that this attitude is still 
prevalent.
To quote Chen Ruihua ( ( ^ ^ ^ ) ,  ‘the problem of criminal procedure in the final analysis is 
one that goes to the nature of the judicial system, especially the relationships between the Public 
Security Organs, the prosecution organs and the People's Court. Chen Ruihua, ‘Major Issues 
Concerning the Reform of Criminal Judicature in China’ (2000?) translated by Yang Yushen and 
revised by David Kelly, available at http://www.usc.cuhk.edu.hk/wk_wzdetails.asp?id=1720. (No 
date of publication is explicitly stated.)
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truthfully', and only the right ‘to refuse to answer such questions as have no 
connection with the case.’ As Song Yinghui writes in 2003,
‘The suspect’s statement is turned into almost the sole aim of the criminal 
investigation process. In order to obtain a confession even inappropriate 
[not legally available] measures may be taken, and at times this results in 
grievous violations of the suspect’s right to bodily integrity. In our law 
enforcement and judicial practice [sifa shijian] the reliance on confessions 
is very strong, almost to the point where “when one has not obtained a 
confession, this cannot be counted as having solved the case [po’a/i].”’16
Besides Article 93, a further factor is that witnesses in China often do not appear 
in court as they do not wish to be caught up in the criminal justice process. 
Articles 47 and 48 of the Criminal Procedure Law require witnesses to appear in 
court, but there are no provisions for enforcing the legal duty to appear in court in 
the Criminal Law. This is widely considered as further increasing the importance 
of confessions.17 The consequences of the pressure on obtaining a confession are 
maltreatment and torture.18
16 Song Yinghui ), Introduction to the Elements o f Criminal Procedure (Xingshi Susong
Yuanli Daodu, , Beiing: 2003), at p. 329. Some legal professionals even
consider that the 19% reform in some ways lowered the standard of protection of the rights of the 
defendants. He Jiahong analyses as follows. ‘Perhaps this is a conception handed down
to us by our traditional judicial practice. But then we have to change now. We cannot go on 
handling cases revolving around the testimony of the suspect (kougong, P  {ft); we ought to 
promote the principle of going from evidence to suspect’s or defendant’s statement; that is, of first 
gathering [independent] evidence, and then using the defendant’s statement to confirm it.' He 
Jiahong contribution to ‘Law online: on torture (Fazhi zai xian: xingxun bigong, '/irfrj
ffj iftiilift )’, Renminwang, 22 October 2003, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/ 
15157/2146427. html031022.
17 Article 46 of the Criminal Procedure Law, while saying that no conviction must be made solely 
on the basis of the defendant’s statement (confession), but this provision, which aims to reduce 
the use of torture to elicit confessions, is of little significance in criminal practice.
18 The extent of the problem of torture is further illustrated by what some authorities and 
individuals do to reduce its use. Indeed, a People’s Procuracy in Fushun City in Liaoning 
Province attempted to stop it by an internal directive ordering its officials (procurators) that any 
statements obtained from suspects in police detention ‘should be entirely disregarded’ (shi zhi wei 
ling, Only the knowledge that torture was inflicted routinely could justify such a 
measure. For the report on this see Liu Jinyou (^(Jife^), ‘The right to silence, the value of 
defendants’ or suspects’ statements and “zero confession” (Chenmoquan, kougong jiazhi yu “ling 
kougong", “# □ # £ ”)’, published by China Legal Daily. 10 February 2002, 
at http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/gb/content/2002-02/10/content_31946.htm
174
Importantly, there is not only a great perceived need to obtain a confession 
to prove someone guilty. There is also resentment toward persons whose guilt is 
strongly suggested by evidence but who maintain their innocence: they, too, still 
have to be brought to confess, or ‘confess’. In recent years, there have been 
several newspaper reports on the phenomenon of guilty verdicts ‘with zero 
confession’.19 The news value of such cases illustrated how unusual they still 
were. This particular and distinctive motif for torture indicates that again, (public) 
recognition by the individual at the centre of a legal dispute, of its central facts, is 
considered to be of the highest importance for a ‘resolution’.
If we can now observe a change of attitude about torture, it is concurrent 
with changes in conception of the relationship between truth and law. In any legal 
procedure, we may take it, one seeks to approximate knowledge of the relevant 
facts; but beyond this, value is seen in achieving a shared understanding or 
perception of the truth. Rarely, too, can it be the case in China that someone is 
tortured to see if they are not, after all, innocent, although such a proceeding is of 
course imaginable, for instance in the context of medieval ordeals. Torture is 
normally premised on an assumption of the torturer’s having ‘got it right,’ that is, 
of having got hold of the right suspect already. Consider, in this context, a police 
officer’s description of what happens when officials are in the habit of practicing 
torture:
Amnesty International claims that in December 2003 there were 460 deaths and 117 cases of 
serious injury caused by "abuse of power and dereliction of duty" by law enforcement officials 
during the first 10 months of 2003.’ Ibid. sub 3.1.
The vice president of the National People’s Procuracy, Gu Chunwang (W # E ) , put the 
number of public servants prosecuted because they ‘imposed illegal detention, practiced torture, 
disrupted [political] elections, or in other ways infringed the right to personal integrity or the 
political rights of citizens’ in 2003 at 1408. BBC (Chinese version), Chinese courts cooperate in 
the protection of private property (Zhongguo fayuan peihe baohu siyouchanquan, 4 1 o'
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/chinese/news/newsid_3498000/34984041 .stm 
19 (ling kougong W- P  (ft).
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‘Legal interrogation of criminal suspects is an important part of criminal 
investigation. [But] in practice there are a few officers who, when 
handling cases, overindulge in a sense of special powers, and who apply 
the law with a notion of “The law, that’s me,” or ‘The law enforcement 
officer, that’s me”.’20
It is not surprising, given this background, that Chinese courts should have to 
struggle hard to be ‘allowed’ to state a suspicion of torture having taken place in 
a court decision, and that reportedly even courts themselves may use torture in 
the process of criminal adjudication.~ The judgement in last instance by the 
Liaoning Province Court on Liu Yong's Case in 2003 was resented, because it 
said explicitly that ‘the possibility of the defendant having been tortured by 
public security organs to extort a confession could not be excluded.’22 This was 
thought to be a daring thing on the part of a court to do. It was also thought that 
this might set an example for other courts.23
The protection o f rights in administrative or civil procedure. In the case of old 
Mr Yuan above, after obtaining an order in the course of administrative 
reconsideration, the family discovered that the authorities ordered to pay damages
20 Zhang Yansheng a police officer in a district of Changde City in Hunan province, in
a contribution to ‘Legal System online: torture (Fazhi zai xian: xingxun bigong, IPJvR
ill {ft )’, Renminwang, 22 October 2003, at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/15157/214 
6427 .html031022.
211 elaborate on this case in chapter nine, where I discuss the role of criminal defence lawyers.
22 See Lin Chufang ), ‘Sentenced to death in first instance but escaped with his life in
second instance -  an investigation into the overturning of the verdict in Liu Yong’s case (Yi shen 
pan sixing ershen taochu shengtian, liu yong an gaipan diaocha, —
k  28 August 2003,
Renminwang website at http://www.people.com.cn/GB/shehui/1063/2041979.html.
23 In an interview with Chen Guangzhong of Beijing’s University of Politics and Law he stated: 
‘That the court dared to mention “that we cannot rule out the possibility of torture;” (...) to dare 
write this [into a court judgement] is in my opinion a good sign; it is an expression of the spirit of 
the rule of law.’ Interview ‘Special visit paid to the vice president of China’s Legal Academic’s 
Society Chen Guangzhong: the conversion into suspended death sentence was an expression of 
the spirit of the rule of law, (Zhuanfang Zhongguo faxuehui fuhuizhang Chen Guangzhong: 
gaipan sihuan tixianle fazhi jingsheng, H fp
)’, 24 December 2003, available at http://www.law-thinker.com/detail.asp7id::1900. 
Emphases added.
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were unwilling to do so. In April 2001, therefore, they filed an application for 
administrative litigation with the Futian District Court (of Shenzhen], against the 
branch police station and the Shenzhen City internment and deportation station, 
for a declaration that the administrative measure against Mr Yuan had been 
illegal and an order to pay damages, including compensation for psychiatric 
damage.24 The first instance decision rejected the complaint. The only piece of 
legislation it cited were the (regional, not national) Regulations for the Handling
25o f Temporary Residence Permits in the Special Economic Zone o f Shenzhen, 
and applying these, the court found that there were no specific provisions 
regarding the age of those to be arrested for not being able to produce a 
temporary residence permit, etc. Article 45 of the Regulations said that those 
without the required documents were to be handed over to the authority under the 
Department of Civil Affairs, and deported from the Special Economic Zone. 
Since Mr Yuan did not have his temporary residence card with him at the time of 
his arrest, and since there was no explicit exception for the elderly from 
internment and deportation measures, the court thought there had been no 
technical mistake. This decision, so far as we know, did not consider whether the 
Shenzhen rules just quoted contravened higher ranking law or if there had been 
an unlawful use of administrative discretion.26 According to the newspaper report 
available on the case, there is no indication that the decision considered the 
wrong entry into the station’s register and the way this made it more difficult for 
Mr Yuan’s family to trace him. The court judgement at first instance, thus even 
went back on the outcome of the reconsideration procedure (although as we saw,
24 More literally, ‘mental loss’, jingshen sunshi
25 Shenzhen jingji tequ zhanzhu renyuan hukou guanli tiaoli, P f f S
26 See Article 54 (2) of the Administrative Litigation Law.
Ill
the decision made in the course of that reconsideration procedure had not been 
respected and not been carried out).
The second instance decision by the Shenzhen City Intermediate Court, was 
made on 24 June 2003, just a few days after the trial in the Sun Zhigang murder 
case, and in the context of widespread indignation about the internment and 
deportation system (so far as it applied to ‘vagrants’). The second instance court 
found that the internment of Mr Yuan had been illegal, and awarded damages for 
expenses incurred by the family in the course of administrative litigation, but no 
compensation for psychiatric damages.
‘Ms Wang [the daughter] said yesterday evening that even if the court had 
not supported Yuan Wen’s claim for compensation for psychiatric 
damages, it was enough for them that it had decided that the 
administrative acts of the two defendants were illegal. “We are not after 
so and so much compensation; the main thing is for government to give an 
apology [gongdao].”’27
In a case adjudicated ten years earlier, the plaintiff had been less fortunate. So far 
the only case, apparently, of litigation against a state authority for wrongful 
internment to have made it into a published casebook of Exemplary Decisions in
■JQ
Administrative Litigation, is the case of a man named Li Caokang. In the early 
morning of 17 April 1993 he was picked up by a police officer of the Shanghai 
City Yuyuanlu branch police station, and taken to an internment and deportation 
station. He was carrying his identity card with him. According to the facts as
27 The expression she uses contains the word gongdao, already discussed in chapter two: zhuyao 
shi zhengfu yao gei ge gongdao
28 Jiang Yong ( MM,  editor), Exemplary administrative litigation cases (Diarvcing xingzheng 
susong anli, Beijing: 2000). Note that the word for ‘exemplary’, ‘dianxing
does not always connote ‘good’. But see the account of the specific comment on this case in the 
main text. The decision was published online at http://www. law999.net/casefocus/doc/ 
XIZH/2003/00000076.html.
178
ascertained by the court,29 he told the policeman that he was out of work and had 
no relatives in Shanghai, he himself having come from Nantong to Shanghai by 
ferry, as his ferry ticket corroborated. Because he had not found work and also 
had no relatives or friends in Shanghai, he had slept that night rough in the street. 
In accordance with the Shanghai Regulations fo r  the Handling o f Internment and 
Deportation, he was interned. The internment station contacted the local 
government of the place of Li’s household registration, asking Li’s relatives to 
come to Shanghai to fetch him home. Li Caokang, according to the court’s 
summary report of the facts, turned out to be ‘very weak’ during the period of his 
internment; he ‘would not eat.’ The court decision states that he was taken to a 
clinic twice, where the doctors failed to discover anything the matter with him. 
On 20 April, he was taken to the accident and emergency department of a 
Shanghai municipal hospital, where they could not discover any illness.
But on the morning of 21 April, Li Caokang was found dead in his room. 
According to the hospital’s report as referred to later by the court, the staff of the 
internment station ‘inferred that he had died of “a slow consumption”.’ ‘When 
they tidied his room, they found’ Li’s work permit, certifying that he had actually 
been employed as a construction worker with a Shanghai company. The court 
report does not explain why this work permit was only ‘found’ after his death, 
when such a document ought to have helped Li to oppose the internment 
measure. Nor does it mention whether Li Caokang also had a temporary 
residence permit, and/or whether such a permit was also found among his things.
29 See Wang Zhenmin Casebook on Constitutional Law, Tsinghua University Law
School (Zhongguo xianfa anli jiaocheng, Qinghua Daxue faxueyuan, Beijing 2002 nian ba yue, 4 1 
WM. » . j bM,  2002 ^  8 unpublished, Beijing: August
2002) at p. 121.
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Li Caokang’s father Li Caofu filed an application for administrative 
reconsideration with the Civil Affairs Bureau (the bureau in charge of internment 
and deportation stations), asking for an annulment of the ‘specific administrative 
act’ of internment against his son. This was declined and so he filed a lawsuit 
against the internment and deportation station, [also?] demanding compensation. 
He said that his son should not have been interned, and that the station had failed 
to take appropriate action to help Li Caokang in his illness, and thereby hastened 
his death.
The court held that the police branch station had correctly come to the 
conclusion that Li Caokang was jobless and homeless and vagrant. This had been 
evidenced, it thought, by Li’s own statement and ‘relevant documents’, and 
therefore to impose an internment measure ‘was in accordance with the 
Directives fo r  Internment and Deportation o f Urban Vagrants and Beggars and 
the Shanghai Regulations fo r  the Handling o f Internment and Deportation. There 
had been no mismanagement. The correct law had been applied, the station had 
provided adequate medical care and had informed Li’s family in a timely manner, 
and in accordance with law, the measure must be upheld.’ There was no legal 
basis, the court decided, for the request for compensation. But remarkably, ‘in 
order to demonstrate the government’s concern,’ the station had in the course of 
the adjudication procedure ‘voluntarily undertaken’ to make an ‘aid’ payment to 
Li Caofu, in the amount of 1000 Yuan. Citing Article 2, subsection 3, of the 
Directives , Article 7, subsection 2 of the Shanghai Regulations and ‘the relevant 
provisions’ of Article 54, subsection 2 of the Administrative Litigation Law, the 
court rejected Li Caofu’s application, upheld the specific administrative act, and
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stated that the internment station had ‘voluntarily’ undertaken to pay 1000 Yuan 
to Li Caofu.
A commentary by a ‘legal expert' on this case praises the decision, saying 
that the administrative act was in accordance with the ‘substantive law’, that there 
had been no procedural mistake and that the specific administrative act had been 
decided, communicated and served in an unobjectionable manner. Indeed, 
invoking the important standards, or requirements, already discussed in the 
context of mediation, the commentator praises the conduct of the station as 
‘having a basis in law, and according with feeling and reason.’30 Doubtless, this 
positive appraisal is also the reason why the decision came to be included in a 
collection of ‘exemplary’ cases. The application of the law alone was perceived 
as too harsh and so it was ‘tempered’ by feeling and reason.
Comparing Li Caokang’s case described just now with Yuan Wen’s case, 
we can get a sense of some development in administrative litigation practice in 
China. Presumably, formal ‘justifications’ for administrative measures, which are 
flawed in substance, are now less readily accepted by courts. But great difficulties 
remain. With the creation of the administrative litigation law certain -  not all - 
so-called specific administrative acts were subjected to judicial review in China. 
The Administrative Litigation Law has not, however, provided any remedies 
against laws and ‘abstract administrative acts’; that is, administrative legislation 
according to the Legislation Law. It is not effective, either, against much of the
30 To quote from the original: ‘Qiansongzhan juci zuochu dui qi skourong qiansong de juti 
xingzheng xingwei, shi yu fa  you ju  de, heqing heli
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'legislation' occurring in the shape of various ‘normative documents' produced 
by the administration.31
The purpose of administrative litigation from the point of view of the 
citizen is to obtain an annulment or partial annulment of an administrative act, 
and possibly also to obtain compensation (compare Articles 54 and 67 
Administrative Litigation Law). But such remedies are not available against all 
specific administrative acts against which, according to the abstract definition 
presented above, they could be made available. Remedies are available only in 
cases enumerated -  non-exhaustively - in Article eleven of the Administrative 
Litigation Law. Most importantly in the context of internment, specific 
administrative acts restricting one’s right to personal freedom and to property are 
subjected to judicial review.32
We have to understand two kinds of restriction in the review of 
administrative acts in the context of administrative litigation: of the extent to 
which review can be undertaken (only specific acts), as well as of the kinds of 
specific administrative acts and rights violations that can be subjected to review. 
(One act may affect or restrict a number of different rights.) Even if certain 
administrative acts cannot become the subject of administrative litigation, they 
may still become the subject of civil litigation.33 This makes it more difficult to
31 See Luo Haocai, ibid. chapter 4 (pp. 97 ff.) on ‘abstract administrative acts’. See also above in 
the main text, on the few ‘abstract administrative acts’ subjected to administrative 
reconsideration.
32 Note restrictions on the procedural admissibility to administrative litigation by the Supreme 
People’s Court’s judicial ‘Interpretation on problems relating to the application of the 
Administrative Litigation Law (Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu zhixing xingshi susongfa ruogan 
wenti de jieshi, Mil !$ $ ¥ # )’, Judicial interpretation
2000 no. 8. Cp. Wang Zhenmin’s Casebook p. 31.
33 In some continental European jurisdictions the distinction between ‘public individual rights’ 
and rights in civil relationships is considered to dictate a difference in appropriate court 
procedures for their protection.And even to require different courts.
There is an ongoing discussion about creating special administrative courts in China. See Wu 
Nan (3£}$j), ‘The courts should set up internal administrative courts (Fayuan neibu ying sheli
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understand the use of a distinction between administrative and civil litigation in 
the first place.34 - In civil litigation, we observe that courts allow themselves 
considerable freedom in ‘accepting’ cases ‘for handling’ -  or not, sometimes for 
reasons to be discussed in Chapter Eight in reference to the position of courts vis- 
&-vis other political powers.
The scope of laws which according to the Administrative Litigation Law 
should be used by the courts, is also restricted. It is defined in its Articles 52 to 
53. Without making specific reference to the Constitution, it includes the laws 
and ministry and provincial level administrative regulations made in accordance 
with the Legislation Law. Besides ‘application’ of these, the law allows the ‘use 
for reference’ of further administrative regulations at lower levels according to 
Article 53. There is no clear direction in the legislation as to how the difference 
between ‘application’ and ‘use for reference’ should be understood. In the above 
case of Li Caokang, both the Directives and the Shanghai City Regulations on 
internment, as well as of course the Administrative Litigation Law, are norms 
within the scope defined by Article 52 Administrative Litigation Law, and were 
cited by the court.
In practice, documents of much less certain legal status will often be used 
and cited as ‘legal basis’ for court decisions, while the only mention made of the 
Constitution in the Administrative Litigation Law is the claim that ‘this law has 
been drafted on the basis of the Constitution’ in Article 1. This is the problem,
xingzheng fayuan, China Legal Daily, 3 July 2003, at http://www.
legaldaily.com.cn/bm/2003-07/03/content_35920.htm.
34 To understand the point of this distinction one might advance that the citizen-state relationship 
demands a presumption of freedom in favour of the citizen, which would not make sense if 
applied to the relationships between private individuals. The state has a different obligation to 
protect freedom of speech or the right to education, say, than private citizens. For a concise 
discussion of this conception of ‘basic rights’ against the state, see Isensee, Josef, ‘Das 
Grundrecht als Abwehrrecht und als staatliche Schutzpflicht’, paragraph 111 in Handbuch des 
Staatsrechts (Heidelberg: 2000). - Where the differences indicated here are not sufficiently 
recognised, there is indeed some danger that protection will be insufficient.
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already encountered in the fifth chapter, of ‘red-headed documents’. According to 
the Supreme People’s Court’s understanding of abstract administrative acts as 
referred to in the Administrative Litigation Law, any administrative command 
(‘document of binding character’) addressed to an indefinite number of persons 
and allowing for multiple application is exempt from court scrutiny as ‘abstract’. 
Unbelievably, this would appear even to include the ‘regulation’ used by the 
Lianyuan internment and deportation centre for setting tariffs for ransom: at least 
as long as one did not adopt a logically circular interpretation of ‘of binding 
character’ in the sense of a substantive examination of whether the document in 
question could have binding character by the standard, say, of rationality or 
legality or justice. As we saw in the last chapter, the new Litigation Law has 
tried, for instance in Article 64, to establish a hierarchy of legal norms and to 
affirm the general principle that a higher-ranking norm supersedes a lower- 
ranking one in cases of inconsistency, but courts are nowhere explicitly 
authorised to take it upon themselves to make assessments of inconsistency.
In an apparent move to assert greater independence, as well as to enable 
more coherent and principled decisions, courts will sometimes choose not to 
apply or ‘use for reference’ certain regulations.35 In rare cases they will even 
make an explicit statement about inconsistency, but in doing so, they take 
personal risks. For instance, in 2003 two judges in Luoyang faced severe
35 One may consider that this practice of non-reference borders on judicial review. See, for 
instance, ‘Case of Zhou Jianjun v Beijing City branch traffic police squad of Chaoyang District 
traffic police (Zhou Jianjun su Beijing Shi gong ’an jiaotong guanliju chaoyang jiaotong zhidui 
jidongdui an, in Wang Zhenmin’s
Casebook, p. 39. In this case the court held that the legal basis for imposing a certain fine should 
have been a higher ranking norm, which prescribed much lower fines.
Courts are in some sense in a Catch 22 situation. If they just do not refer to norms they deem 
illegal (unconstitutional), they can neither really state the full reasons for their judgement, nor 
expect to influence later judicial practice. If they submit the question of illegality to another body, 
they give the decision away -  to someone else who may seem little fit to perform the task of 
review; this raises the question in how far judges can lawfully be asked to make judgements 
which they are convinced violate the Constitution.
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consequences -  initially it was expected at least one of them would be fired, and 
she lost her party membership - for writing into a judgement that a certain local 
regulation contravened a national regulation and therefore could not be applied.36 
Opinions about this case were divided, and many recognised that in practice, this 
may be the only way in which courts can respect their perhaps more important 
obligation to honour the Constitution, or to honour higher-ranking law (for 
reasons discussed at greater length in the next chapter). Yet because how to do so 
is notoriously a matter of great disagreement, this practice, however useful in 
individual cases, does nothing to strengthen the legal system as a whole. The 
problems indicated here -  how to ensure coherence among legal norms and ‘sort 
out’ norms that only purport to be legal, is even more urgent in the context of 
conformity with the Constitution, to which I now turn.
Protection o f ‘constitutional’ rights? Where does the last section’s identification 
of the applicable procedural law in administrative and civil litigation respectively 
leave the argument above, about the unconstitutionality of the internment and 
deportation measures? Where does it leave Wang Xingmao’s, Ma Jiyun’s, Li 
Caokang’s, and others’ constitutional rights to equality and personal freedom? 
We observe that in both actual decisions just discusssed, constitutionality was not 
an issue addressed by the court. But that, of course, does not mean that it might 
not have been; especially given the attention paid to constitutionality problems in 
China in the very recent past.
36 See a discussion of this by Cheng Jie (^ lio ), ‘How to understand court supervision by local 
People’s congresses (Ruhe lijie difang renda dui fayuan de jiandu,
) in the 21st Century Economic Herald (21 ), 5 December 2003, at
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/15157/2230127.html. See also the comprehensive report 
‘Luoyang City “Seed” Case Highlights Chinese Courts’ Lack of Authority to Declare Laws 
Invalid’ (2004) China Law and Governance Review (June issue).
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So far only few Chinese judges dare openly to claim that they are applying 
the Constitution when adjudicating cases, even cases about constitutional rights 
(which, of course, may have been affected by a specific administrative act 
coming under review according to the Administrative Litigation Law). The 
problem is not so much by what procedure certain constitutional rights should be 
protected, as that there appears to be no such procedure at all to the majority of 
Chinese legal practitioners. For instance, to date, it appears that there has been no 
court procedure based on a claim that someone’s freedom of speech was 
infringed by a public authority. A complaint (case) to that effect filed with a 
Chinese court would be likely not to be ‘accepted for adjudication’ (shouli).3s 
The real issue is not a technical one, but rather another required change of 
perspective. There is a genuine dispute -  a dispute sustained by conviction on 
both sides -  as to whether the Chinese Constitution can be interpreted (and 
‘applied’) by Chinese judges.
So now we have to address the already mentioned ‘judicialisation of the 
Constitution’ discussion.39 According to Article 3 of the Constitution the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) ‘supervises’ the administrative, the people’s courts and 
the people’s procuracies, and Article 57 gives the NPC the status of the highest 
organ of state (Article 57). More specifically, the Constitution states in Article 
62 that it has the right to amend the Constitution and to ‘supervise its 
implementation’. The NPC only meets for two weeks a year and is otherwise 
represented by its Standing Committee, which has the task, according to Article 
67 of the Constitution, to ‘interpret and amend’ the Constitution. It is around this
37 By contrast, and a little paradoxically, administrative litigation on the basis of the right to 
personal freedom as mentioned in the Administrative Litigation Law are relatively frequent.




Article that much of the academic discussion revolves.40 Some scholars argue that 
the task of interpreting the Constitution lies exclusively with the NPC and its 
Standing Committee. From this argument several further contentions have arisen: 
that it is not permissible in China to File a lawsuit based on a public authority’s 
infringement of a constitutional right; that courts may not cite the Constitution or 
‘apply’ the Constitution as legal basis of their decisions (unless they are citing 
more specific legislation as well); that courts may not declare legislation, 
including administrative legislation, unconstitutional.
The mere text of the Constitution does not settle this matter, for one thing, 
because it does not expressly exclude the possibility that courts may also interpret 
the Constitution. Apart from this, it is difficult to make even basic sense of the 
Constitution as one -  or indeed ‘the highest’ - law in the land, if courts of law 
must not ‘interpret’ it at all. This is as bad as saying they must ignore it. Even in 
systems which reserve the task of constitutional review, for instance, to a special 
institution such as a constitutional court, it is of course not forbidden to other 
courts, but instead required of them, to interpret the Constitution, for instance 
because only such interpretation allows them to decide whether they should 
submit some specific legislation which they consider unconstitutional, for
40 See for a summary account of the opposing view, as well as few a discussion of Article 67, Zhou 
Wei (editor, Study on the Judicial Protection o f Constitutional Rights (Xianfa jihen quanli
sifa jiuji yanjiu, Beijing: 2003), pp. 118, especially pp. 128 ff. The
authors make the important point that it is nowhere explicitly mentioned in the Constitution that 
the judicial organs (including procuracy) are directly bound by the Constitution, at p. 129. Their 
overall argument is that there is no way the judges could ignore the Constitution; similar to the 
argument here. Interestingly, their argument includes a reference to the Criminal Code’s Article 
54, which prescribes that while ‘political freedoms’ including (!) the right to free speech could be 
taken away as punishment, at least it is clear that only courts can do so.
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constitutional review to the court or committee specially entrusted with this task, 
and to formulate a resolution to this effect.41
But courts in China are not like courts in Western countries, in many 
ways,42 and the discussion about what they can and should do, too, is quite 
different from the discussions led in Western countries. The institution of the so- 
called ‘judicial interpretation’ reflects some Chinese peculiarities, as do the 
various documents binding lower courts issued by the Supreme People’s Court.43 
Judicial interpretations in a narrower sense44 take the outward shape of codes 
accompanying People’s Congresses’ legislation, and providing guidance for their 
interpretation; these interpretations are often provided almost immediately after 
promulgation of a new law, and do not arise from specific cases or decisions. 
They look just like laws, only that each article of a judicial interpretation 
typically refers to (‘interprets’) the article of a law in the technical sense of this 
term. There are also so-called responses issued by the Court, and sometimes 
published, on specific questions submitted to it from lower courts deciding 
specific cases; these, too, are published and circulated among the courts. In a 
wider sense, all these kinds of document can be referred to as judicial 
interpretation.
41 Article 100 of the German Basic Law and the corresponding articles of the BverfGG (the 
Organic Law of the Federal Constitutional Court) constitute an example of this obvious 
requirement.
42 As I argued in chapter one, this is no reason not to talk about ‘courts’.
43 See Lubman, Bird in a Cage (Stanford: 1999), p. 283 for an overview of the forms these 
documents take. For a brief summary of the history of judicial interpretations, see Huang 
Songyou in ‘The judicialisation of the Constitution and what it means -  a discussion proceeding 
from the Supreme People’s court’s “approving response” today (Xianfa sifahu jiqi yiyi - cong 
zuigao renmin fayuan jintian de yige “pifu” tanqi, AK/iK 
A A M — 13 August 2001, available at http://www.gongfa.com/huangsy xianfa 
sifahua.htm.
44 Sifa jieshi ( ^ '/£&?#); another variety also published in the Supreme People’s Court’s official 
Gazette is called yijian (M RL).
45 The Chinese terms are pifu (ttfcS), fuhan (jlill) and dafu (I^ Jt) -  these, too, are (often) 
published and used by courts in a way similar to that of the judicial interpretations. Lubman 
discusses them ibid (note 43).
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There are three ‘responses' (judicial interpretations in a wider sense) by the 
Supreme People's Court on the question if the Constitution can be used as ‘basis’ 
for court decisions. The earliest one of 1955 held that the Constitution could not 
be used as a basis for arguments attributing criminal responsibility.46 The 1986 
one is widely considered to have excluded the Constitution from the body of laws 
and regulations that can be cited in court judgements: but whether it has, is 
nevertheless a matter of debate. Note the language used in the 1986 response 
about the scope of law applicable by the People’s Courts.
‘The People’s Courts in their adjudication of civil and economic cases 
according to the law can, when composing written court judgements, cite 
all laws made by the NPC and its Standing Committee. The People’s 
Courts may moreover cite all local regulations made by provincial or 
directly administered cities’ People’s Congresses and Standing Committee, 
autonomous regulations and separate regulations made as required by 
local conditions, which are in not in contravention o f the Constitution or 
o f laws or administrative regulations, if the parties to the dispute both 
belong to the administrative territory in question....’47
Contrary to what seems to be the mainstream interpretation, in this pre- 
Administrative Litigation Law response, the Supreme People’s Court could be 
argued to have implied the power of courts to interpret whether the local norms 
they applied were constitutional.
46 Or in Chinese, ‘Xianfa buyiyinwei lunzui kexing deyiju See 
‘Supreme People’s Court’s Answer regarding the non-application of the Constitution as a basis 
for holding someone criminally responsible or measuring their punishment (Zuigao renmin 
fayuan guanyu zai xingshi panjue zhong bu yi yuanyin xianfa lunzui kexing de yiju de pifu, Jtiifj
), judicial interpretation 
1955, reference number 11298, issued on 30 July 1955. Wang Zhenmin’s Casebook, p. 30.
47 ‘Supreme People’s Court’s Answer regarding the question how the courts when issuing legal 
documents should cite to normative documents (Zuigao renminfayuan guanyurenmin fayuan zai 
zhizjuo falii wenshu ying ruhe yinyongfalii guifanxing wenjian de pifu,
Judicial Interpetation 1986 no 31 of 28 
October 1986, in Wang Zhenmin’s Casebook at p. 30. My emphasis. By contrast, Article 53 the 
1989 Administrative Litigation Law (first paragraph) does not refer to the Constitution.
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In its response in the third case, the Case o f Qi Yuling in 2001,48 the Court 
held that the plaintiffs right to education according to the Constitution had been 
infringed, both by a governmental education bureau and by a private further 
party. Some regarded this as a breakthrough for the protection of constitutional 
rights, invoking Marbury v Madison for a parallel. But there have also been 
voices deploring the low quality of the decision itself.49 In issuing these 
interpretations, the Supreme Court was certainly supplying an interpretation of 
the Chinese Constitution -  whether correct or not -  and it expected lower courts 
to abide by these interpretations. The Qi Yuling decision, in allowing a claim 
based on a right only mentioned in the Constitution to be handled by the court, 
indicates that constitutional rights may play a greater role in adjudication in the 
future; but two issues remain: the claim that constitutional rights in China are not 
justiciable, and that judicial review cannot extend to the review of (administrative 
or People’s Congresses’) legislation. For these claims could be made intelligible 
even when it is admitted that Chinese judges, like anyone else, are allowed to
48 Qi Yuling anjian ).
49 For a discussion of the two earlier judicial interpretations also calling the mainstream 
interpretation into doubt, see Wang Zhenmin ( T.JkK), ‘Can the Chinese Constitution be applied 
in Court? (Shilun zhongguo xianfa kefou jinru susong, at http://
202.99.23.246/wsrmlt/jbzl/wangzhenmin/wzm4.html. In the third case, a student had obtained 
another student’s admission letter for a school leading on to university, and after fulfilling the 
three further preconditions of enrollment (payment of tuition fees, a place at a specific school, and 
an agreement with a future employer), had run through a full course of study and obtained her 
degree and a job based on this degree, under the name of the student whose admission she had 
‘obtained’. Years later, the student deprived of university education sued this person as well as the 
education authority in charge of the admission procedures, for an infringement of her ‘right to her 
name’ and of her ‘right to education’. The right to one’s name is a right protected under the 
General Principles of Civil law, but for the right to education the claimant had to invoke a 
‘constitutional’ right - a right, that is, mentioned in the Constitution but no ordinary law. The 
court adjudicating the case submitted the question if this claim could be based on a constitutional 
right, to the Supreme People’s Court. The Supreme People’s Court replied that the constitutional 
right of the claimant to receive education had been infringed, not only by the education 
authorities, but also by the other student. For a summary and discussion of this case see Huang 
Songyou ‘The judicialisation of the Constitution and what it means -  a discussion
proceeding from the Supreme People’s court’s “approving response” today (Xianfa sifahua jiqi 
yiyi -  cong zuigao renmin fayuan jintian de yige “pifu ” tanqi,  JAMM
available at http://www.law-thinker.com/ show. asp?id=205, 
and for an extract from the judgement itself see Zhou Wei, ibid.(note, 40) p. 161.The finding that a 
private person (the other student) infringed a constitutional right seems peculiar.
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interpret the Constitution, as a precondition, for instance, of respecting it: and 
this, at least, they are quite clearly required to do by Article 3 of the Judges' 
Law.50
As one of the apparently most decided opponents of the Constitution's 
(wholesale) ‘judicialisation', Jiang Shigong seeks to make a case by insisting that 
one should only look at ‘the very text of the Constitution itself.’ 51 One of his 
reproaches against people who admit ‘abstract principles’ into the interpretation 
of that text is that they invariably, he says, look at the American Constitution 
rather than the Chinese one, and draw on the principles of American 
constitutional law to argue that China, too, needs judicial review of legislation 
and litigation based on civil rights. This, we are to conclude, would be ‘un- 
Chinese’. Yet it is difficult to see how an insistence on obeying the ‘very text of 
the Constitution itself could be of real help in the current discussion. As Jiang 
concedes himself, not even contemporary legal positivists would advance that the 
black letters of a law could somehow provide all answers to all constitutional 
questions, without any intermediate process of what is frequently called textual 
analysis.52 To use a simple example, the Chinese Constitution states in Article 16 
that every Chinese citizen has the right as well as the duty to be educated -  but 
educated to what? educated how long? educated by whom? In Article 33 the 
Constitution protects, as already mentioned, the right to equality before the law -
50 This is discussed by Zhou Wei ibid. (note 40) at p. 136.
51 The expression used is xianfa benwen ($E'/£^ 3t). Jiang Shigong ( ? S t ‘Misconceptions 
regarding the judicialisation of the Constitution -  discussion of the self-contradiction in the ideas 
of a national transformation and constitutionalism, proceeding from the self-contradictory 
discourse on the judicialisation of the Constitution, (Xianfa sifahua de “wuqu ” -  cong “xianfa 
sifahua" de huayu beilun kan guojia zhuanxing xianzheng beilun,
)’, 2003, at http://article.chinalawinfo.com/
article/user/article_display.asp?ArticleID=23563.
52 Indeed, legal positivists are ready to concede that there are abstract requirements in many legal 
texts; only, these may be ‘vague’. Jiang describes himself as a ‘traditional legal positivist’, thus 
indicating a distance between himself and contemporary legal positivism.
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but what does this mean in connection with the right to education? It seems that 
there is no way these questions could be answered without giving some further 
thought to the matter, beyond reading the ‘very text of the Constitution itself;’ 
there is no way ‘abstract’ ideas (principles) could be kept out of constitutional 
interpretation.53
In this perplexity, the question turns on what abstract and substantive 
principles need to be employed in interpreting the Constitution. This discussion 
should make use of the analysis offered earlier on, regarding supervision- and 
control-oriented approaches to good government. The idea of supervision, along 
with hierarchical control is as strong in the area of judicial activities, as it is in the 
area of administration and legislation. What makes courts different from 
administration and legislation, is that at least there is now widespread recognition 
in China that courts do need some independence, even if the limits of judicial 
independence are much argued about.54 The principle of supervising officials, 
including judges, is to some extent opposed to having courts protect legal rights. 
Chinese adjudication as of today is not possible without first and foremost 
protecting those abstract principles which guide an ultimate judgement on what is 
law, and what is not.
Taking my previous discussion of the possibility of ‘universalising’ and of 
creating a ‘public’ context in which to make judgement into account, this is not 
best explained by courts, or individual judges, having some kind of self- 
referential ‘legal’ authority to pronounce what is legally true. Rather, it is because
53 If the author of the above-mentioned essay dwells very much on the fact that the text of the 
Constitution contains contradictory provisions without attempting a suggestion for the resolution 
of such contradictions, this is perhaps because he finds it impossible to get an answer out of the 
black letters (characters) of the ‘text of the Constitution itself.
54 This argument is sometimes underrated by approaches too easily dismissing everything not 
immediately furthering rights-oriented adjudication, and not clearly modelled on the examples 
offered by Western court systems, as ‘corrupt’ or ‘abnormal’ - as mere transitional irregularities 
to be got rid of soon, and with the seeming necessity of ‘historical development’.
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they are much better placed to make impartial judgements, in all the ways judicial 
independence is traditionally approximated in Western countries.55 Of only 
secondary importance, according to this position, is the fact that courts can also 
build up case practice allowing the further refinement of the principle of treating 
like cases alike, and allowing for transparency.% Only courts can produce 
decisions on the question of legality, including constitutionality. This provides us 
with an argument at least for court adjudication of constitutional-rights-based 
cases. It suggests, too, that courts should be able to engage in some kind of 
review of legislation: at least, it suggests that there should be some procedural 
connection between ordinary adjudication and constitutional review, as there is in 
several continental European jurisdictions with special institutions for 
constitutional review.
The current practice of adjudication in China provides ample evidence of 
courts being influenced and put under pressure in their decision-making process. 
This by itself urges the conclusion that judging rights issues requires 
independence; if there were no courts and no judges to be influenced or 
pressurised, would not the situation be worse? Seen this way, there is nothing 
better for explaining why courts, not People’s Congresses or branches of 
government, should adjudicate constitutional rights issues, than looking to see 
how badly Chinese courts work in their present condition of dependency on and 
exposition to pressure from various institutions, as the next chapter does.
55 At a more concrete level, in accordance with the Administrative Reconsideration Law, an 
administrative authority will not only consider the question if someone’s right was infringed. It 
will examine the appropriateness as well as the ‘legality’ of the decision. In this context that 
whether an administrative decision should be altered cm - annulled, does not hinge on whether it has 
infringed a right.
56 He Weifang draws attention to this, He Weifang (ItSUv'j), ‘Building up a transparent court 
(Jianshe touming fayuan, Southern Weekend /«3^), 24 August 2003. I
think his argument here unnecessarily dismisses the requirement few judges honestly to employ 
their own convictions about justice and reasonableness.
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Chapter Eight Rights protection and judicial strength
Courts. The Constitution provides in Article 126 that the courts enjoy 
independence in adjudicating cases, stating that they are free from interference by 
any administrative authority, organisation in society, or individual.1 But the 
Constitution also says that of all state organs, the People’s Congresses are at the 
top, above the respective state organs at corresponding level. In practice, not only 
the People’s Congresses but also the Communist Party, branches of government, 
and the People’s Procuracies exercise influence on judicial decisions. This 
chapter considers the resulting conflict between judicial supervision on the one 
hand, and judicial independence and strength on the other. It is argued that rights 
protection requires a disciplined practice of public disagreement in courts as well 
as strong judges who can make final decisions. For an appropriate understanding 
of finality we must turn again to jurisprudence, as we also have to, in order to 
understand the status of disagreement, in the following chapter. In the present 
context, this amounts to a discussion of the impact of different kinds of 
procedures: namely, procedures for the supervision of courts and judges, 
procedures for the influencing of decisions to be made, and procedures for the 
reversing of judicial decisions. All these procedures relate to the idea of finality 
of court judgements. Finality of legal decisions is grounded on the assumptions 
both that judges should ‘get it right’ and that they can ‘get it wrong.’ Attributing 
finality to court decisions disciplines disagreement by requiring respect for the 
judicial decision which, although such respect accords formally to any judicial 
decision regardless of its content, should increase the more persuasive it is.
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As has already been mentioned, the People's Congresses are involved in the 
election and/or appointment of judges. The courts do not only have to submit 
annual reports to the People’s Congresses.2 They should also accept and answer 
queries regarding their adjudication work. Further, the members of the Standing 
Committees of the People’s Congresses routinely ‘visit and examine’3 the courts, 
during which visits the person responsible for the matter under examination is 
expected to make a report, and ‘conscientiously to listen to the criticisms, 
suggestions and views proffered by the representatives, and make alterations and 
supply explanations accordingly, based on the principle of ‘seeking truth from 
facts.’ The courts are expected to co-operate with the People’s Congresses in 
matters arising from the work of their letters and complaints offices,4 complying 
with ‘correct’ suggestions from the People’s Congress, and explaining when and 
why they do not comply with suggestions that would ‘not be in accordance with 
the facts or the law’ - by contrast, in Western countries, it is supposed to be the 
work of the court, or the individual judge, to establish what the facts and the law 
are. Most importantly perhaps, the court will also receive ‘supervision’ regarding 
specific cases at hand, and is required, even in the context of specific cases, to 
arrange meetings with representatives from the People’s Congresses if necessary, 
and justify its proceeding in a certain manner.5 The suggestions regarding specific
1 The Judges Law says in Article 7 that judges (not just courts) are not to be interfered with by 
these entities in their ‘adjudication of cases according to the law.’
2 The way in which individual courts’ responsibility to the National People’s Congress moreover 
bears on court practice can be inferred few instance from the Supreme People’s Court’s 1998 
‘Notice on the Supreme People’s Court’s Views on People’s Courts receiving People’s 
Congresses’ and their Standing Committees’ supervision (Zuigao renmin fayuan guanyu renmin 
fayuan jieshou renmin daibiao dahui jiqi changweiyuanhui jiandu de ruogan yijian de tongzhi, M
reprinted in the Judges’ Law and complementary provisions (Faguanfa jiqi peitao guiding, 'g 
Beijing: 2001).
3 Shicha ($£#?)•
4 According to Article 9 of the Notice.
5 Article 5 of the Notes.
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cases should be ‘examined according to the procedure determined by law’ and 
that (only) ‘answers' should be provided to the suggestions submitted by 
members of the People's Congresses. The further problem of ‘supervision of 
individual cases’6 is addressed below.
Significant further pressure, though not of a kind officially required or 
recognised, comes from the financial administration. For any money they spend, 
for instance on salaries, courtrooms, etc., the courts depend directly on the 
financial departments of the governments at corresponding level. 7 This 
circumstance is considered to be one of the major factors leading to what is called 
‘local protectionism’ -  a bias on the part of courts in favour of local parties to 
disputes they adjudicate. He Weifang describes the dilemma judges can find 
themselves in.
‘Even if ostensibly we will not practice local protectionism, I must say, as 
a lowest level court president or even a court president at provincial level 
-  how can one not practice local protectionism? The clothing, feeding, 
housing, transport, social security of a few hundred people [working] in a 
court all weigh on the court president’s shoulders; if the leadership, 
including the leadership in the administration, the Party, and the People’s 
Congress, think that a judgement favourable to the interests of a local 
party should be made, then in my eyes it is [not only] very difficult to go 
against that, [but] indeed he also shouldn’t go against it. Because the 
current system provides that your welfare, your economic existence is in 
the hands of another.,H
Besides the People’s Congresses and financial administration, the probably most 
powerful institutions exercising pressure on the courts (or individual judges) are
6 The term for this is ge’an jiandu
7 Courts, at least up until recently, were also allowed to retain part of the litigation fees which they 
collected. This sometimes aggravated the phenomenon of ‘local protectionism’, because lower 
level courts might be eager to get permission to adjudicate (would adjudicate) cases for which a 
higher level court had jurisdiction, in order to get at a share of the fee. Compare Article 23 of the 
Administrative Litigation Law about changing the level at which a case is adjudicated.
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the so-called Political and Legal Committees of the Communist Party. They 
concern themselves with setting up and enforcing guidelines for the work of party 
members in politics- and law-related areas.9 Their original function is to co­
ordinate the work of the police, procuracies, and courts.10 The Committees are 
involved in the work of the court through no formal procedure at all, but they 
have great influence. It is normal for the president of a court to be a vice 
president (or president) in the Political and Legal Committee; in this double 
function he will anyway be likely to ‘transmit’ the views of the party into the 
adjudicative process.11 In a manner similar to that of the representatives from 
People’s Congresses, the Political and Legal Committees will demand specific 
decisions in certain cases. Their interference is widely considered to be restricted 
to cases held to be of particular significance.12 The Political and Legal Committee 
at national level was rumoured to have interfered after the first ‘last instance’ 
decision on the mafia boss Liu Yong, for instance.
Besides ways of influencing decisions to be made by courts, there are also 
many ways in which court decisions were subjected to challenges and revision. 
The Chinese court system is a three-tier one, and second instance decisions are
8 He Weifang ($5 11 Jj), ‘Eight great difficulties with judicial reform (Sifa gaige de ba da nanti, 
s] i k A  ) V A M  ), 2001, posted 30 April 2003 at http://www.legaltheory.com.cn/info.asp? 
id=3444.
9 For a typical report see ‘Central Political and Legal Committee emphasises need further to build 
up the Legal and Political [committee] contingent’, dealing with the enforcement of measures 
against conduct ‘contrary to [party] discipline or contrary to law’ (Zhongyang zhengfawei tongzhi 
qiangdiao: yao jin yi bu jiaqiang zhengfa duiwu jianshe,
/£ P A ) Sinolaw of 15 July 2003 at http://www.law.gov.cn/news/jryw/jryw/ 715200 
391018.htm.
10 Which during the Cultural Revolution were effectively merged into one organisation.
11 Often, the president of the Political and Legal Committee is the president of the Police Bureau, 
and the two vice presidents are the presidents of the People’s Procuracy and People’s Court 
respectively.
12 In Chinese, zhongda anjian There is no legislation or other official document that
could serve as ‘basis’ for this practice, but it is entrenched.
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‘final’.13 The chance of a second instance procedure is increased by the fact that 
the People's Procuracies as one branch of the organs of ‘administration of 
justice*14 are entitled to ‘appeal’, not only in cases of criminal trials where they 
are the prosecuting authority, but also in civil and administrative litigation 
(kangsu)15 (Article 69 Administrative Litigation Law).]b
Apart from this mechanism of appeal by the People’s Procuracies, it is also 
possible to apply to a higher level court to institute a new court procedure or re­
trial (zaishen, 17 see for instance Article 63 Administrative Reconsideration Law). 
In the context of administrative litigation, a new court procedure can be instituted, 
simply, when ‘a mistake has been made in the application of the law or 
regulations:’ in other words, any wrong ‘final’ court decision may be subjected to 
reconsideration in the context of a new court procedure, by decision either of the 
judicial committee of the same court, or of a higher ranking court, according to 
Article 63 of the Administrative Litigation Law.
Neither according to the law just cited, nor in court practice do there appear 
to be further restrictions, beyond time limitations. A Guide to Application fo r  Re­
trial issued by the Chengdu City Intermediate Court says that the application for 
re-trial must occur within two years of the original judgement becoming 
binding.18 There is not, apparently, any provision exempting such cases from the 
re-trial procedure, in which altering the judgement would frustrate legitimate
13 Notwithstanding problems with the finality of court decisions.
14 Sifa jiguan, W]
15 In Chinese, kangsu (J/Ci/F).
16 The ‘procuracy’ in Russia and in the former Soviet Union had a similar function. For a 
discussion see Yang Lixin “ Procuratorial Supervision over Civil and Administration
Procedures and Judicial Justice (Minshi xingzheng susong jiancha jiandu yu sifa gongzheng,
(2000) Faxue Yanjiu vol. 4 p. 45.
17 Zaishen (#$).
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expectations of legal certainty on the part of citizens, especially the parties of the 
case. Therefore, while in one sense the re-trial mechanism may help to protect 
rights; to restore justice, it can also endanger it. The purpose of re-trial at least in 
cases in which a legitimate expectation of having reached a final decision is 
disappointed, can only be correctness ‘for correctness’s sake;’ it cannot be the 
protection of legal rights.19
Complementing appeals and (application for) retrial, there is a further, 
broader application mechanism which can be addressed either to the People’s 
Procuracy or to a higher level court. People can apply to these institutions so that 
they initiate a retrial, by filing a different kind of ‘appeal’ (shensu).20 It is hardly 
necessary to mention that there may also be petitions or letters written to other 
authorities, such as the People’s Congress, which are originally not directly 
involved in the court procedure, but which as we have seen, have considerable 
influence on the courts, for instance in the context of ‘supervision of individual 
cases’.21 Two Henan local court judges writing about the special problem of 
shangfang, letters and complaints visits, to the courts, could not be more 
vociferous about this phenomenon at the present time. Their main observation is 
that at present letters and complaints visits paid to courts, often ‘making use of 
public holidays’ or of ‘coming in groups’, are aimed at ‘overturning legally 
effective decisions’ of the courts, and that because of the form of letters and 
complaints visits, the principle on which these complaints are dealt with is to 
handle those that complain most vociferously, but not others. This, they conclude,
18 Chengdu City Intermediate Court, ‘Guide to Litigation - How to Apply for a re-trial (Susong 
zhinanzhishi - shenqing zaishen, obtained on 8 September 2003. 
No reference is made to the legal basis of this limitation.
19 In Chinese, a frequently used expression for this is jiuzheng cuowu jEIhi|=).
20 Shensu (^  i/f).
21 Such petitions should be called shenqing (f^in).
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is unbearable, even though they readily concede that citizens have a right to 
complain through the letters and complaints procedure.22
Because of the large number of mechanisms available for reconsidering a 
final judgement, court decisions in China lack the certainty which an entrenched 
principle of finality could provide. This lessens the weight of an individual 
court’s judgement. The fact that a judgement was wrong, will easily trigger re­
trials, even in the case of a ‘final’ judgement, in the supposed effort to ensure just 
(correct) results. The many possibilities of re-opening a trial or litigation can 
counteract efforts ‘strictly’ to ensure that the law is applied in the right way, 
when these mechanisms are abused to circumvent the law. But even though some 
bad effects of the extensive use of re-trial mechanisms, and of interference with 
the work of courts, are obvious, it is not so clear, especially not to those involved 
in actual court cases, what precisely is wrong about such interference or re-trials, 
at least in those cases in which they genuinely have the aim of correcting 
mistakes. This is all the more important in the context of real power hierarchies 
apparently set up by the constitution itself, especially the supposed supremacy of 
People’s Congresses.
It is important to appreciate that we are here faced with a real choice: 
arranging for court decisions to be final of course means to accept that there can 
be wrong final decisions; arranging for rights issues to be argued controversially 
means to accept sustained disagreement, that will in many situations leave one 
party (at least) with the feeling that the final decision was wrong. But the choice
22 Ding Xiuzhi, Zhang Zhiwei ‘Our view on perfecting the letters and
complaints system in courts (Wanshan fayuan xinfang zhidu zhiwojian, tu
, 31 March 2004, at http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=
109647.
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is not between two kinds of commitment: a commitment to protecting rights, and 
a commitment to ensuring right decisions. For protecting rights implies a 
commitment to ensuring right decisions; only the logic of rights also blocks 
wrong decisions from being reconsidered again and again, precisely because the 
perspective of the rights bearers in a dispute has become so important, and 
potentially indefinite reconsideration would violate the right to a right decision, 
even if the actual decision made in a particular, concrete case was wrong: The 
putative (ideal) rightness of the decision to which one has a right, cannot be used 
to weaken or narrow the right to a decision. There are exceptions (as when 
terrible injustice has been done), but these must be principled: there can be no 
general instruction to repeat a court decision procedure, on the mere ground that 
‘the law was applied wrongly.’ Rights-centred adjudication, in short, does not 
allow for endless consideration of what should, all things considered, be done.23
This suggests that if it is based on the idea that final but wrong court 
decisions must be corrected, some of the currently ongoing supervision of courts 
cannot be integral parts of the legal order under the Chinese Constitution. They 
express a view opposed to that of rights protection within contemporary Chinese 
constitutional practice, albeit a view for which one can find some ‘textual basis’ 
(to use a deliberately vague phrase) in the Constitution, and which is expressed in 
the practice supposedly built on the Constitution. Situations where the text of a 
Constitution appears to harbour contradictions, are not infrequent, in any 
constitution; they all the more illustrate the need for constitutional interpretation
23 Several of Nanping Liu’s works have addressed the problem of finality in Chinese court 
practice; see, for instance, his ‘A Vulnerable Justice: Finality of Civil Judgements in China’, 
(2000) 13 Columbia Journal o f Asian Law 35. There he attributes a ‘different concept of finality’ 
to the Chinese, in a move perhaps similar to Clarke’s approach to shenpanyuan discussed in 
Chapter One. Liu also argues that the finality of court judgements is a not really much-discussed
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and the application of constitutional principles; they make clearer that the text of 
a constitution does not by itself tell us what the constitutional law is on a certain 
point. The logic of final court decisions only holds if courts at particular instances 
do, indeed, decide for themselves. Otherwise, there would be no point in having 
several instances in the first place. The assumption underlying this practice 
obviously cannot be that the higher instance court always gets it right:24 why not, 
otherwise, technically abolish lower instances by bringing them up to the level of 
the higher instance? To use Lubman’s phrase, such a set-up would indeed make 
courts resemble administrative institutions, with junior staff handling incoming 
cases but under direction and supervision of their senior superiors. In observing 
as much we have already begun to interpret judicial independence, understood as 
the concept that captures what individual judges are supposed to do when judging 
cases.
Judges. Perhaps, above, we had some hesitation in considering and criticising the 
lack of financial independence of courts in China: for after all, there always will 
be a need for courts to get money from somewhere, without actually imposing 
and collecting taxes themselves, or living entirely on litigation fees they collect.25
issue within China; perhaps this is because of the strength of the attitude which I have here 
characterised as an attitude of supervision, and correcting ‘for correctness’s sake’.
24 This is perhaps an important point to make, given that some of those who now plead, with some 
excellent arguments, for a reduction of external supervision of the courts, insist that ‘there is 
already enough legal [internal] supervision’ of the courts, for ‘if there has been a mistake, the 
second instance court will generally correct it, and if the judgement has already become legally 
effective, then the higher-ranking court can still decide to try it again by the tiqi procedue.’ Han 
Zhe ($115), ‘The dividing line between court independence and the power of the People’s 
Congresses to supervise (Fayuan duli shenpanquan he renda jianduquan de bianjie,
H W fr  20 November 2003 21st Century Herald Tribune (21
http://www. nanfang daily.com.cn/jj/20031120/jd/200311190598.asp
25 It is also of interest to note that the area of commercial law, relatively successful arbitration 
services are by some seen as competitors to courts, taking ‘lucrative’ cases away from them. Class 
on Arbitration Law (f^^c'/S) to European participants of the EU-China Legal and Judicial Co­
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Courts are always in some ways dependent on other institutions. Considering the 
situation of individual judges in China will allow us to turn from a discussion of 
adjudicative finality and institutional judicial independence, to a situation in 
which the question of independence presents itself more clearly, because it can be 
related directly to the requirement of judicial impartiality as a personal virtue. We 
may usefully talk about judicial ‘strength’, as what enables a judge to judge 
impartially, or in a way that respects others as equals, or shows awareness of 
‘alterity’. An individual judge working, say, in a local (lowest level) court, will 
have been appointed, and can be dismissed by the president of the court where he 
works, upon approval of the local People’s Congress to whom appointment 
requests or suggestions have to be submitted (Article eleven of the Judges ' Law). 
The court president himself has been elected by the People’s Congress at 
corresponding level and can be dismissed by it, too. Reasons for dismissing 
judges are mentioned in the Judges' Law; the enumeration includes ‘being 
considered incompetent for the post’ and ‘other circumstances that call for 
removal from the post (Article thirteen).’ Removal of judges is indeed 
comparatively frequent.27 Many judges in China abandon their jobs of their own 
accord, preferring to work as academics or as lawyers. This by itself could be 
read as an indication of how uncomfortable their situation is overall.
operation Programme, June 2003, by Wang Changsheng (EE4£:Efe), on the role of the China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (hereafter, CIETAC).
26 In Wiggins’s terms. See above, Chapter 3.
27 So few instance, in the recent case in the Luoyang City court, already mentioned in Chapter 
Seven. The judge was threatened with removal when she wrote in a judgement that a certain 
regulation on the pricing of seeds was not to be applied, because it contravened the higher ranking 
law made by the NPC’s Standing Committee on the same matter. See Chapter 7 as well as an 
instructive account of this case, ‘Luoyang City “Seed” Case Highlights Chinese Courts’ Lack of 
Authority to Declare Laws Invalid’, (2004) China Law and Governance Review Issue no.4. at 
www.chinareview.info.
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The judge's chief duty, in the words of the Judges' Law, is ‘strictly to 
respect the constitution and the law,’28 and ‘to take facts as the basis, and laws as 
the criterion when trying cases, to handle cases impartially, and not to bend law 
for personal gain’ (Article 7). Article 8 of the Judges' Law stipulates that the 
judges have the ‘right’ that their adjudication of individual cases be not 
‘interfered with’ by administrative authorities, by groups in society or by 
individuals. As we know that the administration and the legislature as well as the 
party do indeed take influence on the way judges decide, even the way they 
decide individual cases, we can only try to understand ‘the court’ as something 
different from ‘the judges', to try and make the rules on judicial supervision and 
on judicial independence cohere. But how far is this possible?
There are arguments for the supervision of individual judges, which to 
many appear to be strong enough arguments to dismiss qualms about personal 
judicial independence. When China began its legal reforms after the Cultural 
Revolution, few judges29 were still left over from before the Cultural Revolution, 
and those that were newly recruited tended to have a poor educational 
background. This problem has been hampering the development of the Chinese 
judiciary over the past twenty years, and it still has not been resolved. Just to 
illustrate, many Chinese judges formerly served in the People’s Liberation Army 
and were transferred to courts as an alternative to being made altogether 
redundant. They received very little legal education. Many Chinese people’s 
reaction to this fact30 is to demand that judges be supervised, controlled, and
28 Article two requires that they loyally ‘carry out’(zhongshi zhixing, the Constitution
and the law (laws).
29 During the Cultural Revolution judges were branded as rightists and suffered persecution, as 
related e.g. in Lubman, Bird in a Cage, at p. 101 and passim.
30 For an interesting recent account of the situation especially of courts in remote places, see Guo 
Guosong lUfflfe), ‘ Remote courts: resources lacking within, rescuing forces lacking without
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improved. There is a lot of talk about the ‘quality' of judges, and many appear to 
blame a lack of ‘quality’ for nearly all the failures of the Chinese judicial 
system.31 This has found expression in a variety of mechanisms and institutions 
for internal supervision of individual judges.
The judicial or adjudication committee32 consists of the court president and 
the presiding judges of the divisions of the court. Individual judges adjudicating a 
case are obligated to submit all ‘major’ cases to the so-called judiciary 
committees set up within every court. The committee is also itself entitled to take 
on cases, and is involved in the re-trial decision e.g. according to Article 62 of the 
Administrative Litigation Law. When it ‘takes on’ a case, this means that the 
committee members look at the file of the case, and discuss what the decision 
should be like. This leads to a situation described in Chinese as ‘those who try, do 
not decide, and those who decide, have not tried the case’.33
In connection with the judicial committees, secondly, it should be 
mentioned that the president of a court, given his power to appoint and dismiss 
(see above), and his function in the judicial committee, is a figure of particular
f
importance for an individual judge, in whose person a lot of power is 
concentrated. In addition to this, some courts today have ‘supervision chambers’
(Bianyuan fayuan: nei que liangcao, wai que jiu bing, )\
Southern Weekend ( f] M ) of 21 August 2003, at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zxn/ 
2003082 l/xw/shxw/200308210924.asp. Incidentally this Article points out a case in which 
(absurdly) the employment of judges in quite remote places, too, is made dependent on the 
applicants’ having the local household registration.
3 Not to say that lack of professionalism is not a serious problem. See e.g. the discussion in 
Peerenboom, China’s Long march Toward the Rule o f Law, pp. 289 ff.
32 Shenpan weiyuanhui !Zl4x).
33 Shen er bu pan, pan er bu shen > ^JWT^). Note that one of the points on the
agendas of the 1848 revolutions in several European countries was that court procedures (trials) 
should be public and oral, and that decisions on merely documentary basis should be abolished.
205
charged with considering judgements by the other chambers alleged to be wrong, 
and ‘research offices’ whose tasks include supervision.34
Imagine a judge tries to resist a suggestion made by the judicial committee, 
and decide a case simply the way he thinks right, regardless of what is suggested 
to him. What does he come up against? The already mentioned pressures have 
been further institutionalised through disciplinary, evaluation and grading 
mechanisms, some of whose main features are outlined in the following. If we 
take up a current edition of the Judges' Law and Complementary Regulations35 
we will find, for instance, that it includes the 1997 Notes on the Publication o f the 
‘Provisional Regulations on the Grading o f Judges', published jointly by the 
Communist Party’s organisational and personnel department and the Supreme 
People’s Court, the 1998 Directives fo r  the Handling o f Violations o f Discipline36 
in Adjudication and complementing these, the Supreme People’s Court’s 1998 
Directives fo r  the Centre Handling Reports on Judges Having Contravened the 
Law or Contravened Professional Discipline, the Supreme People’s Court’s 
1998 Notes on the Publication o f the Trial Version o f the ‘Directives fo r  Holding 
Adjudicators who Adjudicate Unlawfully Responsible', the Supreme People’s 
Court’s 1998 trial version of Directives on Disciplinary Sanctions in Adjudication 
(Trial Version), its 2000 Explanations on Certain Problems o f Determining and 
Fine-tuning the Grading o f Judges', and its 2001 Basic Principles o f Judicial 
Ethics.37 Besides these, some of the provisions of the Judges ’ Law itself are
34 By contrast, the fact that court procedures are not exclusively but frequently handled by panels 
of judges, may be a way of improving rather than hampering just outcomes. The voice of the 
presiding judge on a panel carries the same weight as that of the other judges. Note that in 
administrative litigation , according to Article ten of the Administrative Litigation Law, there are 
only panel decisions.
35 Faguanfa jiqi peitao guiding ( v £ l = r B e i j i n g : 2 0 0 1 ) .
36 Jilii (%^W) can refer to Party and/or professional discipline requirements.
37 These include avoiding undue contact with parties -  and compliance with this requirement, too, 
is supposed to be supervised. In an Article published in June 2003 in Southern Weekend, He
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concerned with evaluating, disciplining and sanctioning judges. The Supreme 
People’s Court in 2003 issued new Rules fo r Strictly Enforcing the Sanctions 
System o f the Judges' Law, 38 and in 2004 there were reports that it was working 
on a new system of ‘financial pledges, penalties and incentives’ to ensure judicial 
integrity. There seems to be a continuous stream of regulations sanctioning 
judicial conduct.
Firstly as to the disciplining and punishment of judges, in Article 32 of the 
Judges Law, reprehensible forms of conduct of judges are listed, and as the eighth 
among these we find ‘the neglect of one’s official duties, if it leads to a wrong[ly 
decided] case, or to significant losses for any of the parties’. Such reprehensible 
conduct is to be met with by sanctions of gradated severity: an official reprimand, 
[the verdict of having committed a] ‘disciplinary offence’ or a ‘great disciplinary 
offence’, down-grading, the suspension from office,40 and dismissal (Article 34). 
The 1998 Supreme People’s Court’s Notes on the publication o f the trial version 
o f the ‘Directions fo r  Holding Adjudicators who Adjudicate Unlawfully 
Responsible’ also refer to ‘wrong decisions’, as decisions in which ‘one has 
intentionally contravened the facts [sic] or the law’, or in which as a consequence
Weifang comments on a new system of supervision introduced recently by a court in Chongqing, 
which involves the spouses of judges based on a ‘responsibility declaration’ to be signed by them. 
The spouses were asked to keep records of whom their partner was meeting with, with whom he 
was eating out, which restaurants he went to, and who paid the bill. They had to repeal at regular 
intervals to the supervision organs of the court, namely, the president of the court and the head of 
the court’s own ‘discipline and investigation group’. If they performed well, they were to be 
praised and [their spouses] given bonuses; if they performed badly, they were to ‘take joint 
responsibility’ [with the judge in question; presumably this means that the judges whose spouse 
has failed would face sanctions]. He Weifang ‘Supervision has arrived at home (Jiandu dao jia le, 
J&lff'JliCT ), Southern Weekend ( ^ ' A Ml A ) of 19 June 2003, at http://www.nanfangdaily. 
com.cn/zm/20030619/xw/shxw/20030619111 l.asp.
38 Cui Li (]iM) Guanyu yange zhixing “zhonghua renmin gongheguo faguanfa” youguan 
chengjie zhidu de ruogan guiding,,
published by the Court 19 June 2003.
39 ‘Supreme People’s Court says that in courts with sufficient [economic] conditions one can run a 
system of financial pledges to ensure [judicial] integrity (Gaofa biaoshi: you tiaojian defayuan ke 
shixing qianzheng baozheng jin zhidu,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-04/09/content_1409209.htm.
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of grave negligence, a wrong judgement has been produced and this leads to a 
‘grave result’.
The reference to intentionally wrong decisions and negligently wrong 
decisions is at best confusing. The point of ‘intentionally wrong’ must be that a 
judge knew that the law was other than he claimed it was, and a ‘negligently 
wrong’ decision must mean that the judge ought to have known that the law was 
different from what he claimed it was -  this seems to be the best sense we can 
impute to these provisions. But on the one hand, it seems that a judge ‘ought to’ 
know anyway what the law is. Or is there an imaginable situation in which we 
could say, ‘the law actually was such and such, but the judge need not know it?’41 
There may, indeed, be contexts in which this formulation can be used to express 
that the judge should -  or shouldn’t - be excused for having erred 42 It may be 
considered negligent of a judge to overlook a statute -  but the important legal 
question in such a case is usually the question whether this made the decision 
wrong, even if the judge was ‘guilty’ of negligence. It would be difficult to say, 
too, that a judge was negligent whenever he opted for the wrong side of a 
disagreement about what the law is. Negligence of the judge is not itself a 
criterion for the incorrectness of a decision, its significance for the parties 
affected by it, or the decision’s significance for how law will be interpreted in 
later instances.43 An intentional mistake of law on the part of a judge may also be 
difficult to distinguish from an ‘honest and sincere’ interpretation of the law
40 The expression used is chezhi (ftllR).
41 The idea of negligence requires a conception of due care.
42 Indeed, in the context of Chinese law especially, with its great number of ever more specific 
and more local regulations of all kinds, judges will perhaps have to be ‘forgiven’ quite often for 
not knowing one or another regulation.
43 Both common law and European ‘continental’ law judicial practice rely very much on this 
function of previous decisions, though using it in different ways.
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which simply differed from the one favoured by those assessing his ‘error’. This 
raises the question who should judge judges, and by what standards.
We have already observed a similar attitude towards mistakes on the part of 
officials, above, in the context of the various forms of administrative supervision. 
This rejects the assumption, implicit in a multiple-tier judiciary system, that any 
judge can get it wrong (see just above).44 It also superimposes a new function on 
the process of adjudication -  by regarding it primarily as a form of official 
conduct whose correctness, like that of administrative measures and decisions, 
has to be ensured ‘for correctness’s sake.’ This is not to deny that individual 
judges require to be judged, sometimes -  when they commit a crime, for instance, 
or indeed when they do grossly counteract the requirements of their office. But in 
order to forestall the abovementioned threats to judicial independence, the 
‘judging of the judging of judges’ -  of the actual process of adjudicating 
individual cases - should occur in a set-up different from personal supervision. 
Trust in the capability of a supervision and disciplining system for an 
improvement of adjudication, is fatally misplaced trust, at least when the aim of 
adjudication is taken to be good judiciary decisions, rather than the education of 
judges for its own sake or a confirmation of the principle that mistakes are 
‘followed up’. This particular take on judicial ‘mistakes’, ‘intentional’ and 
‘negligent misapplication’ of the law is not accidental: it reinforces what has been 
said about the principles operating against effective rights protection through 
final court judgements in the previous section of this chapter, at the level of 
individual officials. Judges who will be punished, effectively, for disagreeing 
with higher-ranking superiors, will be considerably weakened in their sense of
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responsibility for the parties' right to a right decision: their sense of obligation 
will be more toward their superiors (more than is perhaps unavoidable in a 
system of human hierarchies).
Apart from the system for judicial supervision, there are mechanisms for the 
assessment and grading of judges in place, which also weaken the ability of 
judges to work independently. The ‘assessment and approval’ 45 system is 
required according to the Judges' Law, and results in annual work reports on the 
judge. This examination is to be held ‘within the respective court’s structure’ 
(Article 21), and is to be based on the ‘actual work performance, the virtuousness 
of the judge’s thinking, the skill and theoretical understanding displayed in his 
decisions, the work attitude and work method [style] of the judge’ (Article 23). 
The assessment system also leads to judges being put into three categories: 
‘outstanding’, ‘satisfactory [satisfying the requirements of the office]’, and ‘not 
satisfactory’ (Article 24). The assessment influences whether they receive 
rewards or sanctions, whether they undergo training, whether they are dismissed 
or suspended from office, and, finally, their salary (Article 24).
Beyond ‘assessment and approval’, there is also a grading system for 
judges. The grading is also entrenched in the 1995 Judges Law, whose Articles 
18 to 20 require that each judge be subjected to a yearly appraisal according to a 
scale of twelve different grades. The highest grade is held by the president of the 
Supreme People’s Court alone. The remaining eleven grades influence what 
position one can hold but are to be awarded not as a consequence or expression of 
one’s ranking in the court hierarchy, but according to the tasks that were assigned
44 A mere argument from efficiency would not do, at least if it were possible to train a great 
number of people up to the standards of the respective highest court, at lesser expense than 
incurred by setting up several court instances.
45 Kaohe (%&).
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to the judges, how they performed in terms of their morals and ability, the quality 
of their work output, their work efficiency (number of cases handled) and the 
number of years they have worked. 46 A more rough-scale grading is 
superimposed on the twelve grades, ranging from ‘great judge’ to ‘high-grade 
judge' and ‘judge’. The two above-mentioned 1997 Notes on the provisional 
regulations fo r  the grading o f judges and the Supreme People’s Court’s 2000 
Answer regarding certain questions about the evaluation o f judges and the 
adjustment o f such evaluation further refine this system, for instance by 
specifying that the vice president of the Supreme People’s Court has to be a first 
or second grade ‘great judge’, and that as a judicial assistant at the local court 
level (the lowest adjudicator possible) one is a mere grade three to grade five 
‘judge’. The Notes also introduce a system of semi-automatic ascendance to 
higher grades according to time of service.47
Eagerness to avoid making judgements which are later overturned is a 
familiar phenomenon in all court systems, but in China, for the reasons discussed 
just above, it is particularly pronounced.48 Apart from pressure directly on how 
they decide, there is also considerable pressure on judges to decide quickly (and 
this, too, is of course the case in many other legal systems).49 The judicial system
46 The criteria listed are in Chinese, faguan suo ren zhiwu, decai biaoxian, yewu shuiping, 
shenpangongzuo de gongzuo nianxian
if- ^ PK), according to Article 19 of the Judges Law.
47 On condition that one does not perform badly in any of the above mentioned areas, in Articles 
twelve to sixteen. Article eleven says that the president, vice president etc. down to the judicial 
assistants participate in the evaluation [meetings, held at each court], but Article ten specifies that 
the president of the respective higher level court has to approve of each grading.
48 No bonuses will be given to judges with ,too many’ wrong judgements, but because of the low 
salaries for judges, especially in poor provinces, the ‘scrapping of bonuses’ ( t P ^ i z  ) is a 
considerable economic threat. Bonuses are also awarded, for instance, on the basis of efficiency in 
concluding cases
49 Compare an Article on a Beijing court’s effort to improve efficiency by demanding judges to 
put in extra hours, and threatening not to consider them for distinctions if they failed to conclude 
the cases they were assigned within the time prescribed by law for the conclusion of cases. 
‘Particular attention was given to criminal cases’ in this context. See Xinhuawang, ‘In Beijing 
[judges] work overtime to clear away cases that are over the time limit set for handling, judges
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currently in place provides mechanisms whereby judges can try to ensure 
compliance with what their superiors think: there are not only the judicial 
interpretations, ranging from law-like sets of rules issued by the Court down to 
specific directions on how to adjudicate a certain case, by the Supreme People’s 
Court. There is also an entrenched system of ‘asking for instruction’ by any 
higher ranking court.50
One might still think that the relationship between lower and higher level 
courts created by these mechanisms is in effect not very different from those in 
Western countries, be they Common-Law- or Continental-Law-dominated. In 
Western legal systems, hierarchical pressures might simply be more concealed, 
and juridical decisions will in any way refer to previous decisions by higher 
courts. But this already suggests a great difference. The reference by a judge to a 
previous decision by a Common Law or Continental court is a reference to a text 
to be interpreted by that judge; by contrast, the reference to a higher level court is 
the reference of a decision to a person, or several persons, who has some measure 
of power over oneself.51 The reference to another person is more like asking for a 
command, a directive, to do this or that; the command will be correspondingly 
concise. It reflects only power as power can be expressed in a hierarchy, but not 
judicial strength, as it could be attributed to an individual judge. Reference to a 
previous decision, or reference to a rule provided by legislation,52 involves some
who cannot cope will not receive approval [praise] (Beijing jiaban qingli chaoshenxian anjian, 
qingli bu li faguan bu yu pingyou, lI ’T 'T ’VFtfc ), 21
October 2003 at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-10/21/content_1133800.htm.
50 This procedure is called qingshi (ift/F).
51 Further problems are that sometimes parts of an item of legislation which it would be difficult 
to get through the NPC is left out in the NPC legislation, but then put in immediately after 
promulgation of the new law, in the shape of a judicial interpretation previously agreed on by the 
legislation-drafting branch of government (often a ministry) and the Supreme People’s Court.
52 Variances in the way decisions are written should not obscure the fact that legal practice in 
Civil European jurisdictions always involves a body of commentaries aiding this interpretation 
process, even if, as for instance in France, court decisions themselves do not state many reasons.
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kind of interpretation which, as suggested previously, must be tested against the 
venerable test of universalisability, or made against a background assumption of 
equality, properly understood.53 The form which many (if not most) judgements 
by Chinese courts take to date, reflects that there is no perceived need for stating 
reasons; it reflects more of a ‘command’ conception of adjudication, than one of 
‘considered judgement'.54 If courts did not so frequently resort to the mechanism 
of requesting to be told how to decide by higher order judges; and if the Judges' 
Law, instead of merely requiring that courts and judges be not interfered with by 
any administrative organ or any group in society, also protected individual judges 
from interference by their own superiors, this would probably be different.55
In the previous chapter we saw that one important objection to the 
‘judicialisation’ of the constitution was that the constitution was too abstract to 
get any specific answers out of it, when deciding actual cases. But it is the stifling 
of judicial practice through supervision and interference which presents an 
obstacle to working out what the abstract words of a constitution, or indeed of 
any lower level ordinary law or legislation, mean. There is no incentive, nor is 
there much opportunity, for individual judge’s creativity and sense of 
responsibility to go into proper, considered judgements.56
There are many efforts under way to improve this situation. There is wide 
academic discussion, for instance, of how to create a system in which precedent 
decisions play some kind role, and individual courts, notably the Supreme
53 See third chapter on universality, publicity, equality and shu (#8).
54 Of course, this is not to say that reference to previous court judgements does not occur at all -  
but until now it appears not to be open; up to now one does not see previous decisions cited in 
new decisions, for instance.
55 By contrast, on this interpretation, abstract and legislation-like judicial interpretations only 
reduce judges’ ability to judge if they are in contradiction with specific legislation.
56 And for building up a body of precedent decisions to be consulted by other judges later.
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People’s Court, make compilations of case decisions to be used by judges.57 The 
discussion whether this means that China is moving toward a ‘case law’ system, 
and whether this is justified given that it has a ‘continental’ legal system, seems 
to accentuate differences in the wrong way. For in its current wide neglect of 
previous court practice, the Chinese system resembles neither traditional 
continental legal systems such as the French or German one, nor the Anglo- 
American system. Both Common Law and continental systems rely heavily on 
the instruction to be gained from previous, specific decisions of cases, and 
because several of the institutions and practices discussed above, such as judicial 
interpretations, the easy availability of re-trials, and certain forms of ‘judicial 
supervision’ are not common in either.
Recent development in the relationship o f the Courts and People’s Congresses: 
constitutional review by the NPC Standing Committee? Above, it seemed that due 
to its current extension of ‘legislative’ power to People’s Congresses at various 
levels and to a large number of government authorities, and because of the near­
absence of any distribution of legislative power according to federal or functional 
(separation of powers) principles, China’s ‘real’ law could be limited to those 
principles of the Chinese constitution which truly embodied the spirit of the rule 
of law. If there are no real ‘laws’, why talk about constitutional or judicial 
review? The premise of this question is exaggerated. But still, by posing this 
question, we can draw attention to real difficulties with constitutional review in 
China. Not only do legal norms lack justification from democratic procedures. 
Chinese laws, regulations and rules of their various provenances also appear
57 Compare for instance the contributions available on the website http://www.chinalegaltheory. 
com.
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virtually calculated to be inconsistent with each other. The only available 
justification for the current system of ‘extension’ rather than ‘distribution’ of 
legislative power is local state authorities’ greater proximity to and better 
acquaintance with local conditions, but as observed above, this justification could 
be read as the concession that consistency of principle (coherence) cannot be 
achieved -  that circumstance-specific decisions are more important than 
principled decisions. Then a constitution (‘constitutionalism’) would appear to be 
in fundamental contradiction with the pattern of Chinese government, based on as 
local and specific rules and commands as possible. In institutional terms, one 
might say that this contradiction reflects a claim to supremacy of People’s 
Congresses, which due to the peculiar take on the idea of laws and ‘normative 
documents’ is quite special to China, even though in countries where there is a 
supposed supremacy of parliament, similar discussions arise.
But the juxtaposition of circumstance-specific and principled decisions is 
simplistic. Rule-following and adherence to principles are instantiated in 
specific circumstances. This is why equality has such paramount importance as a 
legal principle. Formulae such as ‘if a then do b, ceteris paribus’ as a model for 
law are treacherously slippery,58 and one way of addressing this problem is by 
working out how conditions of equality can be achieved in each instance. An 
important inherent justification for laws is that they can best fulfil the 
requirement of equality -  of minimal or to put it in a better way, of only 
principled differentiation.59 ‘Administrative regulation’ and the extension of
58 See already the discussion of what it means, and how important it is, to treat like cases alike and 
of complementing principles of equality or justice, in the second and third chapter.
59 For a discussion of the implications of the constitutional equality requirement for principles of 
legislation in China, see also the chapter of this title in Zhou Wei (editor, iSjff?), Study on the 
Judicial Protection o f Constitutional Rights (Xianfa jiben quanli sifa jiuji yanjiu,
%, Beijing: 2003).
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legislative power to a great number of state authorities, by contrast, encourage 
arbitrariness.60 The review of political (legislative) and administrative (including 
legislative) decisions in accordance with constitutional principles is not less but 
more required: because of the badness of legislation, in some ways particularly at 
local levels, legal practice should all the more rely on such principles.
On 14 May 2003, as mentioned in Chapter Five, three legal scholars in 
Beijing submitted a ‘suggestion letter’ on the Directions fo r  internment and 
deportation o f tramps and beggars in cities to the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress, arguing that the Directions infringed the 
Constitution’s right to personal freedom,61 the Administrative Punishment Law, 
and the Legislation Law?2 in the ways already discussed above. There was no 
telling when, or indeed if, the suggestion would be answered, but the subsequent 
abolition of the internment and deportation measure, and their replacement with a 
new regulation, made this question disappear. In the following, the independent 
merits of the new petitioning procedure under the Legislation Law are considered.
The procedure for submission according to Article 90 of the 2000 
Legislation Law recalls the principles underlying the bei ’an or filing procedure of 
submitting new legislation to higher authorities. In particular it recalls to mind the 
principle that the Standing Committees of People’s Congresses at central and 
local levels can in certain cases annul or alter corresponding level government 
regulations (Article 88 Legislation Law), as well as lower level People’s
60 Symptomatic for this is the differentiation between so called ‘abstract’ and so-called ‘specific’ 
administrative acts.
61 The right to personal freedom is mentioned not only in Article 37 of the 1982/ 1999 
Constitution but also in the 1986 General Principles o f Civil Law.
62 See the Article on this petition by Zhao Xiang (^ $ 0 ) and Wan Xuezhong (T f^-S ), ‘Three 
citizens suggest a review of the ‘internment law [sic], and experts enthusiastically affirm [the 
appropriateness of suggestion] (San Gongmin jianyi shencha “shourongfa", youguan zhuanjia 
jiyu jiji kending, ( (^  §'/£)) H‘/Ji), Legal Daily ('/£rfrj 0 ),
18 May 2003.
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Congresses' regulations.63 But there are also important differences. For not only 
do certain designated authorities such as the State Council have the right to 
submit ‘requests' for a review of administrative regulations and local regulations 
as to whether they conform with the laws and the constitution.64 But also private 
individuals may submit ‘suggestions’ to the NPC Standing Committee.
‘Requests’ submitted by specially entitled institutions must be answered 
within two months. The organisations entitled to submit are the State Council, the 
Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy and the Standing Committees of the People’s Congresses of the 
provinces, autonomous regions and directly administered cities. The inclusion of 
the Supreme People’s Court shows, yet again, that courts, at least the Supreme 
People’s Court, may indeed ‘interpret’ the Constitution. The Supreme People’s 
Court could be asked to submit questions of constitutionality to the Standing 
Committee by lower ranking courts, for instance through the ‘asking for 
instructions’ procedure mentioned above. So there is a kind of procedure for 
‘constitutional review’, even though it is limited to administrative and local 
regulations, laws remaining unreviewable.
While ‘suggestions from ordinary people must be received and 
considered'65 they need not actually be responded to or ‘handled’ in the sense of 
a strict requirement to do so.66 According to oral information received from 
scholars there have been thousands of ‘suggestions’ per year, but there appears to 
have been only one case, by the end of 2003, in which one of the authorities
63 Also, People’s Congresses can alter or annul their own Standing Committees’ laws/regulations, 
according to Article 88 Legislation Law.





privileged to make ‘requests' for review has actually made use of its privilege. 
Since there is no publicity requirement for the review procedure, however, these 
data are uncertain. The one known case of review upon ‘request’ had then not yet 
been ‘decided’.67
Whether it comes in the form of a request or of a suggestion, an issue under 
review is first handled by one of the so called ‘work commissions’ of the NPC’s 
Standing Committee. The work committee produces a suggestion which, having 
been passed under the eyes of the Standing Committee’s First Secretary, is passed 
on to one of the so-called ‘Special Committees’ of the NPC’s Standing 
Committee, of which there are nine altogether. In relatively simple or 
uncontroversial cases, an assessment that the regulation in question is 
unconstitutional or contravenes higher ranking law will lead to an informal 
request to the authority which made it, to alter or amend or revoke it 
accordingly.68 In complicated cases, several of these Special Committees, 
including the Law Committee, may be convened for an extensive discussion of 
the problem. If this happens, then the NPC’s Standing Committee will usually 
invite the institution that issued the regulation under review to ‘defend’ it. In such 
cases the review procedure assumes a somewhat forensic format,69 but crucially, 
as has been pointed out by Wang Zhenmin, only the defendant is allowed to
70appear and make its case.
67 Wang Zhenmin’s LL.M. class on constitutional law at Tsinghua Law School
Beijing, 30 September 2003.
68 Article 91 of the Legislation Law says that it may submit a written suggestion, but it appears 
that normally, this request is made in the form of a mere phone call.
69 The ‘decision’ taken in such a case also has to be put in written form.
70 Nor are lawyers allowed to represent either of the ‘parties’. Wang Zhenmin, ibid (above note 
66) . ’
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The organ that has created the regulation at issue is then required to ‘study 
and handle'71 the suggestion put to it in written form, and to get back to the law 
Committee. Refusal to comply with the suggestion72 will trigger a second round 
of ‘review’ opened by the same panel that has undertaken the first ‘review’.73 If 
it is still of opinion that the regulation in question is illegal (unconstitutional), it is 
called upon to submit the matter to the panel within the Standing Committee, 
namely its ‘Council of Chairmen’, which has the power to submit it to the plenum 
of the Standing Committee for a decision to abolish the regulation, by simple 
majority vote. 74 So ultimately, after some considerable consultation, the 
regulation in question may be quashed.
The petitioning mechanism is the first procedure in China allowing ordinary 
citizens directly to challenge the constitutionality of administrative regulations, 
local regulations, autonomous regulations or ‘separate’ regulations. It is a 
beginning,75 and it still continues to reflect the contradiction between the two 
different justificatory ideas of ‘supervision’ and ‘review’. As a supervision 
mechanism, it rests on the idea that each institution (authority ) is in charge of its 
own rules: therefore the Constitution is watched over by the Standing Committee 
of the same institution that creates the Constitution (supervision of rule by the
71 Yanchu
72 As for the Directions on Internment and Deportation, it is possible that they were scrapped as a 
consequence of a suggestion from the relevant committee (s) of the NPC Standing Committee.
73 Wang Zhenmin, ibid. calls this a ‘re-trial’ ( zaishen,
74 Wang Zhenmin, ibid. calls this a ‘last instance trial’ (zhongshen,
75 It does not include the option of challenging the constitutionality of ‘laws’ or indeed of ‘local 
rules’ made by local governments, or of ‘rules’ made by ministries and ministry-level 
commissions, the so-called Local Rules as well as Administrative Rules are outside the remit of 
‘review’ by the NPC’s Standing Committee altogether: for neither have they been produced by 
the government which the National People’s Congress has established, nor have they been 
produced by a lower ranking People’s Congress. Although this procedure has in part already been 
discussed, it is appropriate in this context again to call to mind the possibility of filing for review 
(bei’an) by central and local governments, in accordance with the Legislation Law and the State 
Council’s Regulation on Filing Administrative regulations and Rules and its Regulation on Filing 
Autonomous and Separate Regulations. In the context of that procedure, Local ‘Rules’ and
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ruler), but at the same time an unconstitutional regulation should if possible be 
withdrawn or altered in consultation with the institution (authority) that created 
the regulation. As a review mechanism, the petitioning mechanism is highly 
imperfect: I understand that the Legislative Commission receives thousands of 
‘suggestions’ each year. Of these thousands of suggestions, not all are ‘handled’, 
and sometimes the ‘handling’ appears only to consist in making a phone call to 
the authority (e.g. a ministry) who had made the regulation in question, and 
suggesting some measure of correcting or abolishing such a regulation, without 
getting back to the petitioning individual at all. Also, there is no clear procedural 
connection between court cases and constitutional review at the request of a court. 
It is easy to think of cases in which a mere revocation, effective as of the date of
76the revocation or later, might have no effect on the case at hand.
Given that the power to hold judicial review was never thought to be in the 
hands of the courts, the novelty of the procedure under Article 90 of the 
Legislation Law appears to consist mainly in giving some institutions and the 
Chinese people the right to ask questions rather than in re-allocating the right to 
answer such questions. Also, by itself, an institutional disjunction of 
constitutional review mechanisms from normal court practice can be made 
compatible with a court practice of respecting and applying the constitution, as 
various European jurisdictions with well-functioning separate courts or other 
committees for constitutional review show. It is useful in this context to recall a 
differentiation made earlier on, between the justiciability of constitutional rights, 
and the prerogative of constitutional or judicial review of legal norms. The latter
Administrative Rules respectively can be subjected to a kind of review, and such review can also 
take place below the central level (be carried out by local governments).
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does not on principle affect the power of ordinary courts to adjudicate claims 
based on constitutional rights infringements.
It is quite possible that the new review mechanism of submitting 
constitutionality questions to the NPC Standing Committee might evolve into a 
genuine constitutional review mechanism with the crucial power also to review 
the constitutionality of other legislation. 77 The problem with the review 
mechanism introduced by the Legislation Law appears to be much less whether it 
curtails the power of courts, than whether it can be in itself efficient. In this 
respect, the confusion about what justifies it -  supervision, or review -  proves 
damaging. Article 88 of the Legislation Law gives, as we have already seen, the 
power to alter or annul certain local rules and regulations to lower ranking 
authorities than the NPC Standing Committee, e.g. local People’s Congresses’ 
Standing Committees. The Standing Committee is not the body that makes or
76 It is not evident, from the provisions of the Legislation Law, if any differentiation was intended 
as to the time from which revocation or declaring invalid of a regulation or rule by the Standing 
Committee of the People’s Congress would be effective.
77 Michael Dowdle in his ‘Of Parliaments, Pragmatism, and the Dynamics of Constitutional 
Development: the Curious Case of China’, 35 (2002) New York University Journal o f 
International Law and Politics 1, argues that the NPC is easily underestimated in its capacity to 
promote ‘constitutionalism’ in an otherwise authoritarian climate, despite its current lack of full 
democratic legitimisation (as its members are not freely elected). He argues, successfully in my 
view, that it would be wrong to deny the NPC’s potential on the grounds that it lacked legitimacy 
through elections, or that Chinese people (or the Chinese ‘political environment’) lacked the right, 
liberal values. He believes that a ‘constitutional evolutionary process’ may be successful in China. 
Yet from the perspective of the present study, it is rather difficult to see how constitutional 
principles can become meaningful unless they are allowed, in the Chinese phrase, to ‘enter the 
courts.’ Perhaps this is because I connect the legitimacy of court adjudication to rights protection, 
rather than to ‘technocratic expertise’, as Dowdle does. ‘Under the standard constitutional 
paradigm, administrative and judicial institutions generally found their political authority on 
claims of special, technocratic expertise, i.e., on their ability effectively to promote particular 
administrative and regulatory goals.’ Ibid. p. 190. Dowdle’s observation, obviously serving to 
explain why constitutional legal practice can develop without greater involvement of the courts, 
that ‘nonjusticiability’ is ‘a commonly found feature of many Western constitutions’ (p. 103) 
seems formalistic and is not much to the point of the present discussion, which is normative in 
character. He uses English law and several Continental jurisdictions as examples; but of course 
rights designated as fundamental in such documents as the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) are protected by English courts; not to mention the new Human Rights Act and 
the changes it has brought. As for the Dutch constitution, which he also mentions as still 
‘forbidding judicial review,’ fundamental rights protection has effectively been provided for 
decades through the ECHR mechanism. More important than these historical points is that the 
Chinese courts, other than European courts, are weakened in their ability to protect rights in ways
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alerts or amends the constitution, yet it derives its power from this institution. Is it 
entitled to ‘review’ because it is so close to the constitution-maker? Or does its 
power to review correspond directly to Article 88 of the Legislation Lawl In that 
case, does only the NPC Standing Committee have the power to conduct 
‘constitutional review’ of certain regulations, or may local Standing Committees 
conduct their own constitutional review, and accept and handle submissions for
7 0
review in the same manner as the NPC’s Standing Committee? But then again, 
how is unity of principle to be ensured?
described in the main text.
78 Note that Article 88 refers to the Constitution only in its first sections but not in the later ones, 
where it details the power of local People’s Congresses etc. to review local regulations and rules. 
In these sections is uses the term ‘inappropriate’; but then an unconstitutional regulation could not 
be ‘appropriate’.
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Chapter Nine Rights advocacy and the changing role of lawyers
Voices o f dissent. The preceding chapters juxtaposed traditional with new forms 
of seeking justice in China, and discussed how traditional attitudes play a role in 
the protection of legal rights by courts. This discussion resulted in a picture of 
widely incoherent legal practices, often systematically disregarding legal rights, 
with only weak efforts to ensure the unity of legal principles. It was argued that it 
could be acceptable to seek conflict resolution without employing the language 
and logic of rights. Being silent about one’s rights or being unaware of them does 
not mean one does not have rights or denies that rights are important. While 
justice can be achieved outside the context of rights protection, where there are 
courts set up for the protection of legal rights, such rights sometimes ought to be 
asserted, defended and protected in court. This chapter pursues the question 
asked at the end of the last chapter, how unity of principle can be promoted in 
Chinese legal practice. It discusses how Chinese lawyers and other rights 
advocates can promote rights awareness and rights assertiveness in cases where 
this is morally important. To be successful, they need to fight for greater social 
acceptance of public disagreement about what the law requires, as a central 
element of effective rights protection.
The phrase of it being ‘within a person’s rights’ to do something is 
characteristic for an understanding of rights, which can encourage both 
exaggerated hopes and doubts about the moral position of lawyers. The lawyer 
can be perceived as responsible for defending that realm against outside, whereas 
what is decided ‘within one’s rights’, is not his but his clients’ business. 
Consequently, one may be disappointed with the seeming ethical indifference of
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the lawyer’s job, or enthuse about his role as a paragon of rights, understood as 
good things anyway. Le juge n'est que la bouche de la l o i on an analogous 
understanding one might characterise lawyers as voices vocalising other people’s 
rights and interests. Some of the dignity of the legal profession seems to come 
from just this ethical independence of the lawyer, who can be seen as upholding 
the law no matter what the motives and intentions of his client are. But as the 
practical attention given to legal ethics illustrates, lawyers do have some personal 
responsibility in influencing their clients’ minds as to what they can do and 
should do. A lawyer’s decision to defend someone’s rights is as little ethically 
‘neutral’ as a judge’s decision to uphold and protect them. As Alford urges us to 
consider, lawyers may be greedy; they may be oblivious to their moral 
obligations; they may unduly encourage confrontation. In China especially, they 
may be induced to strike what he characterises as ‘Faustian bargains’ with the 
state and party authorities, and end up stabilising a regime of injustice.
Whether or not background justifications for a particular legal system are 
available, also matters. Assume that a particular society has no even 
approximately just distribution of resources, for instance, or suffers from other 
iniquities -  in such a situation, a lawyer faces more moral challenges than in a 
society with less injustice. Only in those cases where one ought to be rights- 
assertive, the function of lawyers in litigation assumes particular moral 
importance: it is not merely justified but required, and sometimes, indeed, it is
1 Charles de Secondat Montesquieu, De I’esprit des lois (Paris: 1748), translated by P. Nugent 
(1752) available at http://socserv2.socsci.mcmaster.ca/~econ/ugcm/3113/montesquieu/spiritoflaws. 
pdf.
Alford attacks the romantic idea of the function of lawyers forcefully, in ‘Of Lawyers Lost And 
Found: Searching for legal professionalism in the People’s Republic of China’, in Rossett, Cheng 
and Woo (editors), East Asian Law -Universal Norms and Local Cultures (London and New 
York: 2003). Compare the more optimistic view of the legal profession taken by Peerenboom in 
his report for the Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Lawyers in China: Obstacles to
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urgently required, as a matter of justice. One of the roles in which the lawyer’s 
responsibility for justice comes into focus is criminal defence, and views about 
criminal defence lawyers are accordingly widely different.
Rights advocates can make people more aware of their rights, and promote 
confidence that courts will protect them. Lawyers, legal aid clinics, ‘barefoot’ 
(untrained) lawyers, academics working together with lawyers, can all be 
involved in this. In China, there are now also TV programmes,3 websites, daily 
newspapers, and extensive legal columns in newspapers, promoting rights 
awareness and assertiveness.4
As a practice of public dissensus about law the practice of lawyers is fairly 
novel in China. Voicing dissent, presenting a different view of the law and facts, 
is an indispensable step in the process of protecting rights in court. In a rights- 
centred system, voicing dissent need not be combined with supplication or even 
demonstrations of despair or despondency or -  as in the case of suicide- 
remonstration - with what can be interpreted as a gesture both of submission and 
reproach. When people go to court, especially, there is no indication at all that in 
daring to dissent they also acknowledged the impossibility or impropriety of 
challenging the other, an authority. Of course, the mere fact of expressed 
disagreement does not make the view expressed right. It makes it as little right as 
a court judgement is right by virtue of being a court’s judgement.
Independence and the Defense o f Rights (New York: 1998), which also deals in great detail with 
the difficulties in China, some of which are addressed here.
3 This includes the daily half-hour programme jinri shuo fa  (4* 0  i#'/£ ), roughly, ‘Today’s 
Conversation about Law’, which normally presents one legal case or problem per programme, 
and is very popular.
4 As the media are controlled by the government and party, they assume an ambiguous role in this 
context. To give a sense of the aggressive reporting, note that a Public Security Bureau recently 
decided to hand out face masks to arrested suspects to protect them. Chen Yu ( i^ ^ ) ,  ‘Chongqing: 
arrested suspects will only be taken away into detention after they have been given a head mask 
(Chongqing: zhuahuo xianfan daizhe touzhao cai yazou , 5 
February 2004, available at http://www.southcn.com/law/fzsytp/200402060091.htm.
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As we saw, many traditional attitudes expressed in such different practices 
as court-ordered apologies, mediation, and the extortion of confessions from 
suspects in order to ‘solve’ criminal cases, assume that no closure is reached, 
unless there is public recognition of the truth by the principal parties to a case.5 
By contrast, at least in the perception of some members of the public and of 
government in China at present, legal truth is still not to be disagreed about 
publicly; instead, such disagreement may appear shameful. Especially in a 
criminal law context it may even appear like an outrageous attempt at suspension 
of the law or of reality itself. An angry online commentator on the activity of a 
legal defence lawyer writes in January 2004:6
‘Next time Great Lawyer Tian gives an interview to the press he will 
have something to add to his self-introduction; “[I] once rescued China’s 
biggest mafia boss back from the verge of death, and 1 have the power, 
for a time, to change Chinese law; even to change the facts [shishi]. The 
only condition is that you fork out the money!”’7
In the case about which the above comment was made, the defence for Chinese 
mafia boss Liu Yong, apart from arguing against the crime allegations, had also
5 Notwithstanding the obvious possibility that the truth has not been found or has been suppressed 
or distorted. It is important to appreciate that this assumption goes far beyond a mere assumption 
that there is one right answer to every legal question. Indeed for Western legal philosophers 
strongly defending this view, such as Dworkin, the fact that there is one right answer gives better 
meaning to disagreement and debate. It may be used in an argument against various forms of 
pragmatist, postmodernist, and similarly motivated scepticism, because disagreement revolves 
around what is objectively right, true, the best, and so on: if there were no such central idea, what 
could argument be about?
6 Internet use is of course increasingly monitored. See e.g. Secret China News, ‘Xiao Qiang on 
the suppression and opposition to suppression of news’, Xiao Qiang: zhongguo xinxi fengsuo he 
fanfengsuo fenxi, HUS: T ), available at http://www.secretchina. 
com/news/Articles/4/4/19/63661 .html.
7 Yao Gang ( f^eRlJ), ‘On the four big lawyer accomplices of corruption: from Tian Wenchang to 
Zhang Jianzhong, Li Kuisheng and Wu Deli (Guosida “fubai bangxiong” liishi:: cong Tian 
Wenchang, Zhang Jianzhong, Li Kuisheng dao Wu Deli W M :
H , )’, 26 January 2004, available at http://www.peacehall.
com/news/gb/china/2004/01/200401260718.shtml. My emphases. Also on the internet, the last 
character for Tian Wenchang’s name, which means ‘prosperous, flourishing’, was variously 
misspelt as one that is pronounced the same way but means ‘prostitute’. He Weifang, ibid. 
comments on this.
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provided convincing evidence that the defendant had been tortured by the police 
during investigation. This had led the last instance court in his first trial -  rather 
incoherently - to come up with a verdict of suspended death sentence.8 But in Liu 
Yong’s re-trial a few weeks later the Supreme People’s Court sentenced him to 
death without suspension and he was killed within two hours of the verdict. In 
the eyes of the angry commentator above, arguing in Liu’s defence and achieving 
a suspended death sentence meant changing the law and the facts.
While lawyers were almost generally held in low esteem for many 
centuries,9 public perception of lawyers is now diversifying in China. This is also 
due to changes, or at least diversification, in what lawyers do. While there is a 
growing number of commercial lawyers,10 lawyers increasingly take on cases 
involving the protection of rights when citizens are in stark confrontation with 
state or party power. It is not always different individuals who perform these 
roles; for instance, commercial lawyers may take on Chinese mafia and 
corruption cases,11 or engage in various pro bono activities.12 In all areas in 
which they mount direct challenges to government officials or authorities,
8 In a public lecture at Beijing University at the end of October 2003, entitled falti ren de siwei’
and translated as ‘Thinking according to a lawyer’s mode of thinking’, Chen 
Ruihua (B£iSj^) argued that the court should either have found Liu not guilty, or decided that 
the evidence of torture was insufficient. -  A suspended death sentence, sihuan (WMl), means 
suspension by two years, normally followed by commutation into a life prison sentence.
9 As is set out in great detail in Macauley’s Social Power and Legal Culture. Litigation Masters 
in Late Imperial China (Stanford: 1992).
10 And therefore frequently exposed to spite and envy, also on the part of police, procurators, and 
judges. Sun Yaqun comments on this at p. 68, emphasising that especially in the poor provinces 
there are also many lawyers living in poverty and fearing for their subsistence.
11 Each lawyer moreover has a legal obligation to handle one legal aid case per year. I understand 
that commercial lawyers will be reluctant to do so themselves, though, and rather pay for another 
lawyer to handle any case they may be assigned. The State Council’s 2003 Legal Aid Regulations 
(Guowuyuan ling (di 385 hao) falii yuanzhu tiaoli, (H  385 ^7) allow
for this possibility (in Article 21) and also provide for the possibility of the state setting up its 
own legal aid centres with legal aid workers.
12 See, few instance, the report by Zhou Limin (/r]al[?c), ‘Beijing law firm provides legal aid to 
Fuyang [milk powder] victims (Beijing yi liishishiwusuo wei fuyang shouhaizhe tigong falii 
yuanzhu, 15 ), available at http://news.
xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2004-04/23/content_1436680.htm.
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lawyers are at risk of being obstructed or even persecuted, and are subjected to 
what appear to be increasing efforts at state and party supervision.
Educating, appointing and controlling lawyers. Any system needs institutions 
not only to train and appoint, but also to supervise and discipline and, under 
certain circumstances, debar or disqualify lawyers. In the area of training and 
professional qualification of lawyers great progress has been made in recent 
years in China. In 2002 a national exam was introduced which sets uniform 
standards for members of all legal professions, and is now generally the 
precondition of obtaining a lawyer’s status.13 According to the Lawyers' Law, 
here is a further requirement of a practical training period -  working with other 
lawyers -, before one can obtain a licence to practice as a lawyer. After a 
phasing-out period, the precondition for taking the National Legal Exam is 
moreover to have studied for a law degree at university. Compared to before, this 
means a considerable improvement in ensuring a sufficient fund of legal 
knowledge on the part of anyone who wants to practice as a lawyer.14
For a discussion of how far Chinese lawyers can work to protect rights, the 
rules setting out the requirements for lawyers’ professional ethics and discipline 
are of particular interest. The 2001 Lawyers’ Law, for instance in its Article 36, 
contains a group of provisions addressing and seeking to prevent conflicts of 
interest, for instance by ruling out working for both parties in the same dispute, 
ruling out unfair competition, and illicit contacts with judges, procurators or
13 It is called guojia sifa kaoshi and conducted (supervised) by a special office
of the Ministry of Justice. The Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuracy and 
Ministry of Justice jointly issued Provisional Measures on the State Law Exam 
( l ^ i f ) on 31 October 2001.
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other ‘concerned officials’ outside one’s work context.15 The law, moreover, 
states what the lawyer’s task is, as ‘protecting the legal rights and interests of the 
client within the limits of his mandate in civil law, and as ‘providing material and 
views which demonstrate [are evidence of] the suspect’s or defendant’s 
innocence or the lightness of his crime or his [deserving] mitigation of 
punishment, and protecting the legal rights and interests of the suspect or 
defendant’, in criminal matters (Articles 27, 28). Of course, it is the point of 
litigation to determine these lawful rights and interests. Forceful argument on all 
sides of a dispute will help this process, and in this context the development of 
civil, especially commercial law, has played a great role in strengthening the 
adversarial style of conflict resolution in China. By participating in the litigation 
process, lawyers also effectively help the task of deciding what the law is on a 
certain case.16 In that sense they have a duty towards the court and the public, but 
this is a secondary obligation. Some provisions of the Lawyers' Law seem likely 
to hamper the lawyer’s main responsibility for their client. For instance, Article 
35 subsection five prohibits the provision of false evidence or inciting the parties 
to provide false evidence, without qualifying this as to intention or negligence. 
Article 33 requires that lawyers keep ‘state secrets’, without further indicating 
what state secrets are, or who decides on what counts as such.
14 To prevent clashes of interest and duties, there are also provisions stipulating that no one may 
work as a lawyer for two years after leaving the judicial or procuratorial profession. Such career 
changes happen rather frequently, due in part to the difficulties faced by judges and procurators.
15 It has for many years been a great problem with judges that they allowed themselves to be 
bribed for instance by accepting dinner invitations, presents, etc. To give an impression, a recent 
report mentions the striking-off of a lawyer who openly sent out letters to judges offering 
commission payments for the introduction of clients by the judge: Niu Xiaobo , pen
name?), ‘The intricate entanglement of judges and lawyers (Faguan yu liishi de weimiao jiuchan,
30 June 2004 in 21st Century Herald (21 available at
athttp://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20040701/zj/200406300017.asp.
16 In different jurisdictions, doctrinal approaches to a lawyer’s (barrister’s) position and status in 
the judicial process vary.
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At least as important as the substance of the rules setting out lawyers’ 
ethical obligations, are the arrangements made for their teaching and 
enforcement. In China there is firstly the All China Lawyers’ Association 
heading more local lawyers’ associations, set up in accordance with Articles 37 
ff. of the 2001 Lawyers’ Law as ‘self-regulating organisation’ (Article 37), The 
ACLA is responsible, according to Article 40 subsection four of the Lawyers’ 
Law\ for teaching, investigating and supervising the professional ethics and (self-) 
discipline of lawyers. It is also required to distribute praise and incentives or 
impose measures on its members. Membership is compulsory (Article 39). 17
The most severe disciplinary measures are taken directly by the local 
Bureau of Justice, which is a branch of the Ministry of Justice (an institution 
separate from the People’s Courts and People’s Procuracies).18 This Bureau can 
issue warnings or suspend the licence to practice law for up to three years, as 
well as confiscate illegal gains of lawyers and in serious cases withdraw the 
licence to practice (Article 47). The grounds on which it can do so include those 
already stated above, but also ‘other forms of conduct which ought to be 
disciplined,’ according to Article 44 subsection eleven of the Lawyers’ Law. An 
important ‘supervisory’ function is also performed by a third institution, namely 
the People’s Procuracies, as they are generally responsible for the prosecution of
17 The Ministry of Justice, in its Measures for the disciplining and punishment o f illegal conduct 
on the part o f lawyers and law firm s’ come into force on 1 May 2004, specifies in its Article 
eight further cases in which disciplining measures can be taken according to Article 44 of the 
Lawyers' Law. Among these are ‘to use the media or (commercial) advertisements for the 
purpose of untruthful or inappropriate publicising or dissemination,’ a provision that leaves 
somewhat unclear what must not be disseminated. It could be read to refer only to commercial 
self-advertisement -  or it might be read to refer even to the general dissemination of legal views. 
Subsection 21 of the same provision specifies ‘other illegal conduct or conduct contravening the 
professional ethics of lawyers or public [civil] morality, and seriously harming the image of the 
lawyer’s profession.’ See Liishi he liishishiwusuo weifa xingwei chufa banfa,
‘decree’ (ling, 4 0  no. 86 issued by the Ministry of Justice on 19 March 
2004, available at http://www.southcn.com/law/lfdt/200403240458.htm.
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criminal offences by lawyers in a professional context. This is a particular 
problem with criminal defence lawyers, where the Procuracy and the lawyers are 
already opponents.
The new 2004 Measures fo r  the disciplining and punishment o f illegal 
conduct on the part o f lawyers and law firms say that the Bureaus ‘may’ refer 
matters to the ACLA for investigation, in which cases the association is required 
to investigate fully and fairly and to submit suggestions for the handling of the 
case to the Bureau. This reaffirms the Bureaus’ right and ultimate responsibility 
to supervise (Article 12). Lawyers or law firms are given the right to 
administrative litigation against a decision. (Article 13). The right to interpret the 
Measures, however, is claimed to lie with the Ministry itself, by Article 16.
Trying to predict how the practice is going to develop would be difficult. 
But the clearly evident trend towards greater supervision of lawyers19 could 
counteract the dynamic inherent to the role of lawyers in the litigation process, in 
suppressing lawyers’ ability to help voice that kind of dissent, which is important, 
because it helps rights protection where it is urgently required. It could obstruct 
them from challenging authorities infringing important rights of citizens. In a 
way not dissimilar to the treatment of judges, perceived malpractice and 
corruption among lawyers, too, is answered by more supervision, stricter
18 Alford says, moreover, that the Ministry of Justice has ‘filled the ranks of the All China 
Lawyers’ Association with its own personnel,’ Ibid. p. 187.
19 Besides the Measures mentioned just above, in March 2004, the Ministry of Justice and the 
Supreme People’s Court issued a joint notice (tongzhi) On the relevant rules on the regulation o f 
the relationship between judges and lawyers to ensure just adjudication. Guanyu guifan faguan 
he liishi xianghu guanxi weihu sifa gongzheng de ruogan guiding de tongzhi, notice no. 9 in 2004.
M M ®  . (2004) 9 This
declaration is mainly concerned with describing kinds of interaction between lawyers and judges 
that were forbidden; for instance, giving presents to the judge, telling one’s (prospective) client 
that one knows the judge, or seeking to meet with the judge in a private setting. It also puts 
obligations on the judge to ‘ask for the lawyers’ views’ in litigation (Article 10) and to hold 
public hearings and to inform the parties and lawyers about the progress of the case, but ‘the
231
government control, and by criminal prosecution, rather than by strengthening 
the independence and potential for self-regulation of the profession, or by putting 
trust in a judicial mechanism outside the context of criminal law and disciplinary 
procedures.20
To give an example of increased supervision, the Shanghai City Bureau of 
Justice announced in April 2004 that it was going to publicise ‘integrity’ or 
‘credibility records’ for each of the 570 law firms in Shanghai City, online in co­
operation with an online service website for lawyers.
‘In the future, it will only need a lawyer or a law firm to lose credibility, 
to be subjected to an [administrative, Bureau of Justice] punishment 
measure or to engage in other not pretty professional conduct [bu liang 
zhiye xingwei], for such conduct to be entered in the file [to be set up for 
this purpose], to be entered into the dang'an file,21 and to be disclosed 
[online] in a timely manner. The department under the Ministry of Justice 
will publish within a set time the results of investigation into lawyers’ 
violations of law or discipline and of the measures taken, and thus create 
standards for [guifan] and restrain [zhiyue] the lawyers’ professional 
conduct.’22
judge must not disclose secrets of adjudication,' and the lawyer ‘must not use illegal methods to 
find out about the state of the case’ (Article 5).
20 There appear to be elements of self regulation, as well as a connection with the authority 
issuing the licence to practice in most systems. In the U.S., for instance, there are disciplinary 
committees set up as sub-structures under the court, which may be composed of judges or 
lawyers and include laypeople, depending partly on the nature of the offence in question. In the 
German system, the lawyers’ associations set up courts consisting exclusively of practicing 
lawyers but appointed by the justice administration at the suggestion of the associations. The 
decisions of these courts are subjected to judicial review in administrative courts, according to the 
German Rechtsanwaltsordnung.
The above-mentioned Congressional Executive Commission Report recommends at its end 
that disciplinary committees be set up the ACLA under oversight of either the Ministry of Justice 
or the People’s Procuracy.
21 Dang’an files are to be kept of every individual or organisation according to the law on this 
{dang’an fa,
22 Yang Jinshi (ffifizM), ‘Shanghai sets up a credibility record for lawyers to publish results of 
investigation and measures imposed within set time {Shanghai wei liishi jian “chengxin jilu” 
dingqi gongbu chachu jieguo, available at 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-04/19/content_1427496.htm.
Note the habit, too, of party-related or state-related media as well as other organisations to 
elect ‘ten great legal personalities of the year’ and similar model legal professionals.
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An ultimate supervising function is exercised by the Communist Party, not only 
through the fact that the Ministry of Justice and the All China Lawyers 
Association is heavily influenced by it, but also because each law firm23 is under 
obligation to set up a Communist Party branch either by itself or together with 
other law firms, which must have at least three members.24 Communist Party 
membership appears highly desirable to many ambitious young people in China 
today." It means joining an elite. The most recent important doctrine or 
slogan given out by Jiang Zemin in 2000 is the ‘Three Represents’, the formula 
that opened the Communist Party up toward the new middle classes and elites. It 
says that the Communist Party now represents three groups or values in society:
‘It represents the development trends of advanced productive forces.
It represents the orientations of an advanced culture.
It represents the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of 
the people of China.’27
A report of the party branch association of Junhe law firm (Beijing), which is one 
of the two or three biggest Chinese law firms at present,28 for instance, considers 
the role the Party can and should play toward lawyers and law firms in the 
following manner.
21 There are now three fa ins of aganisation of law firms in China. There are the law firms that 
emerged from the old state-owned law firms, namely firms ‘with capital invested by the state’,
whose liability is limited to this capital. Then there is a mixed form of law firms whose liability is
limited by the contributions to the capital made by the lawyers. Finally, there are partnerships, 
with joint and several liability of the partners. So far, lawyers are not allowed to practice on their 
own. See Lawyers' Law, Articles 36-38.
24 Alford mentions this, for instance, ibid. at p. 188.
25 It is also attractive to join any of the other ‘Democratic Parties’, which are allowed to 
participate in consultations and legislative drafting processes..
6 There were about 66 million Communist Party members in 2002, in a population of about 1.3 
billion, which amounts to around five percent. See China Today on the Communist Party of 
China, information available at http://www.chinatoday.com/ag/cpc/.
27 See the introduction to the ‘Three Represents’ available at the China Internet Information 
Center at http://www.china.org.cn/english/zhuanti/3represents/68735.htm.
28 The report is written in or after 2002.
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‘We believe that, considering the most fundamental factors determining 
the national condition [genben guoqing], namely the status of the Party 
and the nature of the state, it is not possible to determine the status of the 
Party entirely as that of a centre of leadership, but it should have, it 
should develop its function of ensuring and supervising. What we mean 
by ‘ensuring’, is ensuring that the work of the entire law firm can develop 
in a healthy and orderly manner, and what we mean by ‘supervising’, is 
to supervise the operation of the law firm in accordance with the Party’s 
broader policies [dazheng fangzhen] and the legal regulations of the 
state.’29
The task o f criminal defence lawyers. A certain view of criminal justice which 
we may term the conservative view in China, and which has imperial as well as 
Maoist origins, makes it easy to regard suspects as criminals not deserving the 
protection of the law. This attitude, again, is reminiscent of the Maoist distinction 
between ‘contradictions between the people and enemies of the people’ and 
‘contradictions among the people’. Only internal contradictions are matters of 
right and wrong, Mao said. If criminals or a certain type of criminals are 
regarded as enemies of the people rather than as elements in ‘internal 
contradictions’, then they place themselves, in a certain way, outside the law: 
although types of crime perceived to harm the public in a particular way, such as 
corruption, are wrong and unlawful conduct by definition, the way society 
responds to such conduct is not determined by the categories of right and wrong, 
but by those of friend and foe.30
29 The report is entitled ‘Actively promoting the party branch’s work by exploring the spirit of 
reform (Yi tansuo gaige de jingshen jiji tuijin dangzhibu gongzuo -  Beijing shi Junhe 
liishishiwusuo dangzhibu,
, available at http://www.bjsf.gov.cn/Article/detail.asp?UNID=6954.
30 For the distinction between two kinds of contradiction, see Mao Zedong, 1957, ‘On the Correct 
Handling of Contradictions Among the People’, (translation) in Selden, Mark, The People’s 
Republic o f China: A Documentary History o f Revolutionary Change, New York Monthly 
Review Press, 1979, pp. 324 ff. For the application of this distinction in criminal procedure see 
also Clarke and Feinerman, ‘Antagonistic Contradictions - Criminal Law and Human Rights in 
China’, (1995) 141 The China Quarterly 135-154.
234
Only when a liberal and rights-conscious view of criminal responsibility is 
adopted, does the criminal trial clearly assume the function of determining the 
facts on the basis of which the defendant will be judged and treated, and do 
evidentiary rules take the function of protecting defendants. This understanding 
leaves no room for the possibility that a defendant should be punished according 
to ‘substantive’ justice, but will walk free according to ‘procedural justice’ in 
some cases, though the distinction is sometimes used in this way to express the
o  1
supposed ‘Chinese’ emphasis on ‘substantive’ criminal justice.
Because, it seems, of the continued strength of the conservative view of 
criminal justice in China, criminal defence lawyers’ work continues to be greatly 
obstructed, resulting in a decline of the percentage of criminal defendants 
represented by lawyers, as well as in a general weakening of defence lawyers’ 
morale.32 In ‘How difficult is it really to be a criminal defence lawyer?’, a legal 
researcher with the Judicial Research Institute of the Chinese Ministry of Justice 
characterises the principal difficulty as one of mindset:33
‘Once a suspect has been locked up and is detained [guanya] some of the 
people handling the case will be convinced in their minds that he is a bad 
person, and make a ‘presumption of guilt.’ They will also think that the 
lawyer stores [away] the person’s money and destroys [evidence], and 
helps the suspect to speak [in his defence]; so from their perspective they 
will rather be set against the defence lawyer (...) In their hearts, they find 
it very difficult to recognise that the lawyer’s participation in the criminal
31 For instance, Peerenboom remarks ibid. at p. 376 that ‘As has been true for the last two 
thousand years, the Chinese criminal system favours substantive over procedural justice.’ The 
problem with this attribution of a belief is that it presupposed acceptance of the importance of the 
distinction. It could well be argued, however, that in a system truly concerned with rights of the 
defendant, it was part of substantive justice to acquit people guilty of a crime, under certain 
circumstances.
32 This is the assessment provided in ‘Congressional Executive Commission on China, ‘Defense 
Lawyers Turned defendants: Zhang Jianzhong and the Criminal Prosecution of defense lawyers 
in China” , available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/zhang _052703.php and http://www. 
cecc. gov/pages/news/zhangupdate.php.
33 One of his suggestions is to strengthen the role of the Ministry of Justice and the Bureaus 
beneath it in supervising lawyers.
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procedure process promotes just adjudication, that he protects the legal 
rights and interests of the suspect and defendant, and that he helps to 
prevent miscarriages of justice.’34
These attitudes have found further expression in numerous regulations and 
practices. So for instance defence lawyers will find it difficult to see their client 
in police detention. They also have problems with viewing the files of the case, 
and with the gathering evidence. According to Article 95 of the Criminal 
Procedure Law the first interview between the lawyer and his client ‘should’ 
happen after ‘the first interrogation,’ but it is the police which determines when 
the first ‘interrogation’ has taken place. Excessive detention is a problem already 
discussed in the previous chapter. There are also no rules for enforcement of the 
right to see their client for lawyers. When torture has been used, then the 
police are unwilling to admit lawyers as long as the wounds resulting from it
i z :
have not yet healed; on the other hand, so far as there are no traces of torture 
left, lawyers cannot usually prove that it happened in court. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that lawyers are not allowed to take cameras into the detention stations, 
and that often the police or the procuracy are present during interviews of 
detained suspects or defendants with their lawyers.
Despite a concerted effort, beginning in 2003, to improve working 
conditions of defence lawyers, much remains to be done. Eight days after Liu 
Yong’s execution, for instance, the Supreme People’s Procuracy issued a
34 Or more literally, individually unjust, fabricated or mistaken judgements (yuan, jia, cuo’an, %
Sun Yequn ‘How difficult is it really to be a criminal defence lawyer -
thoughts about the problems faced by lawyers participating in the criminal litigation process (Zuo 
yige xingbian liishi jiujing you duo nan -  liishi canyu xingshi susong huodong youguan wenti de
s i k a o  y ,  (2003)





Regulation on Protecting the right o f defence lawyers legally to perform their
37duties in criminal procedure, which provides, among other things, that the 
procuracy should arrange for an interview within 48 hours of a request on the 
part of the defence lawyer to see his client, except in ‘important’ (!) cases of 
corruption involving several suspects. It says that the defence lawyer has the 
right to ask the suspect not only about the case but also whether his right to 
physical integrity and his right to defend himself have been infringed while in 
detention, during the interview. It also says, however, that a procurator may 
attend interviews between the lawyer and the suspect during the ‘investigation’ 
period, although it rules such attendance out after conclusion of this period, that
38is, once a suggestion to prosecute has been made. It is important to appreciate 
that these regulations were issued by the Supreme People’s Procuracy and do not, 
therefore, apply to people in police detention and under police investigation, that 
is, to the majority of people detained as suspects.39
37 Guanyu renminjianchayuan baozhang liishi zai xingshi susong zhong yifa zhiye de guiding, 
passed on 30 December 2003 ( , 2003
12 n  30 16 On 11 March 2004 a
meeting on the enforcement of this regulation convened members of the Supreme People’s 
Procuracy and the Ministry of Justice who, several weeks after the second trial of Liu Yong, 
emphasised the need to protect criminal defence lawyers’ right to perform their task in the 
criminal process. Se Gu Ruizhen ), ‘The Supreme People’s Procuracy reiterates its
guarantee of protection for the rights of the criminal defence lawyers (Gaojian sifabu chongshen 
quebao xingshi bianhu liishi yifa zhiye de quanli ( # 1 ^  
M$£#!!)’, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-03/ll/content_1360818.htm.
38 The Regulations also address the defence lawyer’s right to make suggestions toward the 
procuracy, especially regarding excessive detention, which, as has been mentioned, was a 
problem specially tackled in 2003. Finally, the regulations address the lawyers’ rights to inspect 
the files of the case, and to gather evidence. The right to gather evidence is arguably restricted 
rather than extended by the Regulations, which merely allow lawyers to apply to the procuracy so 
that it gather evidence, rather than directly to gather it themselves.
39 There are some apparent attempts at ‘co-operation’ between criminal defence lawyers and the 
procuracies. According to a report in April 2004, an agreement was reached between the Beijing 
procuracy and the ‘Beijing lawyers’ -  perhaps the Beijing Lawyers’ Association -  to co-operate 
in the battle against corruption. Worryingly, the Xinhua news report details the obligations of the 
procuracy (to guarantee access to clients within a set time), but not those of the lawyers. On the 
latter, it only says: ‘..The signing of the agreement benefits the procuracy’s and lawyers working 
hand in hand, and their jointly protecting the legal rights and interest of the parties to a procedure, 
and their reaching a mutual understanding [of the case at hand?] through the principles of co­
operation and mutual forgiveness and understanding.’ See Li Jia and Yu Gao ffiitliq
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There are not only procedural rules hampering the work of criminal 
defence lawyers. It is not just that they should not get on the wrong side of the 
police for their client’s sake. Lawyers must also be cautious not themselves to 
offend against substantive criminal law rules, or find themselves locked up for no 
proper reason.40 Criminal offences which lawyers, especially defence lawyers, 
are likely to be accused of include the fabrication of evidence, fraud (possibly at 
the allegation of dissatisfied clients of the lawyer), the disclosure of state secrets 
which may consist in ‘disclosing’ the facts of the case or of documents belonging 
to case files, obstruction of the administration of justice, and collusion with 
criminals 41 It appears that only in few cases, lawyers detained by the police are 
then really prosecuted for a crime they have committed 42
Most importantly, there is a special criminal statute to punish lawyers who 
falsify evidence, as opposed to anybody else committing this crime. Article 306 
sets a lower threshold for criminal liability than Article 307, in several ways. It 
punishes a certain criminal conduct, rather than the result of an action.43 It also 
punishes merely ‘helping’ to destroy or forge evidence, whereas for any other 
person only using ‘violence, threat, bribery or any other means’ to get someone
), ‘Anti-corruption office of Beijing City People’s Procuracy reaches agreement with 
lawyers and will join forces with lawyers to fight corruption (Beijing shi jian fantanju yu liishi da 
xieyi, jiang yu liishi xieshou fanfu, )’,
available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-04/22/content_1433668.htm.
40 Sun Yaqun, ibid., reports that of 200 lawyers detained altogether only in ‘special’ cases 
prosecution followed detention. He provides further statistics. This fact suggest that detention 
often occurs without any real basis for prosecution, as an intimidating measure.
41 Sun Yaqun, ibid., mentions these offences in the statistics he provides for Henan province. 
According to him, between 1995 and 1999 there were six cases of falsifications of evidence, two 
of fraud, one of disclosure of state secrets, one of obstruction of (perverting) the course of justice, 
and one of sheltering criminals. During this time, there must have been on average about 4250 
lawyers in the province, and in 1999, for instance, each lawyer handled 4.8 criminal cases, 
statistically. The Article provides statistics few Zhejiang and Hangzhou provinces, too, which 
show that the ratio of criminal cases handled by lawyers has fallen.
42 Sun Yaqun, ibid.
43 Sun, ibid., argues that this applies only to Article 306 but not to Article 307.
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to destroy or forge will constitute criminal liability.44 It is the police and 
procuracy -  their natural opponents - who are in charge of investigation and 
prosecution in the case of Article 306 offences 45 Article 306 has recently come 
under so much attack, that there are signs that it might be repealed 46 but it is 
unclear how much this would help, as long as it is possible to ‘apply’ Article 307 
to intimidate defence lawyers.47
While on the one hand we find evidence of great resentment against 
criminal defence lawyers, there are also interesting suggestions in legal practice 
to encourage the mediation of criminal matters that can be privately litigated, 
even when they are being prosecuted publicly in a concrete instance.48 This
44 Incidentally, too, merely to ‘obstruct’ the gathering or providing of evidence (weihai zhengju), 
moreover, will trigger criminal liability few the lawyer, but the same conduct will only trigger a 
disciplinary measure for judges. Sun, ibid. p. 68 provides this argument, drawing attention to the 
Supreme People’s Court’s Measures for the Disciplining o f Judges’ Article 34.
45 Sun, ibid. says that ‘in the [criminal] litigation process, the prosecution is both a player and a 
referee, and thus hardly on a par with the defence.’
46 XiaoYang in the English language edition of China Daily on 12 April 2004, ‘Scrapping Article 
306 would make law fairer’, reports that ‘[a] National People's Congress representative 
confirmed last week that a special perjury charge for lawyers in the Criminal Law will likely be 
removed. Although the legislature member did not reveal a specific timetable for the law revision, 
the news is enough to cheer up the nation's more than 130,000 licensed lawyers, as well as 
everyone who believes in the rule of law.
47 In a prominent recent case generating a lot of fear among Chinese defence lawyers, criminal 
defence lawyer Zhang Jianzhong was eventually convicted of a crime according to Article 307, 
not Article 306, in a manner presumably pre-empting criticism of Article 306. For a detailed 
account see ‘Congressional Executive Commission on China, ‘Defense Lawyers Turned 
defendants: Zhang Jianzhong and the Criminal Prosecution of defense lawyers in China’, 
available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/news/zhang_052703.php and at http://www.cecc.gov/ 
pages/news/ zhangupdate.php. Many claimed that Zhang was locked up simply because he had 
caused anger among police and other officials, who may have wanted to see him ‘disciplined’, 
and got rid of as a criminal defence lawyer. By defending his client; by opposing the view of the 
prosecution, the lawyer had apparently turned himself into an enemy of society. Again to quote 
Yao Gang: ‘That the so-called , great lawyers’ of China have set up together with corruption for 
[personal] gain can be called a tragedy for Chinese society! However, just like others who choose 
to become “gangsters” [here the author uses a transliteration of the English word], these lawyer 
accomplices of corruption are putting themselves at risk with every step they make. They may at 
any time cut off their own future, and land themselves in prison.’ Yao Gang (MHlJ), ‘On the four 
big lawyer accomplices of corruption: from Tian Wenchang to Zhang Jianzhong, Li Kuisheng 
and Wu Deli (Guosida “fubai bangxiong” liishi:: cong Tian Wenchang, Zhang Jianzhong, Li 
Kuisheng dao Wu Deli L )’,
26 January 2004, available at http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/china/2004/01/200401 
260718.shtml
48 Mao Guofang (^ B T ?), ‘Ideas on establishing pre-trial mediation for all criminal cases that 
can be litigated privately (Xingshi zisu anjian shezhi qianzhi tiaojie chengxu de gouxiang,( M W
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confirms the tendency in Chinese legal practice to consider matters of right and 
wrong as matters of exact and sensitive consideration of relationships and 
positions. This attitude appears to change suddenly and radically at some point, 
when people become suspects and defendants. But such a swift change of 
attitude, which detracts from the attractiveness and justifiability of criminal legal 
practice, is not necessary. A sensible appreciation of the function of the rights of 
the defendant may be able to help change it. Only advocates of rights within the 
Chinese legal system, people with an impact on Chinese society, can bring about 
such a change. But because in the context of criminal law, lawyers are exposed 
to a high degree of public distrust, and due to remaining inadequacies of Chinese 
criminal procedure, including the widespread use of torture, lawyers are often too 
intimidated or powerless to defend their clients effectively.
‘Our courts - I myself don’t often go to court to listen to the pleas and 
arguments delivered by our friends, the lawyers, but in a case like that of 
Chen Xitong49 there was some television footage where we could see the 
lawyers up there in court [on the raised platform where the benches of the 
defence lawyers and procuracy are]. In that trial, the judge would speak 
and then ask, did the lawyer have anything he’d like to say? No he didn’t, 
the lawyer would reply. After a while the judge would ask again, did the 
lawyer have anything he’d like to say? No, he didn’t. I only listened up to 
the third “no”. - And this is the role our lawyers play in court.'50
Protecting the rights o f the weak in a weak legal system: legal aid. Criminal 
legal cases are given much attention by the Communist Party, the government, 
and the people, and this is sometimes seen as evidence of an increase in ‘legal
posted on 6 September 2002 at http://www.shezfy.com/
Discuss/detail.asp?id= 134.
49 This was a mayor of Beijing who was convicted of corruption 1998. See, for instance, the BBC 
report ‘The corrupt comrade’ at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/143163.stm.
50 Transcript of He Weifang’s speech by the lawyer Chen Yuan Zheng (EizstiE), ‘Transcript of 
Professor He Weifang’s speech - the epochal task of the Chinese lawyer (He Weifang jiaoshou 
yanjiang shilu -  zhongguo liishi de shidai shiming
available at http://forum.acla.org.cn/showflat.php?Board=22&Number=450759..
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awareness’ (falU yishi) among the people. But as discussed before, an emphasis 
on criminal law may also serve to divert from certain primary rights issues. 
Whereas criminal cases require the services of lawyers to a relatively few in 
society, in areas such as property and labour law, lawyers and courts are required 
to help protect many. When we think of the protection of the rights of ‘the many’, 
what may come to mind first are the rights to life and liberty, and rights to 
property and other material goods. But just as in a criminal law (right to life and 
liberty) context, effective protection will crucially depend on the right to voice 
public dissent with important authorities. Because the protection lawyers give in 
these contexts is approved of by a much wider public than in the case of criminal 
defence, their work can be even more irritating to the government authorities 
which, besides private individuals, come under attack.
Land distribution and labour law are particularly important and sensitive 
rights issues in China at present. There is an increasingly unequal distribution of 
resources, and a large number of people are subjected to deprivation of the basis 
of their livelihood at the cost of others, who are getting rich fast.51 Woodiwiss 
points out that the restructuring of the Chinese economy towards a market 
economy model has led to a situation where employment is very largely based on 
contractual relationships,52 while at the same time the property regime remains 
heavily impacted by the doctrine of state administration of national or public 
ownership. The protection of private property is now guaranteed in the Chinese 
constitution, but of course a guarantee like this does not mean that everyone is 
guaranteed to have any given amount or kind of property. It does not guarantee
51 Deng Xiaoping’s famous slogan of 1992 was ‘let a few people become rich first.’
52 See, for instance, A. Woodiwiss, Making Human Rights Work Globally (London, Sydney: 
2003), at pp. 83 ff.
241
social justice; it may only guarantee some important preconditions of social 
justice.
Ordinary workers in China today face many problems, whether they work 
for the often unviable (formerly) state owned companies or for private companies. 
For instance, if they are affected by the transformation of state-owned enterprises 
converted into companies limited by shares and largely owned by the state,53 
there are great problems with workers being insufficiently compensated for the 
loss of welfare benefits from their former ‘work unit’ or being laid off 
altogether.54 At the same time, there is a rising number of employment 
disputes.55 Especially in the context of construction work, it is a common 
phenomenon for employers to keep workers, often migrant workers, on for 
weeks and months without paying them (full) wages, and without paying any 
insurance for them.
In this area, the state is encouraging ordinary workers to seek rights 
protection, be it through labour tribunals arbitrating disputes,56 or through the 
courts.57 Rights protection is seen as an important tool to prevent social unrest. 
As ordinary workers, especially those being owed their wages or social security
53They usually still have a large proportion of shares that can be transferred but cannot be 
publicly traded: here, the state asserts its ownership.
54 In some cases, the way used to satisfy the workers’ demands for some security and some 
compensation for losing all the benefits they used to have when the business ‘changes its system’ 
(gaizhi) is to give them some of the shares; sometimes there are mechanisms whereby the shares 
may exclusively be bought by and sold to employees. Often, the schemes thus developed leave 
employees much worse off than before.
55 See for instance the report on the 2004 White book on Employment, ‘Chinese White Book on 
Situation and Policies regarding Employment published (zhongguo de jiuye zhuangkuang he 
zhengce baipishu fabiao, ), 26 April 2004 on
Xinhuawang, available at http://www.jcrb.com/zyw/n222/ca236650.htm. For a discussion of 
problems in the (large) public sector, see Li Jinghua ( ^ ^ ^ ) ,  Renshi jiufen zhecheng redian
http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-02/01/content_1293587.htm.
56 Which are apparently very much prepared to mediate.
57 A report at Xinhuawang informs us that in 85% of employment disputes in Shanghai, the 
workers win. See the report Shanghai: 85% de laodong zhengyi anjian laodongzhe shengsu (_t 
'M: 8 5 ), available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/ 2004-
05/01/content_1450486.htm.
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payments, tend not to be well paying clients, they make for a large part of the 
clientele of legal aid centres and university legal aid clinics that have been set up 
over the past few years. The Legal Aid Regulations require each lawyer to handle 
one legal aid case per year, but as has already been mentioned, these obligations 
are often disregarded and legal aid has to be provided in another way. In Beijing, 
for instance, the City’s Legal Aid department cooperates with universities to 
provide legal aid. There are also various educational activities by a number of 
different organisations and institutions, whose aim it is to educate workers about 
their rights.58 These activities are important to the development of rights 
assertiveness, because they encourage people to ask what they are owed, by 
reference to their contractual rights.
Protecting the socially weak in the context of employment disputes, may 
lead one naturally on to try and protect them in politically more sensitive 
contexts. Many of the major universities have set up legal aid clinics, and in 
some, their work is combined with scholarly and publications activities directed 
at improving rights protection in sensitive areas, and at improving judicial and 
constitutional review mechanisms.59 Among the rights they protect are tenants’ 
rights in urban and rural redevelopment areas. The market in housing 
developments and industrial developments is producing much iniquity for
58 See, for instance, ‘Over 1500 workers in Beijing seek advice on protecting their rights -  
delayed wages become the hottest topic (Beijing 1500 duo ming zhigong zixun falii weiquan -  
tuoqian gongzi cheng redian, 1500 ),
Xinhuawang on 27 October 2003, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003- 
10/27/content_l 143630.htm. These activities are generally called pufa ( I f '/£ , disseminating 
[knowledge of] the law) activities. Compare the website Zhongguo pufawang (4*0  ),
www.legalinfo.gov.cn..
59 For instance, Tsinghua University’s Constitutional Law and Civil Rights Center, whose web 
address is http://www.legalaid.org.cn/. It was set up in co-operation with the Beijing Lawyers’ 
Association. While its legal aid activities concentrate on employment conflicts and ‘the weak in 
society’, its academic activities included seminars on Sun Zhigang’s case (see chapter seven) and 
other representative fundamental rights cases (See the repeats on these seminars at the website 
just mentioned.)
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families who have the use of certain plots of land but - generally - no clear and 
specific legal claims to it, both in the case of state-owned land occupied by city 
residents and of collectively owned farmland.60 People in effective control over 
land -  village heads, for instance -  make use of this fact by contracting rights of 
use away to property developers, with no or inadequate monetary compensation 
to those who used to live on this land.61 In the case of land in the cities, 
frequently the city government administers the ‘publicly owned’ real property, 
and sells rights to use limited to a maximum 70 years to land developers. This 
sale is usually preceded by a department of the city government making an 
abstract administrative planning decision (that cannot be challenged in court) for 
the area effectively sold off, and then evicting residents on the basis of this 
decision. Citizens affected in this way are increasingly unwilling to submit to the 
idea that they may only challenge or ask for redress for some aspects of 
eviction,62 but not the eviction itself in court. Perhaps a poignant image for this is 
a Beijing resident trying to resist eviction from his home -  unsuccessfully -  with 
a copy of the Chinese constitution in his hand. Often, the only step forward
60 See He Weifang’s comments, ibid on the question of sensibly distributing, or ‘returning to the 
peasants’, land owned collectively by villagers. He refers to the distribution in place under 
‘landlords’, that is, apparently to the time before or at the very beginning of the Communist 
regime, and states that the records then existent are now largely destroyed.
61 Compare e.g. the renowned economist’s He Qinglian’s ‘Where is the Boom of the Chinese 
Real Estate Industry Coming From?’, published in Epoch Times of 8 May 2004, available at 
http://feeds.bignewsnetwork.com/redir.php 7jid=8659d99a489c5d92.
62 The amount of compensation residents are given, and violence used during eviction.
63 See Bao Limin Wt), ‘An old resident of Chongwen district in Beijing resists the coerced
eviction and demolition of his home with a copy of the constitution in his hand (Beijing 
Chongwen qu yi ming lao ren shouchi xianfa dizhi qiangzhi banqian ~
)’, 5 April 2004, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004- 
04/05/content_1400429.htm. To some, this gesture may evoke the image of president Liu Shaoqi 
with the constitution in his hands in 1968, telling the Red Guards who came to arrest him at the 
order of Mao Zedong, that they had no right to do so. Liu Shaoqi died in detention.
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may appear to be a petition to a governmental authority, using the ‘letters and 
complaints’ mechanism introduced in chapter four.64
It is only when lawyers and academics intent on promoting rights 
protection in those areas where such protection is unwelcome to government also 
make use of the public media, that they can have any real impact on people’s 
general rights assertiveness.65 But just as criminal defence, these activities put 
lawyers and other rights advocates at risk. A Shanghai ‘tenant rights lawyer’ who 
passed on information about cases to the organisation ‘Human Rights in China’, 
was convicted in December 2003 for passing on ‘state secrets’ abroad.66 In the 
following spring, two editors/managers of the newspaper group Southern 
Metropolitan Daily, Southern Weekend (Nanfang Zhoumo), which had been 
reporting on the case of Sun Zhigang (see chapter seven) as well as on ‘sensitive’ 
areas of rights protection such as urban evictions,67 were convicted of
64 As for instance the petition submitted to the letters and complaints offices of Wen Jiabao and 
Hu Jintao in November 2003 by Liu Zhengyou from Zigong City, Da’An District, Hongqi village 
in Sichuan Province, ‘I am telling the truth to the General Secretary and to the Premier (Wo xiang 
zongshuji, zongli jiang shihua, ^ f r ) )’, dated 2 November 2003. He 
distributed copies of the petition to the general public by hand.
65 The most dramatic example both of the effectiveness of reporting and of the risks incurred 
thereby so far has been the case of Sun Zhigang, the man detained as ‘vagrant’ and killed in 
detention for deportation (see chapter seven). It was not least the fact that many academics rallied 
to support the reporting of this case by the media, which allowed it to become an issue discussed 
nationwide by lawyers, academics, and the general public. Influential academics wrote about it. 
The Guangdong based newspaper group Southern Metropolitan Daily, Southern Weekend 
(Nanfang Zhoumo) and, later, other newspapers suddenly reported on a number of similar cases. 
Then, the law was changed. This was the first event of this kind in post-socialist China.
66 Human Rights Watch, ‘China: Tenant Rights Advocate Arbitrarily Jailed. Lawyer Accused of 
circulating Secrets?to Rights Group’, 19 December 2003, available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2003/12/18/china6762.htm. The report also says that ‘Official 
statistics show that 850,000 households and 2,500,000 residents were relocated in Shanghai 
during the past decade. Since 2000, at least 80,000 Shanghai households have been relocated 
every year for renovations to the old city district.’
67 For instance, the repeat by Zhao Ling ‘Ten years of eviction tragicomedy (chaiqian
shinian beixiju, in Southern Weekend of 4 September
2003, at http://news.sina.com.en/c/2003-09-04/1131691557s.shtml. A surge of reporting about 
eviction just around this time (see further links at the website just mentioned), was followed by 
nearly complete silence about it.
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‘corruption’ and sentenced to years of imprisonment, and the persecution of 
editors of this newspaper continues.68
Just as there is an increasing rights awareness and assertiveness in those 
areas where the rights of many are violated -  property, as discussed here, and the 
right to life and liberty, as discussed earlier on the context of unlawful detention, 
for instance -  and in criminal law, so, too, increasing attention is given by 
Chinese intellectuals to the importance of the freedom of mind. Jiao Guobiao, for 
instance, a Beijing professor for communications and media, placed an Article 
‘Against the Department for Communications’ on the internet in April 2004, in 
which he gave ‘fourteen reasons for challenging the Department.’69 There is also 
an online petition for a change in the law on instigating the subversion of state 
power, and for releasing Du Daobin,70 who had published an essay online, 
entitled (in translation) ‘Subversion of State Power is Legal’.71 Of course, for 
reasons discussed in chapter seven, advocacy for the right to free speech has no 
forum in the Chinese courts yet.
From the few public discussions of this matter available in mainland China, 
one can sense a growing recognition of the fact that observation is frequently 
made, that freedom of speech not only requires appropriate legal mechanisms to
68 The Guardian of 19 March 2004, ‘China Sentences Former Paper Managers'. The arrests and 
convictions were widely characterised as arbitrary. The sentences were reduced (to seven and 
eight years) in second instance, see Wu Jun (H $2), ‘Second instance judgement for former 
manager of Southern Metropolitan Daily changes sentence to eight years, Nanfang dushibao an 
ershen xuanpan, yuan zongjingli Yu Huafeng gaipan 8 nian,
8 ^ ) ’,15 June 2004, at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2004-06/15/ content_152
6906.htm.
69 Jiao Guobiao ‘Fourteen reasons to attack the Department for Communications
(Taofa zhongxuanbu de shisige liyou, ), available at http://beijing
sjpring.com /c7/xw/wl wz/20040329191737.htm.
7 The petition is available at http://sky.prohosting.com/liudiorg/DuDaobin01e.htm.
71 The Article says, for instance, ‘People’s disdain for our current government is twice or more 
than twice than it was for the Nationalist Party, since the Communist Party is not beholden to 
democratic principles and clearly does not benefit the people. People appealing to the government,
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protect it, but also a change of attitude about public disagreement. An interesting 
and subtle Article by He Sanwei, for instance, discusses ‘the meaning of 
“allowing [government] to say wrong things”.’72 The Article can be read as a 
suggestion that one change one’s attitude, from looking for responsible official 
scapegoats whenever government has made a mistake -  has said something 
wrong -, to reasonable and open discussion of mistaken judgements by 
government officials. But if government should be allowed to say ‘wrong things’, 
this further suggests that anyone should be allowed to say wrong things. This 
certainly contravenes the attitude taken by the Department for Communications.
The central importance of freedom of speech as a precondition of a legal 
practice aimed at rights protection, and of creating conditions in which the mode 
of adversarial ‘dissenting’ legal argument is possible, are also emphasised by He 
Weifang.
‘...[The historian] Han Degang has studied Chinese history, including its 
ancient but most prominently its modem history, in great depth. He 
considers that China has undergone two major transformations in its 
history. The first occurred from the time of the Early Qin through to the 
Qin and Han dynasties, when they changed from a well-field system to a 
system of landlords and counties.73 This was a major transformation and 
it took about two hundred years. He thinks that the second transformation 
began in 1840 when the Chinese people were confronted with the 
challenge of Western culture. This time our aim is to allow this great 
country, with a history of five thousand years of civilisation, to complete 
another transformation: a transformation towards democracy, a legal 
system, and mechanisms of constitutional government. Given the size of 
our country and our long history, this transformation cannot be effected 
all in one go. We are still at the Three Gorges of history, and we have to 
get through the rapids and dangerous currents of the river down to a 
stretch of water that has the smooth surface of around Wuhan. As to when 
we get there, according to Han Degang it took two hundred years last
such as unemployed workers, become the Communist Party’s opposition...’It is available at 
http://english.epochtimes.com/news/3-12-18/17308.html.
72 He Sanwei ({rIH H  ), ‘The meaning of “allowing people to say wrong things ( “Yunxu 
shuocuohua “ de yiyi, “ W , 3 March 2004 in Nanfang Zhoumo, available at
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/zm/20040226/xw/tb/200402260001.asp.
73 (Cong jingtianzhi dao junxianzhi AA Af1 ffl ^ 'I I IS 1! ■)
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time and so it may take something upward of two hundred years again 
this time. It’s a hundred from 1840 to 1940 and then another hundred 
from 1940 to 2040. In 2040 I’ll be only just ninety; if I keep well I may 
live to see that day. I am rather optimistic.’74
This discussion by He Weifang, as well as the preceding discussion of the 
situation of lawyers and other advocates in rights-sensitive issues, warrants an 
important conclusion. Unity of principle in China’s current, increasingly rights- 
centred legal practice can only be achieved through a more liberal practice (or 
culture) of public disagreement and greater freedom of speech, which is not a 
mere ‘luxury right’ for intellectuals. Without such liberalisation no rights issue, 
including the seemingly very different disputes about employment, land, and 
housing for China’s poor majority, can be resolved.
74 Transcript of He Weifang’s speech by the lawyer Chen Yuan Zheng (EizfitiE), ‘Transcript of 
Professor He Weifang’s speech - the epochal task of the Chinese lawyer (He Weifang jiaoshou 
yanjiang shilu -  zhongguo liishi de shidai shiming ^
(3!^)’, available at http://forum.acla.org.cn/showflat.php?Board=22&Number=450759.
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Chapter Ten Conclusion
The present study of the changing nature of dispute resolution in China, and of 
responses to injustice through various social and legal institutions, has two main 
conclusions. One concerns the question how China can address injustices in its 
society through rights protection, and one concerns the relation between dispute 
resolution and justice.
Strengthening the Chinese legal system to provide better rights protection. What 
characterises Chinese legal practice best at the moment is a weakening 
opposition of trends and practices: there is a practice of paternalistic direction 
and control set against the practice of rights protection; a practice of judicial 
supervision set against judicial independence. This could perhaps be expected 
from a society so full of tensions as the Chinese one in its present, post-socialist, 
but also -  still -  post-imperialist stage.
One important part of this study has been to look at the ways ordinary 
people usually seek redress for wrongs they have suffered (especially at the 
hands of government officials), without exclusively paying attention to 
mechanisms which ‘we’ as Western observers expect to see.1 It is important to 
understand the intricacy of shangfang, for instance, not just to focus on the 
development of mechanisms more clearly directed at rights protection than 
shangfang, such as administrative reconsideration and litigation. It takes no 
particular evidence-gathering effort to see that many people in China now want 
to choose, for instance, to express their political views, or to form free religious
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associations, or to move freely within their own country. The disadvantaged want 
equal education benefits for their children, and they want to be protected against 
corruption, against being arbitrarily locked up and held for ransom by 
government officials, and against being thrown out of their houses or deprived of 
the land they work without adequate reasons, fair warning, and appropriate 
compensation. The more basic the things wanted, the less protest against having 
them taken away is a matter of real choice.
In an article about a series of lectures given by Professor Dworkin in a 
number of elite Chinese universities in 2002, Fang Liufang complains about 
criticism of the Chinese legal system ‘from outside’.
‘Regardless of people’s differences in culture, profession and education 
they all live in a particular society and exercise limited choices 
determined by the respective system, and the majority of people will 
usually choose to conform to the system. To initiate reforms by oneself or 
in a group of people means paying a high price with no guarantee of 
success (...) It is a personal decision how much one wants to pay for 
freedom, and when and how one wants to pay that price. No one could 
make such a decision for another. Political theorists living in an open 
society cannot have any real experience of what it means to live under a 
different kind of system, yet they always think they have sufficient moral 
superiority to tell others what to do.’ 2
The point that asserting freedoms, especially in conditions of oppression, is a 
personal decision, is well taken. But then we must acknowledge ‘choices’ to take 
risks can be forced on those who suffer the worst oppression, and the fact that the 
initiation of reform by even just publicising one’s views does come at a price is 
not indifferent to our evaluation of the respective legal and political system.
1 This is a problem noted by many Western observers; Lubman uses the phrase of ‘seeing oneself 
in the mirror’, in his introduction to Bird in a Cage (Stanford: 1999).
2 Fang Liufang ‘Taking the rules of the academic game seriously - some sentiments 
upon reading the reports of Dworkin’s visit to China (Ruhe renzhen de kandai xueshu youxi
o t i  )’, available at http://www.oycf.org/Per- 
specti ves/Chinese/ Chinese_9_01312003/FangLiuFang.htm.
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Criticising the Chinese legal system, as this thesis does in several respects, does 
not necessarily imply reproach of anyone since no person is the system. At the 
level of individual people in a repressive system it would indeed seem as wrong 
to reproach anyone for not taking risks, as it is impossible not to admire those 
who do take them.3
While some entrenched dispute resolution mechanisms not directed at 
rights protection, such as mediation (tiaojie),4 remain useful and appropriate 
within certain limits, others, such as petitioning and remonstration, can no longer 
provide adequate ways of bridging the distance between ordinary people and 
governments when they have come in conflict. The phenomenon of ‘mass 
petitioning’ (jitifang),5 the inability of many of the petitioned institutions to 
respond adequately to petitions, and the uncompromising urgency with which 
people increasingly demand redress for wrongs, all demonstrate this. 
Government and party authorities’ and the privileged new middle classes’ 
frequent disregard for ordinary people’s legitimate wishes and complaints, on the 
other hand, is triggering conflict on a scale that cannot be resolved by merely 
punishing officials who acted wrongly. While these conflicts are not resolved 
adequately by mechanisms essentially for government self-control. It is also clear 
from the preceding discussion that a choice has to be made on how the Chinese 
judiciary should develop. It cannot become both more supervisionist and more 
rights-centred. If judges are to be strong, they must not continue being directed in 
an authoritarian way as to how they should judge individual cases. This is more 
easily understood if we consider that court adjudication derives its moral appeal
3 To tell from Dworkin’s written account, he was not making such a mistake. See Dworkin’s 
‘Taking Rights Seriously in Beijing’, (2002) New York Review of Books (September issue) 46.
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not from some version of state-conferred authority to judges, nor from an 
authority implicit in the concept of law, but from its task of protecting people’s 
legal rights.6
From within a system of governance characterised by extended rather than 
distributed power, positivistic accounts of law strongly relying on the idea of 
law’s authority seem to be attractive, because they offer a conception of strong 
and clearly limited legal rules to be followed by the officials of the system.7 
Superficially, the problem with much of Chinese law to date is that it does not 
have or even consistently claim authority to guide people, because of the related 
phenomena of inconsistent legal rules at different levels, and officials with an 
attitude of ‘I am the law’ - assuming the role of a Haitian ruler (‘Rex I’), rather 
than of a Haitian official of the modem legal system.8 So naturally, people are 
much concerned with strengthening the law’s authority. An important element of 
Hart’s positivistic account of law, and one that pervades many of the debates 
about law and justice in China to date, is the idea that legal rules have a certain 
area of application even though occasionally the law ‘runs out’, leaving certain 
cases to be decided by judges exercising discretion without applying legal rules.
6 At the same time, it is important to understand the present weaknesses of judicial rights 
protection in its wider context of incoherent ‘legislation’ and of the emergence of an unjust two- 
class society in China, and to acknowledge that even at its best, judicial practice will only be able 
to correct some of the injustices occurring in China to date.
7 Contemporary legal positivists tend to explain this authority cm- claim to authority by some 
notion of public or social recognition, societal self-understanding and the nature of the concept of 
law (Raz), or recognition implicit in the practice of state officials (Hart). See Raz, Joseph, ‘Notes 
on Value and Objectivity’, chapter 6  of Engaging Reason (Oxford, 1999), p. 118, and Raz, 
Joseph, ‘Two Views of the Nature of the Theory of Law: A Partial Comparison, 1998 Legal 
Theory 249, and Raz Joseph, ‘Authority, Law, and Morality’, chapter 9 of Ethics in the Public 
Domain (Oxford: 1996). For Hart, see The Concept o f Law (2nd edition, Oxford: 1994).
8 Famously, Hart’s account of a legal system proceeds from a simplistic version in which the 
sovereign, ‘Rex’, rules through ‘the acceptance of a rule conferring authority to legislate.’ The 
assumption of this authority-conferring rule, Hart argues, is also needed to explain why laws Rex 
made continue valid beyond the time of his actually exercised power; for instance, into the time 
of his successor’s reign. Sovereignty here is constituted by legislation, which according to Hart 
consists in issuing rules. Hart, The Concept o f Law, p. 60. But the rule from which authority 
derives, and the rules which it authorises one to issue, are not the same.
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The situation of Chinese legislation as discussed in Chapter Five, on this 
understanding, exposed the lack of any core set of distinct legal rules in the first 
place, because there is incoherent ‘legislation’ ranging across different levels of 
administration (or government) and the rules applied are often quite different 
from those provided by national or even provincial legislation. It was concluded, 
sceptically, that only some fundamental legal principles seemed to remain 
untainted by the problems with incoherence and inconsistency identified in 
Chapter Five; but then later it became clear that there were explicit instructions 
to Chinese judges not to apply the Constitution ‘directly’. A positivistic 
authority-centred understanding of law therefore serves well to expose one of the 
weaknesses of the Chinese legal system at present. But it gives us no direction 
for how to strengthen it.9 If we try to determine the significance of these courts 
by reference only to social fact, political power and success,10 then they will 
simply seem insignificant:
‘The truth may be that, when courts settle previously unenvisaged 
questions concerning the most fundamental constitutional rules, they get 
their authority to decide them accepted after the questions have been 
given. Here all that succeeds is success.’
The idea of authority implicit in this understanding of success is corroded in a 
situation where repressive rulers do not allow judges ever to assume the function 
of filling legal ‘gaps’.
9 In Hart’s account of a legal system in The Concept o f Law, courts and judges are already in 
place and they are strong institutions in the sense that they can perform their tasks of identifying 
valid and applicable law and applying it well. More widely in Western legal systems courts and 
judges represent powers which other political powers have to accommodate themselves to. But in 
China, of course, courts lack power, and judges are exposed to unique schemes of discipline and 
supervision.
10 Hart, The Concept of Law, p. 152. This also relates to the ‘creative’ aspect of judges’ powers 
on Hart’s account.
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It seems easy to conclude from the lack of authority Chinese law appears to 
have that it should be more strictly enforced and that its supervision should be 
more strictly supervised. The idea of law as chiefly a form of conveying and 
exercising authority is apparently guiding the aspirations of China’s present 
rulers for the future. In an often-used Chinese phrase, the important standards set 
by the project of ‘ruling the country in accordance with’ or ‘by law’11 are ‘to 
have a law that can be applied; having to apply the law one has; to apply the law 
with strictness; and to correct cases of violation of the law.’12 The programme 
resulting from this understanding is to provide more detailed and disciplined law 
by ensuring consistency among legal rules, to restrict - as has been attempted by 
the Legislation Law - the number of authorities entitled to make law, and to 
minimise cases in which judges have discretion because the law ‘has run out.’
The image of the judge complementing such legislative activism has been 
clearly passive. Rather than at least sometimes characterising ‘judicial 
activism’13 as a ‘noble dream’, in Hart’s phrase, many in China roundly reject it 
as a ‘nightmare’, as we saw in Chapter Seven. 14 The phenomenon of 
controversial rights discourse in courts would only seem to disturb the project of 
‘ruling the country by law’ as envisaged by China’s rulers.15 But a study of
11,1 Yifazhiguo  (f& ifcftS).
12 You fa keyi, you fa  bi yi, zhi fa  biyan, wei fa  bi jiu
*H).
13 The often-used Chinese phrase for this is sifa jiji zhuyi ( o] iiMtfklfiSL).
14 This account requires a distinction between two entirely different kinds of reasoning: one, to 
determine what the law is, the other, to determine what it should be. Adjudication, as Hart 
understands it, is primarily concerned with the first kind of activity, and the fact that it cannot 
entirely refrain from the second was characterised by him in one of his essays on American 
jurisprudence as a potential ‘nightmare’. Hart, Herbert, ‘American Jurisprudence Through 
English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream’, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 
(Oxford: 1983), essay 4, p. 121.
15 Perhaps, indeed, the image of the insufficiently controlled imperial magistrate is in the 
background of such fears: but then the culturally well-entrenched requirements of ‘according with 
feeling’ and ‘according with reason’ and the Confucian emphasis on ‘propriety’ may have 
provided an important complement to orders imposed on the magistrate-judge ‘from above’.
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individual cases and an interpretive account of the system in which they occurred 
(both of which this thesis has attempted to provide) show that if the project of 
‘ruling the country in accordance with law’ is understood and carried out in this 
way in China, then legal processes will not be able to provide correction of the 
most urgent injustices in Chinese society, which they might otherwise provide. It 
will not be able to provide a good replacement for the overstretched petitioning 
and remonstration mechanisms, and it will not allow for a good understanding of 
law, because constitutional rights and principles shape the law and so must be 
applied in courts, and elsewhere.
In a case discussed in Chapter Seven, the Case o f Li Caokang,16 the court 
combined ‘strict application of the law’ with a ‘statement’ to the effect that the 
severity of the law actually applied had been tempered by a voluntary payment. 
This payment, it stated, was made by the successful defendant, a government 
authority. The plaintiff was a citizen who had lost his son in the process of the 
independently flawed application17 of an unconstitutional legal regulation.18 This 
‘decision’ and the court’s ‘statement’ were praised, we saw, as ‘according with 
law, reason and feeling:’ only we could not help concluding that the ‘reason and 
feeling’ part of this process was dissociated from the legal part in this case. A 
decision ten years later in the Case o f Yuan Wen (Chapters Six and Seven) 
required directly that the government authority in an in some respects similar 
case pay some compensation to the citizen whose rights had been violated.
16 At p. 179.
17 Li did have a work permit although he was stated to have said he was out of work upon his 
detention; the records used in the court judgement unconvincingly stated he had been taken to 
hospital twice in four days while interned and that ‘nothing the matter’ had been discovered with 
him, but then that he had died ‘of a slow consumption’ at the end of these four days.
18 In the absence of the Legislation Law, then not yet in place, it would have needed a different 
kind of argument to come to this conclusion. But Article 37 of both the 1982 and 1993 
Constitutions (the 1993 Constitution amendment law had just been passed when the case 
happened) already stated only the police could carry out detention, for instance.
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Without dwelling on the problem of constitutionality of the legislation involved, 
the court at least managed to conclude, correctly, that government authorities had 
misapplied law in this particular instance. But the injunction on courts to keep 
away from constitutionality review19 remains strong, as the widely commented 
case of the two judges in Luoyang in 2003 (mentioned in Chapter Eight) showed. 
These two examples seem to illustrate that an explanation of adjudicative 
authority by reference to consensus or to command and obedience among 
officials is inferior to a rights-centred account, especially in a weak legal system 
like the Chinese one. In a Chinese context, the first kind of account has the 
particular disadvantage of closing the practice of law to those elements of feeling 
(qing) and reason (//), and to the idea of ‘alterity’, reciprocity and direct equality 
(shu) which can improve our understanding of rights in any cultural or political 
context, as it was argued at the beginning of this thesis.
If we take a rights-centred perspective, we will see the real difference 
between the new developments in Chinese legal practice, and some of its 
important legal traditions. We should not be unwilling to see such differences, 
because of some confused assumption that rights can only succeed in China, if 
we find out, happily, that they have been part of Chinese culture all along, or that 
the Chinese have been talking about rights for a sufficiently long time to possess 
‘the concept’ of rights now, or indeed because of the even more confused notion, 
now sometimes proffered as unargued wisdom, that ‘we shouldn’t judge’ others. 
Actually, as has been argued in Chapter Two, at their most abstract rights 
introduce a mode of argument that centres on the individual, and insists that 
justice be done to him or her: this principle we recognise to be respected in the
19 Some prefer to speak of wnconstitutionality review in Chinese (weixian shencha,
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practice of Chinese mediation, which seeks voluntary consensus between the 
disputing parties as equals. But to become part of Chinese court practice, rights 
require the strengthening of some relatively novel modes of judging (dispute 
resolution), and this is what makes them attractive to some in China (not to 
others). As was recorded in Chapter Three, the very attraction of ‘rights talk’ in 
China came initially from its being a new kind of talk, according to recent 
research; a new instrument for some of the new problems Chinese society was - 
and is now -  facing. But despite this, and although we can usefully characterise 
the Chinese legal system as a system in transition, we should not be led too easily 
to assume that the transition in fact will be one toward a more rights-centred 
system.
The status o f disagreement about justice in dispute resolution. I think that my 
discussion of contemporary legal practices in China has brought out how 
important a set of particular attitudes toward errors, mistakes and wrongs is to 
rights-centred legal systems, by showing how this attitude contrasts with 
attitudes implicit in some Chinese legal practices (including that of courts). To 
reach this conclusion I have looked at a foreign legal system to see what was 
different and remarkable about our own practices; but then also to look back at 
the foreign practices in an effort to understand both sides better.
The situations aptly and comprehensively characterised in Chinese as min 
gao guan20 - ‘an ordinary person accusing an official’ -  call for some toleration 
of dissensus in society.21 The right to complain, generally, towards state
stressing the way unconstitutionality leaves judges no choice.
2 0  E L  A h . ' r i rK o  B.
21 As not only the lengthy quotation from He Weifang’s article in the last chapter, but also the 
characterisation of forms of public protest show, such accusations quickly lead to some kind of
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authorities, has been acknowledged in the ideal if not wholly in the practice for a 
long time in China; but such a ‘right’ was widely not understood to support
sustained and principled dissensus in society. In most instances it just expresses
2^the possibility of submitting petitions. Due also to the precarious ‘cleavage’ " 
currently opening up in Chinese society between rich and poor, and between 
rural and urban population, petitioning mechanisms are now no longer enough. 
Dissent with government is taking dramatically new forms in Chinese public life, 
especially in urban and semi-urban areas.23 Gradually, too, Chinese courts are 
becoming places in which dissensus can be made public. Chinese intellectuals 
are calling for more tolerance and relating these calls to the idea of ‘limited 
government’, thereby expressing opposition to the idea of an all-powerful, 
comprehensively responsible government.24
A discussion of the Chinese system shows how important it is that in 
rights-centred systems, judges are singled out for making right decisions which 
we should follow, even though we may think them wrong, and criticise them. At 
a certain level, therefore, rights-centred adjudication practice could be described 
as a way of imposing systematic discipline upon sustained disagreement. Public
ritualisation of public disagreement (about justice), and the spectacle of court procedures 
achieves something similar.
22 Duanlie/[Social]Cleavage is the Chinese/English title of a sociological book by Sun
Liping ( # ^ 1 ^ ) ,  Cleavage: Chinese society since the nineteen- nineties (Duanlie: Ershi shiji 
jiushiniandai yilai de Zhongguo shehui BiM: 20 90 , Beijing:
2003). He argues persuasively that the gap between rich and poor is widening also in urban 
society, where the lower middle classes stopped benefiting proportionately (or even significantly) 
from economic growth in the nineties, while a few rich people have become richer than ever.
23 As we saw in the last chapter, for instance because of technical changes in the public media. 
An interesting manifestation of changes in attitude was the plea for tolerance for government 
officials occasionally ‘getting it wrong’ or ‘saying wrong things.’
24 I quote Wang Zhenmin and Lii Xiaobo as contributors to the discussion of ‘limited 
government’, connecting this idea to limited liability-based corporate governance in chapter five. 
Another writer, Cheng Jie, argues that the idea of a written or posited constitution is connected to 
the concept of shu (ffl), alterity, and the idea of tolerance, but also to the idea of limited 
government, and of a social contract. See Cheng Jie ( §  ia), ‘Three philosophical sources of
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disagreement about central questions occurs in any community of people, but 
many communities treat disagreement with much greater wariness than rights- 
centred ones. A particular value attributed to disagreement is particularly evident 
from the practice of courts of law. The moral appeal of adjudicating rights in 
courts comes from courts’ and judges’ ability to stand apart from other branches 
of government, and judge in a manner reaffirming people’s rights. These include 
an abstract right to make wrong judgements, as well as a limited right to do the 
wrong thing.25 These attitudes could be described as attitudes of tolerance and 
discipline: it is accepted that we differ about the fundamental principles of our 
political community, but discipline is imposed on the way disagreement may 
influence decisions; hence the importance of finality of court decisions.
But the conclusion we should draw from this is not, in my view, that 
adjudication about rights has a different purpose from Chinese mechanisms we 
have looked at. It is not that the purpose of different forms of dispute resolution 
is reaching either a decision in the face of sustained disagreement (the normal 
situation in court adjudication), or reaching consensus.26 ‘Different procedures’ 
do not ‘have different moralities,’ as Fuller claimed. The point of dispute 
resolution is rightness and truth, not alternatively consensus or some disciplined 
form of disagreement. Even though better rights protection is necessary in China, 
then, it would be wrong to think that the practice of rights protection was
constitutionalism (Lixian zhuyi de san zhong sixiang yuanliu, ), at
http://www. gongfa.com/chengjielixianzhuyisanchaoliu.htm.
25 There is, too, the humane idea that we must not become obsessed with correcting wrong 
actions or decisions just for the sake of correction. The point of our efforts may get lost in the 
process of correction, when we discover that we cannot retrieve lost time, as Chinese courts 
sometimes do. This is why in some places a description of Chinese practices came to resemble 
the situations and mechanisms envisaged by what is called moral ‘perfectionism’.
26This is what is misleading in characterisations of adjudication as ‘adversarial’. They are 
adversarial in many ways, but that is not their moral point.
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opposed to reaching consensual and just solutions to disputes. It is after all not 
shameful or wrong to be persuaded, or to apologise genuinely, or to forgive.
Single-minded concentration on one’s rights may sometimes blind one to 
what justice, understood as a personal virtue, demands of an individual person 
locked in conflict. Chinese mediation is an interesting and instructive practice, in 
which the undoubted authority of the mediator is put under a constant check: for 
it is strongly appreciated and emphasised that while deference to the mediator is 
good, the mediator must be both persuasive and just; and no mediation will work 
unless it is genuinely accepted by the parties -  the implicit and often explicit 
presupposition being that a solution is acceptable, if and when it is right. Despite 
the long Chinese tradition of paternalistic supervision, direction and education of 
officials, the indigenous practice of Chinese mediation appears to work best with 
strong mediators, who have the same power as judges and whose strength 
significantly resembles that of judges. They understand not only the importance 
of letting people have their say,27 and of getting it right, but also of being 
persuasive. Yet worthwhile consensus still is consensus on what is right (shifei). 
In these aspects, Chinese mediation culture represents a strain of resistance to 
being ruled by mere coercion, which is also (as we have seen) present in some of 
China’s Confucian political philosophy: no ruler rules entirely free from the 
requirement to justify himself.
In some situations it may even be that justice is done fully only when 
reconciliation is achieved: but nothing hinges on the fulfilment of a requirement 
of ‘justice’ as a distinct virtue, in my view; what is important is that the right
27 Fuller’s well-known characterisation of the essence of adjudication (see discussion in Chapters 
Three and Four). Fuller, ‘Mediation -  its Forms and Functions’, (1971) 44 Southern California 
Law Review 305, and ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ (1978), Chapter One in Freeman, 
Michael (ed.), Alternative Dispute Resolution (New York University Press: New York, 1995).
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thing is done. A practice of rights protection does not preclude a practice of 
conciliation and mediation. If it did, it would not only be Chinese legal practice 
that would be facing problems, but any rights-centred legal practice, as the 




Table of Cases 
of mediation, remonstration, reconsideration, litigation, and 
disciplinary measures discussed or mentioned1
The case o f the demonstrators in front o f a Beijing hotel (ch. 2, p. 33; no written 
reference available)
The case o f Ye Guoqiang's suicide attempt on Tian'anmen Square (ch. 2, p. 43)
The case o f Zhu Zhengliang from Anhui, who set fire to himself in front o f the 
portrait o f Mao Zedong on Tiananmen Square, on 15 September 2003, in protest 
against eviction and demolition (ch. 2, p. 43 note 35)
The mediation case of Mr Ah and his wife, who could not have children (ch. 4, 
p. 91)
The mediation case between the Gong and Liu families, regarding a footpath
(ch. 4, p. 92)
The mediation case of Mr Wu and his stepdaughter, involving mediator 
iPorridge’ Su (ch. 4, p. 96)
The mediation case about Yu Xiaosan, who refused to marry his neighbour’s 
daughter after he slept with her (ch. 4, p. 101)
The court mediation case ‘settling' the dispute between a blackmailing husband 
and the man with whom his wife betrayed him (ch. 4, p. 107 note 74)
The case of Wang Xingmao, whose son was held for ransom in an internment 
station (ch. 5, p. 110; at p. 107 note 8 there are further references to other 
internment case reports)
The Case o f Ye Zhiqiu, a journalist's, internment in a police station overnight (ch. 
6, p. 137, note 2)
The case o f the official Wang Huaizhan, first expelled from the CPC, then from  
his government post (mentioned in ch. 6, p. 143 note 22)
1 Due to the nature of this study, a limitation only to court decisions would be inappropriate. 
References given here direct to where in the main text the cases are discussed or mentioned and 
further referenced, in the order in which they appear in the dissertation; mostly these are 
references to news reports rather than official law reports or files (see Introduction).
I have chosen the common way of referring to the cases in China, so that e.g. the case o f Sun 
Zhigang refers to Sun’s murder, which triggered an (aborted) administrative litigation procedure, 
and a criminal trial. The cases discussed at some length are put in bold.
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The case o f a number o f officials in Xiangfan (Hubei) suffering the Party's 'two 
prescribed' treatment (mentioned in ch. 6, p. 144 note 24)
The ‘shangfang’ (complaints visits) case of Ma Jiyun who tried to get a court 
judgement enforced, and was interned for making unreasonable complaints 
(ch. 6, p. 150)
The case o f seven Shanghai citizens arrested for coming to Beijing to make 
complaints visits (demonstrate), thereby ‘causing a public disturbance' (a report 
mentioned in ch. 6, p. 155 note 59)
The case o f peasants who signed the ‘Ten Thousand People's Memorandum' 
detained to prevent them from demonstrating (a report mentioned at p. 155 no. 
60)
The administrative reconsideration and litigation case of eighty-year-old Mr 
Yuan Wen, who was interned wrongfully as a vagrant in Shenzhen (ch. 6, p. 
156, and ch. 7, p. 176)
The criminal litigation case of Sun Zhigang’s internment (as vagrant) and 
murder in a Guangdong internment station (ch. 7, p. 168)
The criminal litigation case of Liu Yong, a Chinese mafia (lieidang) boss who 
was re-tried and sentenced to death, after getting a milder initial final sentence 
because ‘it could not be excluded that he had been tortured’ by the police (ch. 7, 
p. 171 and note 22, also ch. 9, p. 226)
The administrative litigation case of Li Caokang’s internment (for vagrancy) 
and death in a Shanghai internment station (ch. 7 p. 179)
The disciplinary case of the Luoyang judges facing dismissal for declaring that 
a lower-ranking legal regulation violated a higher-ranking one (ch. 7, p. 184, 
and ch. 8, p. 203)
The (civil litigation) case o f Zhou Jianjun v Beijing City branch traffic police 
squad o f Chaoyang District traffice police, in which the judge chose ‘not to 
apply' a lower-ranking legal regulation that violated a higher-ranking one (ch. 7, 
p. 184 note 35)
The ‘constitutional’ litigation Case of Qi Yuling, whose fellow student ‘stole’ 
her identity to goto College and get a job in her name (ch. 7, p. 189)
The ‘constitutional’ case of the petitioners to the NPC’s Standing Committee to 
get the Internment and Deportation Directives abolished (ch. 8, p. 216)
The criminal case o f criminal defence lawyer Zhang Jianzhong (referred to in ch. 
9, p. 239 note 47)
The case o f a Beijing resident trying to resist eviction with a copy o f the 
Constitution in his hands (mentioned in ch. 9, p. 244 note 63)
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The criminal case o f two editors o f the relatively liberal newspaper group 
Southern Metropolitan convicted o f corruption (ch. 9 p. 245)
The case o f dissident Du Daobin (ch. 9, p. 245)
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Appendix II
Table of international treaties and protocols, national and local 
level laws, administrative regulations and rules, judicial 
interpretations, and other ‘normative documents9
1. International Treaties and Protocols
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
(cited as of 1994)
Protocol on The Accession o f The People's Republic Of China [to the WTO] 
of 10 November 2001
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
(signed by China in 1998; not yet ratified)
2. Legislation at National Level
2.1 NPC and NPC Standing Committee Legislation1
Constitution o f the People's Republic o f China (3£^£) of 1999 (amended March 
2004; also cited: constitutions of 1993, 1982, and 1954, cited in Chapters Five 
and Ten)2
Administrative Litigation Law (fjil& i/F i^ i), promulgated 4 April 1989 
Administrative Punishment Law (fri$(&h £•]?£), promulgated 17 March 1996 
Administrative Reconsideration Law ( f f ^ M i^ '/ i ) ,  promulgated 30 April 1999 
Administrative Permit Law (ff2&i^FWiIEyi;), promulgated 23 August 2003 
Administrative Supervision Law ( ^ T ^ i^ ^ v i )  promulgated 9 May 1997 
Civil Procedure Law promulgated 9 April 1991
1 Here only the laws themselves are listed, but it is important to appreciate that judicial 
interpretations provided by the Supreme People’s Court and a number of other directives, 
guidelines and interpretations matter to how the laws are interpreted and applied (see Chapters 
Five and Seven). Collections of laws in print or online will usually contain the more important 
of these additional texts.
2 In the following the phrase ‘The People’s Republic of China’s’ is left out in both languages. 
The dates are given as precisely as possible.
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Criminal Procedure Law ( ) ,  promulgated in amended form 17 
March 1996
Files Law (£^j^}£), promulgated in amended form 7 May 1996)
Household Registration Statutes ( f 1 P  promulgated 9 January 1958
Judges' Law (y£ll’y£), promulgated 28 February 1995
Law on assemblies and demonstrations ), promulgated 31
October 1989; implementation guidelines promulgated 16 June 1992
Lawyers ' law, promulgated in amended form 29 December 2001
Legislation Law (AL'ti'li:), promulgated 15 March 2000
Marriage Law (£§#0yi;), promulgated in amended form 28 April 2001
Organic Law o f the People's Courts ( ? £ promulgated in amended 
form 2 December 1986
Organic Law o f the State Council promulgated 10 December
1982
Principles o f Civil Law promulgated 12 April 1986
State Compensation Law (01^!i{qiiiy£), promulgated 12 May 1994
Statutes on administrative punishments for public security and supervision 
purposes )* promulgated 5 September
1986
2.2 State Council
Statutes for the Organisation o f Mediation Committees, State Council Order no. 
37 (1989) published 17 June 1989
Directives on Aid fo r the Homeless
State Council Order no. 381 (2003) published 20 June 2003
Directives on Internment and Deportation 
State Council order promulgated 12 May 1982
Statutes on receiving letters and receiving visitors ), State
Council Order no. 185 (1995) promulgated 28 October 1995
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Statutes on the Filing o f Regulations and Rules ('/£M  #1 {H ). State
Council Order no. 337 (2001), promulgated 14 December 2001
Legal Aid Statutes ) State Council Order (2003) no. 385,
promulgated 16 July 2003
View on the reform o f internment and Deportation Work (f  P 3§ i£  l . i f  
^ l o J ^ j t R L ) ,  1991
Notification o f approval on the Ministry o f Public Security’s Views on the 
handling o f problems relating to the household registration
), (1998)
[circulation] no. 24
Notification o f approval on the Ministry o f Public Security’s Views on 
promoting the reform o f the system o f handling household registration in small 
cities and towns approximately
May 2001
2.3 Ministries (national level)
Civil Affairs Ministry, Specific guidelines for applying the Directives for Aid to 
the urban homeless ($citJ
Civil Affairs Ministry Order no. 24, published 21 July 2003
Ministry of Health, Provisional Rules o f the Ministry of Health for handling 
letters and calls t f  ^ r#!l), 16 July 1988 (?)
Ministry of Justice, Measures fo r the disciplining and punishment o f illegal
conduct on the part o f lawyers and law firm s’
i>] Ministry of Justice order no. 86 of 19 March 2004
Ministry of Public Security, Directives regarding the application for temporary 
residence permits (Hf'SiilE ^  M ^ £ )  Ministry of Public Security in 1995
Ministry of Public Security, Views on promoting the reform o f the system o f 
handling household registration in small cities and towns
), approximately May 2001, circulated with an 
‘approving notice’ by the State Council
Ministry of Public Security, Views on the handling o f problems relating to the 
household registration P l f  I^IS^JIIJlL)
approved and circulates by State Council in 1998 (see above)
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3. Local level legislation (Provincial and city level administrative 
regulations)
Beijing City government’s 13 June 1995 Regulation on the Handling o f the 
household registration o f migrant workers coming to Beijing (4 fc rf j Mi A  ijl
Heilongjiang Province Guidelines (guiding) for carrying out internment and 
deportation on complainants (fH f t ll ' fitifj I  y£M)
Shanghai Regulations for the Handling o f Internment and Deportation
Shenzhen SEZ Statutes fo r  the Handling o f Temporary Residence and 
Household Registration ( ' M t y P l f  ), amended, 9
April 1997
4. Judicial Interpretations and other documents issued by the Supreme 
People’s Court3
Supreme People’s Court’s rules on relevant problems regarding judicial 
mediation work (Draft inviting comments) (Jliti
10 February 2004
Supreme People’s Court’s Rules for strictly enforcing the sanctions system o f 
the Judges Law
passed 10 June 2003 and published on 19 June 2003
Supreme People’s Court Rules on the application o f the simplified civil 
procedure rules (Zuigao fayuan guanyu shiyong jianyi chengxu shenli minshi 
anjian de ruogan guiding,
A rT A l^yA #), judicial interpretation (2003) no. 15
Supreme People’s Court’s Rules on problems o f handling People’s Mediation 
settlement in civil litigation, (Silti K
judicial interpretation (2002) no. 29
Supreme People’s Court’s (trial version) Rules on local and special court’s 
court president and vice presidents taking the blame and resigning (MiTj A K ;y£
( t^ 4t ) ) of 7 November
2001
3 In chronological order, without classification as to the legal status of the document, because
this status is sometimes unclear.
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Supreme People’s Court’s Basic Principles o f Judicial Ethics 
AHIWJ) published 18 October 2001
Supreme People’s Court’s Explanations on certain problems o f determining and 
fine-tuning the grading o f judges ', ( 
g )  of 25 May 2000
Supreme People’s Court’s Rules on problems o f compensation in cases o f
administrative and civil litigation (M
I ln f ic ^ T 'fc lS S $ ? P ) , judicial interpretation (2000) no. 27
Supreme People’s Court’s On problems relating to the application o f the 
Administrative Litigation Law (Jtrtj 
[$& ?#)’, judicial interpretation (2000) no. 8
Supreme People’s Court’s 1998 Notification o f the Supreme People's Court's 
views on People's Courts receiving People's Congresses’ and their Standing 
Committees’ supervision (J t
I^^T.IIJA ilftiS& l), 24 December 1998
Supreme People’s Court’s Directives on disciplinary sanctions in adjudication 
(trial version) (iAAf) 7 September 1998
Supreme People’s Court’s 1998 Notification on the Publication o f the trial 
version ‘Directives for Holding Adjudicators who Adjudicate Unlawfully 
Responsible’ ‘ ‘ (laM r)
(ftil&I no. (1998) 15, 26 August 1998
Supreme People’s Court’s Directives for the Centre Handling Reports on 
Judges Having Contravened the Law or Contravened Professional Discipline 
O t ^ A ^ A ^ A ' t 11 May 1998
Supreme People’s Court’s 1986 Answer regarding the question how the courts 
when issuing legal documents should cite to normative documents
Judicial
Interpetation 1986 no 31 of 28 October 1986
Supreme People’s Court’s 1955 Answer regarding the non-application o f the 
Constitution as a basis for holding someone criminally responsible or 
measuring their punishment (M.
), judicial interpretation (1955) reference number
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Appendix III. Chart of Chinese Legislation according to the Constitution and Legislation Law1
1) National Level
The National People’s Congress 
The NPC’s Standing Committee
The State Council
The Ministries under the State Council
2) Local Levels2
a) Provinces
Provincial Level People’s Congresses 
and their Standing Committees 
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b) Provincial level (other)
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‘non-fundamental’ laws)
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Ministerial (administrative) rules
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Local government (administrative) rules
Autonomous regulations AND 
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c) City level (legislation with approval from higher level)




^ ^ ■ i f W j i b e n  f a l i i  
:i k W , f a l i i
'if ©$£ M, xingzheng fagui
bumen/buwei guizhang 
(= a form of ffiB iM W , xingzheng guizhang)
i&A difangxing fagui
difang renmin zhengfu 
guizhang (a form of xingzheng guizhang)
§  zizhi tiaoli AND danxing tiaoli
difangxing fagui
difang renmin zhengfu guizhang
1 This chart helps to understand the way legislation in China (both by the central and local governments, and by the People’s Congresses and their Standing Committees) 
is supposed to happen. Many ‘normative documents’ are issued by other entities and many have different names than those listed.
2 For the complex provisions on local level legislation see Chapter 4, sections 1 and 2 (Articles 63 ff.) of the Legislation Law. See also Organisation Law o f the State 
Council.
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Appendix IV. Table of Abbreviations
ACLA All China Lawyers’ Association
BVerfGG Bundesverfassungsgerichtsgesetz, Organic Law of the [German]
Federal Constitutional Court
CPC Communist Party of China
CEETAC China International Economic and Trade Arbitration
Commisssion
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IWLO ‘Ideal Western Legal Order’
NPC National People ’ s Congress
MoJ Ministry of Justice
SPC Supreme People’s Court
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